Options for improving EU-UN cooperation in the field of peacekeeping

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Strongly motivated by UN’s and EU’s difficulties in the Balkans in the early 1990s, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) developed itself, since 2000, in complementarity and in support of the United Nations. The European Union and the United Nations became institutional and operational partners towards effective multilateralism. Since the beginning of the reinforcement of its external policy, the EU put an emphasis on strengthening the international order, on a wide definition of security, according to which root causes, and not only the symptoms of instability and crises, must be dealt with. It also recognized the primary responsibility and the legitimacy of the UN Security Council in dealing with international peace and security: ‘Strengthening the UN, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively is a European priority’. Such vision, described in the EU Security Strategy of December 2003, favours a stronger international society, structured through international institutions and based on international law. Therefore the UN, ‘that stands at the apex of the international system’, is for the EU a major partner to cooperate with in global crisis management, despite its primary inclination for NATO. In May 2010, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of the European Union, Lady Catherine Ashton, stated in front of the UN Security Council that: ‘A core objective of EU foreign policy is the development of an effective multilateral system with a strong UN at the centre’. But what does did really mean in the area of peacekeeping operations where the UN has a much longer experience of deploying operations that are multidimensional and more and more integrated with a wide range of actors (primarily those of the UN system)? Are both organizations complement each other or compete with each other?

The EU-UN relationship went indeed through several phases: a phase of “inaction” (1999-2002), an “experimental” phase (2002-2003), “a phase of institutional convergence” (2003-

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Forthcoming as
2006), an active phase (2006-2009)\textsuperscript{4} and, finally, a phase of apathy (2009 to date). UN-EU Cooperation is currently facing an institutional stalemate due in particular to the new developments of ESDP after the Lisbon Treaty – since then, renamed as the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy, CSDP – and to some difficult experiences on the ground (such as the transition between EUFOR Tchad/RCA and MINURCAT). These phases correspond also to different roles played by each organization in trying to advance its interests, to their internal and inter-organizational dynamics. A decade has past since the establishment of this cooperation that proved to be an uneasy and un-natural\textsuperscript{5} one even if it remained a useful one in the context of an increasing complexity in crisis management.

The purpose of this paper is to assess the UN-EU cooperation in light of its concrete actions during the past decade. It wishes also to elaborate on ways to improve further this cooperation in peacekeeping so that both organizations ensure a burden sharing and a unity of effort that is indispensable in current crisis management. If both organizations wish to develop their partnership, to make it stronger in situations where they are both involved, it is to be revitalized it politically, institutionally and operationally. In that context, possible progresses and the effectiveness of that partnership depends greatly upon the will and the national interests of their respective member States, and on the room of manoeuvre they give to both Secretariats.

1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON THE UN-EU COOPERATION IN THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT

A Cooperation that came out of necessity for both organizations

The UN-EU cooperation was conceived and developed after European states took their distances from UN peacekeeping in the mid-1990s and that they favoured military intervention in the framework of a coalition of the willing or a military alliance such as NATO. After the Saint-Malo French-British Summit of 1998 and the European Council of Nice in 2000, ESDP needed to launch concrete actions and to prove that it is able to become a credible actor with new capabilities in crisis management. At the UN, it also wanted to be perceived as something more than just a “lobby group”, a “funding organization” or a “monetary weight” that is contributing to 38,8% of the regular UN budget and to 40,7% of its


peacekeeping one. This cooperation developed in Europe with the need on the part of the UN to leave a post-conflict country (as it was also increasingly asked to be deployed on other continents, especially in Africa), the EU offering a way of leaving in a sustainable way. In Bosnia-Herzegovina in particular, the EU as a “new kid on the block” was thus an exit strategy for the UN. In short, there was in the early 2000s an immediate and concrete need for such cooperation to occur.

The institutional basis of such cooperation was first laid down at the European Council of Nice (2000). It acknowledged the principle of a relationship between the UN and the EU that ‘allows Europeans to answer in an efficient and coherent manner to the requests of leading organisations such as the UN and the OSCE’. One of the goals of the Presidency was then to ‘identify possible areas of cooperation, as well as their modalities, of cooperation between the EU and the UN in crisis management’. The conclusions of the Swedish Presidency of the EU at the Gothenburg Summit recall that ‘military and civilian capacities of the European Union, in development, bring an added value to the crisis management activities/actions of the United Nations’. Two key goals were pronounced during this time: (1) to develop ‘mutually reinforcing approaches to conflict prevention’ and (2) to ensure ‘that the EU’s evolving military and civilian capacities would provide real added value for UN crisis management’.6 The decisions of the June 2001 European Summit of Gothenburg slowly initiated institutional contacts and working relationships between the two Secretariats.7 High-level meetings between the UN Secretary-General and the EU High Representative had already begun to take place regularly since an initial meeting in October 2000 in Brussels.8 In June 2001, the EU General Affairs Council defined three themes of cooperation (conflict prevention, crisis management and regional issues), and agreed on “a platform for intensified cooperation” involving four levels:

- “EU Ministerial meetings, where appropriate in Troika format, with the UN Secretary-General;

7 At the European Summit of Laeken, ‘the Union has begun to cooperate more fully with the United Nations in crisis management and conflict prevention concerning the themes and in the specific areas endorsed by the Gothenburg European Council. Regular contacts at different levels with the representatives of the United Nations have made it possible to keep up the necessary links on the main subjects of common interest. Those contacts have also led to examination, on the basis of the principles and procedures established, of how the development of European capabilities in the ESDP could contribute to United Nations efforts in peacekeeping operations’. Presidency Report on European Security and Defense policy, 22 December 2001, paragraph 22.
8 In October 2000, the Troïka first met with the UN Secretary-General who suggested creating working groups on various themes. The EU Political and Security Committee found this measure premature, as well as the opening of discussions on peacekeeping.
• Meetings and contacts between the EU High Representative and European Commission External Relations Commissioner with the UN Secretary-General and the UN Deputy Secretary-General;
• Political and Security Committee meetings, where appropriate in Troika format, with the UN Deputy Secretary-General and Under Secretaries-General; and other levels and formats as appropriate;
• Contacts of the Council Secretariat and the Commission services with the UN Secretariat at the appropriate levels”.

The initial thinking about the development of an institutional cooperation rapidly gave way to an operational cooperation as circumstances commanded, in particular in the Balkans.

**A Cooperation built in the field**

The UN-EU Cooperation is, from the start, an “operations-driven” cooperation. Its first “test case” took place in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) in the civilian aspects of crisis management (police). At the doorsteps of Europe, in the Balkans, where the EU’s interests are directly at stake, such action was fully supported by all EU member states. After a one-year period of transition, the EU Police Mission (EUPM) was launched in January 2003, taking over the UN Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNMIBH) and the International Police Task Force (IPTF). The transition involved four key elements. First, a European, the Danish Commissioner Sven-Christian Frederiksen was sequentially appointed as the head of IPTF, then as the head of the EU Planning Mission in BiH (August-December 2002) and, finally, as the head of the EU Police Mission. Second, the High Representative in BiH was also named Special Representative of the EU (EUSR). Third, the EU sent a planning mission nine months prior to the handover from the UN. Fourth, a small UN liaison office (11 staff members) remained from January to June 30, 2003 in the EUPM headquarters in order to provide assistance to EUPM, to complete the transfer of database, and to liaise with the locals. The deployment, in December 2004, of an EU military force (Operation Althéa), taking over NATO Implementation Force, brought a new turn to the involvement of the EU.

