Military crisis management: The challenge of inter-organizationalism

edited by Joachim A. KOOPS
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INTRODUCTION

Joachim A. Koops*

Since the end of the Cold War, the practice of international crisis management has experienced fundamental changes, challenges and transformations of meaning and scope. As a notion that first emerged in earnest as a key international security concept during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, it has now become a popular umbrella concept for a wide range of international security measures. These range from election or cease-fire monitoring activities, short-term humanitarian or strategic interventions to robust and full-fledged peacekeeping missions.\[1\]

Whilst military crisis management has been, by nature, mostly confined to short-term and “rapidly deployable” measures in the past, it has more recently also been intimately connected to, and expanded by, the practice of long-term oriented “capacity-building” in the military realm. The key aim of such initiatives is to equip other actors with the necessary tools, institutions and resources for addressing immediate crises themselves.

In recent years, there has been a notable surge in the number of international organizations involved in military crisis management and capacity-building initiatives. Particularly in Africa, organizations such as the European Union, NATO, the United Nations, the African Union as well as lesser known organizations such as the Standby High Readiness Brigade for UN Operations (SHIRBRIG), have increasingly ventured into this field. This has created unprecedented opportunities, but also fundamental risks. Whilst each organization contributes valuable resources, expertise and its own distinctive approach to military crisis management, it has also become clear that the risk of duplication of efforts and even outright

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[1] The concept and policy of “military crisis management” has been notoriously difficult to define, due to the various and differing definitions offered by national governments and international organizations, such as NATO, the WEU or EU. Indeed, one reason why the concept of military crisis management has become so prominent stems from the fact that it is broad and fuzzy enough to appeal to most actors in the security realm. In this volume, “military crisis management” is defined as a timely, short-term intervention by an actor, or a coalition of actors, in order to mitigate an imminent deterioration of security conditions with the help of predominantly military means. Such a “quick impact” intervention may range from limited peace enforcement to preparatory measures for peacekeeping as well as to robust peacekeeping mission of limited duration. Furthermore, the volume assumes that recent approaches to “military crisis management” increasingly involve attempts to equip and train other actors for becoming capable of conducting crisis management operations themselves; this intimately links “military crisis management” to capacity-building measure. Hence, in its most effective form, crisis management operations are embedded in, and succeeded by, a wider, more comprehensive response frame-work which aims at the long-term stabilisation of the target area in question.
competition between these actors is high and, indeed, a serious impediment to a coherent response to complex crises. Thus, the importance of an effective and efficient inter-organizationalism has repeatedly been stressed by policy-makers and analysts alike.

In this issue of Studia Diplomatica, a collection of practitioners and leading academic specialists analyse the policies, approaches and interactions of key international organizations in the realm of military crisis management and capacity-building. Emphasis is not only placed on theoretical, conceptual and institutional issues, but also on identifying the basic practical conditions and lessons learned for successful schemes of effective inter-organizational cooperation, particularly on the African continent.

The first three articles provide the foundations for understanding the meaning, institutional challenges and conceptual approaches to the growing phenomenon of inter-organizational cooperation in military crisis management. Rafael Biermann analyzes the concept of inter-organizationalism from a theoretical perspective and places it in the wider context of the theory and practice of International Relations. He calls for a more nuanced and inter-disciplinary approach to the theoretical study and practical evaluation of cooperation and rivalry between international organizations. Tânia Felicio assesses the relationship between the United Nations and regional organizations in the realm of peace and security and highlights the need for a renewed effort of establishing a clarified and balanced mode of Global-Regional cooperation schemes. Claudia Major and Christian Mölling scrutinize the rhetoric and reality behind the so-called “comprehensive approach” to security, which has been promoted in recent years by NATO, the EU and the UN in different guises and which has at its heart the strife towards a holistic use of tools and towards the coherent intra- and inter-organizational cooperation.

Thereafter, both academic analysts and practitioners analyze key international organizations and their interaction in military crisis management and capacity-building. Michael F. Harsch and Johannes Varwick evaluate the past and current state of relations between NATO and the United Nations, particularly in the light of the recently signed EU-NATO Declaration on cooperation. Bastian Giegerich provides an in-depth analysis of the European Union’s Military Crisis Management capacities and activities and assesses the inter-organizational dimension of the EU’s European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Offering a comprehensive assessment of EU-UN relations, Thierry Tardy outlines the level, scope and opportunities of EU-UN institutionalisation, but also highlights the key challenges for both organizations’ current and future relationship. Challenging some commonly
held assumptions about EU-UN relations, Richard Gowan critically examines the inherent draw-backs of the EU Battlegroups, and thereby, the limits of the EU’s commitment to supporting the United Nations in military crisis management.

Providing the background to the growing focus on inter-organizational collaboration on the African continent, Rodrigo Tavares sheds light on complex relations between the variously overlapping Regional Economic Communities on the one hand and the African Union on the other. Benedikt Franke focuses on the past progress and future challenges of the European Union’s cooperation with the African Union in the realm of military capacity-building. On the same topic, the EU’s Special Representative to the African Union, Koen Vervaeke, contributes a practitioner’s view on the EU’s cooperation schemes with the African Union in the fields of military crisis management and capacity-building. Joachim Koops explores the major lessons learned from the Standby High Readiness Brigade for UN Operations’ (SHIRBRIG) inter-organizational cooperation with the United Nations and African peace and security organizations. Finally, Christof Tatschl, SHIRBRIG’s former Chief of Staff, offers a view from practice on the brigade’s support to the African Standby Force.

Taken together, the contributions to this Studia Diplomatica highlight the unprecedented opportunities, but also the persistent challenges of inter-organizational approaches to military crisis management and capacity-building. In the coming years, the pace, scope and intensity of cooperation between major international organizations in the area of peace and security is set to increase even further. It is therefore high time to critically and comprehensively examine the major lessons learned from past collaboration projects and to identify the potentials for, and constraints on, future inter-organizational initiatives. Scholars and practitioners should therefore aim for analyzing the “challenges of effective inter-organizationalism” from both a theoretically informed and policy-oriented perspective. It is hoped that this Studia Diplomatica provides its own modest contribution to this end.
INTER-ORGANIZATIONALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

Rafael Biermann*

Inter-organizationalism is an emerging branch of institutionalist theory in International Relations (IR). It investigates the direct and indirect interaction of formal international organizations, both governmental (IGOs) and non-governmental (INGOs).

The recent rediscovery of inter-organizationalism, as IR theory building in general, is stimulated by an interplay of exogenous and endogenous factors. As major international events pose puzzles which traditional IR theory cannot satisfactorily explain, the search for better theory sets in; and as the discourse within the discipline exposes the explanatory limits of existing theories, these are refined or even dismissed.

Exogenously, inter-organizationalism is mainly inspired by the ambivalent consequences of globalization and interdependence. Transnational challenges ranging from humanitarian disasters, pandemics and global warming to nuclear proliferation and Jihadist terrorism pose problems that transcend national capacity. Since institutions, from a functionalist perspective, primarily serve problem-solving purposes, we see three effects. First, new problems stimulate the creation of new organizations and regimes. Since 1945 the total number of IGOs grew more than fourfold, the number of INGOs at least tenfold. Whereas the former are declining in numbers since 1985 (from 378 down to 244 in 2005), the latter continue to grow strongly.[1]

Second, the mounting problem pressure also triggers institutional transformation in order to adapt organizations to shifting purposes. Many organizations, such as the Euro-Atlantic security institutions after 1989/90, expand their institutional scope and membership. Consequently, institutional density is growing worldwide, particularly in Europe.

Third, dense institutional spaces inspire inter-organizational networking. Since 1986 links among IGOs increased more than two-fold, links among INGOs even almost four-fold.[2] As organizations and regimes converge in their mandates, tasks,

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resources and membership, they increasingly overlap in their geographic and functional competences. Overlap is a *sine qua non* for meaningful cooperation, offering opportunities to forum shop among organizations, to share and shift burdens and, overall, to solve problems more effectively. Cooperation incentives all the more arise when organizations are confronted with transnational problems even they cannot solve alone. Thus, dense institutional spaces encourage inter-organizational networking, among IGOs, among INGOs, and also across them in public-private partnerships. Often, this inter-organizational cooperation is embedded in complex, multi-actor governance systems in which organizations contribute to problem-solving among others.

Overlap stimulates cooperation, but it also instigates rivalry for mandates, tasks and resources among organizations competing for relative relevance. Degrees of cooperation and rivalry vary strongly. European security where UN, NATO, EU, OSCE, Council of Europe and numerous other sub-regional security institutions overlap is a prime example where the hybrid effects of overlap can be studied. [1] Today, representatives of these organizations meet almost daily, both among headquarters and “in the field”. They coordinate a wide range of issues. Many organizations have concluded framework agreements outlining the scope and channels of cooperation. Boundary-spanning takes place on all levels, with international bureaucracies coming in particularly on low politics issues.

Inter-organizational interaction is most visible in scenarios of post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction such as in Afghanistan, Bosnia or Kosovo. In his 1992 “Agenda for Peace” UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali characterized this new kind of security regime as “multifunctional peace-building”. By utilizing the comparative advantages of a multitude of institutional and state actors these networks try to tackle the simultaneous and interdependent challenges of military and civilian peace implementation, including *inter alia* institution-building, economic reconstruction, policing, disarmament, capturing war criminals and inter-ethnic reconciliation. Thus, the “Board of Principals” in Sarajevo brings together UN, NATO, EU and OSCE as the core organizations for Dayton implementation; the Peace Implementation Council as the overarching steering body even comprises 55 governments and international organizations, including World Bank, UNHCR and the International Committee of the Red Cross. The High Representative has the thankless task to coordinate all these actors in a heterarchical setting of equals.

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International Relations as an academic discipline was largely caught off guard when inter-organizational networking unfolded in the 1990s. Until recently, inter-organizationalism was largely neglected as an object of study by theoretically informed scholars. The reasons go back to the origins of neoliberal institutionalism. Keohane and others had defined institutions to encompass formal organizations, regimes and conventions.\(^1\) However, the “regime turn” of the 1980s locked the discipline into a reductionist understanding of institutions; they were increasingly equated with regimes. International organizations became the “ugly duckling” of IR theory.\(^2\) Some definitions of institutions still explicitly exclude international organizations.\(^3\)

Thus, the stream of organizational studies of the 1960s and 1970s was largely cut off and valuable insights of scholars such as Cox and Jacobson on the dynamics within and among organizations were marginalized.\(^4\) In the 1990s, only very few IR scholars did study organizations, even less inter-organizational relations, Christer Jönsson being an exception.\(^5\) Thus, by the late 1990s, when Wallander, Keohane, and Haftendorn pioneered the study of security institutions, they had to swim against the mainstream of IR institutionalism.\(^6\)

Why then do we see a new interest in inter-organizationalism today? Apart from exogenous change there are at least three endogenous catalysts. First, in contrast to theory-oriented scholars, others working from a largely empirical, policy-oriented perspective do study inter-organizational networking. Publications especially on relations among the security institutions in Europe, foremost NATO and EU, are rapidly augmenting. However, this literature is idiographic and thus hardly cumulative. It also focuses largely on the dyadic level. Only very few authors apply a conceptual, holistic approach.\(^7\)

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\(^7\) A noteworthy example is David Yost, *NATO and International Organizations*, Forum Paper No. 3 (Rome, NATO Defence College, 2007).
Second, research on international organizations in general experiences a renaissance in IR. Inter-organizationalism is embedded in this larger research programme. International organizations are rediscovered employing three perspectives: the governance perspective looks at the role of organizations in international order; the insider perspective of sociological institutionalism and principal-agent theory investigates the internal dynamics of organizations and focuses on agency; and the inter-organizational perspective prioritizes inter-organizational interaction. They all are mutually reinforcing.

Third, intra-disciplinary spill-over is reinforced by inter-disciplinary spill-over. Organizations are studied in many disciplines, and others do have a much more consistent and substantive research for many decades, also on inter-organizational relations. Most relevant is organization theory in sociology and economics, which has accumulated a vast but highly fragmented literature on Inter-organizational Relations (IORs) among firms and societal groups since the 1970s. Organization theory is increasingly consulted by IR scholars, especially resource dependence theory and social network theory. The former points to resource pooling and provision as major stimuli for inter-organizational cooperation, the latter investigates the quantitative links among organizations and their positional embeddedness within networks.\(^\text{[1]}\)

Compared to this literature, inter-organizational research in IR is still modest. Beyond single case studies, it is so far exploratory and piecemeal. The literature looks at institutional overlap, choice and forum shopping\(^\text{[2]}\), at the genesis of dyads and networks\(^\text{[3]}\), at public-private partnerships\(^\text{[4]}\), cooperation and rivalry among


organizations and the relevance of member-state principals and bureaucratic agents for boundary-spanning, at institutional strategies of “single” and “dual” members, and at action-sets in peace-building. Many research projects are ongoing. Security institutions are the major focus. A coherent analytical framework is still missing. What Ness and Brechin remarked almost twenty years ago still holds true: inter-organizational systems “have not yet received the systematic attention they demand.”

