EU Diplomatic Representation in Third Countries*

DAVID RIJKS, Centre of International Studies, University of Cambridge

Paper prepared for the GARNET Conference ‘The EU in International Affairs’
24-26 April 2008
Please do not cite without permission.
Comments welcome at ddfr2@cam.ac.uk

Abstract

The external representation of the European Union is a responsibility shared between Member States, the Council, and the European Commission. The result is a complex tripartite system that has created a variable geometry of tasks, responsibilities and functions across these actors in third countries. However, an increasing number of policy areas do not fall only within only one of Maastricht’s pillars, and the divisions between areas of competence have become more and more blurred. Legal provisions regarding diplomatic responsibilities are often open to interpretation and local arrangements for representation vary across third countries.

This paper is an analytical attempt to chart the impact on the roles that Member States, the Commission, and, increasingly, the Council play in the representation of the EU in third countries. While examining a number of specific (local) arrangements in greater detail, the purpose is to draw conclusions about the dynamic interplay between the three constituent dimensions and explore the options for change. The second part of this paper explores the consequences for the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, in particular the provisions on the European External Action Service.

The argument is made that developments in national patterns of representation, together with the general mismatch between the regions where most Member States have a strong diplomatic presence and the areas where CFSP/ESDP activity is concentrated, has in a number of cases spurred the role of “EU actors” in EU diplomacy. The role of the latter has been strengthened by innovations in the politico-legal framework over the last decade. Their individual role and influence on the ground, therefore, do not only depend on ‘internal’ factors such as human resources, expertise, professionalism, internal organisation, but also to a large extent on the choice of instruments and implementation for different policy areas, and local circumstances such as the room that Member States are willing to give them.

* This paper is based on a larger report authored together with Geoffrey Edwards on the representation of the EU’s external relations titled Boundary Problems in EU External Representation to be published with the Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS) in May 2008.
I Introduction

The European Union’s (EU) external representation is organised in a complex tripartite structure of competences between the Council, Member States, and the Community. It has thus many different faces to the outside world, depending on the issue at hand. In terms of foreign and security policy, as formalised in the second pillar of the Maastricht Treaty, the representation of the Union’s foreign policy has fallen mainly on the Member States, and particularly on the country holding the Presidency of the Council. Since the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Presidency has been assisted by the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). On matters within the domain of the European Communities within the first pillar, however, such as trade and aid, the European Commission has continued to be responsible for speaking for the Community. At the same time, individual EU Member States also continue to conduct bilateral relations with third states as well as multilateral diplomacy through their own networks of diplomatic missions.

This ideal-type has become increasingly problematic when analysing the EU’s external representation. The functional linkages between the pillars have proliferated and a general mismatch has developed between the Council and the Commission in terms of (diplomatic) instruments on the ground. The Council is by default the most powerful actor in CFSP, but its range of instruments in the field is limited. For local representation, it relies almost exclusively on the Member State holding the Presidency, and, increasingly, on the High Representative and his Special Representatives (only few of whom are resident in the country to which they are appointed). The Commission’s formal, legal powers under CFSP are restricted, yet it can draw on an extensive range of instruments deriving from its competences under the first pillar, as well as on a large network of delegations, which have raised its diplomatic profile and enhanced its representative role in a number of countries.

The broader argument espoused in this paper is therefore that the complexity of the framework of EU external relations and the proliferation of functional linkages between the pillars has enabled the development of a wide variety of local arrangements for diplomatic representation and divisions of roles between Member

---

1 The author is grateful to Geoffrey Edwards and Christopher Hill comments on earlier drafts.
States, the Commission, and, increasingly, the Council in external representation in third countries.\(^2\) This paper examines how, where, and to what extent this occurs. The degree to which the actors involved in EU external representation can capitalise on the opportunities or are affected by the constraints of the legal framework depends not only on their own resources and capabilities, but also on two structural aspects of the system of EU diplomatic representation.

First, the extent to which national diplomatic instruments constitute the Union’s diplomatic capability in a given country or region, as opposed to an ‘autonomous’ EU capacity for collecting information, analysis and representation. Most diplomatic instruments employed under the second pillar in third countries are essentially national instruments, in particular those of the country holding the Presidency. Therefore, in countries where most Member States maintain a permanent diplomatic presence, the existing diplomatic capabilities are adequate (although their coordinated use sometimes poses problems) and the necessity for other actors to develop a stronger profile or assume additional responsibilities is minimal. The importance of bilateral interests associated with extensive national diplomatic presence is also more likely to restrict the scope for EU actors. In locations where few Member States maintain a resident embassy, the situation is reversed.

Second, specific needs for representation and implementation arise in countries or regions at the focus of EU foreign policy priorities, especially where objectives and instruments cut across the ‘pillars’ of the Union. In situations of conflict, peace building, relief, or stabilisation, the need for a more permanent presence of the Union can be necessary. Under these circumstances, the current Treaties privilege actors other than Member States, such as the High Representatives, his Special Representatives, or, in some cases, representatives from the Commission. Significantly, there is a geographical discrepancy between the areas in which the EU is most heavily involved in terms of foreign policy commitments and development initiatives, and the patterns of representation of its Member States.

\(^2\) See Geoffrey Edwards and David Rijks, *Boundary Problems in EU External Representation* (SIEPS, forthcoming) for a more detailed analysis, including (the origins of) the politico-legal framework for representation, the various Brussels-based structures and mechanisms, and the relevance of issues in the domain of Justice and Home Affairs / Freedom, Security and Justice.
The first half of this paper assesses variation in the roles of the actors and arrangements for representation in third countries in the context of the current system of diplomatic representation. The second part aims to interpret the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty on external representation in third countries in the context of the present system of diplomatic representation. It analyses the possible implications for the relevant actors discussed and identifies some of the principal outstanding questions surrounding the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS).

