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Understanding the Role of Bureaucracy in the European Security and Defence Policy: The State of the Art

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Abstract: The establishment of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 1999 has led to the creation of a whole range of bureaucratic bodies in Brussels and the national capitals. These bodies support the crisis management operations of the European Union. This review article presents the state of the art of academic research on the role of bureaucracy in this recent policy area. It argues that the growing institutional complexity and the constant interaction between actors at the national and European level require scholars to go beyond the dominant approaches of International Relations. Using insights from comparative politics, public administration and multi-level governance, this article considers four important questions: who these civil servants are, why they matter, how they interact, and how they are controlled politically and democratically.
Keywords: European Security and Defence Policy, Common Foreign and Security Policy, multi-level governance, crisis management, Council of Ministers, EU bureaucracy, public administration, international relations, institutionalism, integration theory, intergovernmentalism, organization theory, networks, policy analysis, policy coordination, accountability, legitimacy, democratic deficit, political science

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1. Introduction

At the Cologne European Council (June 1999) European Union (EU) member states decided to create the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as part of their Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). While the EU is not yet a fully-fledged international actor, this policy has certainly helped the Union to make a more significant impact abroad. In the past decade, the EU has launched 24 civilian and military operations, ranging from peace-keeping to rule of law missions (see for example: Howorth 2007; Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2008; Grevi, Helly and Keohane 2009; Menon 2009). It has not only been active in its ‘neighbourhood’, but also in countries as remote as Congo, Somalia and Afghanistan. While several of these operations were relatively small-scale and considered as not particularly successful, the EU’s new role as a crisis manager marks a fundamental break with the past when European foreign policy amounted to little more than well-meant declarations.
The European Union has faced several challenges on the road towards an operational foreign policy in terms of civilian and military crisis management. These included, notably, the availability of human and material capabilities, but also the establishment of supporting institutional and bureaucratic structures. The earlier practice of running and implementing European foreign policy as much as possible from the national capitals, facilitated by the rotating Presidency, was at odds with the functional needs of a professional crisis management organisation. It required coordinated action and quick reaction to international events. Existing structures in the Council Secretariat and the European Commission were therefore reinforced, and a whole range of new diplomatic and military bodies has been established in Brussels since 1999. At the national level, the ministries of foreign affairs lost their monopoly over European foreign policy, as other ministries, such as interior and defence, had to deliver the police forces and soldiers necessary for operations. Finally, a chain of command was established, ranging from the Operational Headquarters to the supporting services on the ground.

The central argument of this review article is that the growing institutional complexity in EU foreign policy-making raises new questions and requires scholarly approaches other than that of International Relations, traditionally employed in the study of European foreign policy. The growing institutionalisation and 'bureaucratisation' imply that policy-making can no longer be seen as a form of purely intergovernmental cooperation where everything is decided upon in national capitals. While foreign policy continues to follow an integration logic of its own – consensus remains the rule and the role of supranational institutions is restricted – the constant interaction between actors at national and European level makes foreign policy-making less distinct from other EU policy areas than before. Therefore it becomes increasingly appropriate to use insights from comparative politics, public administration and (multi-level) governance.

We advocate such an approach for several reasons. Firstly, it allows us to look beyond the political level (especially of national governments) into the key role of non-elected actors. As this article shows, it was mainly political actors that established the ESDP, yet this focus alone is not sufficient to capture the dynamics and mechanisms in policy formulation and implementation. Much of the day-to-day policy-making is done through the supporting administrative level. It is, in this respect, well-known that civil servants tend to be more than merely neutral process managers. Since traditional International Relations approaches generally treat states as unitary actors, bureaucratic actors are often ignored. Secondly, such an approach allows ESDP scholars to build upon an extensive research tradition in the other disciplines of social science. Insights from inter alia (neo-)institutionalism, multi-level governance, policy networks and bureaucratic politics, provide an excellent point of departure, but at the same time one must be wary of simply ‘copying and pasting’ concepts and analytical frames; analytical tools need adaptation to the peculiarities of ESDP. In return, applying them to the policy area of ESDP may allow for a refinement and adjustment of the existing frames and concepts. Finally, opening up the study of ESDP to the broader literature

http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2010-004a.htm
on public policy-making allows us to get beyond its isolation in policy analysis and removes the resulting n=1 problem. It furthermore creates opportunities for a more intense dialogue between a rather secluded group of foreign policy scholars and the broader academic community working on European integration. Given the increasingly important 'cross-pillar' nature of many foreign policy dossiers and the need for institutional consistency (Stetter 2004; Eriksson and Rhinard 2009), such interaction should only be endorsed.

This article gives an overview of the state of the art of the analytical research on ESDP bureaucracy. It starts with a short description of the policy itself and with a demonstration of the growing multitude of bureaucratic actors at various levels. Subsequently, it raises four important questions when studying the role of administrative actors in ESDP. Firstly, this article examines who these ESDP officials are and explores current research on their professional and educational background, loyalty, and norms and values. Secondly, it discusses why these ESDP officials matter. An important rationale for studying civil servants, after all, is to analyse under which conditions they assert political influence. Thirdly, the interactions between the various bureaucratic units are analysed. This not only concerns intra- and inter-institutional relations in Brussels and the member states but also between the EU and other international organisations, such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations. Finally, this article raises the normative question of political and democratic control of these non-elected career bureaucrats.

2. ESDP: Capabilities and Operations

During the first ten years of ESDP, the European Union has launched a remarkable number of 24 crisis management operations, of which fourteen were civilian, seven military and three civil-military (see Table 1). The quantity of operations has been assessed as “impressive” (Menon 2009, 228) with a “remarkable increase in scale, distance and diversity” (Giegerich and Wallace 2004, 164). The quality in terms of “external political impact” was evaluated as “significant” (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2008, 199), yet their small size and short duration of ESDP operations is widely acknowledged.

Getting ESDP started was, however, a “painful path from shadow to substance” (Wallace 2005, 429). After the failed ratification of the European Defence Community in 1954, defending Europe became the prerogative of NATO. Despite the repeated acknowledgement of the European Community member states for the need of a stronger and closer security cooperation after the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989), the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) only vaguely envisaged “the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence” (art. J/4). The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) called for a “progressive framing of a common defence policy” (art. 17), but the Kosovo conflict broke out (1998-1999) before it could enter into force. The reaction of the EU member states proved
inappropriate once again and triggered finally the political commitment to establish a European Security and Defence Policy.