What are promising avenues for future research? One approach looks at different configurations of networking. At this early point it is advisable to start with a structured, focused comparison of dyads, including governmental and non-governmental organizations and high and low politics issue areas. Particularly insightful is the study of organization-sets, which comprise all the organizations a focal organization is linked with. The cross-links within networks are much more demanding to analyze since we have to tackle the problem of system-induced network effects such as emulation or positioning which shape organizational behaviour. Triads such as the relations among NATO, WEU and EU are the smallest network configuration. Issue-specific action-sets, such as for peace-building, are more complex. Investigating relational profiles, network boundaries, positions of varying centrality and the life-cycles of networks is challenging. The concepts and methods of network theory are helpful, but the quantitative and structural focus is inadequate to investigate the qualitative, dynamic links within networks. Studies on policy networks, regime interaction and security governance might be an alternative starting point.


From a policy-oriented perspective, we are most interested in exploring the variance of cooperation and rivalry over time. Once we better understand causation, we might be able to offer substantial policy advice on how to alleviate the dysfunctional effects of rivalry and pave the way for more effective problem-solving. Cooperation and rivalry, though, cannot be adequately researched without considering the individual preferences and strategies of member-states and international bureaucracies, the overall distribution of harmonious and conflicting preferences and the multilevel, cross-organizational bargaining and coalition-building processes which aggregate these preferences.\footnote{See the forthcoming article of Rafael Biermann, Co-opetition among International Organizations.} We need to be specific about agency and open the black box of international organizations to identify the forces within them that drive cooperation and rivalry among them. The insights from sociological institutionalism and principal-agent theory\footnote{The main references are Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney, (eds.), Delegation and Agency in International Organizations (Cambridge, MA, Cambridge, 2006); and Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules of the World: International Organizations in Global Politics (Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2004).}, but also from the bureaucratic politics literature\footnote{The major reference is Graham T. Allison’s Essence of Decision, Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd edition (New York, Longman, 1971).} thus directly feed back into the study of inter-organizationalism. The different strands of new institutionalism will increasingly cross-fertilize.
THE UNITED NATIONS AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: THE NEED FOR CLARIFICATION AND COOPERATION

Tânia Felicio*

“The 19th and 20th century can well be described as centuries of nationalism and imperialism. In contrast, the 21st century could become the century of regionalism”[1].

1. REGIONALISM AND THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

Regional organizations have acquired new relevance during the last two decades, particularly in the policy fields of peace and security. This has not always been the case. At the time of the signing of the United Nations Charter, the victorious powers of the Second World War decided to opt for a universal and global focus of the UN system instead of a regional one. With the help of Chapter VIII, the UN Charter merely left a minor opening for regions, especially as regional organizations were at the time almost inexistent.[2] The significance and legal implications of chapter VIII have been thoroughly and extensively analyzed by scholars such as Simma[3], Abass[4], Goodrich[5], Padelford[6], Bebr[7], Eide[8], Akindele[9], and Graham

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[2] Only the Arab and the American states had created “regional” charters at the time, so the contextual basis for cooperation was very limited. And this might have been one of the reasons why there was so much discussion on Chapter VIII and so little definition on the terms used in its articles.


and Felicio\(^1\). Drawn up over 60 years ago, the UN Charter reflects the tensions of that time between advocates of “universalism” and “regionalism”; drafters sought an institutional formula that both facilitated, but at the same time delimited, the role of regional organizations in peace and security, especially when military force was involved.

On the one hand, the Charter (Art.24) gives the Security Council *primary* (and therefore not *exclusive*) responsibility for maintaining peace, and the authority to allow the use of force, albeit strictly controlled through the veto power of its permanent members. But on the other hand, articles 52 (peaceful settlement), 53 (enforcement) and 54 (information duty) allow regional “agencies and arrangements” to take initiatives in this sphere, as long as they inform the Security Council or are granted authorization. Article 51, however, by guaranteeing states’ rights to act in self-defence or in “collective self-defence”, opens the door for regional organizations to use force to defend member states without prior UN authorization.\(^2\) This arrangement was the result of a compromise between universalists and regionalists, consisting of a more universalist approach, but at the same time granting the regionalists the self-defence clause.

The Charter’s ambiguity was deliberate, reflecting the tension between states’ individual demands to preserve their sovereignty and the right to protect themselves and their desire to create an institution with sufficient moral and material weight to prevent aggression by any of their number. But the Charter’s drafters did neither anticipate how the regional organizations would come to grow, nor how power sharing would change worldwide, nor the nature of subsequent conflicts and exigencies of peace management operations.

Yet, with the increase of regional organizations during the Cold War, a clarification and modus operandi for UN-Regional Organizations cooperation was more urgently needed.

### 2. THE PROLIFERATION OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

During the Cold War regional arrangements proliferated mostly with the goal of economic integration instead of pursuing peace and security objectives. By the end of the 1980s, a wide range of regional and sub-regional agencies had established...
themselves without fully clarifying their position vis-à-vis the UN.\[1\] Although the UN Charter provided a rough outline for possible inter-organizational cooperation between the UN and regional organizations, the majority of those regional organizations developed completely detached from the rather “dormant” chapter VIII — with different mandates, geographical areas to cover, structures, and resources.

In the 1990s, the nature of conflicts started to change rapidly: increasing in numbers and complexity, involving non-state actors, weak states, and polarized societies. The UN was unable to respond to these new conflicts or to devise new modes of response. At the same time, regional organizations themselves started developing their own instruments to respond to security threats, even if they were not originally mandated to do so. Subsequently, this has been identified as one of the key characteristics of the so-called “new regionalism”\[2\]. The EU, NATO, AU, but also lesser-known organizations such as the Pacific Island Forum (PIF), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) have all undertaken security interventions in recent years. Furthermore, they have been developing early warning mechanisms to deal with possible conflicts — in such way that some of them can already be described as more or less effective conflict management regimes. At the same time, the UN has seen a rising demand for, and rise in, its security responsibilities, to which it is not longer able to respond effectively on its own. The UN peacekeeping system faces a paradigmatic crisis of the operational, managerial and political mechanisms, as the burden has increased over ten times during the last ten years\[3\]. In 2008 the number of UN military and police personnel in missions had risen to over 100,000. Simultaneously, other international organizations, such as NATO the AU and EU, become heavily involved in peacekeeping. Excluding Iraq, there were approximately 75,000 non-UN “peacekeepers” worldwide in 2008.\[4\] As the UN reaffirmed its commitment and “responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes,

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ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” in 2006\(^1\) the strain on its resources became ever more apparent.\(^2\)

3. AN EMERGING FRAMEWORK FOR INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL COOPERATION

As the UN realised that it was no longer capable of responding to the rising number of different peace challenges and that it was, at the same time, confronted with the danger of loss of prominence, pertinence and relevance, it started reforming its peacekeeping doctrine — and with it — its relationship with regional organizations. In order to “share the burden” in a coordinated manner, the UN started developing a process of multilateral dialogue in the attempt to move from an _ad hoc_ relationship to an organized and systematic collaboration under chapter VIII of the Charter. Milestone documents, such as the Agenda for Peace of 1992, its Supplement of 1995 and the Brahimi Report of 2000 all highlight this shift in doctrine towards the sharing of responsibilities with regional organizations. A framework of cooperation with the regional organizations was called for in 1992 by Russia, in 1993 by the Security Council and in 1994 by the General Assembly, leading to the commencement of “high-level meetings” with regional organizations\(^3\). In 1993, the Security Council invited regional organizations to study ways of strengthening their functions in peace and security and improve coordination with the United Nations\(^4\).

Between 1994 and 2006, seven high-level meetings have been convened, and chaired personally by the Secretary-General. Along these years, discussions focused on challenges to international peace and security, the role of regional organizations and practical measures to promote greater coordination and cooperation in peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Both regional organizations and UN member states showed growing interest as the attendance doubled from 1994 to 2006 and the Security Council held a number of meetings on this subject with different member

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\(^{[1]}\) UN Summit UNGA, 2005 World Summit Outcome, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly (A/RES/60/1), 24 October 2005.

\(^{[2]}\) The UN is also committing more resources in the peace-building area, with the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission in 2006. And the need to replace the small UN office in Timor-Leste with a considerably larger multidimensional mission (UNMIT) sparked new debate about the shortcomings of past international peacebuilding efforts. See Sharon Wharton, Peacekeeping: Keeping Pace with Changes in Conflict, SIPRI Yearbook 2007: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007).

\(^{[3]}\) See Graham and Felício, op. cit., pp. 64-65.

states showing interest in taking the cooperation further[1]. Moreover, in the UN World Summit document, the General Assembly decided to “expand consultation and cooperation (…) through formalized agreements and, as appropriate, involvement of the regional organizations in the work of the Security Council”[2].

However, as a greater number of interested organizations attended the meetings, the complexities of the relationship became clearer. The development of the regional-global security mechanism is hampered by uncertainties over the meaning of the central concepts of “region”, “agency” and “arrangement”; the structural duplication of regional agencies and other organizations (involving overlapping of membership); ambiguity over their objectives (involving, inter alia, improvised and occasionally competing mandates); and contention over the area of application of their functions[3].

These challenges led the UN Secretary General to produce the report A Regional-Global Security Partnership: Challenges and Opportunities. Released in August 2006 pursuant to UNSC Resolution 1631, the report described the Secretary-General’s conviction that “the time is ripe for the establishment of a more effective partnership operating in close cooperation with the Security Council based on a clear division of labour reflecting the comparative advantage of each organization”[4]. While the challenge of capacity building was supported by all organizations and member states alike, the challenge of clarity was overlooked — for the preference of a “pragmatic and flexible approach”, more suitable to the most resourceful organizations. As the dialogue was deemed “too heavy and bureaucratic”, a moment of reflection took over, with no meetings taking place since September 2006.

4. REFLECTING ON A REGIONAL-GLOBAL COOPERATION FRAMEWORK

The complexities of the relationship between regional organizations and the world body in security have become clear. The organizations cooperating with the UN have different mandates, different histories, different memberships, different operation areas, different capacities and power-balance. Even the term region is contested.

[1] For a list of Security Council meetings on cooperation with regional organizations see http://www.securitycouncil-report.org/site/c.gjKWLeMTtisG/b.4039067/k.DDE5/Regional__SubRegional_IssuesbHistorical_Chronology.htm; for a description of the meetings held up to 2006 see Graham and Felício, 2006.


[3] For further reading see GRAHAM and FELICIO, op. cit..

After decades of academic discussion there is still no consensus about what is to be meant by region[^1]. At this point the one thing all organizations have in common is not being universal, as not even their regional nature is certain or well defined. The lack of clarity in definition is accompanied by lack of clarity in mandates and roles, with clear practical consequences. The consequence at the moment is a step back in the high-level meetings process and the framework for cooperation. Unable to agree on a clear definition and delineation of roles and mandates, the organizations cannot agree on who sits around the table in the discussions and who has the responsibility for each region. Had the drafters of the UN Charter been able to find a clear definition, a much more structured regional-global cooperation might have been achieved.

The absence of adequate institutions and procedures and the lack of capacities (human, material and financial) is a further challenge for a number of organizations. Most regional organizations, especially sub-regional, lack adequate institutions, human and financial resources to implement decisions especially when these are of the coercive nature (sanctions and intervention).[^2] Further, while some regional organizations are taking on this new security mandate[^3], members of other organizations remain reluctant to give up sovereignty rights[^4] and to provide their organization with a peacekeeping or military crisis management role. These important differences make cooperation even more necessary. A fully developed and clear framework for cooperation would allow for the development of capacities where they are lacking and would foster opportunities for advancing shared experiences and for sharing learned lessons. Furthermore, it would allow for more effective cooperation schemes between the organizations themselves.

If a clear and effective cooperation framework is not developed, the global and universal UN organization risks being left behind and loosing the credibility of its primary role in peace and security. It is thus also crucial for the UN itself to enhance and promote cooperation with regional organizations. Yet, as outlined above, at present the UN freezes its main initiative for UN-Regional organizations cooperation at a critical time when the need for developing and utilizing such an inter-organizational framework is needed more urgently than ever.