II The Council and Member States in third countries

The Presidency and representation in third countries

Away from Brussels, the Presidency has the responsibility for maintaining continuity and coordinating EU initiatives in third countries largely through its local embassies. Practice has therefore varied hugely. In some cases, the Presidency may be exercised by an ambassador from a Member State with strong bilateral or historic ties with the host state who thereby enjoys a privileged role. Following complaints that a local Presidency could be used to further the agenda of the Member State holding it rather than that of the EU as a whole – (non-binding) updated guidelines on the exercise of the local Presidency were issued in December 2006. A second problem has been that these local Presidencies can pose a considerable administrative burden. As the local representative of the EU Presidency is a national ambassador, he or she has to divide time and responsibilities between the ‘European’ interest and that of the country he/she serves. The Presidency chairs all EU meetings – Heads of Missions (HoMs), Deputy Chiefs of Mission (DCMs) and counsellors – and is responsible for drafting reports. This frequently raises problems of administrative capacity, as many embassies are staffed by only a handful of diplomats posted from capitals. If the country holding the Presidency does maintain only a small network of resident embassies abroad, the number of local presidencies can be extremely high. In the first half of 2008, Slovenia as Presidency-in-Office is represented only in 20 states, in the

other 130 countries it has to rely on a local presidency from another Member State. But it is not only a small Member State problem; even during the German Presidency in the first half of 2007, the 27 local Presidencies were exercised by seven different Member States. A further problem is created where only very few Member States are represented, for they then have to exercise a near continuous (or even continuous\(^4\)) local Presidency with all the additional burdens that brings to the embassy involved.

The rotating Presidency furthermore poses serious problems of continuity as well as capacity. Even apart from continuously changing agendas and priorities, it provides the EU in some capitals with 27 alternating names, faces, and telephone numbers, although this can be significantly less in smaller countries. The CFSP, through the rotating Presidency, has perforce relied strongly on national diplomatic structures in third countries but general geographical patterns of representation and the accession of states with (sometimes very) limited diplomatic resources have produced considerable variation in the arrangements for local representation, as well as in its effectiveness. Although most of the problems associated with the rotating Presidency are of no direct consequence in countries in which EU interest is relatively limited, they are much more significant in areas high on the list of EU external priorities. The introduction of the Troika gave a greater sense of certainty in terms of continuity at the local as well as the European levels insofar as it has frequently been the country next in line for the Presidency that has taken over local functions. At the local level this practice has generally held good, even though the Troika now includes the country holding the Presidency together with the High Representative and the Commissioner for External Relations.

**The role of Member States’ embassies in EU diplomacy**

There is an important analytical distinction to be made in terms of the involvement of national diplomatic missions in the CFSP between their temporary responsibilities as representative of the Presidency and their ‘regular’ activities as diplomatic outposts of EU Member States. When holding the Presidency, the emphasis of an embassy’s work

\(^4\) In 2007 there were 19 countries in which a single member state holds a continuous local Presidency.
is on representation, communication, and coordination, as has been considered above. In the latter capacity, discussed in the present section, their contribution to European diplomacy takes the shape of providing input in the decision-making process, mainly through information and analysis.

Member States’ embassies in third countries are traditionally the ‘eyes and ears’ of European foreign policy cooperation, providing information on, and assessments of, a wide range of developments in third countries. Every ambassador transmits his/her interpretations of events and, if opportune, recommendations for policy initiatives to his or their Foreign Ministry. In whatever form considered desirable, this information is then passed to the foreign policy process in Brussels. Since the Copenhagen Report of 1973, there has been an obligation, later codified in the TEU, for Member States’ embassies in third countries to cooperate more closely in exchanging information and analyses. Indeed, Ambassadors are encouraged, and often explicitly requested, to coordinate their views, assessments, and actions. Since the mid-1980s it has been usual – and again it became a requirement – for the Commission Delegation to be invited to such meetings. The principal platform for this are regular meetings between embassy- and delegation staff at different levels, which in practice are mainly concerned with joint assessments, policy (pre-)coordination, and the exchange of information.

Coordination takes place in regular meetings chaired by the ambassador of the EU Presidency. Practice in both the number of meetings organised by a Presidency and the importance attached to any coordination differs according to each Presidency, each Ambassador and the country to which they are posted. During the Finnish Presidency of 2006, for example, no less than 115 coordination meetings took place in Washington alone at the level of Heads of Mission (HoMs), DCMs and 16 different groups of counsellors. Even so, the frequency of these meetings does not necessary bear any relation to the actual coordination of views or the drafting of joint reports.

---

Joint meetings of HoMs are generally considered to be one of the most significant forms of diplomatic cooperation in the field. It is important to note that their scope and effectiveness, as well as the quality of the reporting, differs strongly between capitals, depending *inter alia* on the demand for information from the field from Brussels and the number of Member States represented. The intensity of cooperation and the frequency of reporting vary widely, in part due to the geographical focus of EU policies and interests. The foreign policy making processes in Brussels and in national capitals require continuous detailed and up-to-date information on countries in which the EU takes a particular interest, especially those plagued by political instability.

This distinction also affects the sharing of information between Member States’ missions. For example, embassies are to keep partners informed about official visits from their country to the host state and it is customary for the ambassador in question to give a brief presentation to his colleagues about the issues discussed during the visit. The usefulness of this exercise differs from country to country and is dependent on whether or not the EU has an immediate interest in the political issues of the host state. If there is no such interest, the added benefit is limited. Conversely, in unstable countries, where information is sparse and access to the administration problematic, it is of interest to all concerned if a minister or head of state from the host country has made any reference to, say, the local peace process or EU involvement.

