ABSTRACT

Is the European Union emerging as a global foreign and security actor? Has the EU developed the necessary tools to deal with the security agenda in the European continent? Is the rapidly evolving European Security and Defence Policy an efficient framework for the Petersberg tasks in the 21st century? What is the role that Turkey play / could play in this context? The proposed article aims to present, with a historical and analytical perspective, the main issues concerning the participation of Turkey in the ESDP, in particular in relation to the institutional mechanisms, the decision making and decision shaping procedures, the relations with NATO and the military capabilities. In other words, the article is built around the question of the ‘Berlin Plus’ agreements between the EU and NATO and the special position of Turkey between these two organisations. In that respect, the present working paper analyses the factors that explain how, why and with what aims has the EU developed a specific policy towards Turkey concerning its participation in ESDP missions and structures.

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Miguel MEDINA ABELLAN
PhD candidate
Centre of International Studies
University of Cambridge
mama4@cam.ac.uk
INTRODUCTION

The status of non-EU European North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Members within the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) decision-making framework is one of the thorniest issues in the development of this policy\(^1\). In this regard, the understanding of the Turkish position in relation to ESDP and the wrangling that ended with the European Council decisions in Copenhagen (December 2002) are vital issues to analyse the dynamics of the ESDP project and the relation with NATO. Turkey has followed a hard line position concerning the development of the ESDP, position that reflects other aspects of the bilateral relations with the EU, exactly in the same way that the EU has been strict and sometimes inflexible with Turkey. Turkey has based its objections concerning ESDP on its privileged relations with NATO (and the United States) and on its disputes with Greece and Cyprus. For its part, the EU has been reluctant to offer Turkey a more accurate status inside ESDP for institutional-political reasons and for the specific character of Turkey as a foreign and security actor. The EU has been struggling to reach consensus on common security and defence policies over the last years, and its relations with NATO and transatlantic affairs in general are uncertain. Adding Turkey to this mix makes the situation even more complex for the EU. Yet multiple questions are open: Would Turkey’s participation enhance or weaken the ESDP endeavour? Can the EU deliver a credible ESDP without Turkey? Would it be useful for Turkey?\(^2\).

The purpose of the present paper is to sketch out, with a historical and analytical perspective, the main issues concerning the participation of Turkey in ESDP, in particular in relation to the institutional mechanisms, the decision making and decision shaping procedures, the relations with NATO and the military capabilities. In other words, the paper focuses around the question of the ‘Berlin Plus’ agreements between the EU and NATO and the special position of Turkey in this context. This piece of work starts by presenting the particularity of the Turkish case inside the European security architecture and the main problems of the bilateral relations with the EU: the unique geopolitical position of Turkey, its status inside ESDP, its relations with NATO, and the current situation. The second section touches upon the centre of the EU – Turkey security concerns: the Berlin Plus agreements. This will be the central section of the paper, since it analyses the most important aspect of Turkish participation in ESDP. Finally, the third section briefly introduces the participation of Turkey in the ESDP missions and deals with the possible Turkish contribution to security and stability in Europe. It addresses the capabilities that Turkey has offered and might supply in the future for ESDP purposes, including both military and non-military inputs. Some partial conclusions close the present document.

\(^1\) Tocci, Nathalie / Hoube, Marc, ‘Accommodating Turkey in ESDP’, in CEPS Policy Briefs No 5, May 2001, p 1

The EU accession process and the involvement in ESDP has left Turkey with the dilemma of how to reconcile its internal and external policy challenges. It is arguable that Turkey has been hesitant to align itself to the EU positions on issues which it feels touch its vital foreign policy and security interests, in particular regarding its geographical neighbourhood. Hence, Turkey has demonstrated that it is willing to impose restrictions on NATO-EU cooperation when it believes its interests are at stake. Turkish officials, not surprisingly, see Turkey maintaining a strong Atlanticist position within NATO and the EU. They insist that Ankara, even being a member of the EU, would maintain a strong strategic defence relationship with the US, arguing that security concerns would not allow Turkey to take an EU-only position at the expense of NATO. What are the most sensitive issues for Turkey? What factors explain Turkey’s position concerning ESDP and NATO?

The first and most important issue to consider in relation to Turkey’s foreign policy is its NATO membership. The discourse of the Turkish authorities has combined support for the strengthening of ESDP with the claim that transatlantic links should remain central. Turkey has been traditionally reluctant in its support of the building of a European defence independent of NATO. Turkey is a geographically a Eurasian country, Islamic by faith but officially secular, and broadly European in outlook and aspiration. The peculiar geographical situation of Turkey has conditioned its own political and historical development, clearly affecting its domestic and foreign policies. In short, Turkey is a Muslim country integrated in the European structures of security and defence, and at the same time is part of the West political, economic and social organisations.

In the traditional sense, while Turkey’s geography has predetermined its security discourses and foreign policy, it has also been able to separate its foreign policy towards the West, which is largely driven by its NATO membership, from its regional relations, particularly with the Middle East. In fact, Turkey’s membership...
to NATO has shaped, and to a specific degree constituted, its perception of the West in general and Europe in particular\textsuperscript{10}.

