“Ah, philosophe barbare! Viens nous lire tes livres sur un champ de bataille”
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Que l’état de guerre nait de l’état social*

The EU needs a frame of analysis to understand the international arena if it wants to intervene in that very arena as a provider of a new kind of security—meaning:
1. a security for all, or “global security” as the 2003 European Security Strategy Paper calls it
2. a security focused on change, “for a better world”, as the document suggests from its very title (‘A secure Europe in a better world’). The wording of the document implies that the EU is not interested in becoming yet another power engaged in reproducing the present world’s order, but a new, challenging international actor ready, presumably, to change it (how else could it make it better?)

“In a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security and prosperity”, reads the document, “increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. The development of a stronger international society, well-functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order is (an EU) objective”. This will not be possible until “the quality of the governments” which form it is enhanced. “The best protection for our own security”, the document emphatically declares, “is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order”.

This is all good as far as declaratory policy is concerned. The point is; are we prepared to support these wishes with an adequate conceptualization of what we mean through the terms global threats, global market and global media, their reciprocal relations and their connections with overall security? And, more generally, do we share some common vision on how Europe was able to put an end to its previous inter-state rivalries? Or how did it happen that the European Communities’ territory had not to endure any attack from outside? We should also be ready to explain which kind of power the EU represents, what do we mean by international society and where the recipes proposed to make it stronger come from, in terms of theories or, at least, hypothesis.

This is where “the ought to be” of European security should be anchored and rooted and these are the questions I’ll try to discuss in this paper.

My interpretation of the linkages between the first three above-mentioned terms (global threats, global markets and global media) is, briefly, set out below.

Let’s begin with threats. Maybe to call them global is misleading, if, for global, we intend, as the paper seems to imply, that they menace the very existence of mankind

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2 The entire sentence reads as follow: “Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world”; see *A secure Europe in a better world. European Security Strategy*, Brussels, 12 December 2003.
taken as a whole (such as global warming). But they are global in the more technical sense that they are closely linked with the existence of a pervasive free-market oriented capitalist system. By this expression I mean a series of real and virtual market places where things “exchanged” (that is, bought and sold) are: money (good and bad, such as unreliable financial instruments or ‘dirty’ money), commodities and raw materials (good and bad, such as uranium), services (good and bad, such as violence, bought and sold on a private basis), goods (good and bad such as drugs and arms, including those of mass destruction) and, last but not least, human resources (good and bad, such as human trafficking, etc).

Despite the rules being formulated and tentatively implemented by international organizations to manage these “risks” (or would it be more appropriate to say, in certain case, because of?), there are increasing portions of humanity endangered by the convergence of one or more of these threats. The current food crises is a clear example of this. And these portions of humanity are localized, both territorially and socially. To define these risks as global, in the sense that they affect all of us would be, therefore, very misleading.

The global media helps in giving everyone the opportunity to look at victims wherever they happen to be. The exposure to images doesn’t help, per se, to globalize the threat. We hope it can help, at least, in encouraging people to try to develop one (or several) conceptual frameworks with which to understand which problems lie behind those dead bodies and exposed suffering.

Despite many sophisticated papers and good task group reports, I think we’re very far from having a genuine debate on this. Yet, in my opinion, the “ought to be” of European security should be strongly rooted into a set of hypothesis on how and why the world goes this way and where the causes of violence and conflict lie.

In the same vein, we set, reset and permanently discuss the possibilities to grasp the complexity of our national societies and their changing internal dynamics. This is a necessary pre-requisite to any debate about, say, the ideal contents of democracy and the instruments to reach it. This is also necessary in order to judge whether one government complied with its past promises in terms of democracy and to help it, eventually and if necessary, to adjust its actions. The ones who follow, say, Rawls, and his concept of “deliberative democracy”, will support certain policies in order to reach its full development, while the ones more attached to a formal vision of democracy will be more focused on legal and institutional matters, etc. Nobody will tell them they’re utopian. On the contrary, they will be prized for helping democracy to consolidate internally and spread externally – with the insightfulness of their argumentation. Nor will they be told that, because more than one definition exists, the concepts are fouled, or democracy is impossible to achieve, or it should be left in the hands of practitioners. As a matter of fact, the very coexistence of more than one concept of democracy is a component of democracy as such!