### Table 1: Overview EU missions from 2003 to 2010 (status: 10.05.2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Completed</th>
<th>Ongoing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total: 24</strong></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Concordia (FYROM)</td>
<td>EUFOR Althea (Bosnia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Artemis (DR Congo)</td>
<td>EU NAVFOR (Somalia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EUFOR RD Congo</td>
<td>EUTM Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EUFOR Chad/RCA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civilian-military</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>EU Support to AMIS (Darfur/Sudan)</td>
<td>EU SSR (Guinea-Bissau)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EUSEC RD Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civilian</strong></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>EUPOL Proxima (FYROM)</td>
<td>EUPM BiH (Bosnia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EJUST Themis (Georgia)</td>
<td>EUPOL RD Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EUPOL Kinshasa (DR Congo)</td>
<td>EU JUST Lex (Iraq)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ACEH monitoring mission (Indonesia)</td>
<td>Border Mission Moldova/Ukraine</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EUPAT (FYROM)</td>
<td>EU BAM Rafah</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EUPOL COPPS (Palestine Territories)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EUPOL Afghanistan</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EUMM Georgia</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EULEX Kosovo</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


The bilateral Saint-Malo Declaration between France and the United Kingdom in December 1998 is generally considered as the starting point of ESDP. Europe's two major military powers, which had until then held very different views on European security, agreed that “the Union must have capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises” (art. 2). At the subsequent Cologne European Council in June 1999, the member states
officially established the ESDP, envisaging “autonomous action backed up by credible military capabilities and appropriate decision making bodies” (European Council 1999a, p. 37, emphasis added) in order to carry out the full range of Petersberg Tasks as agreed upon in the Amsterdam Treaty: “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace making” (art. 17/2).

Once the member states had secured political agreement for ESDP, they had to address assessing the civilian and military capabilities of the member states and the set-up of appropriate structures in Brussels. In December 1999, the European Council adopted the Helsinki Headline Goals as a first benchmark for military capabilities: the member states pledged to be able by 2003 to deploy within sixty days 50-60,000 soldiers for a period of at least one year. The European Council also created the first permanent ESDP decision-making bodies in Brussels (see below). In terms of civilian crisis management, the Feira European Council (June 2000) identified four priority areas (police, strengthening the rule of law, of civilian administration and civilian protection), for which some 5,000 police officers would be available. Close cooperation with the civilian crisis mechanisms of the European Community was furthermore emphasised (European Council 2000a), as already various Community instruments in these fields existed (Duke and Ojanen 2006; Schroeder 2007; Dijkstra 2009).

Achieving the Helsinki and Feira targets became an important focal point for ESDP until 2003, as only a low number of European troops were adequately trained for actual deployment. A fundamental shift was required from “quantity to quality”, in order to provide professional soldiers with sufficient training, and who also possessed the requisite of political, cultural, social and linguistic skills (Howorth 2007, 96-104). Several Capability Improvement Conferences were held in Brussels from November 2000-onwards to assess the civilian and military forces of the member states. The Nice European Council (December 2000) highlighted the need to improve availability, deployability, sustainability and interoperability of forces, and asked for serious efforts to be made in terms of strategic intelligence, as well as air and naval transport capabilities (European Council 2000b). It also formalised the ad hoc bureaucratic bodies that had been set-up by the Helsinki European Council (see below).

In December 2001, the Laeken European Council finally deemed that “the EU is now able to conduct some crisis-management operations” due to progress made during the various capability conferences and as a result of the rapidly developing institutional structures. At the same time, however, it pointed out that for the full range of Petersberg tasks “substantial progress will have to be made” (European Council 2001, p. 28). To avoid member states spending scarce resources unnecessarily, the ‘Berlin Plus’ agreement (2003) gave the European Union access to NATO assets (e.g. planning capacity, SHAPE headquarters, logistics, communication) during its crisis management operations.

followed in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), effectively taking over a previous NATO operation and making use of the Berlin Plus arrangements. Using French facilities under the 'framework nation' concept, the first 'autonomous' ESDP military mission called Artemis was deployed in Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo) in order to protect internally displaced persons and civilians, and to provide support for the UN mission on the ground. Finally in December 2003, a police mission known as EUPOL Proxima started in FYROM.

Lessons were learnt from these first operations, especially regarding the EU’s capabilities that now again came to the fore of attention. The Helsinki Headline Goals had proven insufficient and inflexible, with the EU striving for “the ability to conduct concurrent operations thus sustaining several operations simultaneously at different levels of engagement” (External Relations Council 2004, 1). To tackle these shortcomings a process similar to the earlier attempts like in 1999 and 2000 was started. First, a military Headline Goal 2010 and a Civilian Headline Goal 2008/2010 were set up, which would be regularly reviewed and adapted. Secondly, annual conferences would ensure that capabilities improved towards these goals. And thirdly – and for the focus of this article most interestingly – various bureaucratic bodies were tasked with engaging in a process of improving capabilities and planning (External Relations Council 2004, 5; Howorth 2007). The member states, in this respect, also established the European Defence Agency in 2004 to facilitate the cooperation between member states in acquiring better capabilities.

Parallel to these developments, the member states continued to launch ESDP operations in Bosnia, Georgia, the Palestinian Territories, Aceh, and the DR Congo (2004-2006). While these operations clearly consolidated the EU record in civilian and military crisis management, a real quantitative leap forward in terms of number but also size of missions came only in 2007-2008, when the member states started planning the ambitious civilian missions in Afghanistan and Kosovo, and the military operation in Chad. These missions were challenging from a security, political, and logistical perspective and confronted the EU with significant problems in terms of planning and implementation, providing again feedback for future development.

This brief account shows that the creation of ESDP was at the outset decided by national politicians. The more specific set-up of certain procedures, adjustment of capabilities, and implementation were to a large extent, however, shaped by bureaucratic actors. The next section discusses these players in more detail.