[^2]: For further detail on regional organization’s capacities in peace and security see UNU-CRIS, Regional Capacity Survey, March 2009, available at www.cris.unu.edu
[^3]: Such as, for example, the African Union
[^4]: Such as, most notably, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
In the present context of the changes and challenges at the international security level, a new modus operandi between the United Nations and regional organizations needs to be pursued. “Regional organizations can play an important role in addressing security threats and are well placed to monitor peace agreements and provide early warning. Because of their proximity they can function as a continental or sub-continental forum for de-escalating tensions, pacifying conflicts and for promoting a comprehensive regional approach to cross-border issues”. [1] In this way, they can play a crucial role for increasing the effectiveness of the United Nations system in the realm of peace and security. Thus, in turn, as Sorpong Peou has rightly argued, “facing so many challenges in security, the UN has a better chance of achieving its goals by helping to build effective regional organizations and security communities.” [2] Therefore, it should be in the UN’s own interest to promote such a form of multilevel security governance that enhances the role of regional organizations and utilizes their comparative advantage whilst, at the same time, underscoring the pivotal role of the United Nations as the sole and universal source of global legitimacy.


MORE THAN WISHFUL THINKING?
THE EU, UN, NATO AND THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO MILITARY CRISIS MANAGEMENT

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The changing nature of crises management in terms of tasks, means to address them, and actors involved has forced security actors to reconsider their responses. One answer has been labelled “comprehensive approach” (CA). It describes an all-encompassing response to a crisis which promotes the external and internal coordination of policy instruments and the coherence of objectives between different actors. However, the approach has not yet been developed into a single, clear-cut doctrine to guide intra- and inter-organizational affairs. Quite the opposite, it subsumes a number of heterogeneous concepts to reinvigorate the way crisis management operations are planned and conducted.

The paper will first clarify the main conceptual issues discussed under the label of CA. Second, it offers an empirical analysis on how international organizations (IO), here NATO, the EU and the UN, respond to the need for CA. The paper closes with an overall evaluation of CA and proposes policy recommendations for improvement.

1. COMPREHENSIVE APPROACHES: BACKGROUND, CONCEPTS AND CHALLENGES

International crisis management has changed in three dimensions over the past years. First, the spectrum of tasks has expanded. If traditional peacekeeping focused on containing military escalation, contemporary crisis management aims at a social, political, and economic transformation to reach a comprehensive and sustainable conflict resolution.[1] Consequently, the range of tasks today comprises humanitarian aid, physical protection of individuals, and ensuring the rule of law and functioning of political institutions.

Secondly, the timelines of crisis management have expanded. Related activities span today from the initial phase of conflict prevention; the actual crisis management, which includes humanitarian intervention, peace building and peacekeeping; up to

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post-conflict management. Managing the junctions between the often overlapping phases poses an additional challenge.

Third, the number of actors involved has increased significantly. This is partly due to the broadened spectrum of tasks, which require specific instruments and expertise that no single actor can hope to supply. Moreover, actors from the crisis region, such as religious groups, the government, or relevant forces from neighbouring regions, become increasingly involved. Their ownership in the conflict resolution is central to ensuring its sustainability. Eventually, involving various actors also enhances the legitimacy of an engagement.

Due to this expansion of tasks, timelines and actors, and the enhanced interaction of actors and tasks, the complexity of crisis management has increased tremendously. Crisis management has, in fact, become foremost complexity management. The internal and external coordination of all available instruments and actors, their timely and appropriate deployment in the various conflict phases, and the specification of common mission objectives have become of paramount importance for reaching a successful and sustainable crisis response. Put differently, a common, multidimensional strategy is needed that coordinates the wide range of international responses to crises in view of assuring effective results.

One conceptual answer has been labelled “Comprehensive Approach”. It aims to reinvigorate the way crisis responses should be planned and carried out in view of enhancing both its efficiency and legitimacy by harmonizing the interaction and interdependence of tasks and actors involved. However, there is no single, coherent or commonly agreed CA model. Moreover, strategies and models can signify de facto a comprehensive approach without using the term. This complicates comparisons and creates terminological confusion. Besides, while most actors today acknowledge the necessity for better coordination and cooperation, their approaches diverge significantly regarding priorities, means and suggested end-states of crisis management. This conditions the prospects for common action. Commonly defined goals and coordination often exist only in general terms. Instead, different objectives and interests affect the interaction between actors and tasks. This can be categorized along two main lines:

Horizontal interaction describes the interaction of different tasks or actors at the same level of hierarchy, at both the field and strategic levels. The most prominent example is the strained relationship between the civilian and military realms, which is troubled by different objectives and organizational cultures. [1] However, there are also tensions within these two supposedly homogeneous domains. For the military, the different national rules of engagement in peacekeeping operations (PKO) but also different military cultures affect multinational or multiservice interoperability. In the civilian sphere, the related activities but diverging goals with respect to human rights protection, political reform, or economic development frequently spur conflicts over responsibilities, resources and relevance ranking.

Vertical interaction refers to the interaction between the field and the strategic levels of a mission. There are usually different views on problems depending on whether they are seen from the perspective of the mission in the field or the headquarters that exercise political control and strategic guidance. This may result, for example, in unrealistic orders or inadequate allocation of resources. [2]

Furthermore, at both the vertical and the horizontal levels of interaction, problems result not only from functional or cultural differences, but also from particular interests and competition between the different entities for resources and influence.

2. COMPREHENSIVE APPROACHES APPLIED — THE UN, EU AND NATO

The UN, EU and NATO have developed CAs to address the growing complexity of missions and to improve their own limited success in tackling crises. Although these concepts are still blueprints, they are crucial in that they indicate not only the willingness and increasing ability of the IOs to adapt to current challenges but also display the degree to which they are able to engage in inter-organizational cooperation.

2.1. The UN’s “Integrated missions”

As the most active organization in PKO, the UN was also the most struck by the fundamental changes in the character of such operations. Since the late 1980s, it had to adapt to a paradigm shift in peacekeeping from the traditional monitoring of ceasefires towards complex scenarios characterized by inter-state, ethnic or...


tribal conflicts, and civil wars that frequently resulted in disorder, social-economic depression and failed states.

The UN’s efforts to develop a “comprehensive doctrine that better defines what modern UN peacekeeping operations have become” have culminated in the Integrated Missions (IM) concept. Overall, it aims to create a balance between the need for a security response and the necessity to consider all perspectives of crisis management. It seeks to improve the coherence of the UN system in PKOs by bundling military, political, development aid, gender and humanitarian activities in a coherent and mutually supportive manner. IM refers to a specific type of operational process, where the planning and coordination of the different elements of the UN units are integrated into a single country-level system. In 2005, the IM concept has been established as the guiding principle for complex post-conflict operations. It has recently been substantiated with the so-called Capstone Doctrine.

Given the rather recent development of the IM concept, it remains difficult to assess its impact. One achievement was probably to carry on the reform of authorities in operations, e.g. the position of the “Special Representatives to the Secretary General” (SRSG). As Senior UN Representative in the country with authority over all UN activities, the SRSG has to ensure that all UN components pursue a coordinated and coherent approach. Its success depends on the ability to manage the contradictions and tensions among the UN elements and in the overall mandate rather than in the systematic development of strategies and priorities.

Eventually, the size of the UN, the parallel structure of its subordinate and specialized organizations and the resulting limited control condition the implementation of the IM concept. Generally, considerable differences exist in the way problems are perceived and resolved by the different UN actors. In the field of crisis management the “Department for Political Affairs” and the “Department for Peacekeeping Operations” rival over the overall control of operations.

2.2. The EU’s “Civil-Military Coordination”

The EU disposes of a broad range of civilian and military instruments for crisis management. Its core challenge consists in assuring coherence (1) between the instruments of the EU Commission and those of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP); and (2) between civilian and military instruments within CFSP/ESDP itself.

To respond to “the need for effective co-ordination of the actions of all relevant EU actors”, the EU has developed the concept of Civil-Military Co-ordination (CMCO) within CFSP/ESDP.\[1\] It seeks to ensure and guide a CA particularly at the political-strategic level, spanning from the planning phase to the execution of a mission. The “Crisis Management Procedures”\[2\] and the “Crisis Management Concept”, which is developed individually for each operation, are geared towards ensuring that a comprehensive approach is applied in the EU’s crisis management activities.

Moreover “EU Special Representatives”, who are based in the field, increasingly play the role of a coordination hub for EU activities, thereby linking Brussels and the field level, and the different agencies in the field.\[3\] Besides, the EU constantly attempts to increase the common understanding of its staff for example by conducting integrated training of personnel.

However, the Union has so far been unable to make full use of its potential for integrated civil-military operations. The EU reform treaty addresses deficits in the inter-institutional cooperation resulting from the EU’s pillar construction, such as funding of operations, or an integrated staff of the Council and the Commission.\[4\] However, it is currently blocked. In fact, the future of the reform treaty and the full use of the already existing structures for integrated operations, such as the civil-military planning cell, are repeatedly prevented by member states who cling to their particular interests.\[5\]

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2.3. NATO’s Comprehensive Approach

Experiences gained in several operations since the early 1990s, such as Kosovo, made clear that NATO is never alone in the theatre. It underlined that effective co-ordination between a wide spectrum of actors from the international community became essential to achieve sustainable results.

NATO’s first doctrine of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) was established in 2002.\[1\] While it emphasizes the importance of cooperation with national and local actors as well as with other IO’s and NGO’s its primary objective is force protection.\[2\]

At the 2006 Riga Summit, NATO Allies agreed that a CA was required to meet the challenges of operational environments, mainly Afghanistan and Kosovo. With the “Comprehensive Political Guidance”, the Alliance established the CA as its planning blueprint. It was to be achieved by expanding its approach for military planning to include all civilian and military aspects of a NATO engagement through the entire duration of an operation. Given that NATO itself has no relevant civilian capabilities, it primarily seeks to improve the cooperation with external civilian actors and other IOs. The 2008 Bucharest summit confirmed this direction.\[3\]

In the field, NATO has made first partially successful steps by setting up several Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan, which are designed to provide security locally and to facilitate reconstruction measures. However, both the composition of the PRTs and their objectives and means diverge considerably. This reflects to some extent the need to adapt the PRTs to the specific environment. Nevertheless, given that the composition of PRTs remains the prerogative of the lead nation and the other participants, national or even departmental conceptions of crisis management and particular interests of domestic actors gain influence on the effectiveness and feasibility of NATO’s CA.\[4\]

However, the Alliance’s basic problem remains its reputation as a military actor who is less aware of the civilian dimension of crisis management, and its reluctance to become coordinated itself, while aiming to coordinate others. Thus, its credibility as a cooperative partner and advocate of the CA is rather limited.

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[1] CIMIC is the “co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the missions, between the commander and civil actors, including national populations and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organization and agencies” NATO IMS MC 411/1 NATO Military Policy on Civil-Military Co-operation, January 2002


[3] It called to seek “cooperation and coordination between the international organizations, individual agencies and NGO’s, as well as the host government.” Keynote address by NATO Deputy Secretary General Ambassador Claudio Bisogniero at the GLOBSEC Conference, 17 January 2008; Press Kit — NATO Summit meetings of Heads of State and Government Bucharest, Romania, 2-4 April 2008, p. 3.

The record of CA so far remains ambiguous. Diverging organizational cultures and the scarcity of resources pose structural limits to harmonisation and efficiency. Necessary systemic changes to assure a CA often require serious commitments in terms of transformation costs, willingness and time. However, the reallocation of power and resources often meets departmental resistance or ignorance. Administrative structures and privileges are rarely abandoned to serve abstract concepts such as coherence or efficiency.

Nevertheless, the challenges that led to the development of CAs remain valid. There is hence no alternative than to continue pursuing a comprehensive approach. To keep on failing to manage the complexity of crisis management will undermine the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the commitment of the international community.

Given the constraints for common crisis management concepts, the probability for the CA to advance from a model to a tangible contribution to international security will depend on the (re-) balancing of system-wide and particular interests. Common strategies cannot be sustained beyond the security cultures of the participating actors. This however poses a qualitatively different reason than the ones resulting from inter-agency rivalries about resources, prestige and careers. How then to move beyond the wishful thinking towards a successful implementation of CA?