At the same time, international ambitions, real or imagined bilateral interests, and historical background are of continued relevance – not only in the economic and commercial area, but also in the political sphere. Despite the existence of a ‘distinct European interest’ on a number of issues, member states on many occasions lack the will to act in unison. This is mirrored in third countries, as diplomats, in responding to events, or when making decisions primarily consult with their ministry at home for instructions rather than with their counterparts from other Member States or the Commission in the same location.6

---

In a number of countries, representatives from the host countries give regular briefings to EU heads of mission on relevant policy issues. As many diplomats observe, however, Member States often lack the willingness to make common assessments of this information. Somewhat ironically, most joint briefings are mainly of benefit to the host state, which can speak to (not with!) the EU in one meeting, rather than to its Members in 27 separate briefings. It is therefore not surprising that research has shown that the number of joint reports has increased, but that in most cases these reports give a rather informal impression of the different viewpoints rather than formal recommendations for action.

The enlargement of the Union has not only widened the range of interests, the sheer number of EU ambassadors around the table in some countries has also affected the informal club atmosphere, which was credited with bridging some of these differences. Hence, in day to day diplomatic practice, the EU often functions as a platform to meet with other diplomats, though not by definition under an EU banner. It is commonplace for Member States to meet in different (regional) groupings, depending on the issue of interest. Often third states with similar interests are invited to these meetings, which underscores that point that the importance of the framework of EU cooperation is often relative.

**EU Special Representatives in third countries**

Both in supporting the High Representative as a further source of information independent of the Member States, and directly representing the Union in third countries, the role of EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) has become of increasing significance even if so far they have been limited in number. EUSRs have been appointed to address particular problems of geographical concern to the EU, and to promote EU policies in troubled regions and countries. They are supported by teams

---

7 Interviews with diplomats in Washington, Pretoria, Brussels, and various EU capitals.
8 Bale, T., Field-level CFSP: EU diplomatic cooperation in third countries. See above note 41.
9 At present nine Special Representatives cover the following areas: Afghanistan, the African Great Lakes Region, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Central Asia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Middle East, Moldova, the South Caucasus and Sudan. EUSRs are to be distinguished from Javier
made up of seconded officials from Member States or EU institutions, international contract staff, and local contract staff.

The tasks of EUSRs on the ground are not fundamentally different from those of special envoys or ambassadors in national administrations, and requirements regarding their personal capacities are thus similar. Grevi distinguishes between three main tasks that EUSRs fulfil in support of EU foreign policy. First, representing the European Union in areas of particular concern or crisis, with the added responsibility of maintaining political oversight over crisis management operations. They provide a ‘voice’ and a ‘face’ to the CFSP and are generally extensively involved in local or regional peace-making/peace building efforts. The impact of EUSRs on the local diplomatic playing field can thus be significant. Close cooperation with national diplomatic missions on the ground is often indispensable for the success of the EUSR’s efforts, yet over-engagement by Member States could effectively undermine any advances, and thus weaken the EU position.

Second, EUSRs have an important role to play in third countries in terms of the collection of information and the input in policy initiatives – very much a traditional diplomatic role but one that primarily, or at least initially, services the High Representative and the Council Secretariat. In the areas where EUSRs have been appointed, the diplomatic presence of Member States is often limited to a small number of countries. Providing information then becomes very much a two-way street: on the one hand, the contribution of EUSRs as providers of ‘EU-made’ information can be a valuable addition to HoMs reports and information from capitals with embassies in the field. On the other hand, as an EUSR’s capacity for independent data collection in the field is often modest, they generally rely on information from national diplomatic services – which is not always of the desired quality, especially concerning sensitive issues – or from the Commission, which may not be geared to political interpretation.

---

10 Grevi, G., Pioneering Foreign Policy: The EU Special Representatives, Chaillot Paper, No. 106 (EUISS, 2007) pp. 41-49
Third, in addition to their responsibilities for representation and reporting, EUSRs can contribute to a more coherent use of CFSP/ESDP tools and Community instruments and policies at a variety of different levels. These range from greater coherence in the field, both between CFSP/ESDP and Community activities, different CFSP/ESDP missions, between EU policies and national foreign policies and between the EU and its efforts and those of the wider international community.\(^\text{12}\)

Although the personal efforts of individual Special Representatives are key in performing these tasks, practical cooperation with national and Commission diplomatic missions is essential: EUSRs frequently rely on logistical support from the Commission delegation, for example, and currently four EUSRs and their teams work from Commission premises under a co-location agreement, in Addis Ababa, Chisinau, Kiev, and Skopje. Substantive policy coordination, however, has proven far more problematic, in part due to the lack of clarity about the managerial relationship between the EUSR and the head of delegation.\(^\text{13}\) EUSRs are often perceived as an additional layer of bureaucracy and in practice have sparked unavoidable turf battles with the Commission delegations.\(^\text{14}\)

**Double-hatting EU Special Representatives**

From an institutional point of view, a significant development in the field of external representation is ‘double-hatting’, the arrangement by which the roles of EU Special Representative and Commission head of delegation are combined. To date, two of these projects are in operation, although local and political circumstances have made for different arrangements.\(^\text{15}\) The novelty of this approach lies in bestowing responsibility for first and second pillar instruments on one individual, yet the Community and CFSP/ESDP dimensions of their work remain functionally distinct.

\(^{12}\) Grevi, G., Pioneering Foreign Policy: The EU Special Representatives, p. 46. See above note 16.