3. ESDP Bureaucracies: Brussels, Capitals, Headquarters and Theatre

The creation of the ESDP inevitably led to a number of functional demands related to supporting bureaucracies and institutions. Previously, the foreign policy machinery had been
relatively light reflecting the sovereignty concerns of the member states (1970-1999). The focal point of foreign policy coordination was the Political Committee (PoCo), consisting of the Political Directors, who met on a monthly basis in the capital of the Presidency. The meetings of PoCo were prepared by the various CFSP working groups in Brussels and by junior diplomats, known as the European Correspondents, in the ministries of foreign affairs. Finally, there was a small CFSP unit in the Directorate-General External Relations (DG E) of the Council Secretariat, which supported the work of the Presidency, as well as a handful of officials in the European Commission (Nuttall 2000; Dijkstra 2008). This structure was, however, unable to support the autonomous peace-keeping operations that the member states envisaged.

The foreign policy machinery was first strengthened following the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty (1999). This treaty created the position of the High Representative (HR) for the CFSP to be based in Council Secretariat. Javier Solana (1999-2009) became the first occupant, and as a former NATO Secretary-General and Spanish minister of foreign affairs, he provided the CFSP with political leadership. He was supported by a Policy Unit of approximately 35 civil servants. Parts of the Policy Unit were from 2004-onwards integrated into DG E for reasons of consistency (Duke and Vanhoonacker 2006). While all these changes were the result of a more ambitious CFSP, and not directly related to the creation of ESDP, they did transform the Council Secretariat, which eventually became the institutional basis for the ESDP.

The St. Malo Declaration (1998) had recognised that the European Union “must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence and a capability for relevant strategic planning” (art. 3). There was, however, no blueprint for the institutional structure and most ESDP bureaucracies developed gradually. Overall, four sorts of bureaucratic bodies can be identified (for an overview see Table 2): firstly, within the permanent representations in Brussels, military, political and security sections were established. The size of these sections ranges from 6 civil servants in the Permanent Representation of Malta to 23 in the Permanent Representation of France. These diplomats and military officers take part in the ESDP working groups. Secondly, various directorates and units were established within the Council Secretariat and the Commission. These bureaucracies employ approximately 300-350 officials and facilitate the working groups; they will become part of the European External Action Service (EEAS). Thirdly, the ESDP units in the national ministries provide the Permanent Representations with instructions and deliver the troops, policemen and judges for the missions. Fourthly, the ESDP requires an Operational Headquarters (OHQ) from where missions and staff on the ground ('in theatre') can be directed.

3.1 Brussels-based bureaucracies

The initial focus of the member states was on the Brussels-based bureaucratic structures, and particularly on ESDP missions with a military rather than civilian character (Nowak 2006;
Björkdahl 2008). The Helsinki European Council (1999) established three new permanent bodies: the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) and the European Union Military Staff (EUMS). The first two are strictly intergovernmental Council bodies with one seat per member state, while the latter is an integrated military bureaucracy, based in the Council Secretariat. During one of the first meetings of the PSC (March 2000), foreign ministers were recommended to establish a Committee for the Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM).

The Political and Security Committee replaced the Political Committee as the ‘linchpin’ of the CFSP/ESDP and consists of member states ambassadors (Duke 2005; Meyer 2006; Juncos and Reynolds 2007). Formally, all dossiers of the PSC pass through the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper) before being discussed at ministerial level. In practice, however, the agenda of Coreper is so overloaded that the PSC is de facto the highest administrative body in the ESDP. It normally meets twice a week, but it can meet exceptionally in case of emergency, which rarely happens. The PSC used to be chaired by the Presidency, but under the Lisbon Treaty will be chaired by “a representative of the High Representative”. The agenda of the PSC is prepared by the Nicolaides group and relies on the support of the Political-Military Group, consisting of junior diplomats and defence counsellors. Finally, RELEX Counsellors formally report to Coreper, providing the bridge to Community matters and dealing with legal and financial issues (Grevi 2009).

The EU Military Committee (EUMC) is the highest military body within the Council and formally consists of the Chiefs of Defence of all the member states. On a day-to-day basis, however, they are represented through their Military Representatives in the Permanent Representations, most of whom are also the national representatives in the NATO Military Committee. Since NATO affairs are considered more important than ESDP, most EU business is handled by the deputy Military Representatives. The EUMC is the most important source of military advice for the PSC, and it discusses all military operations before the PSC takes decisions. Given that the implementation of military operations is often rather technical, the EUMC is generally the highest body in the EU amending military planning documents. Unlike the PSC, the EUMC has always had a permanent chairman for a period of three years, who is supported by a very small staff. As a result, the Presidency plays a significantly smaller role in military crisis management. The EUMC is supported by the EUMC working group.

The EU Military Staff (EUMS) is not a strictly intergovernmental body. Rather it is a hierarchically organised expert bureaucracy, set up as a Directorate-General and located in the Council Secretariat. In the future, it will also become part of the External Action Service. Its task is to provide military expertise to the EUMC as well as the High Representative. It thus has two formal principals. Currently, the EUMS consists of 200+ seconded national officials and every member state has a number of seats. It has various directorates ranging from intelligence to logistics and a civil-military cell. Its Director-General is supported by an executive office, which has also direct liaisons with the United Nations and NATO.
the ESDP policy cycle, the EUMS plays a key role in the military planning process (Mattelaer 2010). After the political decision to launch a military operation has been made, it drafts the first military planning documents and helps the Operations Commander with the Operational Plan and in launching the operations. While it is involved in the implementation phase, it does not have a formal position in the chain of command.

Whereas the military structures were established rapidly, it took member states some time to create equivalent civilian structures. The Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM), for example, was established in May 2000. Its role was initially unclear. In its founding document (2000/354/CFSP), the cross-pillar dimension of crisis management was stressed, thus potentially duplicating the work of the RELEX Group and the European Commission. However, over time, it became the civilian equivalent of the EUMC preparing and planning the civilian ESDP missions. Despite the fact that the numerous civilian missions clearly outnumber the military operations, CIVCOM remains much lower in prestige than the EUMC (Cross 2010). The representatives in CIVCOM are 'merely' the deputies of the PSC ambassadors, compared to the Chiefs of Defence and Military Representatives in the EUMC. Moreover, CIVCOM, unlike the EUMC, does not have its own working group. A final important difference is that while the EUMC mainly performs military oversight of underlying working bodies, the CIVCOM is much more actively engaged in drafting civilian planning documents. This partially results from the fact that the supporting civilian structures in the Council Secretariat are much weaker and because the member states want to keep much closer control over civilian planning.