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10 On 28 February 2002, the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council accepted the offer made by the EU. On 4 March 2002, the authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina invited the EU to assume responsibility for the follow-on to the UN police mission. The UN Security Council Resolution 1396 welcomed the PIC decision on 5 March 2002. The EU Police Mission is created by the Council Joint action 2002/210/CFSP of 11 March 2002. EUPM was composed of about 484 international policemen, 66 civilian experts, and about 337 local staff. The EUPM reported through the EU Special Representative to the High Representative in Brussels.
1639) in this country, with a presence of 7,000 soldiers at the outset (currently around 2,000). Logically therefore, ESDP developed itself and became operational in Europe, where the EU as a whole is also conducting wider action: clearly, crisis management capabilities were being deployed as the perspective for possible access to EU membership of the Balkans countries was put forward.

In the summer of 2003, the UN-EU cooperation also went to further horizons with “Operation Artémis”, that became the first rapid military deployment of the EU in support of a UN Mission in Africa, the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). The EU operation specifically answered a request from the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan. The EU decision came a week after the authorization of the UN Security Council Resolution 1484 (30 May 2003) calling for the deployment of “an Interim Emergency Multinational Force in Bunia in close coordination with MONUC”. The EU intervention took the shape of a rapid reaction force of some 1,800 troops to restore the security situation in Ituri, a province in the North-East of DRC. Twelve EU member states contributed to Artemis, with France as the “framework nation”, thus providing the Operational Headquarters and the bulk of the Force. It had a strict time limit, and allowed the UN to strengthen its own operation and to extend its mandate. The EU and the UN worked in close cooperation throughout the planning and deployment phases of Artemis: the deployment of the UN troop reinforcements benefited from EU logistical support; joint planning of the transition period; co-localisation of MONUC and Artemis field headquarters; implementation of coordination mechanisms such as regular meetings and liaison officers, and visit of the Artemis Force Commander in New York.

Building on the success of Operation Artemis, France and the United Kingdom proposed in November 2003 ‘a new initiative for the EU to focus on the development of its rapid reaction capabilities to enhance its ability to help the UN in short-term crisis management situations’. In December 2003, the EU Council welcomed this proposal and developed the concept of “coherent, credible battle-groups” of 1,500 troops to be deployed at short notice and on a short-term basis. This mechanism – that became operational in 2007 – was in fact very EU centric (with very little engagement with the UN), and has not been used to date for any EU

12 The operational headquarters (OHQ) were located in Paris and included officers from several participating countries as well as officials from the General Secretariat of the EU Council. The Force Headquarters (FHQ) was located in Entebbe (Uganda) with an advanced position in Bunia (DRC).
operation nor any strategic reserve for UN operations, as Member States remain rather divided on the conditions of their deployment.\textsuperscript{14}

A Cooperation lightly institutionalized through a Joint Declaration (2003)

The experience gained on the ground led logically to the process of formalising it at the institutional level. The EU General Affairs Council (GAC) conclusions of July 21st, 2003, made crisis management a priority in the EU’s relations with the UN.\textsuperscript{15} A framework for regular consultations between the two organizations was created by the “Joint Declaration on EU-UN Cooperation in Crisis Management”, signed on September 24th, 2003 (under the Italian Presidency of the EU). It identified four areas of cooperation that should be further developed:

- planning, including reciprocal assistance in assessment missions and greater contact and cooperation between mission planning units;
- training: the establishment of joint training standards, procedures and planning for military and civilian personnel the synchronization of pre-deployment training; and the institutionalization of training seminars, conferences and exercises;
- communication: greater cooperation between situation centres; exchange of liaison officers whenever required; establishment of desk-to-desk dialogue through the respective liaison offices in New York and Brussels;
- best practices: regular and systematic exchange of lessons learned and best practices information, including information on mission hand-over and procurement.

A mechanism for consultations, the Steering Committee, was then established to increase the coordination in those areas between the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department for Political Affairs (DPA) of the UN Secretariat, on one side, and the structures of the EU (General Council Secretariat, including the EU Military Staff, and the Commission) on the other. The Steering Committee usually meets twice a year. This does not prevent the Head of DPKO from regularly briefing the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) on operations where both organizations are involved, and the EU High Representative – now the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of the EU.

\textsuperscript{14} As some member states could be flexible on their use, some others consider that the Battle Groups could only and strictly be used for an emergency situation where a military operation is needed.

\textsuperscript{15} General Affairs and External Relations Conclusions, 2522\textsuperscript{nd} Council meeting, Brussels, 21 July 2003.
European Union – from doing the same in front of the Security Council. Intervening at the request of the Italian representative to the UN on behalf of the EU Presidency, Javier Solana addressed the UN Security Council on July 18th, 2003, on Operation Artemis, and briefed it on Eufor RD Congo on 9 January 2007 and on Eufor Tchad/RCA on 24 September 2008.16 More recently, the EU High Representative Ashton made a statement in front of the UN Security Council on “Growing co-operation between the UN and the EU in the area of peace and security”.17

This first Joint Declaration was strengthened by the adoption, by the European Council, of two documents defining the modalities of cooperation in the military and civilian aspects of crisis management (2004), drawing on the experience in the field of the first operations led in cooperation with the UN.18 That allowed the EU to elaborate on the possible scenarios of UN-EU cooperation in crisis management (always implying the respect of an EU chain of command with the strategic and political control of the PSC)19 and to put some conditions for its involvement. In the face of UN demands and expectations, the EU has elaborated principles and prerequisites for participating in crisis management and for putting its civilian and military instruments at the disposal of other organizations. These basic principles are, and remain since then, the following:

- The EU will retain through the PSC the political control and strategic direction of any of its operations;
- Such cooperation will take place on a case-by-case basis;
- There would be no automatic involvement;
- The EU does not constitute a pool of forces but can only intervene by conducting specific missions or operations, and there would be no earmarked forces to any stand-by arrangements.20

Progressively, the two organizations realized that, despite their wish to cooperate together, they have different political agendas, objectives, means and institutional procedures, and that this can put limits at times to their cooperation on the ground, and lead to some “ambiguous

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16 This mechanism is a more substantive one than what has been used for SFOR, KFOR and ISAF, for which 3-page reports are sent to the Council every three months.
17 Specific meeting of the UN Security Council on the cooperation with the European Union, under the item “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”, 4 May 2010, S/PV.6306.
18 General Secretariat of the Council, “EU-UN Cooperation in civilian crisis management operations – Elements of implementation of the EU-UN Joint Declaration”, 8 October 2004. See contribution of Thierry Tardy to this volume for further developments on scenarios of UN-EU Cooperation in the civilian aspects of crisis management.
19 See the possible scenarios developed below and in Annex 3.
results.”

As Thierry Tardy pointed out, ‘the UN-EU relationship in crisis management remains constrained by political, structural and cultural obstacles that can only be overcome to a certain extent. Cooperation is crucial and recognized as such on both sides, but comes second for institutions that are constantly struggling for their own comparative advantages, visibility and identity.’ And the fact is that member states conduct, strangely enough, different policies in each organization and have difficulties in aligning their positions. This is certainly due to a lack of coordination within capitals, but also to the pursuit of different interests in each organization for different purposes and at different levels.