As far as I know, this is not what happens in the debate on the international arena, on how it could develop into a safer place for everybody (or, at least, safer for more people compared to now) and, finally, how best the EU could contribute to this task.

Why? I think for two main reasons: the ambiguity of the present debate going on in Europe on security and the unwillingness of those in charge of the incipient EU defence policy to engage in a serious dialogue on the strategic purposes of such a policy.

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3 According to the document, the five major global threats confronting the EU (and the world) are: terrorism, the proliferation of arms of mass destruction, regional conflict, failing states, and organized crime.
The debate on security in Europe

As a matter of fact, there seems not to be one, but at least four debates going on. The four are interlocked, but of a different nature, the first two being more historical, and the second and third politological (and partly philosophical). This is why they take place in different academic circles and rarely intermingle.

The first of these is about the "internal side" of security, that is: how Europe was able to get out of its hobbesian inter-state disorder and enter a long period of peace within its borders. Elsewhere, taking inspiration from Carr, I offered my interpretation of this, making reference to the three layers of equity which had been accumulating in Europe in the course of its history and which came to converge in the second post war period: the equality of the individuals (the quest of the French revolution), the equality of social groups (the quest of Marxism) and the equality of nations (the quest of a Wilsonian order, in Carr’s vision). National governments and the Communities channelled demands for (and, partially responded to) these three pursuits, in a time of unprecedented economic prosperity. Slowly but surely, the state-centric concept of security based on the accumulation of coercive power was substituted with a more encompassing vision centred on the pursuit of: 1. the protection of individuals, which was rooted in the liberal tradition of European thought and 2. the protection of what were then perceived as underprivileged social groups and classes, that was rooted in the socialist and solidaristic-catholic tradition. Such a vision coalesced into a strategy made up of liberal European regulations and practices of national solidarity. This combined strategies helped to weaken the support for internal communist parties, incorporating some of their requests, while playing allegiance to liberal principles in the economic spheres. So, social peace was guaranteed internally, while providing for a smooth insertion in the global liberally-oriented market.

This, I think, is how the creation of a secure international society within Europe replaced the old-fashioned ‘balance-of-power’ among European states.

Other scholars opt for another interpretation which emphasizes the role played by the necessity to confront a tough common menace (the USSR) and by the opportunity to benefit from a robust federator (the US). In this vision, European states were urged to stick together and put an end to their traditional rivalries by these two external factors.

The second debate is about "the external side" of European security, that is: why Europe never had to endure an armed attack after the second world war – this is the external meaning of its security. Some scholars believe it was a consequence of NATO, others of the Yalta Conference at the end of World War II. Many years ago, I spent some years doing research on military plans and doctrine of the first years of NATO’s life –which happened to be the most tense period of the Cold War in Europe: 1947-1953. The title of my study read ‘Undefended Europe’ and what I found out was that neither NATO nor the nuclear umbrella behind it were credible as defence instruments for Europe at the time. This does not mean that NATO was unimportant. It simply means that the role played by it in ensuring the defence of Europe is all but straightforward and is still a subject of different interpretations.

On the other hand, there is clear historical evidence that Stalin got at Yalta what he wanted: the direct control or indirect hegemony over the territories that the Red Army had occupied. Within a realist logic, it couldn’t but be that way –as these countries had lost the war and they were therefore in the hand of the winner. Stalin and Churchill had similar
ideas on this point and Churchill, up to a certain point, understood Stalin’s obsession about securing a protective belt of pro-communist states around the USSR.

Was European external security assured by Stalin unwillingness to invade it or by NATO readiness to protect it? It would be very useful to approach this question with an historical and not ideological attitude, speaking about facts and not perceptions.

The third debate relates to the nature of the EU as an international security actor.

Positions held in this context depend on interpretations made of the nature of the EU as such. Despite the current differences (the EU appears to be a mix of ever-changing institutions, common values, convincing arguments, socially embedded ‘smart’ rules and efficient policies –every author stressing one of the other of these elements), there seems to exist a convergence towards the belief that it is not a state.