Beyond the NATO stance, Turkey’s position concerning the development of ESDP is also explained by two subsequent factors. First, we must mention Ankara’s mistrust over some European countries. Turkey’s veto threat over ESDP’s use of NATO assets and capabilities was not simply driven by what the civilian-military establishment deemed as European \textit{broken promises}. These simply served to create the legal context through which Turkey articulated its claims. What laid behind these claims was Turkey’s fundamental mistrust of the Union, and its strong preference for NATO, in which it was a full member. Second, despite Greece’s apparent support for Turkish candidacy since 1999, its rationale in the ESDP dispute alerted the rest of MS, given the fact that at the same time it has adopted a very intransigent attitude towards the resolution of the ESDP conflicts between the EU, NATO and Turkey. The Turkish exclusion syndrome, on the one hand, and the defensive Greek stance, on the other, went some way to explaining why the agreement reached in December 2002 was only possible due to long and tense negotiations\textsuperscript{11}, intensive diplomatic meetings and reciprocal concessions.

\section*{2. TURKEY AS A PECULIAR ESDP ASSOCIATE: THE BERLIN PLUS AGREEMENTS}

After having presented a brief overview of Turkey’s foreign policy, it is convenient to further work on the most important aspect concerning Turkey and ESDP: the Berlin Plus arrangements. Let’s refresh our memory.

Berlin Plus meant a strategic partnership between the EU and NATO in the areas of crisis management, conflict prevention and humanitarian missions. The agreements set out the mechanisms by which the EU could have ‘assured access’ to NATO operational capabilities planning, ‘presumption of availability’ to NATO capabilities and common assets, and a European command inside NATO for EU-led operations\textsuperscript{12}.

During the last years of the century the awkward mechanism of the Berlin Plus arrangements proved unsatisfactory in several ways. Nonetheless, the most important problem remained unsolved for some years, in other words the relationship of the ESDP with NATO and the EU access to NATO’s planning capabilities, assets and command. It is precisely in this operational part of the Berlin Plus agreement where the Turkish

\textsuperscript{10} Oymen, Omur, ‘The Place of Turkey in European Security and Defence Identity’, in Nas, Çigdem; Dartan, Muzaffer, \textit{The European Union Enlargement Process and Turkey}, Marmara University European Community Institute, Istanbul, 2002, p 292

\textsuperscript{11} Soler, op.cit., p 41

issue was more visible. Turkey therefore used its membership of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) to block the Berlin Plus process until an agreement was reached. This was a double-edged sword since, at the same time as it stopped EU plans to mount military missions before it was autonomously equipped to do so, it also gave an incentive to the EU to precipitate its move towards total autonomy from NATO\(^\text{13}\).

### 2.1. Turkey and the development of ESDP

Yet Ankara’s initial reaction to ESDP and the institutional set up was fierce, inspired both by an assumption that the EU was seeking to challenge NATO as Europe’s hard security actor and by the consequence that Turkey would thereby be excluded from a key component of Europe’s emerging security architecture\(^\text{14}\). Ankara’s security culture, its national and nationalistic sensitivities, and its mistrust of the EU led it to the conclusion that the ESDP represented a wilful determination to marginalise NATO and exclude non-EU members\(^\text{15}\). The main problem was a dispute over the EU’s links to NATO, and more precisely on the involvement of non-EU European members of NATO in the ESDP. Nor was this simply because of its perpetual problem with Greece: Turkey understandably feared that ESDP developments represented quantum lead towards an EU on its borders with a powerful foreign and defence policy in which it would not be able to participate for the foreseeable future\(^\text{16}\).

In addition, Turkey feared that a EU force could potentially operate on its areas of interests, hence without having the right to decide or intervene. Turkey was concerned about ESDP but, from the very beginning, it wanted to participate. The fact that Turkey was not likely to join the EU by that time did not make the negotiations easier. These fears of exclusion pushed Turkey to veto several times any agreement that would give the EU ‘assured access’ to NATO military assets and planning capabilities. Concerning Ankara’s relations with Athens, Turkey approached Greece from an instrumental perspective. The more the EU behaved receptively to Turkey’s membership, the greater Turkey’s conciliatory steps towards Greece\(^\text{17}\).

Turkey, between NATO and ESDP, was the crucial problem of the implementation of the Berlin Plus \textit{acquis}. The discrepancy was clear. In a few words, Turkey had a certain position within the WEU\(^\text{18}\), allowing it to broker power. Turkey was promised during the Washington summit that the EU should build on existing

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\(^{13}\) Howorth (2003), \textit{op.cit.}, p 9
\(^{14}\) Park, \textit{op.cit.}, p 134
\(^{15}\) Park, \textit{op.cit.}, p 134
\(^{17}\) Oguzlu Tarik, ‘The Latest Turkish-Greek Détente: Instrumentalist Play for EU Membership, or Long-Term Institutionalist Cooperation?’, in \textit{Cambridge Review of International Affairs}, Volume 17, Number 2, July 2004, pp 348
\(^{18}\) Turkey and other non-EU European allies were invited to become Associated Partners in June 1992, status which meant in practice a full membership.
consultation arrangements between NATO and WEU. But ESDP development since then has proved to be different…

The ‘mutual sense of mistrust’ that has characterised the bilateral relations was clear during the Cologne and Helsinki summits: the decision to grant Turkey official candidacy status was largely due to the potential benefits of Turkey’s inclusion into the ESDP and the costs of its exclusion. The link to NATO was all the more necessary for it was commonly assumed that the EU would hardly be able (or perhaps willing) to undertake on its own military operations at the ‘high end’ of the Petersberg tasks, incorporated by the Amsterdam Treaty (Article 17.2 TEU). It was unpractical and even counterproductive – both operationally and in terms of available resources – to end up having a dual set of military planning structures, one for NATO and one for the ESDP.

