Sweden and the Development of the European Security and Defence Policy: A Bi-Directional Process of Europeanisation

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Abstract: Since its creation in 1999, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has evolved rapidly. This new policy area presented Sweden, a once neutral state, with a challenge to its security policy tradition. Applying the multidimensional model of Europeanisation put forward by Reuben Wong and carried out primarily through conducting interviews with key officials, the paper argues that Sweden has embarked on a rather spectacular journey, from being a sceptical and hesitant participant to being one of its main driving forces. While it is beyond any doubt that the ESDP has had a major influence on Sweden's security policy and engendered several changes and adaptations at the domestic level, the paper, however, also argues that Sweden has had a major impact on shaping the current character of the ESDP. As for the reasons behind Swedish activism in the ESDP, it is argued that it was the opportunity to influence the development of the ESDP, including pushing it to reflect Swedish interests, that has been the main driving force. Hence, the paper points to an interwoven relation between European and domestic levels that confirms the bi-directional character of the process of Europeanisation.

Keywords: ESDP, Sweden, security policy, EU, Europeanisation.

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Introduction

"If you want to do something in the [area of] the ESDP [...] it needs to fit into a triangle of France, the UK and Sweden."2

To many, not just Swedes, the above remark may appear surprising. At first sight, it seems rather doubtful that a relatively small member state, and moreover one that is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), would be considered to be in the same league as two of the largest and most powerful member states of the European Union (EU). This may seem even more remarkable as Sweden was highly sceptical towards the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), even indicating that it would be prepared to block it. Following the decision by the Cologne European Council in June 1999 to launch the ESDP, the Swedish government distinguished itself from other EU member states by declaring that the new policy was to mainly focus on ‘minesweeping, police training and the interpretation of satellite images’3.

Despite this narrow appreciation of the coverage of the new policy, their record since paints a different picture. Sweden has contributed with personnel to all ESDP operations to date, including the military engagements. In 2003, it was the only other EU member state to join France in deploying combat forces to Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), a high-risk operation4. In 2004, Sweden announced that it would not only take part in, but also lead one of the EU Battle Groups (EUBG). Sweden contributes the lion share (2,300 out of 2,800 troops5) to the Nordic Battle Group (NBG), on standby mode since 1 January 2008.

From having viewed ESDP initially with great scepticism and reluctance, Sweden has today become one of its most active participants. There seems thus to be a clear indication of a policy shift since 1999 which raises questions as regards the relation between Sweden and the ESDP.

Since its creation in the late 1990s, the ESDP has evolved with the ‘speed of light’, as Javier Solana, the EU’s High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), puts it frequently. This is striking, in particular viewed

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1 The author would like to thank C. D’Aniello for her assistance while writing his M.A. thesis, which this paper builds on. A special thank also goes to M. Strömvik who encouraged research into this topic in the first place and who gave precious advice along the process. Finally, thanks also go to all those officials who agreed to be interviewed.

2 Interview #2.

3 N. Sandberg, ‘Jag lyssnade på...’, DN, 06.06.1999.

4 M. Strömvik, To Act as a Union, Lund, Department of Political Science, Lund University, 2005, p. 228.

5 The NBG also includes participation of Finland (200), Norway (150), Ireland (80) and Estonia (50).
against the incremental steps taken since the failure of the European Defence Community (EDC) in the 1950s. Furthermore, the development is even more remarkable given that security and defence policy is at the core of national sovereignty and thus an area that many would have considered the least likely to be subject to such rapid progress. Since the first ESDP operation was launched in 2003, there have been some twenty missions and in February 2008, the EU launched its largest, and possibly most challenging, civilian mission hitherto in Kosovo.

This new policy area presented Sweden, a once neutral state, with a challenge to its security policy tradition. It had to consider what role to play in Europe’s evolving security order and how to respond to the new security context. At the time, some authors argued that the Swedish security policy tradition of non-alignment would make it impossible for Sweden to claim a place at the core of the EU and that Sweden lacked strong commitment to the ESDP. Furthermore, several scholarly works have emphasised the so-called Europeanisation of Swedish foreign and security policy, which in this context is to be understood as the changes influenced by the EU. This interpretation is not without merit. Certainly, the ESDP is likely to have had an impact on Sweden’s security and defence policy. However, it fails to somehow explain why Sweden has played such an active role in the ESDP as briefly outlined above. Furthermore, it would be quite remarkable if activism had not translated into some form of influence. It thus seems to neglect the possible impact that Sweden has had on the ESDP and what role Sweden has played in the development of the ESDP. Hence, it seems necessary to search for alternative approaches to better understanding Sweden and the development of the ESDP.

**Dimensions of Europeanisation**

As is known, the concept of ‘Europeanisation’ is relatively new and has quickly become fashionable in European scholarly debate. This concept has also increasingly been applied by scholars to the study of national foreign policies within the context of Europe, including the impact of the CFSP, arguably because it somewhat recognises the role that both member states and institutions play. However, it is also rather ill-defined and means different things to different people. As several scholars claim, there is an inter-subjective quality of Europeanisation where adaptational pressure is not an objective entity but is constructed in the relationship between the European and domestic levels. According to Reuben Wong, Europeanisation under

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the CFSP can be understood as ‘a process of foreign policy convergence’ being a ‘dependent variable contingent on the ideas and directives emanating from actors […] in Brussels, as well as policy ideas and actions from member state capitals’\(^9\). With this definition, Europeanisation becomes a concept encompassing both the ‘process of change manifested as policy convergence (both top-down and sideways) as well as national policies amplified as EU policy (bottom-up projection)’\(^10\). Europeanisation is thus understood as a process with at least two directions.