New structures were also established within the Council Secretariat. Apart from the earlier mentioned EUMS, within the Directorate General for External Relations (DG E) the member states created a Directorate for Defence Aspects (DG E VIII) and a Directorate for Civilian Crisis Management (DG E IX). The role of both directorates was, however, rather different. While the officials in DG E VIII could rely on the EUMS and Operational Headquarters (OHQ, see below) for military operations, there was initially not such a civilian equivalent. DG E IX thus had to do everything itself. It often consulted with the EUMS because it did not have sufficient expertise. Together with the unclear chain of command for civilian crisis management, this resulted in bureaucratic reorganisation, with the creation of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) in 2007. The CPCC became the civilian equivalent of the EUMS and the military OHQ. The CPCC is led by the Civilian Operations Commander. Finally, further reshuffling took place in 2009 when DG E VIII, DG E IX and parts of the EUMS were merged into the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD). All three, the EUMS, the CPCC and the CMPD will become part of the External Action Service.

The European Commission plays a minor role in ESDP. Until 2005, it did not even attend the EUMC or its working group, despite the fact that it is 'fully associated' with the CFSP. The Commission felt attendance would offend the member states, as it did not have much to contribute in terms of expertise. In civilian crisis management it plays a more active role
through its management of the CFSP budget (part of the Community budget), which can be used to finance the common costs of civilian missions. The Commission's handling of the CFSP budget has in the past led to inter-institutional tensions with the member states and officials from the Council Secretariat, which want to use the budget line in a quick and flexible manner (Missiroli 2006). Apart from the management of the CFSP budget, it is worth noting that the Commission has been particularly busy to defend Community competences given that there was a lot of cross-pillar overlap. The Commission has tried to avoid that member states use second-pillar instruments to achieve first pillar ends (Schroeder 2007; Hoffmeister 2008; Dijkstra 2009). Finally, during several ESDP missions, the Commission has proposed flanking measures using first pillar resources.

3.2 Other ESDP bureaucracies

ESDP has thus led to the establishment and strengthening of a whole range of Brussels-bureaucracies. Permanent Representations now have sizeable ESDP departments, the Council Secretariat has more than doubled in terms of AD-grade officials and even the Commission had to employ new personnel. The developments in ESDP have, however, also an impact beyond Brussels. Since ESDP is such a sensitive field it is for the member states crucial to keep their own representatives in Brussels 'on message'. They can only do this by sending instructions of the highest quality. This, however, not only involves the national ministries of foreign affairs. Other ministries, such as interior, justice, defence and finance also play a key role when it comes to crisis management. After all, it is the policemen, judges and soldiers who implement the missions and their contributions must be financed. Since actual delivery is key, the involvement of new ministries has raised the question of domestic competence allocation and has created a functional need for coordination mechanisms (Vanhoonacker and Jacobs 2010).

Furthermore there is also the most sensitive topic of the Operational Headquarters and the chain of command. Given the strong American apprehensions about possible duplication of scarce resources (Albright 1998), the EU member states initially decided to use NATO assets under the Berlin Plus agreement. This means the use of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and the Deputy-Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) serves as the Operations Commander. The member states can, however, also make their own national OHQs available for EU operations, which they have done during military operations Artemis, EUFOR Congo, EUFOR Chad and Atalanta. Both options are sub-optimal. The Berlin Plus option is very politicised and leads to consistency problems with other EU policies. The national option is very costly for the member state that makes their OHQs available. Thus the host nation has all kinds of incentives to terminate the operation as soon as possible. Because of these problems, there is a debate about whether the EU should get its own facilities. In 2007, a small-scale Operations Centre was established in Brussels, but it has, for political reasons, not been used since (Norheim-Martinsen 2010).
In addition to the Operational Headquarters, there are bureaucratic structures on the ground (see Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2008). In the theatre, the military Force Commander or civilian Head of Mission plays a crucial role. He/she is generally supported by political advisors (POLADs) seconded from the Council Secretariat, a chief of staff, legal advisors and press officers. Various other staff members are seconded from the member states or directly contracted to ensure the smooth running of the operation. Finally, there is also a need for close cooperation with other EU actors on the ground, such as the EU Special Representatives (EUSR), the Commission Head of Delegation, other international actors, and potentially other ESDP operations. Experience has shown how complicated these relations generally are. In Bosnia, for example, at times there were significant problems between the military and police mission, because of overlapping mandates, between the EUSR and the Commission Head of Delegation, and between the EUSR and Head of the police mission.

Table 2: Bureaucratic actors in Brussels, the capitals and headquarters (1999 -2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supranational bureaucracy</th>
<th>Council Secretariat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DG E &amp; Policy Unit: regional desk officers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG E: Defence Aspects and Civilian Crisis Management / currently</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>European Union Military Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability</td>
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<td>Joint Situation Centre</td>
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<td>European Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>RELEX: Directorate A – CFSP operations and Security Policy</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>RELEX, ELARG, DEV, AidCo, ECHO: regional desk officers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intergovernmental bureaucracy</td>
<td>Permanent Representations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political and Security Committee</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Nicolaides Group</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>European Union Military Committee + working group</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political-Military Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>RELEX Counsellors</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regional working groups (e.g. COWEB or COAFR)</td>
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<tr>
<td>National bureaucracy</td>
<td>National Ministries in the Capitals</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign ministry with Political Director / European Correspondent</td>
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<tr>
<td>Defence / interior / justice ministry</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Finance ministry</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chain of Command</td>
<td>NATO, member states and on the ground</td>
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<tr>
<td>Operations Headquarters (OHQ): NATO's SHAPE; member states assets; Operations Centre</td>
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<td>Force Headquarters on the ground</td>
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4. Understanding the Role of Bureaucracy in ESDP

These bureaucratic institutional developments have taken place in less than a decade. It is thus understandable that the academic community has had a hard time keeping up. As a result, the research on the role of bureaucracy in the ESDP is still in its early stages. This section presents the state of the art and identifies fruitful avenues for further exploration. In doing so, it not only provides a framework, on which the remainder of this special issue builds, but it also situates the study of ESDP bureaucracy within the broader research agenda on the role of bureaucracy in the European Union.