From Turkey’s point of view, this offer fell short of the status it had enjoyed in WEU and also of what it had expected and called for since NATO’s Berlin Plus statement. For Ankara the ambiguity arose from the wording of the Cologne summit, according to which the Union takes measures to guarantee that all participants in an EU-led operation enjoy the same rights concerning the conduct of the operation ‘without prejudice to the principle of autonomy of decision of the EU, namely the right of the Council to examine and decide on questions of principle and of policy’. Accordingly, Turkey decided in 2000 to use its decision-making powers in NATO to hold up the conclusion of NATO-EU arrangements to implement Berlin Plus until there should be some clarification and improvement of its own position. It insisted on the fact that all participants in ESDP were in principle equal, but only after the Council invited them to take part, and on the NATO’s prerogative to have the right to first refusal on the launching of an operation. This formal blockage was to last for two years and in practice also delayed the start of any ad hoc EU military operation with NATO support, although it did not prevent the EU’s proceeding to build up its own ESDP structures and capabilities. Continuous efforts were made by the NATO Secretary General, the EU High Representative and some Member States to clear the way for a solution addressing Turkey’s need for reassurance over operations affecting its interests, as well as issues of its own participation.

The final breakthrough came at the end of 2001 in a context of significant movement in Turkey’s general relationship with the European institutions. The solution was finally found, but not before the presentation in December of a joint UK-US-Turkish document, known as the Ankara Document, which had excluded the Eastern Mediterranean from the ESDP. The document, without ever mentioning Turkey explicitly (as

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19 Tocci, op.cit., p 6
22 Missiroli (2003), op.cit., p 10
demanded by Greece), assured that, whatever the crisis, the ESDP would never be directed against an ally and would always respect the obligations of EU member states vis-à-vis NATO members\textsuperscript{23}. The document included a reverse clause (i.e. if an EU member is concerned, NATO assets cannot be used either – read Turkey). In short, the document involved EU guarantees to Turkey on both non-aggression and consultation\textsuperscript{24}. It has never been released publicly, and it is believed to provide Turkey with the assurances it sought regarding ESDP and to informally assuage Ankara’s concerns regarding the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) operations in areas vital to Turkish interests\textsuperscript{25}. On the whole, the document appeared to be a viable basis for a final deal. There remained a few grey areas – especially the interpretation of ‘geographic proximity’ and the boundaries between political and military control of a given operation - but these were probably inevitable, even indispensable, elements of the constructive ambiguity that often drives policy formulation at the multilateral level\textsuperscript{26}.

The Ankara deal meant that Turkey would withdraw its veto over the crisis management capacities of the EU (given the impossibility of ‘assured’ access to NATO assets. On practical terms, Turkey took this decision only after the EU had guaranteed Ankara that its military task force would not intervene anywhere near the Turkish geopolitical sphere of influence. In return, Turkey gave up the right to have a say in the operation decisions of the force\textsuperscript{27}. The provisions of the Ankara Document of December 2001 did not satisfy Greece, which was worried about the fact that Turkey had been given too much power and, consequently, Turkey could prevent the ESDP to be used in order to defend Greek interests.

The agreement was to be accepted as an official document at the Laeken summit, after the NATO’s Defence Ministers meeting, in December 2001. Surprisingly, it was not approved by the EU, since Greece did not permit its endorsement\textsuperscript{28}. The document was rejected by Greece for both procedural reasons (due to the extra-institutional procedure which was followed) and substantive reasons (ESDP fundamental principles, such as EU-NATO equality, decision-making autonomy and non discrimination were breached). The Ankara document was seen by Greece to go beyond the provisions agreed in Nice. The ‘participation issue’ (in other words, the way in which the non-EU European NATO allies participate in ESDP and the conduct of the missions) was, therefore, unresolved\textsuperscript{29}.

\textsuperscript{24}Howorth, Jolyon, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union, Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills, 2007, p 169
\textsuperscript{26}Müller (2003), op.cit., p 22
\textsuperscript{28}Oymen, op. cit., p 328
\textsuperscript{29}Embassy of Greece to the United States, European Security and Defence Policy. Inception and Historic Course, 2005
Finally, the Greeks agreed to lift their veto on EU access to NATO assets during the Brussels European Council, held in October 2002, reaching a consensus on the Nice provisions concerning the involvement of non-EU European Allies. According to the new arrangement, Cyprus remained outside the area of responsibility of the EU’s RRF, while Turkey lifted its veto on the EU’s assured access to NATO assets. Behaving this way, Turkey wanted to demonstrate that its intentions were not to contribute to further intra-Alliance divisions but to make sure that the EU’s evolving security structure developed in close cooperation with NATO and that the process of Turkey’s accession to be accelerated.

The text, as reformed during the Brussels summit, provided the basis for the final compromise signed in December 2002. American pressure, the Copenhagen decision on enlargement and particularly the rise to power of Erdogan’s government cleared the way, after over three years of negotiations, for the approval of the Nice provisions on Berlin Plus. It is important to point out that a crucial factor of the agreement was the new Turkish Government. Instead of using Turkey’s influence in NATO as a means to extract concessions from the EU –as the previous Government had done- the executive led by Erdogan adopted the opposite approach, namely using that influence to solve the Berlin Plus problem and show goodwill from the EU on the accession issue.

The Copenhagen summit concluded the two-year dispute concerning Turkey’s participation in ESDP and was possible thanks to the Ankara and Brussels documents. The agreement ensured that Cyprus and Malta, as countries that were not included in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP), would not be included as possible locations for ESDP activities and operations. However, while an agreement was reached, it remained unclear what Turkey’s substantive input in ESDP would be. More specifically, the project would assess the possible cooperation between Turkey and the EU in concrete regions in the Wider Europe and its neighbourhood where Turkey has special interests, namely the Caucasus, the Middle East, the Black Sea and the Caspian region. There were also sensitive concerns over military aspects of the Greek-Turkish relationship in general, as well as the Cypriot conflict in particular. It was agreed that the EU would in no circumstances use its military against a NATO ally and that NATO would in no circumstances act against the EU, and it also included agreements on intensive consultation procedures between the non-EU NATO members and the Political and Security Committee (PSC).