Wong then outlines three different dimensions of Europeanisation in the relationship between a member state’s foreign policy and the EU’s. The first one is a top-down process of national adaptation and policy convergence (‘downloading’), the second one is a bottom-up and sideways process involving the export of national preferences, ideas and policy models (‘uploading’) and the third one is the socialisation of interests and identities (‘crossloading’)\(^11\). In the scope of this paper, this third dimension will be left out in favour of a focus on the two first ones.

The first dimension of Europeanisation focuses on the increasing influence of the EU level on national structures and procedures and the adaptation of member states. Initially Europeanisation was considered to be a concept to describe the convergence of national policy-making styles and content that EU membership leads to (sometimes also referred to as ‘Brusselsisation’)\(^12\). This reflects a top-down process in which the state is perceived largely as reactive underlining, the dilution of the ‘national’ in favour of the ‘European’, a transformation that usually translates as an ‘incremental process of adjustment and adaptation reorienting member states’ politics and policies towards the EU’\(^13\). This process of policy convergence is the one that so far has received most attention by scholars and that is predominantly used in the academic literature on Europeanisation. Indeed, most works tend to view the ESDP as a new security context to which member states have had to adapt and react without much possibility to influence its development\(^14\).

The second dimension refers to the projection of national ideas, preferences and models from the national to the EU level. In this conception, it is a process of bottom-up where the states are the primary actors and agents of change rather than mere passive subjects. It emphasises the roles played by the member states themselves. Europeanisation is thus seen as a process where member states use the EU as an instrument to export domestic policies, models, preferences, ideas and details to

\(^{9}\) Ibid., p. 322.
\(^{10}\) Ibid.
\(^{11}\) Ibid., p. 325.
\(^{13}\) Ibid.
\(^{14}\) Cf. Græger et al. (2002).
the EU level. This is perhaps the most interesting dimension given that it is expected that only ‘states which command large resources, strong domestic pressure or dogged commitment’ are able to change or forge a certain EU policy. Following this conception, the larger EU member states use the European level to further their national interests and increase their international influence. However, as Wong writes, sometimes the EU also gives ‘small states the necessary institutional resources … to project their own interests as European interests’ though this has received much less scholarly attention to date.

In summation, it seems that it is only by combining these two dimensions of Europeanisation that we can actually better apprehend the complex relationship between the ESDP and member states’ foreign policies.

Research questions

The relationship between Sweden and the development of the ESDP triggered interest in three key questions:

1. What impact has Sweden had on the ESDP?
2. To what extent has the ESDP influenced Swedish security policy?
3. Why has Sweden become so active and supportive of the ESDP?

This paper aims to shed light on these questions by examining Sweden’s participation in the ESDP since its inception.

Figure 1.1 Process of Europeanisation

[Diagram showing the process of Europeanisation between the ESDP and Swedish security policy]


The first question relates to the possible impact of the ESDP on Swedish security policy in terms of procedures and substance, the dimension that Wong calls ‘downloading’. The second question touches upon the implications for the ESDP of the Swedish commitment, which corresponds to the ‘uploading’ dimension of Wong. This is particularly relevant as there is reason to believe in our case that Sweden has exerted influence on parts of the institutional and political features of the ESDP. Together the two first questions aim to examine the extent of the redefini-

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15 Wong, 'The Europeanization of Foreign Policy', p. 137.
16 Ibid., p. 150.
17 Ibid., p. 147.
tion of Swedish security policy in response to the CFSP, and in particular the
ESDP, but also the projection of one's own interests as European. The third ques-
tion flows from the other two and focuses on the motives behind the Swedish par-
ticipation in the ESDP, but also on possible explanations as to the policy shift that
seems to have taken place. Addressing these three questions, Wong’s dimensions of
Europeanisation will serve as an operational framework and research model for this
paper. For each dimension, there are a number of indicators that will guide the
study.

Table 1.1 Dimensions of Europeanisation in national foreign policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspects of Europeanisation</th>
<th>National foreign policy indicators</th>
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| I. Adaptation and policy convergence | a) Increasing salience of European political agenda  
Harmonisation and transformation of a member state to the needs and requirements over EU membership | b) Adherence to common objectives  
c) Common policy outputs taking priority over national domaines réservés  
d) Internalisation of EU membership and its integration process |
| II. National projection | a) State attempts to increase national influence in the world  
National foreign policy of a member state affects and contributes to the development of a common European foreign policy | b) State attempts to influence foreign policies of other member states  
c) State uses the EU as a cover/umbrella  
d) Externalisation of national foreign policy positions onto the EU level |


As the subject of Sweden’s involvement in the ESDP has so far generated little inter-
est, with the exception of a few works18, the paper has so far been carried out
primarily through conducting interviews with key officials in Stockholm (the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Justice) and Brussels (the Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU) as well as in the EU
institutions (the Council and the Commission)19.

First, the journey from initial scepticism to overt enthusiasm in the ESDP that
Sweden has embarked upon will be explored. The influence that Sweden has had on
its development but also the impact of the ESDP on Swedish security policy will
then be discussed. Finally, the underpinning reasons and motives of Swedish par-
ticipation in the ESDP will be briefly examined.

18 E.g. Bailes, Herolf & Sundelius (2005), Rieker (2006) as well as several pieces written by Strömvik.
19 The author is in this context indebted to M. Strömvik who helped identifying an initial list of po-
tential interviewees. In the text, the interviews are cited only with a number. A full list of respon-
dents including some relevant biographical notes can be found in the bibliography.
1. A journey from scepticism to enthusiasm

1.1 The bumpy road to Cologne

For Sweden, the future security and defence dimension of the EU was highly problematic and in the early years, the Swedish government did not seem entirely convinced of neither the desirability nor the necessity of such a development\textsuperscript{20}. Indeed, Sweden was reluctant and wanted to stop progress towards an EU security and defence policy if it meant a common defence\textsuperscript{21}.