\(^{15}\) The double-hatting agreements where a EUSR also serves as head of delegation, are to be distinguished from other double-hatting agreements where the EUSR performs an additional representative function, for example in the case of Miroslav Lajčák, the EUSR in Bosnia Herzegovina, who also holds the UN Office of the High Representative.
In the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, EUSR Erwan Fouéré also serves as head of delegation, with the result that the post has been retitled as the ‘EU Mission in FYROM’. In December 2007, the Council appointed Koen Vervaeke as a new EUSR to the African Union (AU) and as head of delegation of the Commission delegation to the AU in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

There is a general ambivalence among Member States about the desirability of double-hatting as a model for EU representation. Some, including the UK, are wary of precedents and have successfully pushed for a declaration to the Joint Action appointing the double-hatted EUSR in FYROM that stressed the exceptional nature of the arrangement. The declaration also noted the Council’s primacy in CFSP by stating the Council and Commission’s agreement that the EUSR will take instructions from the Council on CFSP, with no caveats or exceptions. From the opposite perspective, the Commission and the European Parliament have been anxious to prevent further ‘intergovernmentalisation’ of the delegations’ competences.

Turf issues are therefore equally significant in the appointment procedure of double-hatted EUSRs. It is not only personal qualities which matter in the selection process; the political weight and profile of the candidate are crucial political sticking points in the institutional rivalry between the Council and the Commission. For fear of ceding much of the delegations’ autonomy to a high profile Special Representative with a natural proximity to the Council, the Commission is often said to favour candidates of lesser stature. Most Member States, for obvious reasons, take a different view.

III Representation by the Commission in third countries

Formally, Commission delegations represent the Commission in its areas of competence, primarily economic cooperation and external trade, development cooperation, environmental policy, financial and technical cooperation, and in some

---

16 For a discussion on the EUSR in FYROM in the House of Commons Select Committee on European Scrutiny, see the Fifth Report, Session 2005-2006, Document 42 ‘European Union Special Representative in Macedonia (26896) http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmeuleg/34-v/3444.htm
The Maastricht Treaty introduced and consolidated a number of legal provisions with direct impact on the role of the Commission and its delegations abroad.\(^{17}\) The Commission’s formal association with CFSP marked the beginning of a decade of management reforms within the External Service and its network of delegations.\(^{18}\) Among the most significant was the introduction of a process of ‘deconcentration’ of the management of assistance programmes. The latter process meant a significant shift of responsibilities from Brussels to delegations in the field, a development that was mirrored by the redeployment of staff from headquarters to the different posts. But the key element of the reforms initiated by the Prodi Commission reforms was the creation of the DG External Relations (or RELEX). This new DG was given responsibility for managing the Commission’s role in CFSP and for the coordination of relations with third countries. The CFSP directorate within the Commission was later expanded, enabling delegations to become more involved with the activities of the High Representative and his Special and Personal Representatives, in particular through supplying him with political reports.\(^{19}\) To that end, many delegations today have a sizeable political affairs section.

\(^{17}\) Article J.6 (later Art 20 of the Consolidated Treaty) introduced the legal requirement for ‘cooperation’ between Member States’ diplomatic and consular missions and the delegations of the European Commission in third countries and at international organisations in order to ensure compliance with, and implementation of CFSP decisions. The Commission’s ‘fully associated’ status with the “work carried out in the common foreign and security field” ((J.9) later Art. 18(4)) was strengthened, and the Council and the Commission were made jointly responsible for ensuring consistency in the EU’s external activities “in the context of its external relations, security, economic and development policies”, and “in accordance with their respective powers” (Art. C later Art 3 TEU).


\(^{19}\) Ibid., p. 409; Grevi, G. and Cameron, F., ‘Towards an EU Foreign Service, EPC Issue Paper, no. 29 (European Policy Centre, 2005); Duke, S., A Foreign Minister for the EU: But where’s the Ministry?, Discussion Papers in Diplomacy, no. 89 (Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’: 2003a)
The Commission delegations in third countries

A distinction can be made between the delegations’ role in relation to the Commission’s activities within its official competence and concrete involvement in the political and security area. First, the diplomatic profile of the Commission delegations is inevitably determined largely by their mandate, whether development cooperation in ACP-states or trade in important EU trading partners such as Japan and Brazil. In many of these countries, its role as major donor or trade negotiator gives it privileged access to government, or places it at the heart of meetings with other donors and NGOs. Similarly, in a number of states East and South of the EU, the management of the European Neighbourhood Programme (ENP) and the association and accession programmes gives the delegation considerable political influence with local authorities.

Furthermore, due to its extensive network of delegations in third countries and its permanent presence, the Commission can often provide logistical support to Member States in third countries where few others are present. In countries where an ambassador is accredited to but not resident, the delegation is often the first port of call for visiting diplomats from the regional embassies. Furthermore, delegations assist the local EU diplomatic community by providing meeting rooms, or (co-)organising European cultural events.

Second, as a consequence of the Commission’s association with the CFSP and its shared responsibility for coherence, its diplomatic role and impact have been strengthened through cross-pillar linkages. The fact that the EU Presidency and Commission are jointly responsible for ensuring the coherence of EU policies in third countries has in many cases been taken seriously by both parties. In Washington, for example, the Finnish Presidency was the first to invite the Commission to take part in weekly three-way video conferences between the Finnish Embassy in Washington, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Helsinki and the European Commission in Brussels. These meetings served to coordinate the agenda for the video conference the next morning with the State Department and the National Security Council. Although a

---

participant in the conference, the Commission would not speak on these occasions. This practice was continued by German and Portuguese Presidencies in 2007.