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31 Oguzlu, op.cit., p 297
33 CEPS, Turkey in European Monitor, op.cit., p 17
34 Howorth (2007), op.cit., p 186
The bargaining process that lasted for two years evidenced the linkage between the EU bid, a solution for the Cyprus division and the clearing of the last remaining obstacles to the development of the ESDP. Not surprisingly, at the same time that the Member States agreed this solution, the EU and NATO reached a compromise that permitted EU to use NATO capabilities and signed a strategic partnership between the two organisations in the field of crisis management on 16 December 2002. After the approval by the NAC, the EU and NATO issued a Declaration on ESDP, a landmark document which paved the way for the effective implementation of the Berlin Plus agreement. The bilateral framework for permanent relations is based on a basic feature: when NATO as a whole is not engaged, the EU, in undertaking an operation, will choose whether or not to have recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. The Declaration not only reaffirmed the EU assured access to NATO’s planning capabilities for its own military operations, but also laid down the political principles of the strategic partnership. It is worth mentioning that the Declaration stated that ‘the EU is ensuring the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European members of NATO within ESDP, implementing the relevant Nice arrangements’ and that ‘NATO is supporting ESDP in accordance with the relevance Washington Summit decisions’. Turkey felt satisfied for the wording, as Greece did.

The concrete approval of the Berlin Plus arrangements took place on 17 March 2003, providing the basis for permanent NATO-EU cooperation in crisis management by allowing EU access to NATO’s collective assets and capabilities for EU-led operations. The end of the blockade over Berlin Plus opened the way to the launch of ESDP military operations in 2003, and on 31 March 2003 the EU-led operation Concordia took over the responsibilities of the NATO-led mission, Operation Allied Harmony, in Macedonia. In line with Berlin Plus arrangements, NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) was appointed as Operation Commander of this first ever EU-led military peacekeeping mission. NATO supported the EU on strategic, operational and tactical planning. An EU-Operation Headquarters (OHQ) was set-up at NATO’s

36 EU – Turkey Relations Dossier, Analysis Section, Observatory of European Foreign Policy, Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona, EUTR 6/2003, p 6/9
37 European Union / North Atlantic Treaty Association, EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP, Brussels, 16 December 2002, Document S0240/02
38 These are: effective mutual consultation, dialogue and transparency; equality and due regard for the decision-making autonomy of the EU and NATO; respect for the interests of the EU and NATO members states; respect for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; coherent, transparent and mutually reinforcing development of the military capability requirements common to the two organisations
39 North Atlantic Treaty Association, NATO-EU: A strategic partnership, to be found in http://www.nato.int
40 They consist of the following major elements a NATO-EU Security Agreement (which covers the exchange of classified information under reciprocal security protection rules); assured EU access to NATO's planning capabilities for actual use in the military planning of EU-led crisis management operations; presumed availability of NATO capabilities and common assets, such as communication units and headquarters for EU-led crisis management operations; procedures for release, monitoring, return and recall of NATO assets and capabilities; terms of reference for NATO’s Deputy SACEUR - who in principle will be the operation commander of an EU-led operation under Berlin Plus and European command options for NATO; NATO-EU consultation arrangements in the context of an EU-led crisis management operation making use of NATO assets and capabilities; incorporation within NATO's long-established defence planning system, of the military needs and capabilities that may be required for EU-led military operations, thereby ensuring the availability of well-equipped forces trained for either NATO-led or EU-led operations.
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium, to assist the Operation Commander. These dual NATO-EU posts guaranteed the linkage between the EU’s and NATO’s operational chain of command, and therefore made possible the effective development of a EU autonomous mission.

In three months, between December 2002 and March 2003, Turkey underwent the most extraordinary reversal in its foreign relations\textsuperscript{41}. On 1 March 2003 a resolution was brought to the Turkish parliament by the ruling AKP government to allow the temporary deployment of 62,000 US troops on Turkish soil. The deployment and transit through Turkey would have allowed a second-front attack against Iraq. By a few votes, the motion failed to pass through Parliament and the US troops were re-routed to Kuwait\textsuperscript{42}. Yet, on the eve of the Anglo-American strike, Turkish defence plans were the subject of a heated debate in the NATO; several EU countries were of the view that the act of Turkey represented an implicit acceptance of the American position. At the same time, Turkey’s AKP government and the US administration were negotiating a compensation package which Ankara would receive if it allowed allied American and British soldiers to use the Turkish soil. However, when this proposal was presented to the Turkish Parliament, it was rejected in spite of governmental support. This obliged the US to change its initial plans and led to the deterioration the preferential Turkish-American partnership\textsuperscript{43}.

It was in a specific political situation –‘EU-ization of ESDP, factual suppression of the WEU, latent transatlantic tensions over the ESDP, but also qualified acceptance of Turkey as a candidate to join the EU-that Ankara repositioned itself. It stepped up its military engagement in European security, by actively participating in the Kosovo Peacekeeping Force (K-FOR) and by committing an additional sizeable force to the Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG)\textsuperscript{44}.