Nevertheless, under the German Presidency of the EU in the first semester of 2007, a Joint Statement (and not a Declaration as in 2003) on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management was adopted. The German authorities wanted to strengthen further this cooperation, in particular by drawing some lessons from their involvement in the second EU operation in the DRC, at the request of the UN Secretary-General and in order to support MONUC during the Congolese Presidential Elections process. They also wanted to avoid in the future the surprise element of a UN request to which it was difficult to say no. They thus tried to emphasize on the need of a better control of EU member states over the EU-UN partnership, rather than to let it to both secretariats. The EUFOR RD Congo, launched in July 2006, was limited in time (four months) and in scope (Kinshasa). It comprised some 400 to 450 troops in the Congo as well as a battalion-size “over the horizon”, as a strategic reserve located in Libreville (Gabon). The Operational Headquarters provided by Germany were located in Potsdam. The Joint Statement indeed acknowledged the fact that the African continent had become a new theatre of operation for this UN-EU cooperation and contained new prospects such as the ‘support to African peacekeeping capacity-building’ and the “cooperation on aspects of multidimensional peacekeeping, including police, rule of law and security sector reform’. It sought also to ‘further enhance mutual cooperation and coordination’ through in

23 See annex 1
24 As pointed out by Javier Solana in front of the UN Security Council, ‘EUFOR intervention, in close cooperation with MONUC (the UN mission), was decisive in containing the potential spread of violence at a particularly sensitive moment in the election process. In addition to that, EUFOR confirmed its position of neutrality in the eyes of the Congolese population and reinforced its credibility’. EUHR Solana’s Presentation on Democratic Republic of Congo/EUFOR at UN Security Council, 9 January 2007: New York. Nevertheless, as explained Richard Gowan, ‘the experience of EUFOR RD Congo caused frustration in Germany, which provided the second-largest contingent for the mission. Officials in Berlin felt that the UN had pushed them into an unnecessary operation and that the structures put in place in 2003–4 gave EU member States too little oversight of relations with the UN’. “ESDP and the United Nations”, in Grevi, Giovanni/Helly, Damien/Keohane, Daniel (eds), 2009, *op.cit.*, p.120.
particular ‘regular senior-level political dialogue’\textsuperscript{25}, the ‘pursuit of the establishment of specific coordination and cooperation mechanisms for crisis situations where the UN and the EU are jointly engaged’, as well as ‘systematic UN-EU joint lessons learned exercises following cases of joint operational cooperation.’ However, all these recommendations were soon forgotten due to the incoming challenges of new UN-EU transition processes of operations in Kosovo and Chad.

2. THE CURRENT REALITY OF THE EU-UN COOPERATION

After 2006-7, the reality is that the EU and the UN are more and more intertwined. Increasingly, EU missions are deployed where the UN is already engaged. But both organizations are also, too many times, evolving in separate worlds: deployed in the same country, but not necessarily coordinating with each other. There are in fact a series a parallel (or co-located) missions where cooperation between the two organizations is minimal or even non existent, such as in Afghanistan (EUPOL and UNAMA), in DRC (EUSEC/EUPOL and MONUSCO), in Somalia (EUNAVFOR and UNPOS). The EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia did not coordinate much with the then UN Mission in Georgia. Two recent cases contradict that situation: the handover of the UN mission in Kosovo to an EU mission (EULEX); and the handover of EUFOR Tchad/RCA to the UN Mission in Chad and the Central Africa Republic (MINURCAT).

The Recent Cooperation in Kosovo and in Chad

After the adoption of the Joint Statement on UN-EU Cooperation in 2007, the two organizations worked together in Chad where the EU was supposed to help the UN to deploy the military component of MINURCAT and in Kosovo where the UN wanted to hand over its 10-year-mission to an EU civilian (police and rule of law) mission. In both cases, the events contradicted the initial plans: in Kosovo, contrary to the initial plan, the UN had to remain and not transfer all of its tasks to the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX); in Chad and Central African Republic (CAR), EUFOR was the bridging operation of Minurcat.

\textsuperscript{25} In 2008, for example, the EU troika meeting on 27 September 2008 with the UN Secretary General, chaired by the SG/HR, addressed EU-UN cooperation in crisis management both in general terms, and specifically EUFOR Tchad/RCA and EULEX Kosovo; Alain Le Roy, USG for Peacekeeping Operations, addressed the PSC on 17 October; Ambassador Johan Verbeke, UN Special Representative, updated the PSC on 24 November 2008 on developments of Geneva talks (Georgia conflict); Edmond Mulet, ASG for Peacekeeping Operations, attended the meeting of CONUN on 9 July at the invitation of the French Presidency.
The envisaged smooth transition between the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and EULEX was disturbed by the unsuccessful negotiations held in the Security Council in 2008 about the end of the UN mission – the Russians threatening to veto any resolution recognizing the independance of Kosovo, and thus putting an end to Resolution 1244 (1999). As in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the UN Secretariat wanted to handover the peacebuilding process to the EU, as EU membership was envisaged by the Kosovars as a natural end state of integration in their regional environment. ICO (International Civilian Office) and EULEX, operational since April 2009, were supposed to replace UNMIK. But the lack of international legal grounds for the presence of the two new missions weakened their legitimacy, even more so as not all EU member states recognized the independence of Kosovo. The fact that the presence of EULEX was only acknowledged by the EU complicated its official relationships with other international organizations deployed in Kosovo under Resolution 1244 (UN, NATO, OSCE). That de facto froze for a few months the deployment of the EU mission. It could not use the assets left by UNMIK, as initially planned, and thus created many legal and logistical complications for the EU (despite the on-going dialogue between the two secretariats on practical issues). It is only when the neutrality status of EULEX got confirmed, mainly on the insistence of the five EU non-recognizing countries, that the formal technical arrangements could be finalised. Even more, the EU had to accept that EULEX would operate “under a UN umbrella” and within the overall framework of the UN status neutrality.

Moreover, EULEX could not immediately deploy in the North of Kosovo due to the Serbian opposition, Serbian authorities only recognizing the presence of NATO and the UN in a first stage. It was however slowly able to overcome those difficulties as the tensions decreased and as EULEX was able to establish direct contacts with Belgrade (through a liaison office). UNMIK thus had to remain in place; its civilian international and local

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26 Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence on 17 February 2008 expressly invited an international civilian presence, as it was envisaged in the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, drawn up by the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General for Kosovo. The International Civilian Office supervises the independence of Kosovo in accordance with the Status Settlement. The head of ICO was also the EU Special Representative in Kosovo until early 2011. His task was to support the European future for Kosovo.

27 This is the case of Cyprus, Greece, Roumania, Slovakia and Spain. As of August 2011, only 79 states have recognized the independence of Kosovo.

28 During the transition phase, the handover of police and prosecutorial files was chaotic. The Planning Team was never able to get all the files and prepare to plan accordingly.

29 Without changing its name, UNMIK became an assistance mission to the Kosovar authorities. The role of the other international organizations is under the “overall status-neutral authority of UN”. See SG Report of June 2008. The OSCE has maintained its mission mandated with the promotion of human rights and good governance. The European Agency for Reconstruction (managed on behalf of the European Commission) in charge of economic reconstruction has put an end to its mission.
personal still currently amounts about 400 persons.\textsuperscript{30} It is mainly deployed in the North of Kosovo, in the town of Mitrovica where the local authorities only accept a low-profile presence of EULEX. There, UNMIK still plays a role of a more or less reliable facilitator between EULEX and the local authorities, when needed. In the rest of the country, UNMIK is only involved where the Kosovar authorities cannot exert their sovereignty and in some residual tasks (community issues, returns, property, cultural and religious heritage, human rights, minorities)\textsuperscript{31}. In the end, except in the North, cooperation is not an issue anymore for the two organizations on the ground, since their respective missions are very different in their contents. However, “under the UN umbrella”, the EU has to report substantially to the UN. Therefore, the “Report of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the activities of the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo” is attached to the report of the UN Secretary-General on the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, and constitutes its annex 1 since 2009\textsuperscript{32}.