Furthermore, the Commission is a permanent member of the Troika in third countries, and delegations therefore naturally work very closely with the embassy of the Presidency and are often in daily contact. As noted before, this applies in particular to Presidencies whose diplomatic presence and resources are scarce. Many diplomats, from counsellors to ambassadors, admit to being happy with any help they can get from their colleagues from the Commission. The Presidency’s embassy can either take responsibility for proposing initiatives and drafting reports (and thus take on the bulk of the work), or leave things to the Commission. As one diplomat remarked: “You don’t need to ask them to do something, they will take it.”

The Commission has also become an important agent for policy implementation and monitoring in the CFSP. In many areas, however, the Commission has become more active in the employment of its financial and technical resources upon which the CFSP depends heavily. As a consequence, EU involvement in many regions, including the Balkans, Africa and the Arab region, to an important extent relies on first pillar instruments such as the threat of use of sanctions. The influence on the role of delegations on the ground is felt in particular in the area of conflict prevention. The Commission’s engagement in conflict prevention ranges from the negotiation of Country Strategy Papers to instruments within the areas of democratization, human rights, development and trade to support its role in political dialogues, arms controls or the Kimberley process, deigned to ensure trade in diamonds does not fund conflict. The Commission’s management of the different budgets for civilian crisis management has introduced it as a key player in the implementation of objectives, alongside the Council Secretariat. Indeed, it has been argued that the Commission’s say has negatively impacted on the Council Secretariat’s influence. The Africa Peace Facility is a case in point, where the Commission was not only a principal negotiator within its ‘traditional’ competences in aid and trade, but also in the fields of

conflict prevention, crisis management and peacekeeping. Consequently, in cases where Community policies have implications for the CFSP or vice versa, the Commission can act as an important source of information and coordination, due to its full association with the CFSP. In third country capitals, this gives the Head of Delegation a privileged position in meetings of the Heads of Mission in policy areas in which Community tools are considered.

The opportunities for Commission delegations to play a more prominent role in EU diplomacy are in practice often limited by the agenda and attitudes of Member States, and the involvement of EU Special Representatives with their particular mandates. As far as Member States have influence over the role that the delegations can play in third countries, the main factor is the amount of room that they want to give the Commission representatives, which varies according to issues, locations and personal relationships. Despite the gradual intensification of formal contacts between delegation staff and national embassy officials, interest from Member States in further developing diplomatic cooperation with the Commission has developed only slowly. A suggestion by Commission to set up joint diplomatic facilities in the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States in the early 1990s was rejected by the larger Member States, and later attempts to encourage the sharing of facilities in Abuja, Nigeria, and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, have only been partly successful. Furthermore, a small-scale programme exists for the secondment of national diplomats to Commission delegations, though the numbers are very low. In a number of instances national diplomats have been seconded to Commission delegations, but, again, the enthusiasm of Member States for this opportunity has been limited.

Delegations have in many instances taken up the role of coordinating cooperation and promoting coherence of EU external actions. However, in cases where diplomatic cooperation among Member States has been plagued by diverging bilateral interests, the delegations’ potential for acting as a driving force behind cooperation has then been rather limited to proposing cultural events and more general business-oriented

initiatives. Bruter has also argued that the delegations tend to be less effective during a crisis when the focus reverts to Brussels and perhaps the Presidency insofar as it can ‘hold the ring’.  

Another factor affecting the delegations’ autonomy is the involvement of Council representatives, in particular EU Special Representatives. As discussed above, the mandates of EUSRs can be very broad, covering not only areas where the Commission believes it has a role to play, but also including the responsibility of ensuring coherence between the pillars. Similarly on issues such as international crime or counter-terrorism where Europol has liaison officers and agreements (as with Colombia, the United States and elsewhere), the Commission delegation might be ‘out of the loop’.

IV National diplomatic representation

Few contemporary states maintain resident embassies in all the countries with which they have established diplomatic relations and most countries are under pressure to rationalise their network of diplomatic and consular missions. EU diplomacy can offer potential opportunities to organise the conduct of diplomatic relations with third states more efficiently. Many Member States have studied the possibility of enhancing cooperation with other EU members’ bilateral embassies, which can potentially yield significant reductions in overhead and infrastructure costs.

Serious opportunities for sharing facilities generally only occur in three types of circumstances. First, when fresh needs for national representation arise, for instance in countries that have newly (re)gained independence as sovereign states as in the early 1990s, when, for example, a number of bilateral co-location initiatives were developed in various former Soviet satellite states such Kazakhstan and Belarus. Second, when a state’s capital is moved a considerable distance from the old capital, the Nigerian capital’s removal from Lagos to Abuja being a case in point. Third, the

---

The relocation of diplomatic missions to a common premise sometimes becomes a viable option when a host government makes a sizeable plot of building land available to foreign missions or when one member state acquires a substantial parcel of which it wishes to share costs with partner states.

The vast majority of cooperation initiatives concern facilities. Far fewer involve diplomatic instruments, i.e., the sharing of diplomatic and representative tasks in third countries, through, for example, the secondment of officials to each other’s missions or exchanging political information. Apart from obvious concerns about sovereignty, a range of practical obstacles often complicate the effective sharing of diplomatic capabilities. Differences in foreign services’ administrative procedures, hierarchy and culture are just some of them. Other notorious stumbling blocks include security protocols and regulations regarding the sharing of sensitive information.

It is thus difficult to establish a direct causal connection between the need to cut costs and a ‘Europeanisation’ of Member States’ diplomatic missions abroad. This is not to say that budget cuts are irrelevant, although the main question is how Member States respond to these challenges. Indeed, most countries find ‘solutions’ within their own diplomatic services thereby retaining a national character, such as reductions in the numbers of personnel, in particular the number of posted diplomats.