The study of bureaucracy goes a long way back. One of the key references remains Max Weber ([1922] 1978), who identified professional bureaucracy as one of the building blocks of the modern state. Yet since the publication of ‘Economy and Society’, the political context in which governments are operating has drastically changed (Haas 1964; Keohane and Nye 1977; Slaughter 2004). One key development is the increasing complexity of political problems requiring responses far beyond the capacities of national governments and defying the sovereignty of the territorial state. After the Second World War, a whole range of international and regional organisations have been established. All these forums are supported by their own permanent bureaucracies in addition to the day-to-day intergovernmental contacts between national civil servants (Barnett and Finnemore 1999; Reinalda and Verbeeck 1998; Olsen 2006). Through these new layers of international and supranational governance, international organisations defy the Weberian hierarchical model of top-down policy-making (Rosenau 1992). Decisions are taken through a process of intense consultation and negotiation amongst politicians, civil servants, the private sector and civil society acting at different levels.

The European Union is undoubtedly the most developed example of a system of multi-level governance (Marks et al. 1996; Kohler-Koch 1996; Jachtenfuchs 2001; Kohler-Koch and Rittberger 2006). In a growing number of areas its member states are no longer the only ones at the centre of policy-making. Policy is initiated, negotiated and implemented through an interaction between different levels of public authority. As long as the study of the European integration process was dominated by theories of International Relations, the central question was whether it were the member states or the supranational institutions who affected the pace and dynamics of European integration. The focus was on 'history making decisions' (Peterson 1995) and since states were treated as a black box there was no room for the study of bureaucracies. From the 1990s-onwards, however, the EU was increasingly conceptualised as a polity comparable to other political systems (Hix 1994 and 1998; Caporaso 1998) and the study of day-to-day policy-making began to occupy a central place on the European research agenda. The EU was no longer seen as a unique case. It became a venue for testing concepts and hypotheses using comparative policy analysis, as well as other disciplines and approaches, such as public administration and organisation theory.
These alternative approaches have triggered a new interest in the administrative organisation of the EU institutions (Page 1997; Stevens and Stevens 2001; Olsen 2003; Hoffmann and Turk 2006; Trondal 2007). The European Commission, in particular, as the main European executive and a centre of information and expertise has received a lot of attention (e.g. Cini 1996; Nugent 2000; Shore 2000; Hooghe 2001; Dimitrakopoulos 2004; Egeberg 2006; Suvarierol 2008). It is no longer just studied as actor impacting on European integration, but also as an evolving organisation affecting the policy-making process on a day-to-day basis (Dimitrakopoulos 2004).

Administrative research on the Council and the European Parliament remains more limited. The role of the European Parliament, for example, only started to take off after the Maastricht Treaty (1993) when it became a co-legislator. The focus of the research remains on its political powers and structures rather than on the underlying administration (Neuhold 2001; Shackleton 2006; Corbett, Jacobs and Shackleton 2007). Studying the Council is complex since there is not just one body but a wide variety of players going from the working groups (Beyers 2005; Fouilleux, de Maillard and Smith 2005; Häge 2008) to Coreper (Lewis 1998) and the Council Secretariat (Christiansen 2002; Christiansen and Vanhoonacker 2008; Dijkstra 2010). More recently also the role of committees (Wessels 1998; Tonra 2000; Egeberg, Schäfer and Trondal 2003; Christiansen and Larsson 2007, Gornitzka and Sverdrup 2007; Neuhold 2008; Quaglia, De Francesco and Radaelli 2008) and agencies (Shapiro 1997; Kelemen 2002; Gerardin, Munoz and Petit 2005; Pollak and Puntscher-Riekmann 2008; Dehousse 2008) have received considerable attention.

The ‘comparative politics’ and ‘public administration’ turn did initially not receive much resonance in the field of European foreign policy. CFSP is traditionally the domain of international relations scholars and foreign policy analysts (e.g. Hill 1993, 1996; Hill and Smith 2005; White 2001; Bretherton and Vogler 2006; Manners 2002; Hyde-Price 2006). In both traditions, bureaucracy does not play a vital role. There is, however, a more simple reason why the analytical study of bureaucracy has for a long time not been on the radar-screen of European foreign policy scholars: until the Amsterdam Treaty, there was not much bureaucracy to speak of with the member states doing most of the work from the national capitals. Research on key administrative bodies was thus generally integrated in broader studies on European foreign policy cooperation (e.g. Hill 1983 and 1996; de Schoutheeete 1986; Pijpers, Regelsberger and Wessels 1988; Whitman and Manners 2000; Smith 2004). One of the most detailed studies on the foreign policy bureaucracies is by Simon Nuttall (1992; 2000). His unique and extremely rich books examine the day-to-day workings of the machinery of European foreign policy primarily through historical lenses.

The creation of ESDP, as shown above, has proved a real watershed for European foreign policy and its underlying administrative structures. As explained in the previous section it has led to the creation of new structures in Brussels and in the capitals and to the reinforcement of existing bureaucratic bodies. Importantly, even in this sensitive field, decisions are now increasingly taken by actors operating at different levels – in national ministries, the
permanent representations, supranational institutions and the civilian and military command and control structures. By observing interaction between these actors at the different levels, it becomes increasingly difficult to treat European foreign policy as a purely intergovernmental phenomenon and for scholars to restrict themselves to the traditional theories of International Relations. Instead, it is indeed appealing to use insights from comparative politics, public administration and (multi-level) governance.

Embracing multiple conceptual lenses has several advantages. As has already been argued in the introduction to this article, these approaches do not limit themselves to the political level, but specifically pay attention to the role and influence of non-elected players in the policy-making process. They may therefore provide useful concepts and tools to get a better understanding of the daily dynamics of ESDP policy-making. While it may not be sufficient to simply transplant their analytical frames to European foreign policy, a comparative perspective gives a good starting base, encouraging scholarly learning and sharpening our analytical instruments. Furthermore bringing in other disciplines of the social sciences gives a better insight to what extent European foreign policy actually is *sui generis*. It also makes an end to the relative isolation of CFSP scholars, sparking a debate with researchers dealing with other policy areas.