One can say that the UN-EU cooperation reached a new scale with the transition between EUFOR Tchad/RCA and a United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) because it took place in an “unexplored” and difficult theatre for both organizations and because the EU launched there its largest military operation (3,400 soldiers from 25 contributing countries). But this handover was in fact a difficult process and put some light on the difficulties of communication between the two organizations. The EU operation was initially conceived as a military element (‘to establish a safe and secure environment’) of the broader “multidimensional presence” constituted by MINURCAT (Resolution 1778, 25 September 2007). But the deployment of MINURCAT suffered from the security situation (attacks of rebels towards N\u{d}jamena) at the very beginning (January 2008), and from the reluctance of the Chadian government to welcome the presence of the UN (that had claimed the necessity to establish a component watching over the political process in the country). That situation prevented the civilian/police component of MINURCAT from deploying at the same time as the military deployment of EUFOR\textsuperscript{33}.

\textsuperscript{30} As of July 2011: 8 military observers, 6 police, 143 international civilian, 28 UN volunteer, and 233 local civilian.
\textsuperscript{31} The SG Report of 12 June 2008 defined the exact residual functions of UNMIK: ‘The United Nations presence will carry out the following functions, among others to be defined: (a) monitoring and reporting; (b) facilitating, where necessary and possible, arrangements for Kosovo’s engagement in international agreements; (c) facilitating dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade on issues of practical concern; and (d) functions related to the dialogue concerning the implementation of the provisions specified in my letter to Mr. Tadić and referenced in my letter to Mr. Sejdiu’. S/2008/354, §16.
Therefore, EUFOR eventually became a first-entry force ("a bridging force") with the aim of stabilizing the security situation, and thus set the stage for the deployment of a military force provided by the UN as part of a renewed MINURCAT (March 2009). The coordination between the two operations during their conduct phase, throughout 2008, was relatively smooth. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General met with EUFOR Force Commander on a weekly basis and maintained regular meetings with the Operation Commander based in Paris. As put forward by the report of the Secretariat on UN-EU cooperation, there was ‘a well-established network of coordination mechanisms at all levels (Brussels, New York, OHQ, FHQ, MINURCAT), including reciprocal visits to New York, Brussels, Paris and N’Djamena or Abéché, and the integration of EU planners from the OHQ for the planning of the transition phase. The presence of the EU Military Staff Liaison Officer (LO) in New York facilitated exchange of information. The deployment of a UN LO in the EU OHQ served as a confidence building tool and supported effective flow of information’. However the planning for the handover phase was not as smooth as officially described. In fact, the differences within the UN and EU planning processes made it difficult to synchronize on and communicate in sufficient detail on respective efforts. This is, and is likely to remain, a substantial challenge for effective joint action. Liaison and accommodation aspects were addressed very late in the process, and were hampered by different procurement processes existing in the two organizations. There was no real information-sharing mechanism in place (useful in particular for risk/situation assessment). In short, the deployment and the transition processes between the two operations showed that there was a lack of communication between the two institutions, the one wishing something that the second could not provide. The UN Secretariat also perceived the strict time limitation of Eufor (the "end date") and the absence of flexibility of EU member states in that regard as an illegitimate pressure, a lack of understanding of UN constraints, and finally as an easy exit strategy for the EU. Finally, the short period of “re-hatting” (participation in a UN operation of forces previously committed to a EU operation) prevented MINURCAT from having the

34 For the EU, the “bridging model” 'aims at providing the UN with time to mount a new operation or to reorganise an existing one. Such a model calls for rapid deployment of appropriate military capabilities and agreed duration and end-state'. In, “EU-UN cooperation in military crisis management operations – Elements of Implementation of the EU-UN Joint Declaration”, 17-18 June 2004.
same deterrent effects as Eufor and showed in fact the lack of interest of EU member states of a substantial contribution to UN peacekeeping.\(^{37}\)

**The slow implementation of the Joint Declarations**

These difficulties on the ground were reflected institutionally, at headquarters. The Steering Committee is in a stalemate. At the UN-EU Steering Committee of January 2008, the two secretariats agreed to conduct an After-Action Review on UN-EU planning for EUFOR Tchad/RCA. But the following one only led to a vague exchange of views on different crises and respective operations. In November 2008, a special meeting on police issues took place in the margins of the Steering Committee. The meeting addressed the UN’s work on developing a strategic doctrinal framework for international peacekeeping, training, the UN rapidly deployable capabilities, transition issues and recruitment. It was agreed to fine-tune the DPKO proposals for operational follow-up, in particular concerning training and the possible development of a strategic framework for international policing.\(^{38}\) In 2009, it only met once, in December. In 2010 and 2011, the Steering Committee has not met again, due in particular to the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty and the reorganisation of European institutions. Overall, the Steering Committee is perceived by many as being as not so useful when no operation is deployed jointly and when it only consists in a general exchange of information on political aspects of a few crisis.

Apart from the establishment of good contacts, and desk-to-desk dialogue between the two Secretariats, the other recommendations of the UN-EU Declaration and Statement have not been really implemented, in particular when it comes to procedures and specific mechanisms for cooperation and coordination. The fact that the UN does not have any system for secured information prevents the EU (that has signed an information security agreement with NATO) from sharing confidential information with the UN, even though both UN-EU declaration recommend the establishment of regular relations between the two Situation Centres, and several reports recommend to ‘develop coordination to share situational analysis and early planning as appropriate, for theatres in which both organisations are likely to be operationally

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37 As Thierry Tardy rightly pointed out: ‘The Artemis operation in the DRC in 2003, and the EUFOR RD Congo operation in 2006, show what the EU is ready to do in support of the UN, but also what it is not prepared to do – contributing directly to UN peace operations with troops for example. Overall, the UN Secretariat welcomes the EU’s will to be present in Africa through operational support and capacity-building, but is of the view that EU member states should also participate directly in UN-led operations.’ See Report “The European Union in Africa: A Strategic Partner in Peace Operations”, Seminar organized jointly by the International Peace Academy and the GCSP, July 2006, p. 12.

active, including mutual support’.\textsuperscript{39} No common crisis management exercises have been organized since April 2005 with “EST05”, even though such exercises along with joint training and exchanges are regularly recommended as ways of addressing the structural differences between the two organizations.\textsuperscript{40} There were only a few education days organized in Brussels and in New York, idea that came out as a practical application of the 2006 After Action Review on the recognition that both organization did not really know each other. It seems that both secretariats have no time to devote to such exercises and that member states have no appetite for theoretical exercises in-between the launching of operations.