Acknowledging that
- behind every IO stands a member state, whose commitment is crucial in making an CA happen;
- the high degree of structural, organizational and cultural divergence of the different actors involved in a CA will not disappear over night;
- the effectiveness of inter-organizational interoperability will always be lower than that of a sole actor;
the following recommendations can be formulated:

3.1. Engage the Member States

The performance of CA depends on the ideal and material commitment of the member states of IOs. It is their political will that conditions the way CAs are developed and implemented. Therefore, priority should be given to improve bottom up inter-organizational cooperation through improving domestic processes and structures.
3.2. Improve the Unity in Planning

The three organizations do not conduct joint operations. But this should not hinder opting for coordinated planning. Coordination at the planning level at the earliest stage is essential. If during the strategic planning the partners agree on a clear distribution of tasks, the chances for the success of the operation increase. This will enhance mutual understanding of the “ways of doing things”, which could eventually lead to a common or at least coordinated planning culture.

3.3. Aim for a Unity of Effort

In the absence of a unity of command, the different actors of a CA on the ground should aim for a unity of effort. Communication is essential to ensure cooperation particularly in view of the operative autonomy of the partners. In order to assure cooperation, the different actors should make use of liaison structures at an early stage, and up until the lessons learned exercises.

3.4. Strive for a Unity of Goals

Ultimately, the success of CA depends on a common vision of the strategic goal at the specific country level, shared by all actors. The basic problem consists in a lack of mutual understanding, particularly but not exclusively between civilian and military actors; deeply anchored structural patterns and potentially a lack of will to overcome them. Raising awareness and increasing the understanding of the partners and their way of doing things, but also recognising mutual dependence, is key to building bridges and achieving convergence of visions. The different actors should above all concentrate on discussing goals and procedures rather than grand strategies or ideologies. They should more frequently carry out joint lessons, identified exercises, engage in cooperation on best practices, and mutual training. As undesirable they are, painful practical experiences in the field might trigger this process.

The motto of “Unity in diversity” is often used to soften the contradictions which result from complex interaction and to alleviate the consequences of inadequate inter- and intra-organizational cooperation and maverick activities. However, diversity also implies a potential waste of resources. Unity implies that the international community seeks to address the outlined shortcomings that put international crisis management at risk. Reality shows that there is no alternative than keep on trying to manage these tensions.
Cooperation between the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has come a long way since the end of the Cold War. For decades, these organizations resembled oil and water: they did not mix.\[1\] Since the early 1990s this has changed dramatically. Both have cooperated in troubled regions like the Balkans, Darfur and off the coast of Somalia, and they are currently struggling together with a deteriorating situation in Afghanistan.

At NATO’s 60th anniversary summit in April 2009, the alliance’s member states have acknowledged that a decade of cooperation with the UN “has demonstrated the value of effective and efficient coordination.”\[2\] However, while the UN is involved in virtually all ongoing NATO operations, relations have remained troubled. This became obvious again during the long and difficult process of concluding a joint declaration — one which was finally signed by the secretaries general of both organizations in September 2008.

Why have NATO and the UN expanded their cooperation in recent years, and under which conditions have they been able to cooperate effectively? We argue that the growing complexity of international crisis management and an increased geographical and functional overlap of the organizations have rendered NATO and the UN dependent on one another’s resources. In order to accomplish their goals and to achieve sustainable success, they need each other. Keeping in mind the organizations’ unwillingness to give up autonomy, however, closer UN-NATO cooperation is likely to face continuing challenges.

1. UN-NATO RELATIONS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

NATO and the UN were both founded in the aftermath of World War II, as part of an international effort to create a new security architecture aimed at preventing
another large scale military confrontation. The organizations were based on different logics to achieve security. The UN constitutes a system of collective security, in which the UN Security Council is de jure the only body possessing the authority to legitimate the use of force. Chapter VII of the UN Charter determines that, except for the purposes of individual or collective self-defence as set out in Art. 51, military force may only be used on the basis of a Security Council mandate. Under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, “regional arrangements” can take enforcement actions, but only after Security Council authorization. The Security Council can thus be said to possess a monopoly on the legitimization of the (non-self-defensive) use of force. With the beginning of the Cold War, however, the UN Security Council became quickly deadlocked by the East-West-Confrontation.

NATO’s very creation as an alliance for collective defence demonstrated that its members had serious doubts about the UN’s ability to fulfil its promise of collective security. While referring extensively to the UN Charter, the April 1949 North Atlantic Treaty deliberately does not mention Chapter VIII of the Charter, which deals with regional organizations. As a Chapter VIII organization, NATO would be constrained to take military actions only under a UN Security Council mandate. This would have given permanent Security Council members Russia and China the power to veto an alliance decision. The drafters of the Treaty thus chose to rely instead on Art. 51 of the UN Charter, which obliges NATO simply to report to the UN Security Council after self-defence measures have been taken.

NATO and the Warsaw Pact quickly earned the reputation of being vehicles for superpower interests, marginalizing the UN. Within the UN, NATO was seen as part of the arms race problem rather than as part of a solution for threats to international peace and security. From a NATO perspective, the UN was politically and militarily irrelevant for the alliance members’ security, due to its internal deadlock and its lack of military capabilities. As a result, there was virtually no cooperation between the organizations during the Cold War.

2. RATIONALES FOR, AND HINDRANCES TO, COOPERATION

Since 1992, NATO and the UN have gradually increased their collaboration. Operational experiences now range from stabilization operations in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan to supporting the UN-mandated AU-mission in Darfur. NATO has also protected UN food aid shipments to Somalia against pirate attacks. Coop-

[1] See also Tânia Felicío’s contribution in this volume above.
eration encompasses moreover disaster relief operations like the one in Pakistan in 2005, where both sides worked together in providing relief after a devastating earthquake. The underlying reason for the rapprochement is that both organizations’ tasks and structures have changed significantly, resulting in functional and geographical overlap in the field of international crisis management.

NATO has been transformed from an alliance for collective defence against a clearly defined threat into a multi-functional security provider. It now engages in actions against terrorist networks and undertakes expeditionary missions far away from its original treaty area. The expansion of the alliance’s area of operations and its search for a new identity has not yet turned it into a global policeman. Many of its members nevertheless regard international crisis management operations as a necessary means to safeguard their countries’ security.

UN peacekeeping has evolved from Cold War days of deploying unarmed or lightly armed forces to supervise ceasefires in permissive environments to the current large-scale, multi-dimensional peacebuilding missions under challenging conditions. One way for the UN to relieve the increased pressure is to delegate tasks to regional actors. Supporters argue that regional organizations enjoy comparative advantages in crisis management, such as geographical proximity and deeper understanding of the actors and issues involved. The UN’s dependency upon regional bodies — or “coalitions of the willing” — nevertheless entails risks for the organization, as it pierces to the heart of the principle of collective security. The premise that the regional organizations’ members must have a particular interest in taking part in common actions leads almost inevitably to selectiveness in the decision for or against collective measures. However, UN peacekeeping missions of the last 20 years have shown that the success of collective measures depends on more than the willingness of states to implement them. It is also crucial whether or not these states possess the necessary technical, financial and military capabilities to do so.

The UN is in growing need of the NATO members’ capabilities for stabilization operations. The organization faces increasingly complex missions in sometimes hostile environments, like the Congo, Sudan or Afghanistan, which require robust forces, air and sea transport, and aerial reconnaissance capabilities. The UN is badly prepared for acting in such environments, but following the UN’s failure to stop violence in Bosnia, Western states have been reluctant to provide their troops and assets to UN peacekeeping missions.\[1\] The UN secretariat is searching for ways to reengage them.

\[1\] See also Thierry TARDY’s contribution to this volume below.
NATO, in turn, is interested in UN mandates for its missions, which provide legitimacy for the use of force and increase domestic and international support for operations. In complex operations like Afghanistan, it depends on the UN’s capacities and expertise for organizing a political process and coordinating development and reconstruction efforts. If progress lacks in these fields, the alliance will not be able to achieve its goals. NATO has acknowledged its dependence on other actors’ actions by adopting a so-called comprehensive approach at the Riga Summit in 2006. The new approach aims at combining and coordinating its measures in international crisis management more effectively with other actors.\[^{1}\]

At the same time, NATO faces enduring negative perceptions among UN member states, linking it to US global military ambition and thus appearing to put it at odds with the UN mission of maintaining international peace.\[^{2}\] Most importantly, many UN members and staff are afraid that a stronger reliance on NATO assets could reduce UN decision-making autonomy and operational independence. The main troop contributing countries such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, India and Nigeria are especially concerned about possible NATO influence on the UN command and control structures. The UN’s humanitarian bodies and agencies have also been critical of closer relations; they fear that closer cooperation with NATO could jeopardize their neutrality and impartiality in conflict areas and put their staff at risk. Institutional collaboration has thus remained limited to a single NATO military liaison officer in New York (with no civilian staff), ad hoc desk-to-desk contacts and occasional visits.

When the secretary-generals, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and Ban Ki-moon, signed the joint declaration after three years of difficult negotiations, it came as a surprise for many observers. The document establishes for the first time a formal relationship between the Headquarters and a framework for expanded consultation and cooperation.\[^{3}\] The signature has, however, left the UN uneasy. In an effort to not further upset the non-Western Security Council members, the UN secretariat urged NATO not to publish the accord, and ordered its staff to keep the issue as low key as possible. The “quiet signing” nevertheless caused a public outcry in Russia. Foreign minister Sergey Lavrov accused Ban Ki-moon of “secretly” concluding an

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\[^{1}\]  NATO Heads of State and Government, Riga Summit Declaration, 29 November 2006, para. 10, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm. NATO member states have strongly reaffirmed their commitment to a comprehensive approach at the Summits in Bucharest 2008 and Strasbourg/Kehl in 2009. See also the contribution by Claudia MAJOR and Christian MÖLLING in this volume above.


\[^{3}\]  For a more detailed analysis of the Joint Declaration see Michael F. HARSCH and Johannes VARWICK, NATO and the UN, Survival, Vol. 51, No. 2, pp. 5-12.
agreement without properly consulting the UN Security Council members. Russia’s ambassador to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin, even called the declaration “illegal”. The NATO and UN secretariats argue that they held sufficient briefings and that a joint declaration of the Secretaries General does not require approval from UN members.[1]

3. A SUCCESS STORY OF INTER-ORGANIZATIONALISM?

The overall record of UN-NATO cooperation in crisis management operations has been mixed. The organizations have achieved most of their self-defined goals in their operations on the Balkans, and have contributed to stabilizing the region after the bloody conflicts of the 1990s. The process has nevertheless taken much longer than expected and is still fragile. In Afghanistan, efforts to provide security, good governance, and economic development have failed so far. Scholars have heavily criticized NATO members and the UN for their “small footprint” approach of minimal engagement in the first years of the operation, and a rising number of experts have voiced their strong scepticism about the mission’s chances for success.[2]

Concerns about decision-making and operational autonomy have hampered NATO-UN cooperation repeatedly. In Bosnia, the organizations agreed on a dysfunctional “dual key”-agreement which required NATO air strikes to be approved by both UN and NATO officials. For the UN, the arrangement was essentially a control mechanism, but as it turned out, it made rapid and decisive military action impossible. The agreement was altered only after both organizations had failed to prevent the 1995 massacre in the UN-protected “safe area” of Srebrenica, which left more than 8,000 people dead.

During the Kosovo conflict, NATO conducted 78 days of massive air strikes against Yugoslavia without a UN Security Council authorization. Recognizing the need for cooperation in the post-conflict peacebuilding, however, NATO-led forces (KFOR) and the UN mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) were tasked with jointly guaranteeing public safety in Security Council Resolution 1244 of June 1999. While the organizations’ personnel have in most cases worked together well, cooperation procedures sometimes turned out to be cumbersome and imprecise. This became obvious in

March 2004 when thousands of people rioted across Kosovo and committed acts of ethnic cleansing. Taking KFOR troops and UNMIK police by surprise, the rioters brought the security system close to collapse. The events triggered an overhaul of NATO-UN relations in Kosovo, clarifying the division of responsibilities.

In Afghanistan, the lack of political dialogue and high-level coordination has been striking, preventing a coherent strategy of the two organizations. As a European NATO Ambassador remarked recently: “Everyone speaks about the need for coordination, but no organization wants to be coordinated by the other,” reflecting a problem well-known to practitioners and organizational theorists.\(^1\) In the declaration of the 2009 Strasbourg and Kehl summit, NATO heads of state and government recognized “the leadership of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan.”\(^2\) However, it remains to be seen if the declaration will translate into changed behaviour for the actors on the ground.

In all missions, finally, both sides have faced persistent problems with information and intelligence sharing. For example, a Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan rejected a UN request to share its flood-contingency plan because it was classified.\(^3\) Such over-classification of information, even non-military, impedes cooperation.