Building on this same appraisal, some scholars maintain that the EU is experiencing a new kind of sovereignty, which is not rooted on the *ius ad bellum* as its main constituent element, as it is the case for the traditional kind of states. This new sovereignty has been developing due to many concomitant factors and it has gone in parallel with a sort of “civilianization” of member states -which is, in Mario Telò’s vision, at the core of the Europeanisation of member states.

At the same time, these scholars lay emphasis on the important changes experienced in the way power is handled in the international arena. In many instances of international life, persuasion works better than force: This is why it is said that institutions, values and political cultures matter more that coercive means: they are referred to as “soft power”.

In this context, not only the EU can be seen as a pioneer of this new kind of power, but, more properly, it is thought that it “can be conceptualized as a changer of norms in the international system” (which Ian Manners calls the “ontological quality of the term normative power”). The author adds a normative (meaning deontological) twist to the term, when he says that the EU “should act to extend its norms into the international system”.

This has been and will continue to be done by: 1. enlarging EU’s borders, and 2. expanding this pattern of action to other regional areas of the world.

Yet, if it seems correct to say that norms matter, it is also important to remember that norms are not neutral, but the expression of a constellation of interests, prioritized through a specific axiology (that is, a coherent system of values), in a given time period. Norms are thick in social and political content. In the field of security and conflict, the EU is said by Manners to stand in favour of the “norm” of “durable peace”, that is a situation where the structural causes of conflicts are addressed –even if the EU can be called to answer localized violent symptoms from time to time. Can “durable peace” be defined as a

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4 The “Cold War International History Project” of the Wilson Center, Washington DC, has offered some interesting insights on this point through researches conducted in the Russian archives; see www.wilsoncenter.org/cwhp.


norm? And, particularly, as a common EU norm\(^8\)? The empirical study of specific cases (for example, DG RELEX attitudes vis-à-vis Latin America during these last years) gives evidence of the fact that, not always, EU actions fit this model.

A fourth debate relates to the nature of international society and how to make it safer.

Even if the concept of international society (as distinguished from the system of states) first emerged many years ago on European soil, agreement has yet to be reached on what it means and how to translate it in normative terms, that is: how to define the meaning of a “stronger international society”. At first sight, one could think that the easiest way to do it to adapt to the international realm what made it possible to understand how the European arena worked and how we got to create a stronger international society within Europe. But analogy in this field must be used with care and consensus on how to analyse the social and political dynamics which regulate the internal EU arena is dubious\(^9\).

An even more serious problem arises from the fact that, for many scholars, international society does not exist and, if it does, it is an irrelevant element of international security. For them, be they realists, neo-realists, neo-liberal institutionalists or the like, states or international organizations (made up by states) run the game, even if some of them play lip service to NGOs etc.

We all know the story by now: men are naughty, but intelligent. States are naughty and dangerous. To be safe means precisely for them to have power over others (to impede them doing something or force them to do something). And power is a zero-sum game. In this context, the most definite and definitive form of power is physical predominance, therefore coercive power, which is useful in the settling of disputes because it makes the outcomes unquestionable in terms of winners and losers. To be safe, for a state, means, therefore, to be strong. The stronger the safer. Unfortunately, as states do not live in isolation, this tendency, which makes sense individually, creates instability in the system. What matters most to keep the international system running despite this permanent instability, is that every actor be able to calculate correctly the distribution of power (something which can be done only with the help of a bright specialist in security!) and, on the basis of this, strike alliances (or, and, make war).