The starting point of Sweden, shared by several other member states, was that crisis management should be clearly distinguished from a common defence, understood as territorial defence or mutual defence guarantees\textsuperscript{22}. Sweden explicitly excluded mutual defence guarantees and it was therefore considered important to influence the process. The Finnish-Swedish initiative in 1996\textsuperscript{23} proposing that the EU could undertake the Petersberg tasks was indeed an attempt to block progress towards a collective defence\textsuperscript{24}. It should be viewed against a context where proposals of a merger of the Western European Union (WEU) and the EU were being discussed and, as new EU members, Sweden and Finland were not in a position to block these but instead had to consider how to limit their development\textsuperscript{25}. However, the initiative was also the result of an attempt to show loyalty as new EU member states and an expression of constructivism, including highlighting that the two states were not opposed to the use of force per se\textsuperscript{26}. The result of the Finnish-Swedish proposal was that the Petersberg tasks were transferred to the EU, but the WEU's territorial defence mission stayed outside the treaties\textsuperscript{27}. From the Swedish side, the inclusion of the Petersberg tasks in the Amsterdam treaty was perceived as a major diplomatic success and a form of demilitarisation of the EU's security dimension\textsuperscript{28}.

The Swedish reaction to the Anglo-French St. Malo declaration in 1998 was thus lukewarm as it raised concerns as to whether Swedish military non-alignment might be endangered\textsuperscript{29}. In November 1998, Sweden tried to stop – without actually veto-
ing it – the informal meeting of EU defence ministers in Vienna during the Austrian EU Presidency – a move which did not draw much sympathy from other EU member states. At the Cologne European Council in June 1999, the issue of a WEU-EU merger was again on the table. Even though the Cologne European Council saw the birth of the ESDP, the idea of a collective defence guarantee again failed as the decision was taken to include ‘those functions of the WEU which will be necessary for the EU to fulfil its new responsibilities in the area of the Petersberg tasks’. The Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson tried to marginalise the Presidency conclusions and told the Riksdag that the ESDP aimed at ‘mine clearance in Bosnia and the training of border guards in Macedonia and police officers in Albania’. The Swedish government was thus still largely hesitant and reluctant. The Foreign Minister Anna Lindh declared to parliament that a ‘clear dividing line between crisis management and territorial defence should be upheld’. At the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, during the discussions about crisis management troops, Sweden and other like-minded member states managed to insert in the Presidency conclusions that the ESDP process ‘does not imply the creation of a European army’.

However, the Swedish government’s reluctant approval of the ESDP and its cautious remarks made in public should also be seen in the prism of the domestic political scene. According to an official, both Lindh and Persson understood that the ESDP was not meant to be purely about minesweeping, but it took some time to formulate this for domestic consumption. The government’s parliamentary basis depended on two eurosceptic parties and there were internal divisions in the ruling Social Democratic Party itself on the development of the ESDP. The timing is also important as elections to the European Parliament were coming up in June 1999, thus coinciding with the Cologne European Council, which politicised the issue further. Indeed, a week before the elections, the former Swedish Defence Minister Thage G. Peterson, who was still part of the government at the time, attacked his colleagues publicly, expressing his disappointment that the government was accepting increasing militarisation of the EU. Furthermore, the media published articles warning of a ‘common EU defence’ and an ‘EU army’, which pushed the government into a defensive stance.

30 Jonson, op.cit., p. 65f.
31 Cologne European Council, ‘Presidency Conclusions’, 03–04.06.1999, p. 35
32 D. Ljungberg, ‘Från riksdagsdebatt om EU:s militära roll’, DN, 03.06.1999.
35 Interview #3.
37 Interview #1.
1.2 Promoting the civilian dimension

Even though the Swedish government had succeeded in avoiding the development of a common defence in 1999, it was not reassured by the course of events the following year as the introduction of crisis management into the EU started with a heavy emphasis on its military dimension. The set-up of new crisis management institutions such as the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the EU Military Staff (EUMS) tilted the balance clearly towards the military side. In order to counter this development, Sweden became very eager to emphasise the non-military aspects. It was also perceived as easier to sell the ESDP politically if it was not too military and thus not seen as calling into question the policy of military non-alignment.

However, there was also a genuine belief that the civilian instruments were lacking if it was to be a serious tool for crisis management. In promoting the civilian aspects, Sweden argued that the EU was a more suitable actor as its strength lied in its ability to deploy both civilian and military instruments as well as that a comprehensive security approach was needed. There were also questions as to whether the military aspects of the ESDP, which were being strongly pushed for in some quarters, were actually what was required – whether there was a demand for purely military crisis management.

Although Sweden had already pushed for the recognition of the civilian aspects of crisis management in Cologne, it now embarked on a campaign lobbying for conflict prevention, civilian crisis management (CCM) and the possibility of strengthening the UN’s role in peacekeeping. However, this was not a perception shared by other member states at the time who questioned Sweden’s intentions. Indeed, Sweden’s vocal promotion of the civilian aspects met with rather stiff resistance. Swedish officials even felt ridiculed by their colleagues, in particular those from member states that wanted to focus and devote their energy on developing the military dimension of the ESDP. As Sweden championed the issue it even created animosity and frustration amongst other member states, perhaps even to the point where it started to risk becoming counterproductive. It was clear Sweden was working against a stiff headwind as it tried to strengthen the civilian dimension.