2.2. ESDP Decision-making and decision-shaping mechanisms

During the three crucial years between 1999 and 2002, Turkey was the non-EU European allied with the strongest sense of grievance. Turkish position after the Washington summit was clear. Onur Oyemen, the then Turkish Permanent Representative to NATO, argued that ‘The underpinning concepts that emerged after lengthy deliberations in Washington were that, on the one hand (and in accordance with the principles of cooperation, complementarity and non-decoupling), NATO would support the EU’s efforts aimed at the

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\textsuperscript{41} Robins, Philip, ‘Confusion at home, confusion abroad: Turkey between Copenhagen and Iraq’, in \textit{International Affairs}, 79, 3 (2002), p 565
\textsuperscript{42} Emerson, Michael / Tocci, Nathalie, ‘Turkey as a Bridgehead and Spearhead. Integrating EU and Turkey Foreign Policy’, in \textit{CEPS EU-Turkey Working Papers No1, August 2004}, p 27
\textsuperscript{43} EU-Turkey Relations Dossier, \textit{op.cit.}, p 7/9
\textsuperscript{44} Tocci, \textit{op.cit.}, p 3
establishment of ESDP and, on the other hand (and in line with the principles of inclusiveness and the indivisibility of security), the EU would include non-EU European Allies in their project\textsuperscript{45}.

2.2.1 Turkish demands concerning ESDP

Turkey was disappointed with the fact that the Nice summit decisions diverted attention from the decisions adopted in Washington and disregarded to a large extent the mechanisms in the Western European Union (WEU) and those between the NATO and the WEU. This was particularly evident regarding the provisions about the autonomous EU operations and the participation of non-EU European Allies\textsuperscript{46}, given the necessity of having a Council’s invitation and the consequent veto possibility of any MS. Ankara was concerned mainly about the discrimination of non-EU members of NATO outside the EU\textsuperscript{47}. Turkey’s basic expectation from Brussels was the adoption of any necessary provision that would enable the participation of non-EU European allies in EU operations (including preparation and planning, political control and strategic direction) if the operation made use of NATO assets and capabilities or if these countries raised their concerns that the envisaged operation was in their geographical proximity or might even have an effect on their own national security interests\textsuperscript{48}.

Herewith an important point that must be analysed concerning the Washington communiqué and the explicit reference to the necessity to establish ‘the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European allies in EU-led crisis response operations by building on existing consultation mechanisms between NATO and the WEU…’. This was interpreted in different ways by Turkey and by the EU. Turkey took the clear view that NATO’s position should be considered as a package, and that the realization of Berlin Plus was contingent on the EU’s treating its non-EU Allied partners in the way that NATO had envisaged. According to the Turkish Foreign Minister: “NATO Allies …have established the basis which takes into account our expectations for full and equal participation of European Allies who are not, like Turkey, members of the EU, in the new structure of the CESDP.” Turkey also made clear its expectation that the EU would respect mutatis mutandis ‘existing arrangements within the WEU’.

Turkey was worried, from the beginning, about a basic question concerning ESDP: How do the non-EU actors participate in this project? What is the institutional status of Turkey inside ESDP? The divergence of Turkish and EU views on the participation of non-EU European countries of NATO in ESDP has its roots in

\textsuperscript{46} Oymen, op.cit., p 403
\textsuperscript{47} Howorth, (2007), op.cit., p 139
\textsuperscript{48} Oymen, op.cit., p 404
the development processes of these two concepts, ESDI and ESDP. As we saw, Turkey and the other Associate Members had a privileged position as observers in the WEU. This status was certainly stronger that of the non-NATO countries, which were Observers. The Associate Members could participate fully in the meetings of the Council, its working groups and subsidiary bodies, although on two conditions: their participation should not prejudice the provisions laid down in Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty, to which they were not signatories; and a majority of MS may request that participation be restricted to Full Members of the WEU. In addition, Associate Members were associated to the WEU Planning Cell through special arrangements and, by virtue of NATO membership, they were entitled to be consulted and informed on WEU operations in which they were interested, and to be directly involved in the planning and preparation of WEU operations in which NATO assets and capabilities were used, within the framework of the Common Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept. This arrangement clearly was a part of the ESDI, as defined since 1994, and considered all forces employed in a ‘WEU-led’ operation as separable but not separated – in terms of status and substance- from those answerable to the Alliance.

However, after the abolition of this organisation and the takeover by the EU, the possibility for Turkey to sit in Council meetings was no longer given. The Council does not normally allow non-EU Members to sit at the table and explain their vital interests before a decision is taken. The PSC does not allow non members either. Turkey also attempted to negotiate a seat at the EU's defence and security table – in effect membership of the new PSC. This was juridically non-negotiable. It seems that Turkey encourages a closer and more continuous participation in ESDP along the lines of its former status in the WEU. Turkey was expecting to enjoy at least the same status inside ESDP and demanded the right to be included in the ESDP's decision-making structures. The EU's response was that Turkey should be involved in the shaping of decisions and the management of operations, when Turkish forces participate; but since Turkey is not a member of the EU, it cannot claim the right to veto autonomous EU actions that do not involve Ankara.

Although the EU instituted regular security and defence discussions between the PSC and the non-EU NATO members, Turkey found this inadequate in three ways. First, it was widely recognized that most of the scenarios for regional destabilization had their focus in South Eastern Europe – in Turkey’s “near abroad”. Second, this was particularly significant, viewed from Ankara, in the context of the unresolved disputes.

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50 Missiroli (2003), op.cit., p 11
51 Missiroli (2003), op.cit., p 11
52 Neuwahl, op.cit., p 6
between Turkey and Greece over Aegean airspace and territorial waters, and over the divided island of Cyprus. Third, the matter was exacerbated by the EU’s long-standing reluctance to engage in discussions over Turkish membership.