As parallel structures, national diplomacies may thus have transformed but are also enduring. This is reflected in the actual number of Member State permanent diplomatic representations in third countries. An overview of the key trends in patterns of representation of the then 25 EU member states from 2000 to 2006 highlights four conclusions. These, broadly, concern the relationship between Member States in terms of their diplomatic resources on the one hand, and the relationship between national diplomatic representation and European diplomatic activity on the other.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AFRICA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Africa</td>
<td>9.73</td>
<td>10.42</td>
<td>11.44</td>
<td>11.44</td>
<td>11.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Africa</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>4.44</td>
<td>4.44</td>
<td>4.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Africa</td>
<td>25.71</td>
<td>28.14</td>
<td>62.86</td>
<td>62.86</td>
<td>62.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Africa</td>
<td>28.75</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Africa</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>28.75</td>
<td>27.92</td>
<td>27.92</td>
<td>27.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AMERICAS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>8.75</td>
<td>10.44</td>
<td>10.44</td>
<td>10.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central America</td>
<td>58.33</td>
<td>57.22</td>
<td>57.22</td>
<td>57.22</td>
<td>57.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>18.33</td>
<td>18.33</td>
<td>18.33</td>
<td>18.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern America</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ASIA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Asia</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25.33</td>
<td>25.33</td>
<td>25.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Asia</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>53.33</td>
<td>53.33</td>
<td>53.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Asia</td>
<td>16.67</td>
<td>14.44</td>
<td>44.44</td>
<td>44.44</td>
<td>44.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-east Asia</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>17.27</td>
<td>52.12</td>
<td>52.12</td>
<td>52.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Asia</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>19.36</td>
<td>53.75</td>
<td>53.75</td>
<td>53.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EUROPE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>48.33</td>
<td>46.67</td>
<td>65.55</td>
<td>65.55</td>
<td>65.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFTA states</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Europe</td>
<td>21.67</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>52.22</td>
<td>52.22</td>
<td>52.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OCEANIA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia/NZ</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>66.67</td>
<td>66.67</td>
<td>66.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melanesia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11.67</td>
<td>11.67</td>
<td>11.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Micronesia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polynesia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>19.42</td>
<td>20.76</td>
<td>24.76</td>
<td>24.76</td>
<td>24.76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 Comparison of representation coefficients between EU-10 and EU-15 in third states for the period 2000-2006.  

First, from the data it is evident that on average the number of resident embassies that EU Member States maintain in third countries has risen in the period from 2000 to 2006. With a few minor exceptions, there are more resident embassies on each of the five continents in every three-year period. Table 1 gives an overview of the relative combined diplomatic strength of Member States in different regions of the world, distinguishing between the ten Member States that joined the Union in 2004 and the ‘old’ EU-15 as groups. A standardised coefficient is used to control for the different sizes of the two groups and the variation in the number of receiving states per

---

geographic region. As the data in this table does not reflect developments for individual Member States, it is possible that one or more Member States have reduced representations abroad, but these mutations have been compensated for by other EU countries. Specific developments in individual Member States are excluded.

Second, the last two rounds of enlargements have not only increased diversity in terms of foreign policy priorities, but also in terms of diplomatic resources and capabilities. The number of Member States with resident embassies in less than a third of the 150 independent states outside the EU (less than 50) has risen from two to eleven. By contrast, the number of Member States with resident embassies in more than half of the third countries (more than 75) has not increased since the United Kingdom joined the then EC in 1973. Table 2 lists the absolute number of resident embassies that the 25 EU Member States maintained in third countries in 2006. The relative inequalities in diplomatic resources between Member States have therefore grown over the years. In most countries, only very few Member State missions can be considered major diplomatic players, a situation that is compounded by the often low number of posted diplomats in embassies of smaller or even middle-sized Member States. Table 1, however, does show that the difference between the representation coefficients of the new and old Member States for each continent has decreased gradually, suggesting, in general, a convergence in the strength of the diplomatic networks of the states that joined the EU in 2004 and the EU-15.

Third, the diversification in diplomatic resources also impacts on the representation of the EU. This is especially the case for the Presidency. The burdens of representation fall heavily but variably on Member States, with those with the larger number of embassies having more frequently to take on the role in the absence of others in addition to their own period in office.

The representation coefficient is calculated by dividing the sum of the representations in one geographic region per group (EU-10 or EU-15) by the product of the number of Member States and the number of receiving states. This coefficient denotes the actual degree of ‘diplomatic strength’ compared to the theoretical situation where every Member State would have a resident embassy in every country in that region. Only embassies headed by a resident ambassador at the time are included in the data. To facilitate the interpretation, the representation coefficient is denoted as a percentage. A percentage of 100 thus means that every member state in that group is represented in every country in that region. A percentage of 50 refers to the situation where the total number of embassies that all 10 or 15 member states together maintain in all the countries within that geographic region is half of that in a situation where every member state would be represented in every receiving state in that same region. This percentage does not give any information on the distribution of embassies within a geographic region or within the two groups of Member States, but is particularly well-suited to give a comparison of the trends in global patterns of representation between ‘new’ and ‘old’ Member States.
Table 2  Total numbers of embassies headed by a resident ambassador outside the EU of Member States and the European Commission in 2006 (data on Romania, Bulgaria, European Commission from 2008). Note: only embassies headed by extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassadors or resident heads of delegation are included in this data. Missions led by chargés d'affaires are excluded in order to ensure comparability.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Embassies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fourth, the countries and regions where Member States’ bilateral diplomatic representation is well developed do not always correspond with the areas of foreign policy activity of the Union. As table 1 indicates, representation of EU Member States in East and Central Africa, and Central Asia is relatively low, while EU involvement in these regions is substantial. The reverse situation applies in North America.