Moreover, the Action-Action Review of MONUC-Eufor RD Congo recommended in particular ‘the drafting of a roadmap outlining the sequence of necessary steps and processes on both sides’, the “drafting of terms of references for a UN-EU Coordination group”, the ‘drafting of a potential liaison arrangements’, ‘discussions on the possibility of a generic logistics framework’. The After-Action-Action Review of Minurcat-Eufor Tchad/RCA recommended ‘the elaboration of a UN-EU roadmap on joint mission start-up, the drafting of framework arrangements for UN-EU cooperation on financing and logistics aspects, establishment of basic guidelines for joint assessment missions, review arrangements for information exchange’. In July 2008, the UN DPKO/DFS “Guidelines for joint UN-EU planning applicable to existing UN field missions” were finalised and circulated to EU member States for information. They comprise: (i) a comparative road map of UN and EU planning processes; (ii) terms of reference for a UN-EU joint coordination group to support cooperation in planning; (iii) a checklist of elements usually included in UN Security Council Resolutions authorising the deployment of an EU operation; and (iv) a checklist of elements for inclusion in follow-up technical arrangements between the UN and the EU, including models for claims texts. A framework arrangement on mutual logistical support or a model arrangement on logistical support has yet to be written and shared between the two institutions. Furthermore, the two organisations should consider the following: the conditions under which the EU might transfer materiel to the UN following the termination of an EU mission or operation, and vice-versa, as well as the transfer of operational archives in-theatre and, where this is not possible, improving the access to information by the succeeding organisation, in particular where security or legal elements are a factor.\textsuperscript{41}

So far, the experience of UN-EU cooperation led to a practical and technical cooperation, but left aside its political aspects to the circumstances: ‘As concerns the political aspects, the question of how an intensified political dialogue at the beginning of a crisis could be conducted will depend on the actual circumstances and has to be decided on an ad hoc basis, also taking into account the necessity of respecting the decision making autonomy of each organisation’. However, the UN-EU relationship would benefit greatly if it were strengthened by a stronger political dialogue. The Belgium Presidency of 2010 suggested a possible coordination of the respective agendas of the Security Council and the PSC. Furthermore, the Steering Committee would need to be revitalized, especially in the substance of its discussions. It could also meet in various formats on various “hot” topics, when a crisis arises somewhere. The recent (Spring 2011) establishment of the UN Liaison Office in Brussels on crisis management is likely to strengthen that type of coordination. Certain crises could also lead to a strong UN-EU partnership in negotiations and mediation. The EU could also come behind the political processes and strategies of which the UN peacekeeping operations are part of.

3. PROSPECTS FOR STRENGTHENING UN-EU COOPERATION

Each Presidency of the EU wishes to strengthen UN-EU cooperation but the result is often more words than deeds. They all presented non papers on that issue, with new areas to explore and new scenarios for UN-EU Cooperation. Regular progress reports were presented by the EU General Secretariat to the PSC. However, the progress is slow in the absence of an on-going operation, and the two institutions are in fact jealous of their prerogatives. They both wish to keep and give visibility of their action to their constituencies. As Thierry Tardy said, ‘institutions do compete with each other (…): they must display a certain number of comparative advantages, as well as ensure their visibility and efficacy as security actors. Therefore they develop their own agenda, interests and objectives. These imperatives are not, by nature, conducive to inter-institutional cooperation and may, on the contrary, create conditions for competition’. Furthermore, the EU is willing to cooperate in a very limited framework (in cases where it retains through the PSC the political control and strategic direction of its operations), and EU member States seem not to be willing to contribute in

42 Ibid.
43 The representative of that Liaison Office is a joint DPA/DPKO appointment. His task is also to liaise with NATO institutions.
45 Ibid., p. 47.
substance to UN peacekeeping operations (with the exception of UNIFIL). One can legitimately ask whether UN-EU cooperation can progress without the military implication of EU member States in UN peacekeeping. In other words, is the UN-EU cooperation sustainable if EU member States (that have left UN peacekeeping after the UN “failures” in the Balkans\textsuperscript{46}) do not contribute significantly to UN peacekeeping operations?

**Options on the table for military aspects of crisis management**

After ten years of regular cooperation, many of the envisaged scenarios have now been implemented.

The first scenario to be implemented was “an EU operation mandated by the UN Security Council conducted with or without NATO’s assets”, one that requires the minimum cooperation between the EU and the UN at the operational level. Rather, cooperation takes place at the political level to coordinate decisions, including the necessary UN Security Council resolution and the European Council Joint Action, and poses the issue of settling on acceptable practices for reporting to the Security Council. Operation Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina corresponds to that scenario. One has to point out that the first EU operation in the framework of ESDP (“Operation Concordia”) was not formally authorized by a resolution of the UN Security Council.

The second scenario to be implemented was “an EU-led operation in charge of the security presence, with the UN in charge of the civilian presence” – (“Kosovo model”). In this case, cooperation between the EU and the UN would take place through the presence of liaison officers that help coordinate the action on the ground, inform decisions and actions of both headquarters, and ease the potential tensions between the organizations. Thus, effective coordination is contingent on the will and efforts of each head/commander of operation. Such scenario was never implemented as such. It could have happened if the NATO force in Kosovo (KFOR) would have handed over an EU one, as in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2005, but EU member states preferred the “lighter” option of deploying a civilian mission (EULEX). If Eufor Tchad/RCA had been deployed in parallel of MINURCAT, it would have fulfilled the circumstances of this scenario.

The third scenario to be implemented was “an EU-led operation, authorized by the UN Security Council, followed by a UN peacekeeping operation” – (also called “Interfet

\textsuperscript{46} See annex 2: EU member states contribute currently only to 7% of all UN peacekeeping operations. There is in fact a fundamental mistrust on the part of EU militaries to engage in UN-led operations.
This scenario helps the UN to prepare for a longer-term mission or helps it deploy more rapidly a security presence in a country in crisis. Cooperation between the EU and the UN takes place in the transition period between the two operations. Ideally, this model would imply that the EU keeps an element of a continuous presence on the ground, even after the end of the mandate of its own operation. The EU could (as Australia agreed to do in the case of East Timor) leave some soldiers on the ground and transfer them to the UN as “blue helmets”. This would provide the advantage of a continuous presence, and would give the follow-on UN operation the benefit of the robust position already taken by the EU operation. Thus the deterrence effect from the EU operation would continue into the UN mission. This scenario is the preferred one for the UN, and was implemented in the case of Eufor Tchad/RCA. The UN would have only wished that EU soldiers would have stayed longer three months in the UN mission.

The fourth scenario is the EU providing “a strategic reserve” to a UN peacekeeping operation to strengthen its deterrent capacity, to be able to face any substantial disruption of the security situation. Such scenario was not initially envisaged in 2000-2001 but became reality with EUFOR RD Congo. The resolution authorizing this EU force “over the horizon” could serve as a “model resolution” for future EU-UN deployments (S/RES/1671) as it sets clearly the timeframe of the deployment of the EU, its scope, its mandate, the documents needed to be signed and the reporting.

The fifth scenario, and easiest one in a way, is for the EU Political and Security Committee to play the role of a “clearing house” for UN peacekeeping operations by organizing the rotation of national contributions and/or to help build the force generation process. There was an attempt to implement this scenario for the EU to have a coordinated approach to the strengthening of UNIFIL following the adoption of Resolution 1701 in August 2006. A special session of the European Council was held on 25 August 2006, but failed to bring any coherence to European contributions to UNIFIL. Furthermore, the UN has its own force generation process with meetings for potential troop-contributing countries, and does not in fact really need such a “clearing system” on the part of the EU.

Last scenario that could be studied in the military aspects of crisis management and that is already envisaged in the civilian sphere is: “Placing an EU generated force component operating under an EU Flag within a UN Force”. Such scenario has always been rejected by

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47 … to illustrate the Australian intervention in September 1999 with an Interim Force in East Timor (INTERFET) to stabilize the security situation in this Indonesian-controlled territory, before handing over a UN mission, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).
the EU that wishes to retain the strategic control of its chain of command. However, Ireland has recently suggested in a non-paper to the PSC that to ‘go beyond separate EU-led and UN-led missions to the concept of EU force components forming an integral component of a UN blue helmet operation’. Such scenario happened in Haiti after the earthquake of January 2010 and as MINUSTAH\textsuperscript{48} requested the strengthening of its police component. The option of an EU autonomous operation was quickly put aside because the UN Secretariat specifically said that for better efficiency, MINUSTAH needed to remain in the coordination leadoff all efforts of the international community. The solution found by the EU to be visible was therefore that the “gendarmes” deployed had to wear an EU flag on their arm underneath their national flag. Such scenario could be applied for military components and could be a cautious way for EU member states to reinvest in UN peacekeeping. Such deployment would of course be submitted to certain rules (force protection, rules of engagement, reporting) that the UN is likely to accept. Until now, such scenario has been considered by EU member States and institutions as unrealistic.