Given this situation, Turkey would not, and could not, be expected to agree with the use of NATO assets by the EU and to then allow the development of an effective ESDP, especially where its interests might be directly affected, if it was not a EU member. Turkey, a country with a strong Atlanticist orientation in its security policy, raised from the very beginning several concerns regarding the ESDP process, and it has been the most important obstacle to overcome to undertake ESDP operations.

Turkey’s demands about ESDP can be classified into two categories: politico-institutional concerns with respect to preserving the integrity of NATO and strengthening European security; and military concerns in relation to protecting national interests. From a political angle, we can mention two issues. Firstly, Turkey raised the stakes in the EU-NATO negotiations by demanding (i) that the use of NATO assets be decided only on a case-by-case basis; (ii) that, by virtue of its strategic position and role, Turkey be not simply ‘invited’ but rather entitled to take part in EU operations where the EU would not use NATO assets. and (iii) that it be involved on equal footing in their operational planning. Turkey seems to be still not satisfied with the current situation and its status inside ESDP. It wants some kind of permanent seat inside ESDP, and not only when the ESDP uses NATO assets and capabilities.

From a military point of view, given its strategic and political importance during the Cold War and its special position inside NATO, Turkey conceived the inception of an ESDP as a threat to NATO solidarity and maintained that the development of military capabilities by the EU was a rival to NATO and was the first step to a military integration that would diminish NATO’s influence. For Turkey, NATO still is the primary organisation for collective defence and security and it has also priority in crisis-management operations. Accordingly, the formation of ESDP should develop in conformity with the principles of indivisibility of security and preservation of the Atlantic link. Hence, Turkey was concerned with the fact that most of the possible crises and conflicts might take place on its immediate neighbourhood, with the consequent impact on Turkey national security.

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56 Terzi, op.cit., p 53
56 Wood / Quaisser, op.cit., p169
58 Terzi, op.cit., p 54
2.2.2 European Union’s position

For its part, the EU has offered Turkey full participation in the decision-shaping process and the operational planning, i.e. the day-to-day management of an EU-led operation. The EU is willing to engage in deep consultation with Turkey in accordance to the provisions of the Berlin Plus agreements. In particular, the EU draws a distinction between operations using NATO-assets, in which the non-EU NATO members would participate automatically in preliminary discussions “if they so wish”, and EU-only operations when the invitation to participate would be decided by the Council of Ministers of a case-by-case basis. It is also willing to accept Turkey’s involvement in the operational planning stage, provided it assigns forces to the EU. However, Turkey, as a non-EU member, has not been offered participation in decision-making. Turkey has no say at the critical juncture in which the Council would decide on where, when and how to intervene.

It is interesting to point out that the attitude of the EU, using Turkey’s assets in the building of the ESDP military capabilities but excluding Turkey’s full participation in decision-making (as it was the case with the WEU) seems contradictory. What factors explain this attitude? Is it because the EU does not foresee Turkey’s membership in the future? Is it because of the reluctance of some MS to allow Turkey to fully participate in ESDP? Is it because of the lack of a shared security culture between the EU and Turkey? All these are essential questions when analysing Turkey’s participation in ESDP.

3. TURKEY’S CONTRIBUTION TO ESDP AND TO EUROPEAN SECURITY

Turkey has played an essential role in the security and defence framework of the West. It is a long-standing member of NATO and other West supranational organisations (OECD since 1948, Council of Europe since 1949, OSCE since 1973) and thus an important contributor to European security. The Ankara’s strategy of selling Turkey’s EU membership by stressing the country’s role as a security provider is neither new nor very original. On the contrary, this strategy dully reflects the historical environment in which Turkish-Western relations have unfolded. In fact, Turkey’s integration in NATO and other Western institutions was essentially based on the geostrategic assets that the country could offer in the light of security concerns, especially with regard to Soviet expansionism. Turkey’s policymakers have used a variety of means to ease their way into

59 Tocci, op.cit., p 5
60 Delcoigne, Georges, ‘New parameters of Turkish Security’, in Dartan; Nas, op.cit., p 333
the Union. As a part of this effort, they have sought to play the military/security card (geographical position and military capability) to strengthen their own position\(^61\).

### 3.1 Turkey and the ESDP missions

One of the best instruments in creating confidence between the EU and Turkey, not only regarding ESDP and the relationship with NATO, but also the bilateral relations, has been the implication of Ankara in ESDP missions up to now, especially in the Balkans, and the notable assessment of this participation. This is a positive indicator of a joint EU-Turkish effort for the long-term stabilisation of the area. Both Turkey and the EU consider the Balkans a priority area and their security objectives are quite close. Turkey’s involvement has shown not only how Turkey can contribute to a stronger and more autonomous ESDP, but it is also a good indicator of the Europeanisation process of Turkish foreign policy\(^62\). Without Turkey's conformity, the current involvement of the EU’s in the Balkans would be far more complex. The EU assumption of responsibilities was only possible once the agreement with Turkey has been concluded in December 2002 on the use of NATO assets\(^63\). The EU had previously desired to take over NATO’s operation in Macedonia by mid 2002, but it was not possible since it could not have access to NATO resources. Turkey’s European credentials were clearly reinforced.