In an attempt to stimulate further research on the role of bureaucracies in European foreign policy-making and to bring some structure to the future debate, the remainder of this section discusses the current state of the art and suggests questions for further inquiry. Four main issues are addressed: the ‘identity’ of the bureaucratic players in ESDP; their influence; patterns of interaction; and their legitimacy and accountability.

4.1 Who are these ESDP officials?

In line with the broader tradition of public administration, one of the first questions relates to the study of the civil service as a social system (Page 1992) – i.e. what are the *characteristics* of the diplomats and civil servants dealing with ESDP? Issues of particular interest are their educational and professional qualifications, national background, the mode of recruitment and appointment, the means of promotion and, last but not least, their values and norms (Page 1992; Hooghe 2001; Scheinman and Feld 1972). When ESDP was created, the EU institutions had very little expertise in civilian and military crisis management. Thus, the Council Secretariat had to recruit a large part of its personnel from elsewhere. While some of its staff came from other international organisations (e.g. NATO), most vacancies were filled with seconded national officials coming not only from national ministries of foreign affairs but also from sectoral ministries such as defence and the interior (Dijkstra 2008). The question arises how the involvement of new players beyond those of the diplomats that have traditionally dominated European foreign policy impact on policy preferences and instruments. Military staff, for example, may have a quite different view from traditional diplomats when addressing foreign policy challenges.
Recent studies illustrate that ESDP officials and diplomats come from a wide range of educational and professional backgrounds and vary in terms of seniority and status. Juncos and Pomorska (2010) give an overview of the national and professional backgrounds of officials in the Council Secretariat and how these people perceive their individual roles as secretariat officials. They demonstrate that even within the Council Secretariat the role perception of the officials vary according to their personal background and their respective unit. A study by Howorth (2011), which discusses the profiles of the PSC ambassadors, shows that they have some typical foreign service characteristics (education in history, political science or law, multi-lingual, and experience abroad) and that most have specific expertise in the field of security and defence through previous experience. While the age of the ambassadors – and thus their seniority – varies across member states, 'circumstantial evidence' suggests that it has increased with new generations arriving in Brussels. Cross (2010) furthermore compares the national representatives in the EUMC with those in CIVCOM. She finds substantial differences between both committees in terms of expertise, seniority and common identities. Overall, the ESDP officials are clearly different from the supranational Monnet-ideal type civil servant, serving a life-time promoting European interests.

The multi-national and multi-level character of the ESDP administration also raises questions about their predominant norms and values, and how European interaction impacts upon the interests and identities of those involved. Scholars at the European University Institute (EUI), for example, have given special attention to the world views of actors such as the High Representative for CFSP Javier Solana (1999-2009), various Commissioners, and the Director General of DG E Robert Cooper (e.g. Vennesson 2007). A case study on the PSC by Howorth (2011) shows that its members are very attached to the EU (50%) and that 80% believe the development of an EU identity necessary. Yet the ESDP bureaucracy is not limited to the PSC. An interesting group in this respect are the seconded national officials in the Council Secretariat which, in some units, represent between 50 to 100% of the staff. They are supposed to be the ‘ears and the eyes’ of the member states in Brussels but the question arises how processes of socialisation and social learning affect their identity and preferences (Checkel 2003).

It is clear from the overview above that the systematic study of administrative players in ESDP is only just starting and that much of the available empirical material remains unexplored. A further mapping of the characteristics of the different actors in the day-day policy-making process, beyond that of the level of PSC, should not only give us a better idea of who the administrative actors are, but also how their different background and recruitment impacts upon the policy-making process. Secondly, the mushrooming of ESDP administrative bodies provides us with an interesting laboratory for testing institutional theories of how norms, rules and procedures affect behaviour or emerge. Do they merely have an impact on cost-benefit calculations or does participation in European-level networks also lead to new supranational loyalties that complement or even replace national identities?
4.2 How and under what conditions do ESDP officials matter?

One of the crucial research questions in the study of bureaucracy is the extent to which civil servants matter. In line with the formal dichotomy between the political and administrative level (e.g. Wilson 1887; Weber [1922] 1978), the general (normative) idea is that career civil servants, in contrast to their political principals, are non-elected and should thus not assert excessive political influence over policy outcomes (see also below). The academic literature, however, has long recognised that permanent administrations are more than neutral secretariats and often have their own interests and opinions on the preferred solutions to societal problems (e.g. Crozier 1962; Allison 1971; Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman 1981; Urban 1982; Peters 2009).

Within ESDP the formal decision-making power lies with the foreign ministers meeting in the Foreign Affairs Council (previously: General Affairs and External Relations Council) and deciding by unanimity. As the democratically elected political principals, they have the final word. Most of the preparatory work, however, is done at bureaucratic levels in the PSC, the Council working groups, and the Council Secretariat. In case of a military or civilian operation, the Council approves the Crisis Management Concept, the Council Decision (previously: Joint Action) and other planning documents. Apart from some salient issues (mandate, finances, troop levels, choice of headquarters, appointments), the ministers hardly ever amend the proposals prepared by the PSC. However, this does not necessarily imply that civil servants have a lot of influence, as they may anticipate the reactions of their political principals (Bachrach and Baratz 1963; Häge 2008). The PSC, for example, is very wary of the ministers re-opening a dossier when a compromise does not suit them.

The political influence of civil servants depends on their bureaucratic resources. These are firstly their formal competences (e.g. Moravcsik 1998; Pollack 2003; Franchino 2007). Given the sensitivities of security and defence, the foreign ministers have been very reluctant to give formal authority to the bureaucratic level. For functional reasons they have, however, delegated a number of tasks. The PSC, for example, exercises ‘political control and strategic direction’ during the course of an ESDP operation. As a result of its permanent and Brussels-based nature, it has more continuity than the Council and can meet on an emergency basis. Part of this authority is further delegated to the Operations and the Force Commander. Yet contrary to the first pillar, few formal competences have been delegated to the EU institutions (Wagner 2003; Dijkstra 2008, 2010). One example is the chairmanship of some Council bodies. The EUMC, and under the Lisbon Treaty also the PSC, has a permanent chair. Although the person at the helm is supposed to act in the broader European interest, he/she can potentially use the position to put certain questions on the agenda or to steer the negotiations in a certain direction (Tallberg 2006).