One way or another, all scenarios have been tried whether in the military or the civilian aspects of crisis management. The circumstances dictated the occurrence of such or such type of deployment and operation. These were in fact test cases that were taken one by one without any clear strategic vision or outcome to achieve, except to develop the Common Defense and Security Policy. Do we need a fundamental review of such mechanisms or is it sufficient to continue as we are? Both organizations should now reflect on that past experience and see how to go from there. Are there scenarios likely to be repeated? Should some of them be favored? Would this relationship be more functional by focusing on niche areas, comparative expertise and clear division of labour, than with competitive deployments?

**Capacity-building and field-support: An unexplored area for UN-EU Cooperation**

Other possibilities and scenarios exist of cooperation between the UN and the EU in UN peacekeeping: it concerns capacity-building or niche capacity, in providing lacking UN logistics, equipment and training. That is what the EU attempted to do in supporting AMIS in Darfur (2005-2007). For more than two years, the EU made available equipment and assets, provided planning and technical assistance and sent out military observers. It trained African troops, helped with tactical and strategic transportation and provided police assistance and

training. The EU could contribute the setting up of operational headquarters of a UN peacekeeping operation as the SHIRBRIG did for the UN Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea (“UNMEE model”). This scenario poses the problem of EU control of its components within an UN-led operation. To counter that problem, the EU could send deployable headquarters as an entity or operation separate from the UN mission. Such scenario remains theoretical as long as the EU does not have any permanent operations headquarters. Finally, the EU could provide to the UN specific capabilities (such as planning ones) in the preparation of operations. EU-UN cooperation can also be developed on norms, concepts and procedures, rules of engagement, lessons learned, training criteria, legal aspects, and exchange of liaison officers. The EU could help the UN in making its standards and procedures operable, compatible with those of the Europeans. The EU and the UN could establish common criteria for selecting equipment and develop common training modules for peacekeeping, crisis management, and policing. In the context of UN efforts to develop civilian capacities49, both institutions could also share their rosters for deploying civilian and specialized personnel in mission areas.

The “New Horizon” paper (July 2009) of the UN Secretariat on reforms in peacekeeping put forward the need for a “Capability-driven approach” in order to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of UN operations in the field50. It also identified a number of UN critical shortages in mobility (strategic airlift, utility and tactical helicopters, infantry with high mobility vehicles), enablers (engineers, logistics and transportation units), information-gathering (observation/surveillance, including high resolution; night operations capability; data management and analysis), formed police units (specialized in public order management, including crowd control), specialized police (including trainers, organizational reform experts and investigators), civilian specialists (including in security sector reform, judicial and prisons management), strategic planners (military, police and civilian), as well as female and francophone military and police officers. The EU could work on this list and identify areas where it could help the UN. The UN Paper recommends to ‘intensify dialogue with relevant regional organizations to put in place framework arrangements for reimbursement and logistics support, as well as to examine the feasibility of pooling strategic capabilities’. The

EU could work on enabling support to UN Troop and police Contributing Countries (training, in particular to African battalions, funding, provision of equipment, strategic transport).

**Strengthening UN-EU Cooperation in Multidimensional Peacekeeping**

Other areas of cooperation could also be explored if the two institutions wish to work in multidimensional peacekeeping. Such cooperation can be envisaged as parallel operations being deployed, each fulfilling a specific and limited task. This is what the EU had done in DRC for example where it has deployed a SSR mission with the aim of implementing the Congolese revised reform plan for the Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC) and to translate it into concrete actions. The EU is leading a useful action in DRC and the impact is slow and the visibility limited. The same comment could be made for EUPOL Kinshasa. The visibility of these EU missions could have been greater if they were better coordinated with the overall action of MONUC in SSR where it was given a coordinating role by the UN Security Council.

Another way of enhancing cooperation could be to develop an “action plan”, identifying particular aspects where the two organisations would want to focus co-operation on multidimensional aspects of peacekeeping operations. Such a plan should put emphasis on practical cooperation and the maintenance of a maximum of flexibility, also in order to respect the priorities of each side. More concretely such a plan could comprise the following elements (list that is not exhaustive):

1. Identification of potential areas for common approach (e.g. DDR, SSR, Human rights).
2. Development of common modules relating to training and education on specific thematic questions (DDR, SSR, Human rights).
3. Exchange lessons and experience in the field of SSR and, in situations where both organisations are engaged, reinforce efforts to define their respective roles in order to achieve greater complementarity and coherence. Furthermore, identify SSR points of contact in the EU and UN; and develop joint training in the field of SSR.
4. Foster cooperation and common approaches in the field of respect of human rights in the context of peacekeeping operations, including children in armed conflict.
5. Foster cooperation and common approaches in the field of gender mainstreaming.

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51 Issues that are further developed in the paper of Thierry Tardy.
f. Explore possibilities for enhancing police co-operation.

g. Exchange of information on developing capabilities in multi-dimensional aspects of peace-keeping.

h. Identification of possibilities for providing Expert teams to be deployed at short notice.

i. In the framework of the UN Peacebuilding Commission, improve European coordination between EU missions to the UN, and in countries on the Peacebuilding Commission agenda.

j. Explore the possibility of cooperation in the transition from post-conflict to peacebuilding.\(^{53}\)

In certain areas such as SSR that require the pooling of multiple expertise, the idea of “SSR Houses” could be promoted, where all capacities, expertise and resources of the different institutions would be gathered.\(^{54}\)

4. CONCLUSION

The UN-EU Cooperation is one of the most advanced cooperation between the UN and a regional arrangement. It covers the whole spectrum of crisis management (crisis management, peace-building, development, humanitarian relief, political cooperation). Together, the two organizations are doing a lot to ‘improve lives’.\(^{55}\) Their cooperation even tends to become a model, in particular for NATO that had formalized its cooperation with the UN through a joint declaration (2008).\(^{56}\)

This cooperation has been mainly “UN-driven”, as the UN always took the initiative of asking the EU for support, starting with Artemis. But the EU also found an interest in such development. Indeed, in most part, as Richard Gowan rightly put it, ‘it is hard to imagine ESDP having got anything like as far as it has without the UN as a partner’.\(^{57}\)

\(^{53}\) On 25 September 2008, the UN, EC, and World Bank signed a Joint Declaration on Post-Crisis Assessments and Recovery Planning. The Declaration establishes a common platform to mobilize the three institutions and their resources to harmonise and coordinate post-crisis response frameworks to enhance country resilience to crises, by answering recovery needs of vulnerable populations and strengthening the capacity of national institutions for effective prevention, response and recovery.

\(^{54}\) See article of Frank Neisse on that idea applied to Kosovo, “« Communauté internationale » et réforme de la sécurité au Kosovo », Annuaire français de relations internationales, volume XI, 2010.


\(^{56}\) The development of UN-NATO, that is in fact older than the UN-UE one as it started in the 90s with UNPROFOR, led to the recent establishment of a NATO Liaison Office to the UN in New York. For further details of the prospects of that cooperation, see Smith-Windsor, Brooke/Vahlas, Alexis/Harsch, Michael F.,.2011, The UN and NATO: Forward from the Joint Declaration; Forum Paper n 17.