To sum up, all the attention is put on how to gain in terms of comparative power, without messing up everything. Many hypothesis were advanced concerning which kind of distribution is more stable, on how power disparity between alliances influences the propensity of the system for war etc. In general, the main weaknesses of these ways of analysing international relations (IIR) seems to be the lack of theories behind the correlations or the patterns of actions found\(^10\), despite “the seductive search for a theory

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\(^8\) The existence of this norm would be proved by the fact that “La politique de l’UE met l’accent sur l’aide au développement, le commerce, la coopération interrégionale, le dialogue politique et l’élargissement” Ian Manners, *L’identité internationale de l’UE: une puissance normative dans le jeu politique mondial*, in Bernard Adam, *Europe puissance tranquille? Role et identité sur la scène mondiale*, Brussels, GRIP, Editions Complexes, 2006, pp. 33-49: 40. Elsewhere, the EU is said to be “founded on” and have “as its foreign and development policy objectives the consolidation of democracy, rule of law, and respect of human rights and fundamental freedom” – principles mentioned in its main legal texts; see Manners (2002), p. 241.


\(^10\) Let’s take a classic example: the empirical research done by Singer and Small (1968) demonstrating that as the power disparity between alliance increases, the bellicosity of the systems increases as well. Suppose that we share the criteria which lead the two authors to state that during the peaceful XIX century there was little disparity between European alliances, and during the violent XX century there was more disparity, which kind of theory would these correlations confirm or disprove? Where is the ‘why’ question? See
that can qualify as ‘scientific’ by positivistic standards”. The supposedly scientific character of such research rests, in reality, only in the absence of a normative dimension in their thought, which is exactly what many consider one of their major weaknesses.

Most intellectual efforts in the field have been devoted, after the behavioural revolution, to analysing how gains could be calculated in the frame of a retroactive and unstable system, which is the standard image of the international arena (comparative gains, rational choice, system theory, game theory are, basically, all about that). Behaviouralists, more interested in the behaviour of men than in their nature, were more optimists than realists, i.e., you cannot change man’s nature, but you can change behaviour.

The problem was the purpose of this change, i.e., better adaptation to a dangerous and precarious system? It seems that a vast proportion of IR studies during the Cold War pursued this aim; from this point of view, it does not appear so inaccurate to regard them as responsible, at least in part, for the costly accumulation of dangerous and useless nuclear warheads up to 1985. Krippendorff goes so far as to write that “…the Cold War – an absurd reduction of the complexity of the world to two simple poles or camps as the ‘dominant’ or ‘salient’ contradiction (the dialectics) of our time- was the outcome or product, of IR theory”.

On the other hand, more modern theories linked to social constructivism do not bother about what men are, but how do they act in a social frame. Acts of speaking, discussing, convincing and being convinced are considered to be very important ingredients of that frame. Interests, and the way one perceives them, are not inscribed in the objective reality, but are the outcome of this complex game (part of which is explicit and part implicit). Ideas have a repercussion on reality. Interests can change, they can converge. For example, they can converge on the opportunity to present an issue as a crucial menace in front of public opinion (say, immigration, or Iran going nuclear). All this is good but, to what extent has this to do with the understanding of how the security arena works? Once we know everything about how and why a question is securitized, will we be in a better position to understand it?

The “being” of European security

Downgraded to its military contents, security is the reserve de chasse of a small group of “experts” which, working as a silent (and blind) mole and excavating a tunnel under the fourfold debate on security, capitalize on its ambiguities. Their approach is a blend of British empiricism, Jean Monnet’s gradualism and a simple, business-like, no-nonsense attitude. They have a straightforward vision of the past, which they refer to as a sort of uncontroversial fact. It is the one I referred to previously, i.e., the Soviet menace and an external federator (the US) was what helped Europeans to peacefully stick together in the European communities. NATO was what made it possible for Europe to define itself as a new virtuous “civilian power”.


12 See the FAS (Federation of American Scientists) www.fas.org, for some startling data on this phenomenon.

The legitimacy of the defence policy they are building up is thought to arise from poll. In fact, polls say European citizens are ready to give more military teeth to the EU. Sweet music in their ears.