However, the Swedish attempts would eventually be successful as its persistence led to the creation of a Civilian Crisis Management Committee (CIVCOM) in May 2000. The Swedish EU Presidency in the first half of 2001 undoubtedly offered

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39 Interview #8.
40 Interview #3.
41 Interview #8.
42 Interview #1.
Sweden a unique opportunity to give a strong impetus to the CCM aspects. Sweden was particularly active on these issues and there was a clear focus on the civilian dimension. For example, the Presidency drafted an action programme for conflict prevention that was adopted by the Goteborg European Council in June 2001. Sweden was also one of the member states initiating the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 (CHG 2008) in order to match development on the military side. Another Swedish initiative was the so-called Civilian Response Teams (CRT) that Sweden launched together with Germany. It was an idea borrowed from the battle group concept, aimed to establish a civilian rapid reaction capacity.

2. Towards unequivocal enthusiasm

2.1 Embracing the ESDP

Sweden’s initial hesitation towards the ESDP had therefore somewhat faded as the civilian dimension became more recognised and, with it, less need to defend its existence. Holding the EU Presidency had led to a change in attitude not only in political circles but the Swedish public had grown more positive towards the EU in general. However, there was still a certain anxiety with regard to the military dimension of the ESDP, and, in particular, over military operations. This nervousness would finally be overcome in 2003, a year that saw a number of important events.

The shift in attitude first arose in response to the situation in Macedonia (FYROM) and Operation Concordia. The Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh had played an active role during the Swedish EU Presidency in negotiating the Orchid peace agreement in FYROM, an event that had clearly marked her. This was very important since Lindh and Sweden had been in the driver’s seat and thus been able to observe the process from the start. The idea of an ESDP operation in FYROM had been discussed since autumn 2002 and the NATO was already involved. When the decision was taken in January 2003 to launch Concordia, the first military ESDP operation, it was a ‘Berlin plus’ arrangement and largely conform to expectations. However, there were several sensitive points for the Swedish government and

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48 Interview #8.
49 Interview #9.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
it had carefully examined whether it was in line with the EU’s independence of decision-making and its policy of military non-alignment. Concordia was a watershed and contributed to relieving the situation. If Concordia started to reduce fear of the ESDP’s military dimension, Operation Artemis would definitely help eliminate it. There seems to be wide agreement of this operation’s importance for Sweden’s relation to the ESDP. The decision to launch the operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in June 2003 took place only a couple of months after the EU disagreement over the Iraq war and there was thus a wish among EU member states to show some clout. Artemis was unique in several ways: it was the first time the EU deployed troops out-of-area, the first time on a UN Chapter VII mandate and the first time without recourse to NATO assets. While France was willing to launch the operation on their own, they were wary of it being perceived as neo-colonialism. It was on a Swedish initiative that the EU started looking at options for an operation and talks between Sweden and France eventually led to the two being the only member states contributing combat troops to Artemis.

For Sweden, Artemis was, as one official put it, a ‘form of triple touchdown: it was the UN asking the EU for help, it was an autonomous operation and it was Africa’. These three factors suited Swedish motives as well as Lindh’s profile perfectly. Indeed, the Swedish participation had been strongly pushed by Lindh, even, according to some sources, against the Prime Minister’s wishes. For Lindh, it was central that it was on a direct request by the UN given the traditional emphasis placed on the UN in Swedish foreign and security policy. Furthermore, Sweden had been cautious about the ‘Berlin plus’ arrangements and reluctant to let NATO, of which it was not a member, interfere or make decisions for the EU. Finally, it was Africa, traditionally a Swedish priority, and Lindh had even visited the DRC a couple of weeks earlier. She had also been on the phone with the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan who had warned against a repetition of Rwanda. She thus felt a responsibility and she wanted to get the EU involved. It should also not be forgotten that there was a parallel discussion in the Convention on the Future of common defence guarantees. These factors contributed to Lindh pushing the ESDP in a direction

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54 Interview #9.
56 Interview #10.
57 M. Strömvik, To Act as a Union, p. 229.
58 Interview #9.
59 Interview #13.
60 Interview #7.
61 Interview #9.
62 Interview #10.
that she favoured. She saw an opportunity to influence the process and Artemis was precisely the type of operation that she envisioned for the ESDP63.

There seems to be general agreement that Artemis had far-reaching implications and that its effects should not be underestimated. Firstly, as it was widely perceived as a major success – the EU was said to have stopped a potential genocide – it restored the EU’s self-confidence after the debacle over the Iraq war. However, it also gave a stronger self-confidence and credibility to Sweden64. It had a contagious effect and lent Sweden greater influence not only within the ESDP but also in other CFSP-related areas65. Secondly, Artemis showed that being a military non-aligned state does not mean one needs to fear military engagement. In particular due to its strong push for the civilian aspects, Sweden had been perceived as a country with an aversion to the military aspects, seeking only to engage in the civilian aspects of crisis management66. Whether merited or not, this perception largely changed in 200367. Thirdly, Artemis also had effects on the Swedish Armed Forces (SAF), whose focus previously had been mainly on NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP), that started seeing the value of the ESDP as it entailed being fully involved in the whole process including the decision-making68. Artemis would also influence the Swedish position on the EUBG69. Fourthly, Artemis moved France and Sweden closer to each other in the ESDP whereas previously Sweden had more often than not ended up on the Anglo-Saxon side70.

However, the main consequence of Artemis was that it led to a decisive change in attitude towards the ESDP and the military dimension. It made Lindh and the political circles that hitherto had been cautious with regard to the military dimension to understand and utilise the political capital of the instrument71. As one official said, ‘Artemis led to a change, and from that moment Anna started to love the ESDP and Sweden became one of the most ESDP-friendly countries’72. ESDP became uncontroversial and the cautious and hesitant approach eventually gave way to enthusiasm.