A further significant bureaucratic resource, generally accepted as the principal source of influence of the administration is information and expertise (e.g. Weber [1922] 1978; Peters 2009). Such information asymmetries also pertain to the field of security and defence, as the
density and complexity of information is high (Epstein and O'Halloran 1999). A useful
typology is the distinction between content expertise, process expertise and information on
the state of play (Beach 2005; Tallberg 2006). As regards content expertise, the military
services – and particularly the national ministries of defence – clearly hold an informational
advantage in ESDP with the result that the Council and even the PSC hardly comment on
military details. On process expertise, civil servants generally hold an informational
asymmetry over the political principals. Furthermore, the civil servants in the EU institutions,
particularly the Council Secretariat (and its legal service) have more information on the state
of play than the officials from the member states. The creation of an External Action Service,
which enjoys access to the Union delegations in third countries, could further strengthen the
position of Brussels vis-à-vis the national capitals. Yet with the exception of Dijkstra (2010)
and Klein (2010), informational strengths of civil servants in ESDP are not yet explored in the
literature.

The increasing role of bureaucracy in ESDP policy-making invites for a better understanding
of the ability of civil servants and diplomats to shape ESDP decisions in line with their own
preferences. The key question is to what extent bureaucracies can use their resources to assert
political influence over outcomes. The influence question is not only crucial for our general
comprehension of the policy process but is also relevant from a normative perspective (cf.
section 4.4). Assuming an overriding importance of knowledge and expertise as a source of
influence (Peters 2009), we especially encourage further research into how and under what
conditions informational asymmetries have an independent impact on political decisions. This
is challenging since also in other EU policy areas this question requires further investigation
(Moravcsik 2005). Furthermore, measuring influence is methodologically very demanding.
As has been argued by Dür (2008), however, questions of influence are too important to be
ignored and in recent years new methodological steps have been made. An important sub-
question in the discussion about influence is the oversight mechanisms available at the
political level for it to make sure that the administration acts in accordance its political
preferences. Here scholars can draw on principal-agent literature, which is omnipresent in the
disciplines of political science and public administration (see Pollack 1997, Kassim and

4.3 How do ESDP officials interact?

Bureaucracies are not monolithic entities, but consist of different organisational units that
may have their own preferences and ideas about the preferred solutions to particular
problems. Administrative bureaux tend to jealously guard their territory and in case of
competition or overlapping competencies they are likely to defend their turf (Downs 1967). In
addition, officials generally internalise the dominant views of their organisational
environment and will try to have these viewpoints reflected in the policy outcome. The way
bureaucratic politics may affect the policy-making process has been famously illustrated by
Graham Allison in his seminal study on the Cuban missile crisis. He showed how, back in
1962, the United States' decision to respond to the Soviet missile deployment in Cuba with a
naval blockade rather than an air strike was based not merely on purely rational deliberations of national interest, but strongly influenced by the way the United States governmental bureaucracy was organised (Allison 1971; Allison and Zelikow 1999).

The creation of the ESDP has raised new questions of competence allocation or ‘who should be responsible for what’, both within and amongst institutions. The integration of new structures in the existing hierarchy and the accompanying processes of internal re-organisation has triggered rivalry and tensions. The creation of the PSC, for example, initially led to turf battles with Coreper, debating who would formally submit dossiers to the Council (Nuttall 2000; Duke 2005). The original division of tasks in the Council Secretariat between the Policy Unit and DG E whereby the former was in charge of policy formulation and the latter was cast in a supporting role, was never accepted by DG E (Duke and Vanhoonacker 2006). In addition there were also strains in inter-institutional relations, especially between the Council Secretariat and the Commission. In line with Downs’ hypothesis that fights will be most fierce in areas of competing competencies, Dijkstra (2009) finds that the rivalry was strongest in civilian crisis management, where there was already a long Commission tradition. In the area of military matters, where the Commission has no expertise it has accepted its minimal role without problems.

The complex character of the decision making process and the multiple actors involved also put high demands on the coordination process. The number of organisational and managerial challenges is manifold and situated at various levels: at the European level (intra- and inter-institutional), between the EU and the member states, and at the national level (Blockmans 2008; Vanhoonacker 2008). In addition ESDP also requires coordination between the civilian and military dimension (Norheim-Martinsen 2010), rules on interaction with third players such as NATO and the United Nations (Tardy 2005; Reichard 2006; Duke 2008, Major 2008; Wouters and Ruys 2008; Hofmann 2009) and, last but not least, coherence with the other aspects of EU external and internal policy (Duke and Ojanen 2006; Keohane 2008; Eriksson and Rhinard 2009; Weiss and Dalférth 2009).

Building on the findings of the above-mentioned exploratory studies, further research on the interaction of ESDP officials could be organised around the two central themes of intra- and inter-institutional competence allocation and coordination; as well as on the impact of organisational structures on policy outcomes. A mapping of competencies and coordination mechanisms in ESDP not only allows one to get a better insight into the day-to-day policy-making process but also to identify possible weaknesses in terms of duplication, inconsistency, and policy-making gaps (Kassim et al. 2000). A comparative study of ESDP coordination mechanisms at the national level could furthermore link up with the broader Europeanisation debate on the convergence of national administrative structures as a result of European integration (Knill 2001).

Secondly, there seems to be great scope for further research into the impact of organisational structures on processes of ESDP policy-making. Organisation theory has learned us that
structures are never neutral and that they will influence the choices that are made (Hamond 2001). The organisation of issues on either a territorial or functional basis will lead to different patterns of interaction and will forge policy networks along different lines (Gullick 1937; Egeberg 2004). Organisations where horizontal processes of bargaining are dominant operate differently from those organised in a vertical and more hierarchical way. At a time where the member states are setting up the External Action Service, questions about the interrelationship between organisational structures and policy-making may prove highly relevant.