Secretariat had three successive feelings about its relationship with the EU. After initial worries on whether ESDP would distract potential European contributors to UN peacekeeping\textsuperscript{58}, UN officials thought that the EU could become a reliable burden-sharing partner in peacekeeping. Now, they find that it is a difficult partner that had its own constraints and internal turf wars and that is only reliable when its interests are at stake. They perceive this relation as unequal: ‘If, to put it bluntly, the EU does crisis management where, when and how it wishes while the UN does what others do not want to do, wherever and whenever, then the UN-EU relationship does not develop on a sound basis’.\textsuperscript{59} As Denis Tull puts it rightly in his contribution to this volume, ‘[EU’s] support is likely to be sporadic, driven more by internal EU processes and interests of individual EU member states than by the objective needs and requirements of the UN and its operations’. Moreover, on the EU side, member states are uncomfortable with the UN command and control feature (even though some in the Secretariat acknowledges merits to the UN decentralized way of conducting operations). The EU is focused on its own institutional development (especially since the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty), and the UN is too often used only as a global and rhetorical reference. Even if both organizations share the same political goals and comprehensive approach to crisis management, their political decision-making structures, their procedures for planning and implementation of operations as well as their logistical and administrative support procedures are very different. ’As Thierry Tardy put it, ‘the UN-EU relationship is complicated by a general lack of communication or mutual understanding of the respective structures, working methods and institutional cultures.’\textsuperscript{60} That creates frustration and lack of understanding between the two secretariats and also explains the current stalemate. Overall, that reveals that the EU is not ‘as reliable a partner of the UN as the declaratory discourse from Brussels would suggest’\textsuperscript{61}. But the EU-UN is what Member States of respective organizations wish it to be within certain limitations and constraints.

The UN-EU cooperation would need to be revitalized if it wants to be member States wishes it to be more effective and sustained on the long run. That could be done through a triangular cooperation with the African Union in the field of the development of AU crisis management capabilities. But this ‘triangular relationship is still in the process of being

\textsuperscript{58} In July 2001, Austria and Ireland made statements saying that their commitment to ESDP could hamper them in contributing to UN peacekeeping. The Austrians then withdrew their personnel from UNFICYP.


\textsuperscript{60} \emph{Ibid.}, p. 52.

\textsuperscript{61} To reaffirm what Denis Tull suggested in his contribution to this volume.
defined, in terms of objectives, division of labour, and modalities\textsuperscript{62}. That could also be done on a stronger focus on political dialogue and coordination, on giving more substance to more regular UN-EU meetings. That all require first and foremost the political will of UN and EU membership that should see a clear common interest in sharing the burden of crisis management.

Annex 1
Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management
New York, September 24th, 2003

[This could be put in the general appendix of the book, as it is referred to by other authors]

The Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Presidency of the Council of the European Union welcome the existing co-operation between the United Nations and the European Union in the area of civilian and military crisis management, in particular in the Balkans and in Africa. In order to deepen this co-operation and provide it with reliable and sustainable mechanisms, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Presidency of the Council of the European Union have agreed to the following joint Declaration:

1. The United Nations and the European Union are united by the premise that the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security rests with the United Nations Security Council, in accordance with the United Nations Charter. Within this framework, the European Union reasserts its commitment to contribute to the objectives of the United Nations in crisis management.

2. The United Nations and the European Union recognize that the past year saw great progress in tangible co-operation between them in crisis management areas, specifically the hand-over of responsibilities from the United Nations International Police Task Force to the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina; the rapid deployment at the request of the Security Council, of the European Union Military Operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Artemis); and the active consideration by the European Union of ways to assist in the establishment of an Integrated Police Unit in Kinshasa to provide security to the transitional government and institutions.

3. Further practical steps should be taken to build on the momentum of the positive co-operation between the United Nations and the European Union. To this end, the United Nations and the European Union agree to establish a joint consultative mechanism at the working level to examine ways and means to enhance mutual co-ordination and compatibility in the following areas:

- **Planning:** including reciprocal assistance in assessment missions and greater contact and co-operation between mission planning units, specifically with regard to logistical resource allocation and inventory as well as interoperability of equipment.
- **Training:** the establishment of joint training standards, procedures and planning for military and civilian personnel; the synchronization of pre-deployment training for civilian police, military liaison officers and military observers; and the institutionalization of training seminars, conferences and exercises.
- **Communication:** greater co-operation between situation centers; exchange of liaison officers whenever required (military, civilian police, situation center, political/headquarters officials); establishment of desk-to-desk dialogue through the respective liaison offices in New York and Brussels.
- **Best Practices:** regularized and systematic exchange of lessons learned and best practices information, including sharing of information on mission hand-over and procurement.

Signed for the United Nations:
Kofi A. Annan, Secretary-General

Signed for the European Union:
Silvio Berlusconi, Presidency of the Council of the European Union
Joint Statement on UN-EU cooperation in Crisis Management

Brussels, 7 June 2007

Noting our mutual commitment to an international order based on effective multilateralism, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Presidency of the Council of the European Union reaffirm their determination to work together in the area of crisis management and have agreed on the following statement:

1. The United Nations and the European Union are united by the premise that the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security rests with the United Nations Security Council, in accordance with the United Nations Charter. In this context, the United Nations recognizes the considerable contribution of human and material resources on the part of the European Union in crisis management. The European Union reiterates its commitment to contribute to the objective of the United Nations in crisis management.

2. The Secretary General of the United Nations and the European Union note with satisfaction the significant enhancement of UN-EU cooperation that has taken place in the area of civilian and military crisis management since the Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management of 24 September 2003.

3. Deeper UN-EU cooperation in crisis management has led to intensified cooperation in Africa, the Balkans and the Middle East. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, an EU operation succeeded a UN peacekeeping operation to assist national authorities put in place a professional police force. We have worked together intensely over the past year to assist the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo through the establishment of an EU military operation, EUFOR, in support of the UN mission in that country. The UN and the EU are also cooperating closely in supporting the African Union's peacekeeping mission in Darfur, Sudan and working side by side in countries as diverse as Afghanistan, Georgia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

4. With EU Battlegroups fully operational, the EU has improved its capacity for crisis management operations requiring a military rapid response. The EU Battlegroup Concept also provides for the possibility of EU-led Crisis Management Operations being deployed in response to requests form the UN Security Council, under a UN mandate where appropriate.

5. Against this background and building on the achievements of the 2003 Joint UN-EU declaration, the Secretary General of the United Nations and the European Union seek to further enhance mutual cooperation and coordination through the following measures:
   - Regular senior-level political dialogue between the UN Secretariat and the EU Troika on broader aspect of crisis management.
   - Regular exchange of views between senior UN Secretariat officials and the Political and Security Committee of the EU.
   - Continued meetings of the UN-EU Steering Committee including ad hoc meetings in crisis situations as required.
   - Consideration of further steps to enhance cooperation in areas including, but not limited to: support to African peacekeeping capacity-building; cooperation on aspects of multidimensional peacekeeping, including police, rule of law and security sector reform; exchanges between UN and EU Situation Centers; and cooperation with the EU Satellite Centre.
   - Pursuit of the establishment of specific coordination and cooperation mechanisms for crisis situations where the UN and the EU are jointly engaged.
   - Systematic UN-EU joint lessons learned exercises following cases of joint operational cooperation.
## Annex 2

Contributions of European States To UN Peacekeeping Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of troops deployed</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentage of the UN peacekeeping budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Police</td>
<td>Observers</td>
<td>Troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1,683</td>
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<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1,412</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
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<td>222</td>
<td>6,312</td>
</tr>
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</table>

* with the financial contributions of Latvia (0,011%) and Malta (0,017%), countries that do not participate in UN peacekeeping operations.