63 Ibid.
64 Interview #7.
65 Interview #9.
66 Strömvik, ‘Starting to think big’, p. 211.
67 Interview #3.
68 Ibid.
69 Interview #10.
70 Interview #8.
71 Interview #9.
72 Interview #10.
2.2 Shifting into higher gear

The clearest symbol, however, of how Sweden's view on the ESDP and in particular its military dimension had changed came with the Swedish government's support of the EU Battle Group (EUBG) concept proposed by France and the UK. Following Concordia and in particular Artemis, the ESDP project was seen in a more positive light. Operation Artemis had also demonstrated to the Swedish government the importance of a European rapid reaction capacity. In April 2004, Sweden declared, together with Finland, its intention to create an EUBG and assume responsibility as a Framework Nation and in November 2004 the Nordic Battle Group (NBG) was presented. This was a major step for the Swedish government.

On the Swedish side, this decision was motivated by both foreign policy and defence policy motives. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA), wishing that Sweden would be as active as possible in the ESDP, favoured Swedish participation. It was also seen, following the experience of Artemis, as an opportunity to support the UN and fill a void in international crisis management. However, this does not explain fully the Swedish decision to take the lead of a battle group and the MFA would likely have been satisfied with a number of smaller contributions to a couple of battle groups. As one official said, 'the decision [to lead a battle group] would never have come about if the Defence Ministry would not have wanted it'. Firstly, it was an opportunity for the SAF to plan and lead a military unit of battalion size, which was considered a rare feat as Sweden was unlikely to receive this level of responsibility in the PfP. It was therefore perceived that leading a EUBG would strongly contribute to developing the Swedish military capacity for taking part in international crisis management operations. Following Artemis, the SAF had become much more interested in the EU and indeed France had praised the Swedish contribution.

However, the main reason was that it coincided with the government's efforts to transform the SAF from a territorial defence force with static forces to an operational defence force with deployable units that could participate in international operations. The transformation of the SAF had been a difficult process and despite an objective to increase the number of troops deployable for international duty, it

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73 Interview #8.
75 S. Bøe, 'Norge med i nordisk EU-styrka', DN, 23.11.2004.
76 Interview #3.
77 Ibid.
78 Interview #10.
79 Interview #3.
80 Interview #4.
82 Interviews #3, 4.
had never been accomplished. No defence minister had managed to overcome the resistance within the SAF and the reformist camps thus saw a unique window of opportunity in the EUBG to give a decisive push for defence reforms. The new Commander-in-Chief of the SAF, General Håkan Syrén, took on board the EUBG concept as well as the European Security Strategy (ESS). Even though the ESS is not a legally binding document, it was used as a form of 'smokescreen', an imaginary constraint, by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to make politically difficult domestic reforms under the cover of EU prerogative.

3. Activism and Europeanisation

3.1 The changing character of activism

From this overview, it seems clear that there has been a development over time and that Sweden has made quite a significant journey in the ESDP. As one official said, 'we have moved quite remarkably [in the ESDP], from the initial ideas when we were concerned that it was only focusing on military aspects to pushing for the civilian dimension and more recently also the military one'. Perhaps this journey is best personified in the former Foreign Minister Anna Lindh who went from initial suspicion of where the project would lead to realising the great potential of the instrument.

Prior to joining the EU, there had been concerns amongst many EU member states that the non-aligned member states Finland, Austria and Sweden would become problematic and 'sources of nuisance power' as Hanna Ojanen calls it, because their military non-alignment could hamper further development of an EU security and defence policy. It was, according to Pål Jonsson, said that in the early years of the ESDP, Sweden would receive the 'Maginot medal' for its defensive behaviour since it in policy formulation always threw its weight behind any wording that would halt any possible expansion of the ESDP. Obviously, this was not 'a very glorious epithet to hold', as Jonson notes, and created a fear that Sweden would be bypassed or even end up on the 'wrong side of history'. This sentiment seems to have pushed the Swedish government to take a more pro-active stand on the ESDP. The civilian dimension became a means to shape and influence the ESDP in a way con-

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83 Interview #10.
84 Interviews #4, 10, 12.
85 Interviews #8, 9, 10, 13.
86 Interviews #9, 10, 13.
87 Interview #3.
88 Interview #8.
89 Ojanen, op.cit., p. 155.
90 Jonson, op.cit., p. 199.
ducive to traditional Swedish foreign and security policy thinking. However, it also contributed to a greater openness as, notes one official, ‘we did not want to be perceived as anti-military or fearing the military aspects’[^3]. This pushed Sweden to show in the eyes of the other member states, that it was credible when it advocated its broader concept of security, encompassing both civilian and military instruments[^2].

A second reason was that there was a lack of understanding of the ESDP from both administrative and political circles leading to an instinctive reaction from Stockholm to hold back[^3]. As one official stated, ‘we thought that it was only about common defence and that the ESDP would equate to a common defence[^4]’. During the early period of scepticism and reluctance, there was also a more understandable uncertainty as few knew what the new policy would be used for or in which direction it would develop[^5].

The domestic context should not be underestimated either. As a quite major shift in Sweden’s security policy was taking place, it took some time to gain widespread approval and support[^6]. There has thus been a gradual process of adaptation. As time passed, the government adapted to it as well as the Riksdag and the two eurosceptic parties supporting the government. As people understood and saw that the ESDP worked, the more acceptable it became, the military dimension included[^7]. There is also wide consensus that the experience of holding the EU Presidency had an impact as it forced Sweden to take responsibility for the EU and laid the ground for a more positive attitude amongst the public towards the EU, including the ESDP[^8]. As one official noted, it ‘made us become a part of the mainstream, an established partner in the EU’[^9].