4.4 To whom are ESDP officials accountable?

When trying to understand the role of bureaucracies it is not enough to study their internal characteristics, but one should also situate them within the broader political context in which they operate (Olsen 2003). The key role of non-elected officials in policy-making creates the risk of the assertion of excessive political influence by bureaucracy (Weber [1922] 1978), raising normative questions about the democratic quality of the political system. The multi-level nature of EU policy-making, the overall debate on the EU’s democratic deficit, and the traditionally strong role of the executive in the field of security and defence ascribe pivotal importance to the question of legitimacy and accountability in ESDP.

For a long time the debate of the democratic deficit in the European Union was mainly confined to the first pillar (Lord 1998; Majone 1998; Sharpf 1999; Eriksen and Fossum 2000; Moravcsik 2002; Hix 2005). In the early 1990s the growing transfer of national competencies to the European level and the lack of input from the European citizens were increasingly seen as a problem for EU democracy. The interactions between different levels of governance lead to the dispersion of political authority where the lines of accountability were not always clear. While some downplayed the problem by arguing that the EU derives its legitimacy from the efficiency of its policy output (Scharpf 1999; Majone 1998), others have pleaded for increased public input and for standards in analogy with national parliamentary democracies. For a very long time, the emphasis was on increasing the powers of the European Parliament, but more recently there has also been an attempt to increase the involvement of national parliaments. In the context of the Lisbon Treaty, for example, the member states adopted an ‘orange card’ procedure, which can act as an emergency break on the drafting of EU legislation.

In foreign policy where decisions are taken by unanimity, there was traditionally a consensus that the member states themselves were the main source of legitimacy. Ministers could, in principle, always be held accountable through national mechanisms. Furthermore, the declaratory character of European foreign policy made the lack of public influence on outcomes less problematic. With the development of an operational foreign policy, the debate about the normative standards has spilled over to CFSP (e.g. Barbé 2004; Diedrichs 2004; Bono 2006; Crum 2006; Wagner 2006; Sjursen 2007; Lord 2008; Stie 2007). Scholars argue that in practice it is not so simple to hold ministers accountable for decisions taken at the
international level. National parliaments do not always have the required information and their powers of scrutiny differ widely. While in some member states they are involved in defining the national position or can veto the deployment of troops, in others they have no role at all (Anghel et al. 2008; Peters, Wagner and Deitelhoff 2010). Even if a national parliament has a veto power, it may be very reluctant to use it due to the high costs in terms of reputation and credibility (Moravcsik 1994).

For this article particularly relevant is that the preparatory and implementing policy process largely takes place at the administrative level, raising the question of to whom exactly actors such as the PSC and the officials in the Council Secretariat are accountable (Stie 2010). The heavy reliance on the technical and procedural expertise of diplomats, civil servants and military staff creates scope for decisions that may be biased towards their own interests and preferred views. In addition, experts never entirely oversee the consequences of their policy recommendations. There is thus a risk that decisions taken in the ESDP are insufficiently representative of what the broader European public wants.

The academic debate on accountability in ESDP is only just starting and therefore still at the standard setting phase – i.e. against which benchmarks should we assess the democratic character ESDP? Multiple questions for further elaboration and discussion arise. Does the sensitive nature of foreign and security policy and the need for rapid decisions mean that the political authority should in the first place remain with the member states? Or does the EU participation in civilian and military crisis management increasingly require the use of standards that are in not compatible with national parliamentary democracy? And if so, does the solution mainly lay in enhancing the powers of the European Parliament or should democratic control primarily be a responsibility of national parliaments or other players such as transnational parliamentary institutions? Are solutions in the sphere of an extension of parliamentary control sufficient or do we also need to create deliberative fora where citizens can publicly discuss and challenge policy-makers before decisions are taken? While it is hoped that the debate will also spread to the broader public, the academic community can play an important role in formulating the questions and sharpening the arguments of the different perspectives.

5. Conclusion

Since its advent, European foreign policy was mainly a diplomatic forum for coordination of views, and it could be characterised as a “charmed circle, with interference neither from the EC Institutions nor from other ministries at home” (Nuttall 2000, 2). With ESDP this situation has changed radically. The demanding character of civilian and military operations has required the set-up of a whole range of new administrative bodies that are vital to the day-to-day running of the ESDP machinery. In addition, it has moved the centre of gravity from the national capitals to Brussels (Allen 1998) and led to the involvement of several new ministries.
in the EU foreign policy process. Today policy-making in ESDP is more and more the result of the interaction of a wide variety of players at different governmental levels, a process that is further reinforced by the Lisbon Treaty and new players such as the European External Action Service and the Union delegations in third countries.

As illustrated in this article, interactions in the area of ESDP have become increasingly ‘bureaucratic’ rather than diplomatic (cf. Puchala 1972). Policy is conducted according to standard procedures and rules, which are geared towards the reaching and implementation of concrete decisions. The prominent role of diplomats and civil servants in policy-making makes it imperative for researchers to also pay attention to what is happening beyond the political level. The central tenet of this article is that insights from other disciplines and strands of the social sciences such as comparative public policy, public administration, multi-level governance may prove useful for further enquiry, even if they may need adapting to the specific characteristics of foreign policy.

In an attempt to stimulate and frame further research in a very promising and rapidly developing area, this article has presented the state of the art, in terms of the literature, and identified four main areas for future analysis. Building upon earlier scholarly work on (EU) bureaucracies, it has identified options for further investigation into the identity, influence, interaction and democratic accountability of administrative actors. The questions that are put forward for each of these areas are not new, nor exhaustive. These issues have also proven pertinent to researchers in other national, European or international contexts and are now also of relevance to an increasingly institutionalised ESDP. Addressing them should not only contribute to our empirical knowledge and theoretical understanding of policy-making in ESDP, but should also feed into the broader debate on the role of international bureaucracies in today’s society.

References


http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2010-004a.htm


Endnotes

1 ESDP has become the Common Security and Defence Policy under the Lisbon Treaty (2009).
2 Source: websites of both Permanent Representations.
3 The exceptions are the six non-NATO members plus Belgium, France and Luxembourg.