![Table showing contributions](image)

In the 15 PKOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN Member States</th>
<th>In the 5 PKOs in Africa</th>
<th>UNMIL (1)</th>
<th>MONUSCO (2)</th>
<th>MINUSTAH (3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>98,829</td>
<td>70,308</td>
<td>9,200</td>
<td>18,997</td>
<td>12,252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU Member States</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,943</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percentage</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>7,02%</td>
<td>0,29%</td>
<td>0,42%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. where EU member states are mainly deploying police officers.
2. where EU member states are mainly deploying police and military staff officers.
3. where EU member states are mainly deploying police officers.

## Annex 3

### Major stages of the institutionalization of the UN-EU cooperation

[This could be put in the general appendix of the book]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Presidency</th>
<th>Documents</th>
<th>Cooperation Steps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Semester 2000</td>
<td>Portuguese Presidency – Feira</td>
<td>Presidency report on strengthening CFSP</td>
<td>“(…) the importance has been underlined of ensuring an extensive relationship in crisis management by the Union between the military and civilian fields, as well as cooperation between the EU rapidly-evolving crisis management capacity and the UN, OSCE and the Council of Europe.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Semester 2000</td>
<td>French Presidency – Nice</td>
<td>October – Presidency report on strengthening CFSP</td>
<td>The SG/HR and the Presidency and the EU Troika meet for the first time with the UN Secretary-General who submitted a proposal for closer cooperation (such as creating working groups on various themes). The French presidency asks the following presidency to work on the “identification of possible areas as well as modalities of cooperation between the United Nations and the European Union in crisis management”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Semester 2001</td>
<td>Swedish Presidency – Göteborg</td>
<td>Presidency Conclusions to the Göteborg European Council on European Security and Defence Policy</td>
<td>“Important decisions have been taken by the Council to reinforce the political dialogue and strengthen cooperation between the European Union and the UN. Substantial progress has been made in building an effective partnership with the UN in the fields of conflict prevention and crisis management as well as development cooperation, humanitarian affairs, asylum policies and refugee assistance. This partnership is further strengthened by the mutually reinforcing approaches to conflict prevention and by ensuring that the European Union’s evolving military and civilian capacities provide real added value for UN crisis management activities. The Western Balkans, the Middle East and Africa will be given highest priority in this reinforced cooperation. The conclusion of framework agreements between the European Community and relevant UN organisations will enhance cooperation.” + Annex V of the Presidency Report on “EU-UN Cooperation in Conflict Prevention and Conflict Management”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2001</td>
<td>Swedish Presidency</td>
<td>A mission of the EU General Secretariat first met with UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) officials</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Semester 2001</td>
<td>Belgium Presidency – Laeken</td>
<td>Presidency Conclusions to the European Council on European Security and Defence Policy</td>
<td>At the European Summit of Laeken, “the Union has begun to cooperate more fully with the United Nations in crisis management and conflict prevention concerning the themes and in the specific areas endorsed by the Gothenburg European Council. Regular contacts at different levels with the representatives of the United Nations have made it possible to keep up the necessary links on the main subjects of common interest. Those contacts have also led to examination, on the basis of the principles and procedures established, of how the development of European capabilities in the ESDP could contribute to United Nations efforts in peacekeeping operations”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2003</td>
<td>Greek Presidency</td>
<td>Establishment of the “Steering Committee”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Semester 2003</td>
<td>Italian Presidency</td>
<td>Joint Declaration on EU-UN Cooperation in Crisis Management</td>
<td>“The Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Presidency of the Council of the European Union welcome the existing co-operation between the United Nations and the European Union in the area of civilian and military crisis management, in particular in the Balkans and in Africa. In order to deepen this co-operation and provide it with reliable and sustainable mechanisms, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Presidency of the Council of the European Union have agreed to the following joint Declaration”:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 December 2003</td>
<td>Italian Presidency</td>
<td>General Affairs and External Relations Council, Brussels</td>
<td>“(…) The EU’s dynamic role in UN affairs should be further developed and become commensurate with its present and future contribution in light of the enlargement of the Union. This role should be conducive effective multilateralism by building upon the EU contribution made so far to UN activities. In order to help the multilateral system to deliver on its core objectives, the Council reaffirms the EU’s will to improve cooperation with the UN in areas where its contribution may have significant added value for UN activities. (…) Further efforts should be made to raise [the EU’s] profile in all the components of a comprehensive approach to peace, security and”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Presidency</td>
<td>Document Type</td>
<td>Text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
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<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-13 December 2003</td>
<td>Italian Presidency</td>
<td>Brussels European Council – Presidency Conclusions</td>
<td>“The European Council welcomes the conclusions of the GAERC on 8 December 2003 on EUUN relations and stresses the need for these conclusions, as well as the Joint Declaration on crisis management, to be translated into operative action.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2004</td>
<td>Irish Presidency</td>
<td>Adopted by the European Council</td>
<td>EU-UN cooperation in military crisis management operations – Elements of Implementation of the EU-UN Joint Declaration “At this stage, two main options can be identified: provision of national military capabilities in the framework of a UN operation, or an EU operation in answer to a request from the UN”. An in-depth knowledge of each others’ procedures, concept and structures would facilitate cooperation between the two organisations in military crisis management.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2007</td>
<td>German Presidency</td>
<td>Joint Statement on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management</td>
<td>“Noting our mutual commitment to an international order based on effective multilateralism, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Presidency of the Council of the European Union reaffirm their determination to work together in the area of crisis management.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2008</td>
<td>French Presidency</td>
<td>Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council</td>
<td>“The European Council states the Union’s determination to continue its support for the United Nations and for the efforts made by regional security organisations, including the African Union, to promote international peace and security.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2009</td>
<td>Swedish Presidency</td>
<td>With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Commission’s delegation to the UN and the Liaison Office of the General Secretariat of the Council merged to become the European Union Delegation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 4

Road Map for EU autonomous operation in support of a UN Peace Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN</th>
<th>UN-EU Coordination Process</th>
<th>EU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN request for support</td>
<td>UN-EU Coordination Group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultation &amp; Information sharing (e.g. planning requirements, fact finding missions to HQs/field)</td>
<td>Consideration of UN request</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>Consideration of UN request</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If no</td>
<td>Action stops - info UN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Council Resolution (Mandate of EU Force)</td>
<td>EU reply to UN request</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop Technical Assistance &gt; Consult on: - CONOPS - OPLAN + ROE - Logistics/support issues - Media strategy &gt; Field assessment mission &gt; Ongoing exchange of views / information relevant to planning (e.g. SOFA) (Liaison officer arrangements/mechanisms as required)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop TA and Logistics Concept</td>
<td>Joint Action (Council) legal and financial framework for operation, formal trigger for further planning (formal decision on OHQ/FHQ and commanders)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchange of Letters on EUFOR support to UN</td>
<td>IMD released - formal start of Military Planning CONOPS (Council)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Force Generation (OpCdr) OPLAN and ROE (Council)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decision to launch operation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Operation begins</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UN liaison officer in Brussels as required</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Abbreviations/Symbols**
- Key Decisions
- Other Decisions
- CONOPS Concept of Operations
- IMD Initiating Military Directive
- OPLAN Operation Plan
- ROE Rules of Engagement
- TA Technical Arrangement

Source: DPKO/DFS, Guidelines for joint UN-EU planning applicable to existing UN field missions, 13 June 2008, Annex 1.