### 4. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

In order to be able to solve today’s complex security challenges, NATO and the UN face a growing need for cooperation. The organizations’ relationship has intensified over the past years, fitting within the trend towards a stronger role for regional actors in global security. NATO and the UN should further enhance their institutional coordination, building upon the joint declaration. The next task for the two organizations is now to develop rules and principles for closer relations. The secretariats should conclude a follow-up agreement, facilitating the flow of information. The declaration also offers the opportunity for regular strategic dialogue on the political level, which could result in making fragmented UN-NATO efforts more coherent.


\(^2\) Strasbourg / Kehl Summit Declaration, para. 9.

\(^3\) Interview with Scott SMITH, Senior Political Affairs Officer (Afghanistan Desk), UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, New York, October 2008.
Afghanistan in particular is in desperate need of a coherent approach from the major civilian and military actors, and stronger coordination of international reconstruction activities. NATO alone is not suited to fulfil these tasks. The UN potentially possesses the authority and the legitimacy to become the *primus inter pares* that coordinates efforts in stabilization operations. This could help to streamline international actions and facilitate resolving “turf wars” between the actors involved, without creating overly rigid and top-heavy steering mechanisms. Both sides should establish only as many coordinating bodies as necessary, avoiding a situation in which one has to “coordinate the coordinator”. NATO should moreover not duplicate the work of other organizations and only engage in areas where it can bring real added value to existing policies.

Closer ties between the organizations finally have the potential to result in common planning for responding to humanitarian crises and natural disasters such as earthquakes, flooding or tropical storms. In countries with poor infrastructure and limited capacities, a combination of NATO logistics and UN expertise can make a big difference, saving human lives.

Making progress in these fields will be difficult, as the organizations will have to give up some of their operational and decision-making autonomy. In the long run, however, scarce resources, pressing security challenges, and determined political leadership could lead to more effective cooperation in some of the most troubled regions of the world.
In 2007, some 63,000 EU member state troops were deployed in international crisis-management roles, just over 4% of the total active forces of the Union’s member states. While significant, this is hardly an impressive percentage given the EU’s ambition, outlined in the 2003 European Security Strategy, to play a major role in global security and in promoting peace and stability. Overall, military operations short of collective defence have been defined and planned for in great detail at the EU level. Furthermore, despite the relatively short lifespan of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), these ambition levels have already been revised upwards. [1]

Since the pressure of increasing demand for crisis management missions is unlikely to lessen in the near future, effective cooperation between the different organizations active in the field seems vital. Effective inter-organizationalism, in the sense of such cooperation, is often called for but seldom achieved in practice. An important step would be to gain a better understanding of how and under which conditions international organizations engaged in crisis management efforts learn from each other and transfer best practices amongst them. If these processes were to be better understood, they could be facilitated potentially leading to more effective inter-organizationalism. This article will first look at the EU’s record in crisis management operations and, second, venture some thoughts on inter-organizational learning and policy-transfer in this policy realm.

1. THE OPERATIONAL RECORD OF ESDP [2]

The ESDP has been operational since 2003, with EU personnel conducting 23 crisis-management missions to date, 14 of which have been purely civilian. [3] It seems clear
that the Union is in the process of trying to achieve two major goals through the ESDP: to establish an autonomous (i.e., independent of NATO) capacity for action in the field of crisis management, and to enhance its profile as a credible global security actor. To a substantial extent, it has succeeded in drawing nearer to these goals. Moving away from its original focus on Europe, the EU has steadily increased the operational reach of its forces since operations began in 2003. The Balkans and Africa, where the greatest numbers of EU personnel are deployed, are clear focal points. The Middle East is another key region for ESDP operations, and EU personnel have also been deployed to Asia. At roughly 10,000 km from Brussels, the 2005–06 mission to monitor the peace agreement in Aceh is the farthest-flung EU venture there has been thus far.

All operations have been modest in terms of numbers, with the largest, Operation Althea, which had an initial strength of 7,000, being conducted with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities and following on from a NATO mission. Doubts therefore remain about the EU’s capacity for autonomous action beyond relatively small operations. The EU has also been rather risk averse in the military arena so far, though it is not fair to assert that the Union usually relies on other organizations to pacify combatants. European troops are deployed to Africa to support the UN with bridging operations in actually or potentially deteriorating security situations while the UN built up its capacity. Nonetheless, the six military ESDP missions that have been completed or are currently under way have involved a total of only about 16,500 troops. In mid 2008, some 6,200 troops were deployed under the EU flag, which amounts to less than 0.4% of the active forces of EU member states.

It is one of the goals of the ESDP to undertake more crisis-management operations that blur the classic distinction between the civilian and military spheres. The 2005–06 peace-agreement-monitoring mission in Aceh, though it involved mostly military personnel operating in a civilian capacity rather than a truly “integrated” force, is one example of such an operation, as is the explicitly hybrid mission in support of the African Union in Sudan and Somalia in the same period. But the EU has not thus far lived up to its own expectations for integrated civil–military crisis management. Very few missions have involved a mix of personnel, and those few were very limited in scope and size (all were between 40 and 50 strong). These missions were a far cry from the kinds of operation to which the EU aspires: fully integrated operations in which significant civilian support is offered to military operations. The need for integrated, or “one-stop shop”, missions is well recognised by both the European Security Strategy and national policy documents, as contemporary crises require the application of a wide spectrum of instruments.
ESDP missions tend to be made up of small contingents of personnel from several different contributor countries. The EU’s latest military mission, EUFOR Chad/CAR, is typical. By July 2008, a total of almost 3,250 troops had been deployed by 24 countries. The three largest contributors accounted for some 2,400 troops (France 1,671, Ireland 408, Poland 299), with the remaining 850 coming from no fewer than 21 contributing nations. EUFOR RD Congo in 2006, which peaked at around 2,400 personnel, drew contingents from 23 contributing nations. High levels of multinationality increase legitimacy and provide a seat at the table and the opportunity to influence events to many countries. However, there is a tension between a high degree of multinationality and operational effectiveness. The more contributing countries there are, the greater the chances that at least some will come with national restrictions on the tasks they are allowed to carry out. In addition, multinational cooperation always causes some friction, even if units from different countries are accustomed to training and exercising together. Some contingents, particularly the smaller ones, may not have their own command-and-control capacities, which can complicate the job of force commanders.

In the military field, there is a pronounced tendency to tightly define the duration of a mission, to the point of naming a fixed exit date that may not, when the time comes, be appropriate in view of the military situation on the ground. Contributing governments in most EU member states seek clear exit dates mainly because of the cost of more protracted deployments and their concern about the fragility of any domestic consensus in support of deployment. The danger that leaving on time might be accorded more importance than getting the job done well is not something over which operation commanders have any control, as they must operate within the strategic frameworks they are given by EU member governments, acting through the Council and the Political and Security Committee. Thus, it is possible to end up in a situation, the 2003 and 2006 EU deployments to the DRC seem to be a case in point, where the military personnel deployed does a stellar job of implementing the mission but the mission overall is ill-designed to have a strategic impact on the crisis at hand.

The ESDP has already undergone significant development in the field of operations. In terms of the increasing diversity and geographical reach of missions, this development has been largely positive. However, some of the tendencies outlined above show that member states need to address a range of challenges if they want to live up to their collective aspirations. The EU’s potential for robust engagement and the strategic gain that its missions represent for European security and for the regions in which missions have been conducted remain as yet unclear. It is not yet apparent how much strain ESDP operations can take. Its operational achievements
to date have presented the EU with a dilemma: success so far has bred high expectations, which the EU can only satisfy by accepting greater risks than it has in the past. Equally, though, a major setback in the field is likely to have wide political repercussions. The question is, therefore, whether the EU will in future seek out crises appropriate to the instruments it has available, or whether it will actively seek greater resources to be able to tackle more challenging situations.

2. INTER-ORGANIZATIONALISM AND ESDP

In September 2003 the EU and the UN have adopted a Joint Declaration on Cooperation in Crisis Management which calls for practical steps to enhance coordination of planning, training, communication, and an exchange of best practices. The EU security strategy from the same year furthermore commits the EU to support the UN in crisis management and two basic options — the EU as a clearing house for national contributions to UN missions by EU member states and the EU conducting missions on behalf of the UN — were defined in 2004. Yet, a more recent joint EU-UN statement on crisis management from 2007 calls for practical implementation of the earlier priorities which signals a lack of progress.\[1\] Of course, the EU, NATO and the UN, while similar in the regard that crisis management activities form part of their explicit organizational remit, are very different organizations as far as membership, the overall nature and scope of their activities, overall strategic goals, decision making processes, operational experience, and organizational culture are concerned. At the same time it has been observed that EU and UN objectives in terms of finding multilateral solutions to mounting challenges to international peace and stability are by and large similar. Furthermore, the UN has issued clear calls for regional organizations — such as the EU and NATO — to provide personnel and assets for crisis management activities in order to strengthen the UN’s ability to discharge its responsibilities.\[2\]

Recent research has revealed that, in particular in the case of EU-UN cooperation, the continued insistence on the importance of better coordination has in fact led to greater institutionalisation but with dubious results. For example, when the


EU conducted a short-term military crisis management operation in the DRC in 2003 in order to buy the UN time to reinforce its own mission, the UN was not directly involved in the planning for the EU operation and was not even informed in advance of the arrival of the EU troops. There were no liaison arrangements in place. At the same time, after these initial problems, cooperation on the ground in the DRC between the personnel of the different organizations worked well. This stopped just as abruptly as it had begun — when the EU terminated its mission as planned, none of the contributing nations were willing to contribute to the UN mission. The latter would clearly have helped to not only ensure continuity but also increase the ability of the UN to lock-in short term benefits generated by the EU mission.\(^1\) Recent conversations with EU officials indicate that the situation has improved — for example, several member states currently involved in the EU’s mission in Chad and the Central African Republic, which is due to end in March 2009, have indicated that they might sign up for a follow-on UN mission.

The EU and NATO have also adopted a strategic partnership agreement but effective inter-institutional exchange has been blocked. There is a symbolic exchange of views in high-level meetings and pragmatic cooperation of deployed personnel on the ground but no institutionalized exchange on questions of substance. However, through the Berlin Plus agreement between the EU and NATO, the former can access assets and capabilities of the latter. The empirical need for better coordination and cooperation is obvious and there are regular calls for a rational approach to employ these overlapping organizations based on their respective comparative advantages in a given crisis situation.\(^2\) While these organizations share a common crisis management space, their activities are of course not limited to this shared policy arena. These three organizations have different strengths which ideally would be used in a complementary fashion to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness in crisis management. In the absence of better coordination the credibility of these institutions and their respective members is likely to be undermined.\(^3\)

The persistent demand for cooperation should provide an incentive for organizational learning and policy transfer across organizations. Failure to do so carries costs which in the field of crisis management can include the lives of people in a

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given crisis area and that of deployed personnel. And yet, empirical observations so far do not provide much evidence that learning and policy transfer are occurring. The overarching theoretical and empirical puzzle still needs a convincing and policy-relevant answer: despite clear external pressures, why do organizations in the realm of international crisis management fail to learn and transfer best practices between them? It seems that while pressures that may trigger organizational learning and/or policy transfer are located outside of the organizations themselves, the factors and conditions that drive whether or not learning and transfer takes place and which from this process takes if it does occur, in other words what is learned or transferred, depends on factors internal to the organizations.

Against the context of increasing complexity, increasing demands on deployed personnel and assets, and elusive success, the task of understanding and explaining organizational learning and policy transfer in crisis management addresses both a policy-making conundrum and a theoretical desiderata regarding inter-organizationalism. In policy-making terms the sustainability of crisis management activities becomes questionable if an increasing amount of resources is expended on them without a visible success record. Electorates in nations that are contributing to these efforts through various international organizations might turn against them. A better understanding of inter-organizational dynamics is thus important, in particular for an organization like the EU which has built its security strategy and its crisis management activities around the buzzword of effective multilateralism.
UN-EU RELATIONS IN MILITARY CRISIS MANAGEMENT: INSTITUTIONALISATION AND KEY CONSTRAINTS*

Thierry Tardy **

In the crisis management area, the decade that followed the end of the Cold War was characterised by rising needs for crisis management tools, a fundamental evolution of the UN as the main peacekeeper, and the emergence of regional actors, among which was the European Union (EU). The UN-EU relationship started at the intersection of these three trends. From the very beginning, this relationship has been shaped by a presumption of a mutually beneficial cooperation between two natural partners on the one hand, and the inherent limitations to cooperation between two security actors on the other hand. Overall, ten years of UN-EU interaction in the crisis management field have led to some substantial cooperation. The UN and the EU have displayed a will to cooperate, have to a certain extent conceptualised and institutionalised their relationship, and have cooperated on a certain number of crisis management issues and operations.