### 3.2 The process of Europeanisation

**The ESDP’s impact on Swedish security policy**

As Reuben Wong writes, there is merit in making a distinction when speaking of change in foreign policy as to whether it regards procedures and structures or the actual substance of a policy area[^10]. On a structural level, it is clear that the EU

[^1]: Interview #3.
[^2]: Ibid.
[^3]: Interview #4.
[^4]: Interview #3.
[^5]: Interview #11.
[^6]: Interview #3.
[^7]: Interview #9.
[^8]: Interview #9.
[^9]: Interviews #8, 9, 10.
membership has had a clear impact on all aspects on Swedish foreign and security policy. As one official stated:

Holding the EU Presidency forced the whole government administration to think in EU terms and to manage the *acquis communautaire*. This management influenced the whole administration, from the lower levels to the highest level. We had to appear as constructive and appear proactive, not backward looking\(^1\).

It is clear that there was a learning process. In many ways, the early years of membership were devoted to *keeping Sweden's head above the steadily rising EU water level*\(^2\). The scope and the scale of the changes required by membership somewhat struck Swedish government officials by surprise\(^3\). It became quickly clear for Swedish diplomats that the EU was not merely another international organisation. It is a completely different way of working, it is intense and above all it is time-consuming. The EU membership and the rapid development of the CFSP and the ESDP thus had a huge impact on Swedish foreign and security policy and significantly changed it\(^4\).

As regards policy on a macro level, the effects of the ESDP seem to be less marked as it is rather EU membership, as concluded above, that has changed the Swedish security policy tradition. It is clear that the policy of military non-alignment has had little impact on the conduct of Swedish security policy with regard to the ESDP. As Swedish diplomats noted the term ‘military non-alignment’ is never used when discussing the ESDP, only in matters relating to the PfP. The only time military non-alignment seems to have been brought up following the creation of the ESDP was in connection with the discussions in the Convention on the Future on mutual defence guarantees, otherwise it seems to have been completely absent\(^5\). However, on a micro level the change is more substantial, in particular as regards operations as one official notes:

In the EU, we participate fully. In the UN, it is different as the DPKO [Department of Peacekeeping Operations] makes the decisions and in the PfP, we are involved but only to a certain extent. In the EU, we sit as a member around the table, we take part in the process of developing concepts and we take decisions. We are involved not just in the later stages. This has had an enormous impact\(^6\).

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\(^1\) Interview #9.
\(^3\) Ibid., p. 243.
\(^4\) Interview #10.
\(^5\) Ibid.
\(^6\) Interview #4.
The fact that in the ESDP, the member states are involved end to end, from idea to implementation, seems to be key. This aspect seems to be particularly important as Sweden’s activism in the early years also was driven by a fear that it would not be considered on an equal footing with the NATO members in the ESDP\textsuperscript{107}. The impact of EU membership in this regard cannot be underestimated as the EU is a community built on a strong political solidarity between its member states\textsuperscript{101}.

Perhaps the clearest example of the ESDP’s impact on Swedish security policy is in the area of defence reform. It is clear that the transformation of the SAF is largely taking place as a result of the development of the ESDP and according to a Swedish officer, the change is the ‘biggest in the history of the SAF for the last 500 years’\textsuperscript{109}. The commitments made to ESDP operations has been used as a tool by the Swedish government for introducing controversial national defence reforms\textsuperscript{110}. The transformation of the SAF was, if not brought about, then at least accelerated by the development of the ESDP and in particular the NBG\textsuperscript{111}. The ESDP process has thus served as an important vehicle for reforms, or as one official described it, as a ‘transformator’\textsuperscript{112}.

From this overview, it is possible to say that at least three of Reuben Wong’s indicators for adaptation and policy convergence can be found (with the one on common policy outputs taking priority over national \textit{domaines réservés} being less present). Firstly, there has been a growing salience to the European political agenda as Sweden has embraced the ESDP. Secondly, there has been an adherence to common objectives as Sweden first reluctantly recognised in the late 1990s. Thirdly, there has been an internalisation of EU membership clearly seen on both a procedural and a policy level. This may hint at a relatively strong degree of the first aspect of Europeanisation and Hanna Ojanen has even argued that Swedish foreign policy today is more the EU’s than its own\textsuperscript{113}. However, this is slightly exaggerated and oversimplified as Europeanisation is not such a unidirectional and clear-cut process as Sweden has also been active in shaping the ESDP.

\textbf{Sweden’s impact on the ESDP}

From the overview above, it is also clear that Sweden has had quite a substantial influence on the development of the ESDP. This points to an interwoven process as it is a question not only of the ESDP influencing Sweden, but also of Sweden influ-

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{107} Interview #9.  
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{110} Interview #10.  
\textsuperscript{111} Interview #8.  
\textsuperscript{112} Interview #4.  
\textsuperscript{113} Ojanen, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 155.
\end{flushleft}
encing the ESDP. It has participated actively in shaping the process and influencing other member states. Sweden rather quickly saw that the ESDP was a dynamic framework that was relatively flexible and possible to influence, much simpler than, for example, the UN. As has been noted above, Sweden is one of few EU member states that has contributed with personnel to all the military and civilian ESDP operations launched to date. Though figures need to be verified, some internal calculations by the MFA suggest that Sweden has contributed 10 per cent of all civilian personnel in ESDP operations making it the fourth biggest troop contributor.