Turkey has participated in six operations undertaken by the EU, either under the Berlin Plus arrangements or autonomously. In fact, in many operations Turkey has contributed more than most EU partners. Turkey is making a significant contribution to EUFOR-ALTHEA, including to its civilian aspect. In total, its contribution to EUFOR-ALTHEA comes to nearly 255 personnel. In this operation Turkey is currently the biggest non-EU troop contributing country, and the third biggest contributor among a total of 34 countries. Furthermore, Turkey has 4 police officers deployed to the EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUPM). Ankara made its forces also available to the two ESDP missions on Macedonia, CONCORDIA and PROXIMA. Turkey also contributed with one police officer to the EU Police Mission in Kinshasa and participated in the EU’s EUFOR RD Congo mission, aimed at assisting the UN in the DR Congo, with one Turkish C-130 aircraft and its crew deployed in Gabon. Finally, Turkey plans to send one police officer to the EUPOL-COPPS Mission in Palestine and is also considering participating in the EU Border Assistance Mission in Rafah/Palestine. Moreover, Turkey decided to contribute 32 police officers to the ESDP police and rule of law mission in Kosovo (EULEX-KOSOVO) once the operation stage starts.

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\(^62\) Soler, op. cit., p 42
\(^63\) Soler, op. cit., p 41
In addition to ESDP operations, Turkey has declared it would make important contributions to improve EU capabilities under the Headline Goal 2010 and intends to take part in a Battle Group. Concerning the contributions to the Headline Goal 2010, Turkey argues that its possible contributions to EU-led operations may be considered on a case-by-case basis, depending on the location and other circumstances of each operation or mission. In this context, Turkey’s degree of participation in the decision-making processes of the planning and implementation phase of such ESDP operations will also be taken into account. In relation to the Battle Groups, Turkey declared its readiness to contribute to them in November 2004. Turkey will provide both troops and capabilities to the Italian led Battle Group which will be assigned to the EU for the second half of 2010.

3.2 Turkey and the wider European security architecture

As we have seen, since the inclusion of the Petersberg tasks in the Amsterdam Treaty and the effective implementation of ESDP, it is clear which types of military operations the EU can undertake: everything but collective defence, which remains the prerogative of NATO, but including non article 5 operations at the high end of the spectrum of high violence. Furthermore, as stated by the Solana Document, ‘effective multilateralism’ should be the guiding strategic principle of the ESDP. How to implement it? This entails an important expeditionary military capacity as the ultimate instrument in the EU’s toolbox. What could be Turkey’s added value in this regard? In short, we can mention three possible contributions to the ESDP: its military capabilities, its geostrategic position, and its foreign policy and its experience in military operations.

Concerning the military capabilities, with its large expenditure and manpower, Turkey has the capacity to contribute significantly to EU security and defence. It has the largest armed forces in Europe (more than 790,000 personnel) and spends proportionately more on defence (4.8% of its GDP) than any other European member of NATO. Turkey could provide the backbone to certain activities outside the traditional geographic range of EU foreign policy and has pledged 4-5,000 troops to the RRF.

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64 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, internal document NATO-EU relations, March 2008
65 idem
66 Data concerning the participation of Turkey in ESDP missions facilitated by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, internal document European Security and Defence Identity/Policy (ESDI/P), March 2008
68 Biscop, op.cit, p 510
69 Müftüler-Bac, op.cit., p 490
70 Akccakoca, Amanda / Cameron, Fraser / Rhein, Eberhard, “Turkey – Ready for the EU?”, in European Policy Centre Issue Papers, No16, September 2004, p 10
Turkey’s incorporation to the ESDP has made the HHG and the renewed HG more credible, given the Turkish military contribution and the Turkish experience in multinational crisis management and humanitarian operations, under the auspices of both NATO and the UN\textsuperscript{72}. This experience has proved to be a reliable asset for the EU.

Secondly, given its size and location, Turkey is likely to be an important foreign policy player in/for the EU\textsuperscript{73}. It is located in the intersection of three seas, it unites two continents, it occupies a very unique geopolitical space and it has a privileged geostrategic position. It is difficult to define Turkey with a single adjective regarding its geography, since it is located at the same time in Europe, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, the Caucasus, the Balkans, the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea. This has had a clear consequence. Turkey’s international relations have been traditionally multidimensional and global\textsuperscript{74}, but on the other side its security and defence policy has been firmly devoted to the relations with the West, in particular through its NATO membership and its relations with the US.

The end of the Cold War changed the European security landscape and transformed Turkey’s role in this new context. The initial considerations about the lost of Turkish geostrategic importance as a privileged allied of the West, given the end of the blocks confrontation and the possible dilution of Turkish standing as NATO’s South Eastern flank, proved to be erroneous. Turkey stands today in a vital geopolitical enclave not only for European security, but also for world’s stability. This situation gives Turkey a peculiar configuration, since it combines three elements that make this country unique: its geographic situation, its politico-institutional links with the West and its character as the only Muslim democracy in the world. Turkey is still of strategic importance for achieving Europe’s security interest. Ankara’s contribution is also visible regarding the strategic objective, laid down by the European Security Strategy, to foster peace, security and development in the regions adjacent to the EU. Indeed, the country is close to 21 of the 23 possible conflict areas and crisis regions identified by NATO\textsuperscript{75}. Given the general positive view that Turkey has in these countries, any possible ESDP and/or CFSP action concerning these regions that had Turkey inside would be much more credible and accepted. Turkey would provide regional leverage, geostrategic assets and credibility to the EU.