In their vision, the EU is yet another power caught in a power-politics game, whose contents have not changed in centuries. They share what Edward Carr defined as a “revolt against the utopianism of current political thought”\textsuperscript{14}. It is interesting in this respect to cite the appropriate piece of literature that was Carr’s source of inspiration for this comment. We refer to the famous piece contained in chap XV of Machiavelli’s \textit{Il Principe}:

\textit{“E molti si sono immaginati repubbliche e principati che non si sono mai visti né conosciuti essere in vero; perché elli è tanti discosto da come si vive a come si dovrebbe vivere, che colui che lascia quello che si fa per quello che si dovrebbe fare, impara più tosto la ruina che la preservazione sua: perché uno uomo, che voglia fare in tutte le parte professione di buono, conviene rovini infra tanti che non sono buoni. Onde è necessario a uno principe, volendosi mantenere, imparare a poter essere non buono, et usarlo e non usarlo secondo la necessità”}\textsuperscript{15}.

If they wanted to survive, Italian princes of Machiavelli’s times had to abandon any idea of human progress and deontological ethics because they were living among wicked neighbours (the Pope being one of the worst). Indeed Machiavelli lived in a time of extreme animosity among Italian principalities - the 16th century - where each of the princes was in continual danger of the physical destruction of their land, population and themselves. \textit{Mutatis mutandis}, this was also true for Carr, who wrote the first edition of his book in 1939. Can Machiavelli’s times be usefully compared to today’s situation? It seems to me that things have changed remarkably: according to Solana’s document, “large-scale aggression against any Member States” is said to be “improbable”\textsuperscript{16}. Nor does European states seem to be risking their existence because of reciprocal territorial greed. So, why should the EU fear imagining a better world?

The reason is very clear to me. Let’s hear what a scholar, part and parcel of this group, wrote some years ago: “(...) it appears that defence policy can develop quite independently of foreign policy in a sort of cocoon, impervious to any political differences between states. This complete separation of the military sphere, in contradiction with the declared objectives of a common European defence as an extension of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), raises an interesting question: if political disagreements do not affect defence, could that be because defence lies outside politics, hardly perturbed by internal disagreements yet unlikely to influence political relations between member states.”\textsuperscript{17}

“It’s military, stupid”, they seem to be saying. We should stop, once and for all, to think about defence, and the military stuff it is made of, as deeply embedded into politics, economics, culture and society. More than a realist posture, this seems to me the bottom line of naïveté.

In my opinion, the primary reasons for the present trend towards the creation of a European military system have indeed much to do with the need to solve the economic and social problems many national military systems are experiencing. These problems

\textsuperscript{14} Edward H.Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, chap. 5.
\textsuperscript{15} Niccolò Machiavelli, \textit{Il Principe} [1513], con introduzione di Giuliano Procaccio, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1960, chap. XV, p. 65
\textsuperscript{16} One should ask himself/herself (or Mr. Solana) why, is this the case, Europeans have backed Bush’ proposal on missile shield within NATO.
\textsuperscript{17} And then the author, switching to yet another problem, continues in a rather critical tone “If it were indeed the case, there could be no strengthening of the Union’s global political role unless priority were given to its foreign policy: defence as such does not create policy, and even less integration”. Nicole Gnesotto, Preface to ESDP book by ISS, written in December 2003.
arise from two converging dynamics which have been at work since, at least, the Sixties of the 20th century; i.e., a loss of legitimacy of the armed forces and the worsening of the structural disadvantages that the European military industry always had vis-à-vis the North American one. To answer the first and the second problem many avenues have been tried. For example, many governments have dropped their obligatory military systems and many have opened their armed forces to women. As far as the military industry is concerned, one should never forget that, despite all declarations of intent, art. 296 TEC exempts defence-related firms from abiding to the competition rules of the common market. Is there anything wrong in recognizing that without state aid and/or state procurement and/or public funds for R and D, neither European nor North American military firms could survive? Yet, this goes against a certain liberal discourse which has hegemonised European economic debate in the last twenty years. To have a strong political justification behind art. 296 TCE would legitimize yet another exception to this golden rule.

Could that be at least part of the reason why slowly but surely, the EU is setting up military instruments, rules and institutions? This seems to be indirectly confirmed by the fact that never before have some European governments showed such a great and openly-expressed vitality as arms dealers– a business which used to be widely stigmatized as one of the reasons of wars.

The drive toward an European defence, then, could be seen more as a comprehensive and very efficient way to answer two different social and economic needs, than a pursuit of some dignified values.