At the same time, inter-institutional cooperation has been constrained by the two organizations’ own structures or cultures as well as by the effects of implicit competition. Crisis management is a highly politicised and complex activity that the UN and the EU do not necessarily approach with the same vision, know-how and capacities. The two institutions are also going through a period of transition as crisis management actors, leading them to naturally focus on internal reform and performance and to see partnerships as a second-rank priority.

This paper aims to analyse the UN-EU relationship in crisis management, with particular attention paid to the military aspects, for which cooperation has been so far the most visible. The paper starts by laying out the political context of the relationship and some elements of convergence between the two institutions. It then looks at some of the achievements and the extent to which the relationship has been institutionalised. Finally, some key political and structural constraints to UN-EU cooperation are identified.

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1. ELEMENTS OF CONVERGENCE BETWEEN THE UN AND THE EU

The UN and the EU are often presented as “natural partners”\(^1\) in crisis management and there is a presumption of a mutually-beneficial relationship between the two institutions.

For the UN, as noted in the 1992 *Agenda for Peace*, and since then in a series of documents\(^2\), the rising role of regional organizations is welcomed as these institutions can share the burden of the maintenance of international peace and security. Regional organizations can also be seen as responses to some of the operational challenges with which the UN is confronted. In the early 2000s, the UN was launching the reform of its peace operations through the Brahimi Report process at a time when the EU was laying the foundations of ESDP. This created a theoretical convergence between a form of demand on the UN side and a form of supply on the EU side. The UN lacks some “enabling capacities” for its own peace operations and the EU is developing such capacities, while asserting that: “The efforts made will enable Europeans to respond more effectively and more coherently to requests from leading organizations such as the UN”\(^3\).

In return, the UN is an inevitable partner for the EU in crisis management, in the sense that it provides legality and legitimacy for EU activities. The EU recognizes the centrality of the UN in the international security architecture. The 2003 *European Security Strategy* stated that: “The fundamental framework for international relations is the UN Charter” and that: “The UN Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.” In the same vein, the UN is at the centre of the concept of “effective multilateralism”, linking the two institutions at the strategic level. For the EU, partnering with the UN can even be a way to assert itself as a security actor.

It follows that the EU accepts its legal subordination to the United Nations. In the crisis management field, it has been assumed that any EU-led military operation that would imply a chapter VII mandate would have to be legally endorsed by a UN Security Council resolution. Beyond the legal basis provided by the resolution, the

\(^{[1]}\) See The Partnership between the UN and the EU. The UN and the European Commission working together in Development and Humanitarian Cooperation, UN, 2006, p. 6.


EU is also interested in the legitimacy that the association with the UN produces. In places where the EU might be seen as politically biased or simply where the local context is difficult, acting at the request of the UN or on its behalf is of key importance. At the same time, one could note some ambiguity on the propensity of the EU to systematically go to the UN Security Council to legalise its own peace operations. The subordination of EU policy to a Security Council vote potentially gives non-EU members (Russia and China in particular) a veto right over EU operations, which is difficult to square with the EU aspiration to be a full-fledged security actor. Here the EU touches, as does any other security actor, the tension between abiding by international law and asserting its power.

Moreover, the UN and the EU share some common features that reinforce the presumption of mutually-beneficial relationship. The two organizations are different in terms of membership, general mandate, degree of autonomy *vis-à-vis* their member states, internal politics or functioning. Yet, they do share some characteristics as security actors: they have similar aspirations to play a wide-ranging and ambitious role in crisis management; they share a common approach to threat assessment, as illustrated in the High-Level Panel Report and in the *European Security Strategy*\(^\text{(1)}\); they place the same premium on the articulation between security, development and human rights\(^\text{(2)}\); they can even be seen as sharing certain values, such as the belief in the virtues of international law and multilateralism, a preference for the peaceful settlement of disputes and a related uneasiness with the use of force. As a consequence, there is *prima facie* a compatibility between the two institutions, between the two forms of multilateralism, that derives from the nature of the organizations, their liberal conception of peace and security, and their inclusive approach to crisis management.

2. INSTITUTIONALISATION AND ACHIEVEMENTS

The UN-EU relationship in crisis management started in earnest less than ten years ago, and has since gone through a process of institutionalisation that has no equivalent with other regional organizations. The first steps took place in the early 2000s, soon after the EU framed ESDP. At this time, apart from the cooperation that the UN and the European Commission had established in the development and humanitarian fields, the two institutions had hardly any contact with each other in the security domain.

\(^\text{(1)}\) The EU talks about a “Common Assessment of Threat”; see *Paper for submission to the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change*, p. 12, approved by the GAERC, 17-18 May 2004.

In 2000/01, a series of documents (mainly initially on the EU side)[1] and meetings between high-ranking UN and EU representatives called for increased communication and cooperation. Some guiding principles for the relationship were laid down, points of contact were established, and a desk-to-desk dialogue was initiated. A second phase started with the first ESDP operations in 2003, two of them leading to direct inter-institutional cooperation: the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia-Herzegovina taking over the UN International Police Task Force, and operation Artemis in the DRC acting as a “bridging operation” for a reinforced MONUC. These developments led to the September 2003 Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management that welcomed existing cooperation and called for its further institutionalisation. A “joint consultative mechanism” (so-called Steering Committee) was established at the working level, aimed at examining ways to enhance UN-EU cooperation in the four areas of planning, training, communication and best practices.

Following the first ESDP operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina (2003) and in the DRC (2003), subsequent EU operations led to significant cooperation with the UN. In 2006, at the request of the UN, the EU launched an operation in the DRC to assist MONUC during the election process. EUFOR DRC acted as a “strategic reserve”, or an “over-the-horizon” force, in support of the MONUC. Furthermore, in 2007-08, the UN and the EU created and deployed simultaneous operations in Chad and the Central African Republic: MINURCAT is a civilian operation mandated to train and monitor national security forces while EUFOR Chad/CAR is a military operation mandated to contribute to protecting civilians (refugees and displaced persons) and UN personnel, and to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid. The EUFOR is a “bridging operation”, deployed for one year before the UN takes over (planned for March 2009). In the civilian field, the EU presence in the DRC through different civilian missions (EUPOL Kinshasa, EUSEC RDC and EUPOL RDC) together with the MONUC, as well as the EU take over of the UN mission in Kosovo, have also led to substantial cooperation between the two institutions. In June 2007, a second UN-EU joint declaration was signed, at the initiative of the German Presidency of the European Union, and was meant to place the inter-institutional debate at a more political level.

These different cases of UN-EU cooperation cover a wide range of scenarios or interaction patterns. In most cases, the EU acts in support of the UN. These scenarios have been by and large identified by the two organizations, in the military sphere in particular. In the meantime, a significant amount of measures has been taken to operationalize and institutionalize the UN-EU relationship in crisis management. The two institutions

know each other better, channels of communication are in place, and mechanisms for cooperation have been established, tested, and further adapted to the needs.

3. KEY CONSTRAINTS

In this largely positive context, the UN-EU relationship is shaped by constraints that come into play at different levels and with various impacts. These constraints can be divided into three categories: first there are constraints of a political nature that may impede inter-institutional cooperation at a strategic/systemic level or in a particular case. Second, there are constraints that have to do with the two institutions’ respective structures, crisis management cultures and procedures. Third, there is the general constraint coming from a lack of knowledge of the other.

3.1. Inter-institutional competition, diverging political agendas, and dependency

Overall, close to ten years of UN-EU interaction in the crisis management field have demonstrated that the two institutions are generally willing to cooperate. This being said, one key characteristic of inter-institutional interaction is that institutions do compete with each other, in a way similar to how ministries of a given country or how departments of the same administration will compete. As institutions, international organizations must permanently demonstrate that they fulfil the functions for which they were created, or that they can adapt to the new needs. They must display a certain number of comparative advantages, as well as ensure their visibility and efficacy as security actors. Therefore they develop their own agenda, interests and objectives. These imperatives are not, by nature, conducive to inter-institutional cooperation and may, on the contrary, create conditions for competition.

As an example, the form that UN-EU cooperation could take was not clear in the early 2000s, and EU efforts to assume a greater role in the security arena initially led to some concerns within the UN Secretariat that EU assets would be reserved for EU-led operations at the expense of UN operations. The question was raised whether building regional crisis management capabilities would enhance or weaken UN peacekeeping\[1\]. Having two institutions doing the same thing may create synergies, but it may also mean overlap or fewer resources, and therefore competition.

\[1\] A 2001 EU document acknowledged that “ESDP may thus be perceived not as a plus but as a diversion of resources”. Relations between the EU and the UN in crisis management and conflict prevention, Council of the EU, 7 Nov. 2001. EU officials assured that EU member states assets would not be “frozen for ESDP purposes”. See EU-UN Cooperation in Military Crisis Management Operations — Elements of Implementation of the EU-UN Joint Declaration, Annex II, ESDP Presidency Report, European Council, 15 June 2004, § 4.
Second, as inter-governmental bodies, international institutions’ policies are defined by their member states whose agendas may vary from one institution to the other; this is reinforced when institutions have different membership, as in the UN-EU case. At a strategic level, states that are members of both organizations may want to give priority to one over the other, and therefore develop capacities or provide resources to the favoured institution at the expense of the other. Such is the case for most EU member states that tend to favour the EU as a crisis management channel rather than the UN.

Furthermore, the UN-EU relationship somehow reflects a general polarisation within the “international community” between the North and the South. This polarisation finds an expression in the crisis management field as most UN troop contributing countries (TCCs) come from the South while northern countries are globally absent from UN-led operations. The fact that northern countries are involved in crisis management through other institutions, such as the EU or NATO, tends to accentuate the divide. For the main UN TCCs, though the role of the EU is generally welcomed, it is also viewed with some degree of scepticism, and this directly impacts on UN-EU cooperation. For example, the fact that the UN, i.e. the main TCCs, are supposed to take over the EUFOR in Chad after the one-year bridging operation, and therefore allow for the EU withdrawal on the EU’s own terms, is not always well received by the TCCs. If, to put it bluntly, the EU does crisis management where, when and how it wishes while the UN does what others do not want to do, wherever and whenever, then the UN-EU relationship does not develop on a sound basis.

By the same token, UN-EU cooperation can be hindered by diverging political agendas within the UN Security Council. This has been the case with Kosovo and with Georgia, where the EU-Russia opposition negatively impacted UN-EU cooperation. In the Kosovo case, divergences delayed the Security Council’s endorsement of the EU-led civilian mission and complicated UN-EU cooperation on the ground as well as the UN handover to the EU. For Georgia, endorsement by a Security Council resolution of the EU Monitoring Mission was never envisaged, given the civilian nature of the mission and also because of the Russian opposition at the Security Council.

Finally, political agendas come into play as each organization has its own conception of a particular operation, its mandate or the division of tasks it implies. When the two organizations are simultaneously deployed, strategic objectives may diverge based on each actor’s conception of its own role. This was illustrated in Chad when the mandates of EUFOR and MINURCAT were initially defined, with the expecta-
tion on the UN side that the EUFOR would act as a kind of military component of the UN mission while the EU had a different vision about its own mandate and its position vis-à-vis the UN and MINURCAT. UN-EU cooperation in strategic and operational planning was hampered by these divergences.

A third source of tension between the UN and the EU comes from a certain inequality in the relationship. Any relationship between two international organizations implies the idea of primacy, of priority of one over the other; there is inevitably the idea of rank between several institutions that operate in the same field and this may act against the establishment of partnerships between allegedly equal institutions[1].

For example, the UN wishes to retain a certain degree of primacy in its relations with regional organizations, in the legal field, but also in the political/operational field (definition of relations with regional organizations, definition of standards, subordination to the UN by the Chapter VIII regional arrangements, etc.). In practice however, the comparative advantages of the UN and the EU lead to a relative unequal relationship, in the sense that the EU tends to dominate and define the agenda while the UN is often on the receiving end, getting what the EU is willing to give. In most scenarios of UN-EU cooperation, it is the EU that supports the UN so as to palliate an alleged or real weakness of the UN (lack of rapid reaction force, difficulty to conduct robust peacekeeping, lack of tactical air support, finance, etc.). In this “demand versus supply” relationship, what the EU is ready to bring is the result of an internal EU decision-making process and does not necessarily match what the UN would like to get.