V  The Lisbon Treaty and representation in third countries

The Lisbon Treaty envisages important changes to the politico-legal framework of external representation to achieve greater coherence between the CFSP, Community, and national dimensions. The creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) is, however, perhaps the most significant attempt to bring together the different instruments in terms of implementation and representation. The Lisbon Treaty, rather than simply codifying practices as they have developed, creates an entirely new structure alongside national foreign services. Significantly, therefore, the very principle of the EEAS and Union embassies represents a move away from the current ad hoc mode of diplomatic cooperation to a much more institutionalised attempt to integrate the different forms of representation. The present section surveys the likely consequences for the roles and profiles of the different actors under the new arrangements.
Union representation in third countries

An important improvement of the Lisbon Treaty is that it replaces the Troika-format in third countries, and possibly or potentially the rotating Presidency, with representation by the EEAS and the Union Delegations. Many of the problems of continuity and capacity associated with the rotating Presidency, and local presidencies in particular, may then be alleviated. Furthermore, the lack of resident representation by the Council Secretariat will become irrelevant, as its personnel will be part of the EEAS staff and are likely to be posted to the new Union Delegations as well. More consistent representation, together with the EU acquiring legal personality, could thus enhance the Union’s external projection. At the same time, the new Service may make the internal decision-making process more efficient by providing support to the High Representative and streamlining the CFSP information gathering and processing machinery.

The Treaty itself does not provide any detail on the function and composition of the EEAS. These it leaves to be decided by the Council on the basis of a proposal from the new High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Article 188q merely states that Union delegations shall represent the Union in third countries and at international organisations, while placed under the authority of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The Lisbon Treaty specifies that the EEAS will be drawn from the relevant services of the Commission and the Council Secretariat and will also include personnel seconded from the diplomatic services of Member States.

A first attempt to lay the groundwork of the EEAS was made in the Joint Progress Report by the High Representative and the Commission to the European Council of June 2005, which contained an ‘Issues paper on the European External Action Service’ that had been drawn up in the previous March. A number of other ideas and suggestions were put forward subsequently by officials, politicians and others, including Michel Barnier (the former Commissioner and French Foreign Minister), José Cutileiro (the former Secretary General of WEU and Portuguese academic as

well as diplomat). The Joint Progress Report went some way in clarifying the (sui generis) nature of the EEAS, as well as the position of the Union Delegations as part of the EEAS. The number and complexity of issues that need to be resolved before the EEAS can become operational cannot, however, be underestimated. They range from relatively detailed problems of the physical location of the EEAS staff in Brussels and their diplomatic privileges and immunities abroad to fundamental questions on the scope and size of the new Service, as well as on the rotation and training of staff.

The Commission Delegations and the EEAS

According to the 2005 Progress Report, the current Commission Delegations will be an “integral part of the EEAS”, and the daily operation of the new Union Delegations will in part be determined by the functional aspects of their staffing. It seems reasonable to assume that Member States will want to be well represented in the political sections of the Delegations, along, perhaps, with one or two representatives from the Council Secretariat. It is also likely that the Commission will not give up its claim to the trade and development sections, which will remain areas of Community competence. A degree of regional as well as functional specialisation on the part of Union Delegations staff seems therefore a logical consequence. Delegations in ACP, Neighbourhood, or accession countries may have proportionally larger number of Commission staff, whereas in the more political locations, the current Commission delegations will lose at least some of their autonomy with the introduction of Member States’ diplomats and Council Secretariat Staff. The same logic is likely to guide the division of posts of Head of Delegation, and current practice in the appointment of double-hatted EUSRs may be taken as a model. Finally, there is the question whether all staff at the Union Delegations should be part of the EEAS. Similar to national

---

embassies, they could include seconded personnel from other services in areas of Freedom, Security and Justice, financial matters and agriculture.

**National diplomacies and the EEAS**

The anticipated creation of the EEAS has prompted foreign ministries in all EU capitals to formulate expectations and positions on the role and function of the new Service. In some cases, it could offer the prospect of enhancing the performance of national foreign services by, for instance, improving career opportunities for diplomats or providing alternative methods to ensure national representation in third countries on a more cost-effective basis. Further cooperation between national and European diplomatic structures could, on the one hand, offer considerable benefits to national diplomats in the acquisition of specialist skills and expertise, while ‘sub-contracting’ certain representative functions to a *European* diplomacy could at the same time become part of *national* diplomatic strategies.\(^{31}\)

Past experience of diplomatic cooperation in third countries, however, suggests that practical problems, as well as issues of principle, often limit the opportunities for pooling diplomatic facilities and instruments. Sharing arrangements between Member States diplomatic missions do not have an impressive record, while joint representative functions with the Commission delegations have proven to be at least equally problematic. A significant amount of political will to overcome the current barriers to enhanced diplomatic cooperation in third countries will therefore be indispensable.

The EEAS, however, also poses questions to national governments on how to ensure that European diplomatic machinery operates in such a way that its work does not contravene national interests. Most Member States therefore will therefore want to see appropriate representation in the new Service in order to help shape outcomes in its day-to-day activities, in particular where ambassadorial posts are to be divided.

---

There are very likely to be fundamental changes in the relationship between national and European diplomacy due to the development of parallel, independent capabilities of the latter, for which it currently relies mainly on the former. Just as the new High Representative would “replace the Presidency as the key animating force of the CFSP”\(^\text{32}\), the EEAS and Union Delegations may ultimately take over the representative functions of the Presidency in third countries and much of the role that national embassies currently play in the provision of information and analysis. It may thus be that European diplomacy becomes less dependent on national structures but the frequent dual-role of national embassies may not immediately disappear.