Finally, Turkey would provide credibility to the European initiatives in the Mediterranean and Middle East given its privileged relations with different countries and international organisations. Its simultaneous

\textsuperscript{72} Tato Porto, Francisco Javier, ‘Impacto de Turquía en la Política de Seguridad y defensa de la Unión Europea’, in Turquía a las puertas de Europa, Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, Cuadernos de Estrategia, 23 February 2006, p 90
\textsuperscript{73} Hughes, Kirsty, ‘Turkey and the European Union: just another enlargement?’, in Friends of Europe Working Paper, June 2004, p 27
\textsuperscript{74} Tato Porto, op.cit., p 66
\textsuperscript{75} Muller; Gonul, op.cit., p 4
membership to NATO, the OSCE, the OCDE, to forums as the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, and to initiatives as the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, the Southeast European Cooperation Initiative, the BLACKSEAFOR or the Temporary International Presence in Hebron –at the request of Israel as well as of the National Authority Palestine-, situate Turkey as a valid interlocutor before the majority of the countries in the EU’s wider neighbourhood76.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Some years after the official launch of the ESDP by the Cologne summit, the EU can argue that it possesses a security and defence policy worthy of the name, and it has been able to overcome many of the important obstacles it had faced over fifty years of European integration in the realm of foreign and security policy. Eight years after the 1999 decisions, the EU has at its disposal the three necessary elements to develop an effective ESDP: efficient decision-making mechanisms, capacity to undertake military and/or civilian operations, and the necessary military capabilities and assets. The story of ESDP process has also been a reactive one that developed in the context of a certain set of circumstances77. We can underline four complementary explanations for the evolution of the ESDP in the last decade: the ‘EU-ism’ (ESDP as a simple extension of CFSP, a spill over from other areas of integration/cooperation to the security and defence realms); the agreement between Germany, France and Britain over ESDP, which could finally reach a consensus among them; the setting up of effective and real military capabilities; and the ‘Balkan failures, never again’ syndrome78.

The European decision to create an independent ESDP with connections to NATO and to rely sometimes on its capacities is a crucial step forward. We can argue that the causes and timing of ESDP’s birth and evolution suggest that it is indeed a response to US hegemony and to the new security landscape. Its limits suggest it is not quite a balancing projects, but certainly an effort by Europeans, including many who bandwagon in their NATO guise, to develop an alternative security supplier79. EDS was in the doldrums for some years, given that the work on capabilities designed to enable Europe to meet the goals set at Helsinki

76 Lorca, Aleandro (and others), ‘Perspectivas ante el inicio de las negociaciones de adhesión de Turquía a la Unión Europea’, in Real Instituto Elcano, Documento de Trabajo 5/2006, p 12
79 Posen, op.cit., p12
were so far producing unimpressive results. ESDP was to face problems over capabilities but also was ensnared in a cat’s cradle of Greco-Turkish rivalries similar to those with which NATO has had to struggle for decades. Nonetheless, some problems remain, such as the regular relationship with NATO or the final status of the non-EU countries that participate in ESDP.

Somewhere in between these last two dimensions lies a very special case, Turkey. The ESDP project has entailed a process of rethinking the relationship between the EU and NATO, and here the ‘Turkish factor’ appears as crucial. Member of the Atlantic Alliance since 1952, official candidate to accede to the Union since 1999, country participating in six ESDP military operations, and with a considerable amount of military assets and capabilities, Turkey represents a unique challenge to ESDP. The problem of Turkey has been explained by the fact that one of the parties had what it considered national interests at stake during the negotiations between the EU and NATO, and therefore it decided to block for a long time the entire process.

Concerning EU-Turkey-NATO relations, the most important issue is the Berlin Plus acquis, which in fact are related to the necessity to make compatible the contributions of the EU and NATO to European and global security, avoiding unnecessary duplications of money, forces and capabilities. In short, Turkey wants more participation in the foreign and security matters of the EU, full and equal participation in decision-making processes of EU-led operations and on the usage of NATO assets in general. Turkey has consistently been not only a significant muscle for NATO but also one of its most prominent supporters. By the same token, it has made or offered undeniable contributions to the EU’s capabilities. Most important, Turkey has regarded pro-EU, pro-US and pro-NATO policies ultimately as mutually reinforcing. In this regard, one question that maybe Turkey has not asked itself is what would happen in the following situation: if, for example, the PSC suggested to send intervention troops to a crisis region before the NAC becomes concerned with this issue, how would it react? Would it accede to the use by the EU of NATO assets? Would it block it and ask for NATO intervention? In the event of a Berlin Plus kind of operation, Turkey should be forced to define its first security orientation and its institutional affinity. This possible situation reminds us that developments in

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81 Hannay, op.cit., p 368
82 Howorth (2007), op.cit., p 161
83 Tato Porto, op.cit., p 90
84 Özkaragöz, op.cit., p 2
85 Akçapar, op.cit., p 140
Turkey, in Europe and the wider international system will determine the evolution of EU-Turkey relations, including ESDP\textsuperscript{86}.

Given this awkward situation, nowadays the EU is suffering from a notorious contradiction: it has to value participation of Turkey in ESDP as very positive, but to consider also that this country is sometimes seen as not ‘European enough’ to accede to the Union. It would be dangerous for European security architecture to opt for some kind of ‘EU/ESDP or nothing’ policy. Mutual consultation, use of NATO assets and division of labour seem much more convenient and coherent for both ESDP and the Atlantic Alliance. For its part, the risk that Turkey has taken is that by making EU-NATO military/security cooperation awkward, it ends up antagonizing both the US Administration and the EU, finding itself politically isolated within NATO and fatally weakening its case for EU membership\textsuperscript{87}.

Some remaining questions for the future: Does Turkey share the EU’s analysis that describes Europe’s new security environment as a result of numerous interwoven processes within political, economic and cultural globalization with a strong focus on poverty and bad governance? Will Turkey sign up to the EU’s conclusion that no country is capable of solving today’s complex problems alone? How many Ankaras is the EU going to face?.

\textsuperscript{86} Tocci, Natalie, ‘Anchoring Turkey to Europe: the foreign policy challenges ahead’, in IISS/CEPS European Security Forum, 12 May 2003, p 1
\textsuperscript{87} Missiroli (2003), op.cit., p 19
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