However, it is not only about personnel but also about conceptual contributions. This is most marked in the development of the civilian dimension where Sweden has played a leading role. In several ways, it even seems to be a Swedish achievement that there has been such rapid progress in the civilian dimension of the ESDP and that it encompasses a comprehensive security approach. As one official put it, the ‘fact that there is a civilian dimension of the ESDP today is almost a Swedish accomplishment.’ While Sweden considered it crucial for the success of the ESDP that there would be both a military and a civilian dimension, there was, as we have seen above, a strong degree of incomprehension from the other member states fearing that it would dilute the military dimension. While Swedish diplomats were almost laughed at around the table in the early days of the ESDP, it is a very different situation today. The comprehensive security approach and the broad range of civilian and military instruments of the EU is today touted by Solana and other top EU officials in almost all keynote speeches. Furthermore, of the twenty ESDP operations launched so far only five have been military, though it should be noted that most civilian operations have been rather small and their mandates limited, which has shown that Sweden and other like-minded member states had been correct. Swedish diplomats thus take a certain pride, perhaps rightly so, in having succeeded in ensuring both a civilian and military approach in the ESDP.

It has been highlighted above how the ESDP and the process associated with the NBG have contributed to a more rapid transformation of the SAF. However, the NBG has also worked the other way round as it has made Sweden becoming more proactive on the military side. The speed with which the MoD and the SAF deve-
oped and implemented the EUBG concept meant they could play a very active role and contribute to the discussions at the EU level.

Sweden has thus exerted quite a substantial influence on the ESDP given its size and managed to have an impact on its development. As one official said, 'Sweden is recognised, it is a great power within the CFSP'. A recent study by Daniel Naurin seems to confirm this as Sweden is ranked the fourth most sought-after member state (after Germany, the UK and France) in the CFSP and that it scores are higher in foreign policy than in economic and agricultural policy. This seems to defy previous research on Europeanisation where only the larger member states are said to be powerful enough to fashion the structures and influence the EU policies according to their interests. This is particularly interesting in light of what was mentioned above regarding the challenges that member states face with regard to the CFSP policy-making process. Indeed, for several smaller member states, the capacity to launch initiatives is hampered in the CFSP by the limited resources of their ministries. However, the case of Sweden shows that the ESDP is not only about the larger member states. If you are a serious player ready to contribute to the policy process and to operations with personnel, you can wield an influence much beyond your size. As one official noted, 'if you have a solid argumentation' it is possible to influence the system.

In terms of the second aspect of Europeanisation, the one of national projection, we can therefore find a rather strong presence of more or less all four indicators. Firstly, Sweden has attempted to increase its national influence in the world through the ESDP such as in the case of Artemis. Secondly, it has attempted to influence the policies of other member states by being one of the most active member states in the ESDP, pushing development of its crisis management capacity. Thirdly, it has used the EU as a cover as we have seen with regard to defence reforms. Fourthly, it has externalised its national foreign policy positions onto the EU level by pressing for issues that fitted well with traditional Swedish security policy such as conflict prevention, civilian-military cooperation and EU-UN relations. It therefore seems clear not only that Sweden has made its mark on the ESDP, but also that Swedish participation in the ESDP is truly a bi-directional process of Europeanisation.

\[121\text{ Interview #8.}\]
\[122\text{ Interview #12.}\]
\[124\text{ Wong, 'The Europeanization of Foreign Policy', p. 137.}\]
\[125\text{ Interview #3.}\]
4. Explaining Swedish activism in the ESDP

4.1 The EU as a foreign policy platform

From the attempts in the late 1990s when the focus was to stop all progress towards a common defence, Sweden today embraces the ESDP. As we conclude that such an attitude change to the ESDP, and in particular its military dimension, has taken place we must also ask ourselves why this took place. Some indications have already been given, but there are also some broader underpinning reasons. A general reason explaining Swedish activism in the ESDP was a generally positive attitude towards the CFSP and belief in the EU as an actor on the international stage, including in terms of security policy.\textsuperscript{126} The experience of the EU presidency in this regard was very important in recognising the EU as a global actor.\textsuperscript{127} In the political discourse, this is also possible to observe from the declarations and speeches made by Anna Lindh, as we have seen, a vocal supporter of the EU. The new government, with Carl Bildt as Foreign Minister, in this regard has taken the rhetoric further, reflecting that the EU has simply become the most relevant security organisation for Sweden.

However, one should note that Sweden also has a long tradition of pursuing an active and independent foreign policy with a strong self-confidence and vision, believing that a smaller state can make a difference. Furthermore, Sweden has a long tradition of participation in international peacekeeping operations.\textsuperscript{128} Taking part in various UN peacekeeping operations has been considered a central part of Sweden’s international involvement.\textsuperscript{129} However, Sweden has also taken part in all NATO-led operations, since IFOR in 1995 (then SFOR).\textsuperscript{130} This tradition has facilitated Swedish participation in ESDP operations, as there were no taboos with regard to sending military troops abroad. The experiences of taking part in first UN-led, then NATO-led operations in the Balkans, also contributed to an awareness that the UN was not well-equipped to handle the new types of complex threats such as those in the Balkans.\textsuperscript{131} This led Sweden to become genuinely interested in strengthening the EU’s crisis management capabilities. Furthermore, whereas peacekeeping enjoyed considerable public support, the EU itself was less warmly appreciated. As such, participation in the ESDP was also a way of influencing domestic opinion and showcasing the EU as a project for peace. With its tradition of an active foreign pol-

\textsuperscript{126} Interview #1.
\textsuperscript{127} Interview #9.
\textsuperscript{128} Interview #10.
\textsuperscript{129} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{130} Interview #9.
\textsuperscript{131} Jonson, op.cit., p. 203.
icy, but recognising that as an EU member it was no longer possible to act in the way it once had, Sweden thus needed to find other ways to act.