### 3.2. EU member states’ policies and EU autonomy

A second set of political constraints comes from the EU and EU member states’ policies in relation to the UN. The UN-EU relationship is directly shaped by two aspects of the EU and its member states’ policies vis-à-vis UN-led peace operations. One is the general absence of EU member states as troop contributing countries to UN-led operations; the other is the importance that the EU gives to its autonomy of decision when it comes to military assets.

The UN-EU relationship has developed on the assumption that EU member states do not contribute troops to UN-led operations. All scenarios are based on this

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assumption. Since the mid-1990s, European states have by and large ceased to contribute troops to UN-led operations, while financing approximately 40% of the peacekeeping operations budget. This general absence raises a lot of questions, ranging from the ability of the UN to run complex military operations without the assets of Western states to the development of the so-called “two-speed crisis management”, with the dichotomy between UN peace operations, mainly run by developing countries, and EU or NATO operations.

It follows that the development of the UN-EU relationship has taken place with the assumption that the EU and EU member states would support UN operations short of contributing to them. Yet, the relationship would be fundamentally modified if EU member states participated significantly in UN operations, in Africa in particular. The very question of the need to create distinct EU operations in the DRC in 2003 (Artemis) and 2006 (EUFOR DRC) and in Chad and CAR in 2007 (EUFOR Chad/CAR) would be posed in different terms had EU member states been present in MONUC and MINURCAT. One could even argue that operations Artemis and EUFOR DRC became necessary because of the absence of EU member states in MONUC.

A related constraint comes from the conception that the EU has of its own role as a security actor, articulated around the concept of autonomy. Autonomy of action and decision is consubstantial to CFSP and the aspiration to be a global player. This imperative finds expressions at different levels: at the institutional level, it explains the reluctance of the EU to be a regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, as autonomy is difficult to reconcile with the subordination to the UN that a Chapter VIII status implies. At a political-operational level, autonomy is reflected in the necessity to have any EU-led operation put under the political control and strategic direction of the Political and Security Committee (PSC). This explains the impossibility for an EU military operation to be placed under UN command, and therefore to achieve unity of command in a hypothetical UN-EU operation.

### 3.3. Structural differences

Thirdly, at the operational level, significant constraints on UN-EU cooperation stem from the differences in the structures and functioning of both institutions. To start with, the mix of intergovernmental and supranational approaches within the EU — i.e. the combination of ESDP and Commission activities — tends to complicate cooperation with the UN as it adds to the number of players and confuses UN interlocutors as to what the EU is and how it works. Secondly, different working methods
in the areas of financing or logistics have impeded cooperation, while information sharing has remained a politically and technically difficult issue with inherent limits that can only be addressed on a case-by-case basis. Thirdly, the operations in the DRC in 2006 and in Chad as of 2007/08 have revealed key differences in the respective decision-making, planning and command processes and structures.

Insofar as decision-making is concerned, although the EU was able to decide upon and deploy in less than a month the operation Artemis in the DRC in 2003, in general terms, the EU process tends to be heavier and more closely supervised by member states than the UN decision-making process. This has a direct impact on the way the UN and the EU plan operations. Two differences can be identified here. One is reflected in the differences in sequencing during the planning phase, and consequently in the difficulty to synchronise UN and EU planning in the case of parallel mission start-up (as in the case of Chad). At the UN, most of the planning, including operational planning and part of force generation, is done before the decision to launch the operation is taken, while for the EU, operational planning and force generation can only start after the adoption of a Joint Action by the Council, which usually follows the UN Security Council resolution. In the case of an EU operation in support of an existing UN mission, the problem is less acute as the UN planning related to the adjustment of the mission would take place after the UN Security Council resolution.

The second difference stems from the respective planning responsibilities. At the UN, planning does not make the clear-cut distinctions between the different layers of the planning process that the EU does. Furthermore, most of the planning is done by the UN Secretariat that hands over to the operation’s leadership at a late stage, once operational planning is completed. In contrast, the distinction between strategic and operational planning is very clear at the EU, with the latter being conducted by the operation leadership (in the Operation Headquarters, OHQ), which reports to Brussels but is functionally separate.

Finally, the UN and the EU differ on HQ organizational structures, the main difference being in the location and responsibilities of the different layers of command. At the UN, the operation HQ and Force Commander are in the field, and enjoy a significant delegation of responsibilities. Things are different at the EU where command of the operation at the military strategic level lies in the Operation Headquarters (OHQ), located either in one of the five national OHQs, in SHAPE or within the EU Operations Centre. The EU also makes a clear distinction between the OHQ and the Force HQ that commands the operation on the ground with little autonomy given to the Force HQ.
3.4. Lack of mutual knowledge

Finally, the UN-EU relationship is complicated by a general lack of communication or mutual understanding of the respective structures, working methods and institutional cultures. As previously stated, the UN and the EU were unfamiliar with each other when they initiated cooperation in 2000. Nine years later, things have changed and through the work of the Steering Committee and field interaction, mutual knowledge and understanding have improved, particularly in the categories of staff that interact. However, given the complexity of the institutions and the amount of information that needs to be digested, mutual knowledge at the working level is still limited.

4. CONCLUSION

The UN and the EU are both going through a period of transformation and adaptation to the evolving security environment. In this context, the two institutions have managed to develop and institutionalise their relationship in a manner that has not been observed between the UN and any other regional actor. The quality of the relationship stems from a certain degree of convergence of the two institutions insofar as their conception of security management is concerned, but also from a certain complementarity at the operational level. Yet, the UN-EU relationship in crisis management remains constrained by political, structural and cultural obstacles that can only be overcome to a certain extent. Cooperation is crucial and recognised as such on both sides, but comes second for institutions that are constantly struggling for their own comparatives advantages, visibility and identity.
The European Union and the United Nations are both struggling to maintain their credibility as military actors, but for very different reasons. The UN has defied warnings of irrelevance to deploy over 80,000 troops worldwide. But this level of activity has plunged it into systemic crisis, with its operational structures strained and ability to use force in doubt.\(^1\) The EU has fewer than 10,000 troops under its flag and its members have failed to meet many (or most) of their commitments to increase the quality and deployability of their forces.\(^2\) If the UN is suffering from overstretch, the EU lacks reach.

While the two organizations face such dissimilar challenges, they have repeatedly pledged to cooperate on military crisis management — and sometimes even done so. The history of the EU as a military actor is intertwined with its relationship with the UN.

Of the five land-based military operations launched under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to date, three have been in direct support of a UN mission in Africa (twice in the Democratic Republic of Congo and, most recently, in Chad and the Central African Republic). The 2008 authorization for an EU naval operation off the coast of Somalia was linked to plans to send UN peacekeepers ashore there. As I joked in May 2008, “the UN and EU are the Obelix and Asterix of international security: one handling big, slow missions while the other concentrates on smaller, flexible, operations.”\(^3\)

Yet at the end of last year, the two organizations’ cooperation faltered when EU leaders refused a request from UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to send a mission to support UN forces under threat in the eastern Congo. If this was an

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inter-organizational breakdown, it was rooted in serious inter-governmental differences within the EU.

Some member-states, including Belgium and the Nordic countries, favoured launching a mission. Others, led by Britain and Germany, resisted. London even refused to provide operational headquarters facilities in the UK to oversee a Scandinavian deployment. France, holding the rotating EU presidency, seemed uncertain how to act — rumours circulated of splits between the (pro-intervention) Foreign Ministry and (sceptical) President’s office.

Whatever the causes of the EU’s no-show, it was sadly predictable. As the next section of this article argues, the quality of European support to the UN has declined since 2003, when the EU managed a rapid deployment to the Congo during an earlier crisis. European decision-making has grown slower, and it has proved progressively harder to find the troops and military assets — in Chad, the EU has turned to Russia for helicopters.

This downward trajectory in EU-UN military cooperation challenges some common ideas about how inter-organizational relations evolve. There is a tendency to assume that the more often organizations interact, the more smoothly they will do so. In operational terms, this should mean that certain repeatable routines emerge and eventually be formalized. Politically, it should become harder for one organization to ignore another that it has helped before. The argument that the EU should intervene in the Congo in 2008 rested in part on the bare fact that it had done so previously, making it “the second most important testing ground for ESDP — surpassed only by Bosnia.”[1] The combination of mutual familiarity and commitment may even result in a form of “interpenetration”, as organizations’ decision-making and operational structures gradually blend together.[2]

These are all arguments that this author has made before. They would seem most compelling in cases where, as with the EU and UN, governments that drive decisions inside one entity are also powerful in the other (one might expect inter-organizational learning to be weaker where this overlap is absent, as in EU-AU relations). But they do not seem to apply to EU-UN cooperation in peacekeeping. What is wrong with them?


This article argues that the EU has developed a dysfunctional system for military cooperation with the UN, creating structures that restrain rather than facilitate action. As Thierry Tardy shows in this volume, there are many structural obstacles to EU-UN cooperation. The most important is that the EU has attempted to construct its military support to the UN around a system of battlegroups designed for rapid reaction — but this has been set up in a way that actually limits the chances of quick, flexible deployments.

If this argument is correct, it has broader implications for how we think about inter-organizational cooperation. Just as there is a tendency to assume that interaction between international institutions will lead to their convergence, it is tempting to assume that this will translate into concrete systems rather than remain *ad hoc*. Most advocates of inter-organizational cooperation quietly nurse a vision of a future global “system of systems”.

The EU is committed to something of this sort: the 2003 *European Security Strategy* describes “effective multilateralism” in terms of overlapping and mutually reinforcing international institutions — including the UN. Although UN ideologues still argue for the organization’s primacy in peace and security, the Security Council, General Assembly and Secretariat have all given new emphasis to regional organizations — including the EU.

More specifically, the EU and UN have signed off on a series of policy statements aimed at formalizing their dialogues on peacekeeping.\(^1\) Taken at face value, these are steps towards a systematized relationship. But in practice, this has not grown deep roots. This raises the possibility that *ad hoc* cooperation may in fact be a more natural mode of inter-organizational interaction — and the urge to systematize even counter-productive.

**1. THE BATTLEGROUPS: NOTABLE BY THEIR ABSENCE**

The battlegroups — initiated by France, Britain and Germany in 2004 — have received enough attention from academics and policy-makers that they do not require a lengthy introduction here. EU members maintain two brigade-strength forces, including multi-national and single-nation formations, in a state of high readiness at any given time. Each battlegroup should be able to deploy within fifteen days, and each is on standby for six months at a time — they are expected to operate for three months if ever deployed.

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So far, none has been deployed. Nonetheless, the fact that this system is up and running is held up as an unusual success for an EU defence program. Nick Witney, former head of the European Defence Agency, argues that the “initiative has, in some cases, helped to catalyze defence modernization, and to ensure that national contingents can work together effectively.”[1] Even so, he notes that if some contingents seem impressive, others “have the look of paper formations, likely to fail in even minimally demanding operations.”

The battlegroups are not necessarily intended to fight alongside UN missions — they are, for example, potentially well-suited for evacuating European nationals from a war zone. Nor, EU officials hasten to point out, were they ever supposed to be the only mechanism for ESDP support to a UN operation. But the battlegroups were designed to help the UN. The very first paragraph of the original proposal for the new formation states that they should be deployed “principally in response to requests from the UN”, and the concept paper goes on to say that they should be designed specifically for this purpose.[2]

The explicit model for the battlegroups and their cooperation with the UN was the EU’s 2003 Operation Artemis in support of beleaguered blue helmets in the eastern Congo. The desire to repeat this success led European planners to take a narrow view of what future operations would be like: Artemis II, Artemis III, and so on. If inter-organizational cooperation involves learning through repeated interactions, it can stifle innovation because it frequently seems easiest to redo what has been done before without variations.

Challenges for the EU and UN have been more complex and less predictable than the battlegroup concept assumed. To evaluate the utility of the concept, we can turn to recent case studies of EU-UN cooperation which suggest that the existence of the battlegroups is at best a distraction from actual operations, and at worst an obstacle to rapid EU action.