On the one hand, the boundaries between European and national diplomacy could well become sharper. The new European diplomatic service will cover what could be termed as the ‘European interest’, to the extent that agreement exists on what that interest is. In these cases the role of national foreign services could be marginalised. On the other hand, what may then be ‘left’ for national embassies, however, is not only bilateral representation to the host country, but, possibly as or even more importantly, the foreign policy issues on which the Member States have not been able to agree. National embassies will, therefore, continue to be relevant in European external relations, but their role could gradually be transformed from constituting the backbone of European diplomacy to the fall-back instruments for Member States when European diplomacy cannot deliver.

This point is particularly relevant since Article 188q of the Lisbon Treaty leaves open what in practice the relationship will be between national diplomats working in Member States’ embassies – if present – and those seconded to the EEAS, working in the Union delegations, stating merely that Union delegations “shall act in close cooperation with Member States’ diplomatic and consular missions”. Even though the latter will be officially serving the European interest, it would be difficult to imagine that they would not seek to maintain close relations with their compatriots and long-term colleagues in the local embassy or in the home capital. Therefore, personalities and attitudes, those of national Ambassadors in particular, will be significant for local

variation in the relationship between national and European diplomacy. Personal experience in the European diplomatic service is likely to improve the prospects of effective cooperation, but ultimately national foreign policy objectives will sometimes motivate a less than complimentary attitude.

**Future developments**

In order to maximise the benefits of representation by the Union Delegations, the transformation of all the current Commission delegations – whether through a ‘big bang’ or a gradual process – is one of the options to be considered. Experiences of the current system of EU diplomatic representation, however, suggests that patterns of national representation will have to be taken into account when considering the scope and focus of the network of Union Delegations. Problems of diplomatic capacity are most pressing in countries where only few Member States are present. Union Delegations could make a tremendously important contribution in this regard, alleviating at the same time the problem of local Presidencies. Conversely, in third countries where many Member States maintain resident embassies, EEAS staff in EU embassies are much more likely to risk duplicating the work of their colleagues in national embassies. For this reason, the network of Union delegations should aim – at least initially – to complement existing networks of resident diplomatic representation.

Furthermore, as previous sections of this paper suggest, substantive external relations considerations should also be taken into account. Union Delegations should first be set up where they are needed most – a principle that also guides the establishment of national diplomatic missions. This implies that, first, the added benefit of the new EU missions is greatest where the Union currently has ‘heavy’ CFSP/external relations commitments, or envisages the need to deepen them in the future. Second, the composition of its staff makes the EEAS particularly useful for deployment to locations where an integrated approach and joint instruments are required from the Council and the Commission. Double-hatted EU Special Representatives have been appointed to areas requiring strong cross-pillar cooperation for the EU to be effective,
and the EU could build on this experience in devising a rationale for the development of the network of Union Delegations.\textsuperscript{33}

When exactly the EEAS will become operational is unclear. During the current preparatory period, all the parties involved are disclosing as little as possible about their views and positions. Officials from both the Commission and the Council Secretariat are under instructions not to speak about the Service in public, as both sides are preparing for what will probably be one of the most significant turf battles of the coming years. Member States are also keeping a low profile. For domestic reasons, some governments are cautious, wishing to avoid stirring Eurosceptic sentiments. Due to the secrecy surrounding the preparations it is difficult to get a sense of the state of play, but the complexity of the questions and their possible implications make for potential difficulties on the road.

Although public debate on the EEAS is minimal, it is arguably the most significant innovation in EU diplomatic representation in third countries in decades. In the same way that EUSRs have, to a large extent, come to fulfil the same tasks as ambassadors, and their teams the same function as embassies, the Union Delegations may in many ways come to resemble national embassies, with the High Representative ultimately in charge of the network. There are, however, many factors that indicate that in practice the EEAS will not – in the short to medium term at least – replace the current national diplomatic structures in third countries. The variable geometry in terms of actors and functions is likely to persist, if not increase.

\textsuperscript{33} Adebahr, C. and Grevi, G., The EU Special Representatives: what lessons for the EEAS?, in Avery et. al., The EU Foreign Service: how to build a more effective common policy.
V References

Books and articles

Duke, S., A Foreign Minister for the EU: But where’s the Ministry?, Discussion Papers in Diplomacy, no. 89 (Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’: 2003)
Grevi, G. and Cameron, F., ‘Towards an EU Foreign Service, EPC Issue Paper, no. 29 (European Policy Centre, 2005)
Grevi, G., Pioneering Foreign Policy: The EU Special Representatives, Chaillot Paper, No. 106 (EU Institute for Security Studies, 2007)
Rijks, D. and Whitman, R., European diplomatic representation in third countries: trends and options, in Avery et. al., The EU Foreign Service: how to build a more effective common policy, European Policy Centre Working Paper, No. 28 (EPC: 2007)

Other documents

House of Commons Select Committee on European Scrutiny, Fifth Report, Session 2005-2006, Document 42 ‘European Union Special Representative in Macedonia (26896)
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmeuleg/34-v/3444.htm
Speech by Chris Patten to the European Parliament on the Galeote Report on the External Service, 4 September 2000, Speech 00/294,
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/news/patten/speech_00_294.htm
Stocktaking Report on the implementation of measures to increase the efficiency, coherence and visibility of EU external policies and future work, Council of the European Union, 8 December 2006 (16419/06)
Stocktaking report on the implementation of measures to increase the effectiveness, coherence and visibility of EU external policies and future work, Council of the European Union, 13 June 2007 (8909/07)
Stocktaking report on the implementation of measures to increase the effectiveness, coherence and visibility of EU external policies and future work, Council of the European Union, 12 December 2007 (16467/07)