Even though perhaps reluctantly in the first years, Sweden thus came to recognised that the EU offered the best way to channel Swedish foreign policy\textsuperscript{132}. As a smaller country with international dependence, it was probably easier to accept international co-operation\textsuperscript{133}. For Sweden, the CFSP and the ESDP thus presented an opportunity as a platform for continuing to pursue an active foreign and security policy\textsuperscript{134}. However, it also pushed Sweden to become more active as it realised the possibility to influence the EU’s broader agenda for international peace and security.

4.2 Realising the potential of the ESDP

It may at first sight seem a paradox that Sweden has taken such an active part and promoted an area which strikes at the core of national sovereignty. On the other hand, the Swedish government has been careful stressing the intergovernmental basis of the ESDP, rejecting the use of qualified majority voting. As one official said, the intergovernmental structure of the ESDP has been an ‘indispensable condition’ and Sweden has been able to be active in the ESDP because it has been intergovernmental\textsuperscript{135}. The fact that the ESDP has been in the hands of the member states have given them a sense of retaining control of its development, particularly important in the case of a Sweden keen not to see any progress towards a common defence. Furthermore, it has created a strong sense of ownership\textsuperscript{136}.

Another important explanation as to why the ESDP was appreciated by Sweden was that it was shown to be an efficient instrument in terms of both resources and results\textsuperscript{137}. As one official noted, it is a ‘cheap form of foreign policy’\textsuperscript{138}. The CFSP budget covers all civilian ESDP costs with exception of salaries for the personnel for which Sweden has no problems funding out of the development aid budget\textsuperscript{139}. For a small member state, there is thus a clear monetary value as it would cost more to act alone. As regards results, Sweden saw that the ESDP functioned well and that its operations delivered which generated a positive attitude\textsuperscript{140}. Furthermore, the development of the ESDP was in line with Swedish views of a wider concept of secu-

\textsuperscript{132} Interview #3.
\textsuperscript{133} Interview #8.
\textsuperscript{134} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{135} Interview #3.
\textsuperscript{136} Interview #9.
\textsuperscript{137} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{138} Interview #3.
\textsuperscript{139} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{140} Interview #10.
The combination of different instruments suited Sweden well and as the civilian dimension grew to become the dominant one, thus rewarding a hard-fought struggle, it gave further encouragement. This made the ESDP a very attractive option for Sweden.

Upon entering the EU in 1995, the Swedish government aspired to belong to the inner core and stated that it would not accept a position as one of the many peripheral members. However, there were several handicaps to such a role including the country’s eurosceptic public opinion and the policy of military non-alignment. In order to advance its own positions and interests, one of the answers was to be active in the policy process and contribute where possible, following a rather simple logic that activism generates credibility. The ESDP became an area where Sweden could show activism, take the lead and push European integration. This was not possible in all EU policy areas.

As Sweden concluded in the late 1990s that it was not possible to stop the establishment of the ESDP, the second best option was to ensure that it reflected Swedish priorities and influence its direction. This seems particularly true for the introduction of CCM in the ESDP, an area in which Sweden had a certain knowledge and expertise, which permitted it to have an extra leverage in discussions as well as seconding Swedish civil servants in high-ranking positions in the General Secretariat of the Council (GSC). The same seems to hold true for participation in missions, including military ones. Taking part in the military missions follows the same logic of showing commitment and thus gaining influence. There is also a more psychological phenomenon linked to this. As the former chairperson of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, put it, if the EU needs troops, the 'question is posed to all around the table. The country that does not raise its hand will count as a lightweight – even in other political issues'. This example highlights the bi-directional nature of Europeanisation; in one way, it shows the peer pressure that is put on member states in the EU context, and in the other, it shows how to gain influence in the ESDP by playing a pro-active role and obtaining an influence going beyond its size.

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141 Interview #9.
142 Ibid.
143 Ekengren & Sundelius, op.cit., p. 240.
144 Interview #1.
145 Interview #10.
146 Interview #13.
147 Strömvik, 'Starting to think big', p. 212.
The aim of this paper has been to examine the role Sweden has played in the ESDP and why it has become so active in this policy area, including how and to what extent the ESDP has influenced Sweden and vice versa.

It is clear that Sweden was firmly against the development of the EU into a military actor in the early years. Once it was clear that it was a question of crisis management and the civilian dimension was introduced, its attitude changed. There has been an adaptation of Swedish security policy due not only to EU membership itself, but also due to the pressures arising from the development of the ESDP. Sweden has had to reform and to reshape its security policy due to EU membership.

However, there has also been a projection of Swedish preferences, ideas and policies into the ESDP such as CCM and conflict prevention. Sweden played an active role in the development of the ESDP and tried to bring its own foreign policy orientations to bear on its development and quite successfully so. The results clearly show that Europeanisation has been truly a bi-directional process in the case of Sweden and the ESDP.

In a study on the consequences on EU membership on Swedish security policy prepared by two retired senior diplomats, the potentially sweeping changes brought by EU membership on Swedish security policy are stressed, but that at the same time the EU would also help promote Swedish security policy:

No one should be mistaken that EU membership will bring about far-reaching obligations of a character that Sweden hitherto has not needed to consider or undertake. But no one should either believe that Sweden hereby abandons the control over its foreign policy. What is at stake is to assemble the European states to collective action through the promotion of common values and interests.\(^\text{148}\)

Thirteen years later, this assessment seems to hold even though neither the ESDP nor the concept of Europeanisation existed at the time.