If my analysis is right, the present convergence of European governments will apply to the setting up of common military means, but will not necessarily extend to their employment. Once the military forces are set up, it is indeed difficult to understand how they could lead to overcoming the present uncertainties that characterize the sphere of military policy intended as the deployment of armed forces. The fact that Petersberg missions be pursued with common instead of national forces - temporarily earmarked to the EU - will not change the political difficulty created by having to decide whether to intervene or not.

Whether the decalogue of ‘principles’ contained in, say, the Human Security Doctrine for Europe could become useful to legitimize European military interventions in public opinions’ eyes, it will not help to create a debate on the causes of global insecurity, nor in finding a common ground in cases of disagreements on this or that action. Indeed, the “primacy of human rights, clear political authority, multilateralism, a bottom-up approach, regional focus, the use of legal instruments, and the appropriate use of force” appears to be a list of very civilized suggestions to cope with threats in the realm of what have been cleverly defined by Žižek as “pseudo-naturalized ethno-religious conflicts”. “In the age of ‘post-politics’” - he says - “when politics proper is progressively replaced by expert social administration, the sole remaining sources of conflict are cultural (religious) or natural (ethnic) tensions”. It is good time for Europe to ponder over these intimations.

In the meanwhile, it could be helpful to operationalize those vague concepts such as multilateralism. Is multilateralism, and international organizations which mostly embody it, good per se? In case it is so, why is it that the EU is so shy to commit itself in those very fields where its declared stand for multilateralism (and for the use of legal instruments) could effectively be put to test? I’m referring, for instance, to one of the most menacing long-term developments in the global strategic balance, i.e. the progressive

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militarization of space. This is a development which will affect global security and require multilateral action, but no one in Europe, at this moment, seems ready to work in this direction. The same could be said for the progressive erosion of the anti-ballistic missile regime. It is not surprising to see traditional powers, such as Russia and China, reacting in traditional ways to these menaces, with rearmament. What it is really puzzling, is the reserved position of Europe on all that. - or, should we define Europe’s backing of Bush on a missile shield within NATO as a response tuned with all the discourses going on about civilian power and human security?

In the meantime, the military dimension of Europe is not an object of public scrutiny, polls being considered a sufficient surrogate for public debate. In case of future controversial interventions it will be much easier for European governments to decide, via Brussels, and its yet unclear chain of command, with no interference from any parliament – as EP participation is excluded from the European security field, while national parliaments could object to national defence policies only. Will European defence policy turn out to be an instance of consolidation of national executives? This would be the rather an ironic end to many years of well-intentioned and inspired debate.

Conclusions

The present gap between the theory and practice of European security is unhelpful for everyone. Not only are we risking losing a historical opportunity for putting to the test the possibility of helping to change the world, but the EU risks being perceived, from the outside, as one of the most blatant examples of Machiavellism. Let’s remind ourselves of what the Florentine said about the conflict between moral law (which he called “le leggi”) and practice, in the realm of security (“la forza”) (chap XVIII). He recognized that moral law is the realm of man, and force is the path of beasts. Yet, he wrote, the prince must make use of both. “(...) uno principe, e massime uno principe nuovo, non può osservare tutte quelle cose per le quali li uomini sono tenuti buoni, sendo spesso necessitate, per mantenere lo stato, operare contro la fede, contro alla carità, contro alla umanità, contro alla relligione. E però bisogna che ellì abbi uno animo disposto a volgersi secondo ch’è venti e le variazioni della fortuna li comandono e, come sopra dissi, non partirsì dal bene, potendo, ma sapere entrare nel male, necessitando. Debbbe adunque avere uno principe gran cura che non li esca mai di bocca una cosa che non sia piena delle soprascritte cinque qualità e paia, a vederlo et udirlo, tutto pietà, tutto fede, tutto integrità, tutto umanità, tutto religione”19.

All the talk about Europe as a civilian power and the like would risk being seen not only as yet another instance of the European love for talk, but rather as a convenient cover for a military build-up which bears no relation to them.

Some extra bibliography:


19 N. Machiavelli, op.cit, chap. XVIII, p.72-73.