The first example is the UN’s request for EU support during the Congolese elections of 2006. This was made at the end of 2005, and UN officials admit that it was a test of how serious the EU’s was about using the battlegroups. France initially advocated deploying one, but as Claudia Major notes, systemic and political factors stopped this happening:


The UN’s request coincided with rotation from a French battlegroup [BG] to a Franco-German BG. It was the latter which France suggested deploying. However, this Franco-German BG was bi-national solely to the extent that it comprised a small number of French officers, whereas the main component was German. Deploying this BG would have meant that Germany would have had to bear the responsibility and the costs almost on its own. Moreover, the BG in question was mainly able to carry out evacuation tasks. Thus, it would not have been able to cover the whole range of tasks outlined in the mandate.\(^1\)

Rather than give the EU flexibility, therefore, the battlegroup system distributed risks and costs in a way that militated against deployment — the EU took months to put together an *ad hoc* force (EUFOR RD Congo) to support the UN that was complicated by caveats and lack of common standards. Some disappointed European governments began to look for a crisis that would be suitable for a battlegroup intervention, but this proved a distraction as the EU moved towards cooperation with the UN in Chad in late 2007:

One year onwards from EUFOR RD Congo . . . some felt it was time for a new military operation to foster the development of ESDP as a crisis management tool. In this context the [EU Political and Security Committee] debated the possible deployment of the Nordic Battlegroup into the eastern Congo. Chad soon emerged as another candidate, albeit not ideal for a battlegroup scenario.\(^2\)

This was an inversion of sound strategic sense, with the EU auditioning crises to see if they met the requirements of its system, rather than adapting its system to strategic realities. While the EU did approve a military mission to Chad in September 2007 to operate alongside a UN police deployment (and be replaced by UN troops after one year) it was again based on *ad hoc* contributions. Member-states struggled to find enough helicopters to get the deployment going, leading to murmuring about its cancellation.

By mid-2008, with the Chad operation finally underway, many observers were starting to wonder if the circumstances for another *Artemis* (and hence a battlegroup deployment) would ever arise. But they reappeared with a vengeance in the eastern

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\(^1\) Major, op.cit., p. 24. It should be noted that the battlegroup concept was only partially operational at this time, not being declared fully operational until 2007 — but this does not affect the case made here.

Congo at the end of the year — and the system once again came up short. The UK had a battlegroup on standby, but was not willing to deploy it, arguing that it was “not designed for this kind of operation”. The Nordic countries had just stood down their own battlegroup, and were ready to reactivate it, but Britain refused to provide the services of its Permanent Joint Headquarters in Northwood as an operational HQ (a facility the Scandinavians lacked).

Rather than merely delay or distract from European action to support the UN, the battlegroup system arguably prevented action altogether on this occasion — Britain’s urge to avoid deploying any of its own forces meant that it halted the system entirely. Nick Witney had argued before the crisis that, because the battlegroup system ensures that certain countries have troops ready at any given moment, “there is no doubt about whose name is in the frame when the need arises.” But as Germany proved in 2006 and Britain affirmed in 2008, this also means that those “in the frame” have a lot of leverage to block an EU mission completely if they want to avoid taking on unwelcome liabilities.

It is obvious that, at root, these issues arise from decisions by specific governments rather than the inter-governmental and inter-organizational mechanisms that mediate them. But it is equally clear that, at the inter-governmental level, the battlegroup system exacerbates tensions rather than reduces them when crises flare up. At the inter-organizational level it complicates EU-UN relations by raising false expectations on the part of the UN Secretariat. The unpredictability of inter-governmental debate in each new crisis also reduces the relevance of EU-UN dialogues in quieter times. Ultimately, the battlegroup system’s flaws have retarded EU-UN cooperation in crisis management by diverting both institutions’ hopes and energies into a mechanism that consistently fails to deliver troops.

2. ALTERNATIVES AND IMPROVEMENTS

The failure of the battlegroups to boost the UN should be weighed against their contributions to military capacity-building in the EU, as Witney reminds us. But it must also be contrasted with EU member-states’ ability to send forces to support the UN through ad hoc mechanisms such as the rapid deployment to Lebanon in 2006. Negotiated through both the Security Council and European Council, this was neither an ESDP mission nor a traditional UN operation — European units


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wore blue helmets circumvented cumbersome UN logistics and administration to get troops on the ground.

Even if EUFOR RD Congo and the mission in Chad suffered from resource problems, these two *ad hoc* options were also still more viable than battlegroup deployments. The operational history of EU-UN interactions over the last five years is a tale of sustained cooperation in spite, rather than because of, efforts to systematize their collaboration.

It might be argued that the battlegroups have nonetheless played a useful role in symbolizing the EU’s desire to work with the UN — even if the option has not been used in Chad and Congo, its existence stimulated debates about the EU’s role in both theaters.

Given the EU’s limited military profile, it may be able to afford symbolism — but the UN’s level of overstretch demands something stronger. A number of commentators (including Witney, Tardy and this author) have called for the EU to develop a more extensive variety of military peacekeeping tools than the battlegroups. However, the battlegroup concept is unlikely to disappear any time soon. Is it open to improvement?

The foregoing analysis suggests that two sets of problems need to be addressed if the battlegroup system is to grow less self-limiting. The first set is operational: the formations should be upgraded so that all are able to meet a broad range of mandates, rather than specialize in niche activities like evacuation. A dimension of this should be to sensitize officers to UN practices, capabilities and vulnerabilities *before* crises break out.

The second — and ultimately greater — set of problems is political: the EU should work to remove the structural factors that have repeatedly prevented battlegroup deployments. A familiar theme here is financing. As Germany demonstrated in 2006, governments are likely to shy away from deploying battlegroups if they must shoulder all the costs. In an ideal world, the EU’s members could develop a standard mechanism to spread these costs: in cases where a mission is in response to a UN request, all countries could pay on a scale derived from their contributions to the UN budget, for example. In reality, limited ways to mitigate troop contributors’ expenses can be identified on a case-by-case basis.

A second sensitive area is command and control: countries with advanced headquarters facilities must commit not to repeat the UK’s refusal of support to the Nordic countries. More ambitiously, they could follow Witney’s solution: “a fully
integrated EU Operational Headquarters in Brussels”. A political mechanism should also be found for intensive discussions within the EU of support options to the UN, avoiding the drawn-out haggling that has become the norm in planning the EU’s outings to the Congo and Chad.

Even if these improvements were made, there could be no guarantee of EU support to the UN in future crises — political imperatives always upset systems in an emergency. This brings us back to the question posed in the introduction to this article. Faced with complex and unpredictable challenges, can two militarily weak institutions such as the EU and UN afford to restrict their military options by trying to systematize their ties? It is time to ensure that EU-UN cooperation works as well on ground as it does on paper.

1. INTRODUCTION

In Greek mythology, Polynices and his brother Eteocles were supposed to rule
Thebes in alternate years, but as Eteocles refused to relinquish the throne, Polynices
and Eteocles ended up facing each other in battle. Analogously, the African Union
(AU) and the regional economic communities (RECs) were meant to cooperate
effectively — almost fraternally — towards the development of the continent.
But this has not been fully attained. This article traces the historical formation of
the RECs and highlights the major impediments to effective cooperation with the
African Union. In the final part, it describes possible scenarios for the future.

Since the early 1960s, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
(UNECA) has encouraged African states to combine their economies into sub-
regional markets that would ultimately form one Africa-wide economic union.
Over the years the Organization of African Unity (OAU) sponsored various resolutions
and declarations — namely in Algiers in September 1968, or in Addis Ababa in
August 1970 and May 1973 — that identified the need for the economic integra-
tion of the continent as a pre-requisite for the realization of the objectives of the
Organization.[1] In this process a handful of regional economic pacts were eventu-
ally formed, but the conscious decision to strengthen the RECs (also known as the
African Economic Communities) was only set in motion with the adoption in 1980
of the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and Final Act of Lagos (FAL), two programs that
made provisions for the future establishment of an African Economic Community

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[1] In addition, at its 27th Ordinary Session in 1976, the OAU Council of Ministers by paragraph 2(a) of its Resolution CM/
Res. 464(XXVI) also decided that, “there shall be five regions of the OAU, namely, Northern, Western, Central, Eastern and
Southern.”
The Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (Abuja Treaty) was signed only in 1991 (and came into effect in 1994), but it clearly envisaged that the Community must be established mainly through the coordination, harmonisation and progressive integration of the activities of the RECs. To this end, member states are expected to promote the coordination and harmonisation of the integration activities of the RECs of which they are members with the activities of the AEC, it being understood that the establishment of the latter is the final objective towards which the activities of existing and future RECs must be geared.

Although the RECs became a prominent actor in African politics, it was only with the Protocol on Relations between the African Economic Community and the RECs, signed in 1998, that they were clearly named and identified. The signatories of the document were the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the East African Community (EAC), and the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) joined later, in contrast to the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) which opted out due to some objections by one of its members. Nevertheless, the AU recognizes the existence of the eight RECs (including the AMU).

However, the 1998 Protocol turned out to be a cosmetic document which did not lead to the implementation of any new state of affairs. Conscious of its obsolete nature, the AU Maputo Summit of 2003 requested the African Union Commission to accelerate the preparation of a new draft Protocol. The much-needed new version of the Protocol was signed in January 2008 — after much technical and political negotiation — by the seven RECs that had recognized the legal value of the first Protocol. Once again the Arab Maghreb Union decided to stay out.

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[1] After the LPA and FAL several other resolution have also instructed African leaders to strengthen the RECS, namely:

(i) Resolution CM/Res.1043 (XLIV) of the 44th Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers (1986), requested in paragraph 7 “the OAU Secretary General, to examine the practical and operational modalities for coordinating and harmonizing the activities and programmes of existing sub-regional economic groupings”;

(ii) The Heads of State and Government, in paragraph 7 of Resolution AHG/Res.161 (XXIII) adopted at the 23rd Ordinary Session in 1987, requested the “Secretary General of the OAU, the Executive Secretary of the ECA, and the authorities of sub-regional and regional economic groupings, particularly ECOWAS, PTA, SADCC and ECCAS to take the necessary steps to ensure coordination, harmonisation and rationalization of activities, projects and programmes of all the African inter-governmental cooperation and integration organizations in their respective regions in order to avert overlaps, power conflicts and wastage of efforts and resources.

[2] It should be noted that although recognized as RECs, EAC, IGAD and CEN-SAD do not satisfy the criteria of “region” as per OAU Resolution 464 (see footnote 1, p. 61).
But more pertinent than analyzing in detail all protocols and declarations that reiterate the need to streamline cooperation is to assess the major obstacles towards the full implementation of the African Economic Community and, simultaneously, the major hindrances in the coordination between the African Union and the RECs. The *Constitutive Act of the AU* alerted to the “need to accelerate” the process of implementing the Abuja Treaty in order to promote the socio-economic development of the continent (Preamble). Also in the military field, cooperation amongst the many regional economic organizations as well as between the RECs and AU is still far from problem-free. But what are the major hindrances?

### 2. REGIONAL OVERLAPPING

Although the African Union has identified the eight regional organizations tasked to champion sub-regional economic development in the five African sub-regions and to serve as building blocks of the African Community, there is a proliferation of several other regional institutions causing hence duplication and overlapping of activities. Currently there are 14 regional economic organizations in Africa. Such a trend makes the task of cooperation difficult, as the same country would be progressing towards economic integration at different paces in the different communities to which it belongs. As an AU audit noted, multi-membership in different regional organizations leads to “irrational configurations, negotiating positions, and inconsistencies in harmonisation and coordination of trade liberalization and facilitation.”[1] In the same vein, a study conducted in 2007 by the African Union to address this issue[2] reached the similar conclusion that multiplication of organizations is fraught with obvious disadvantages, such as:

- poor leadership and the difficulty of devising a harmonized and coordinated timeframe for Africa’s integration;
- dispersal of scarce human and financial resources in terms of capacities, institutional frameworks, as well as implementation of key programs;
- unnecessary competition, and even contradiction of policies;
- fragmentation of markets, thereby constraining economies of scale;
- inefficiency resulting from dispersed and duplication of efforts.

Indeed, African countries that belong to more than one regional institution find themselves burdened with the technical, administrative and financial challenges

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of multiple memberships.\textsuperscript{[1]} This was recognized at the highest level by the First Conference of African Integration Ministers organized in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, in March 2006. Presently, out of the 53 African countries, 26 are members of two regional organizations, 20 are members of three and 1 (DRC) is a member of four\textsuperscript{[2]}. Why do countries still join more than one REC given these problems? Half cite political and strategic reasons as the main determinant of whether to join a REC. Economic interests rank a distant second, with only 35\% of countries citing it. Geography, which is a key consideration in the Abuja Treaty, is cited by only 21\%.\textsuperscript{[3]}

3. DIFFERENT SPEEDS

The Abuja Treaty anticipated that the African Economic Community was to be achieved through six consecutive steps. Even if these steps were considered unambitious and feasible, some of the RECs have not yet achieved the foundational stage within the envisaged timeframes. AMU and IGAD are yet to fully establish free trade areas, and the EAC, COMESA, and SADC have plans to move towards a common market only in 2009, 2014 and 2015 respectively. As the AU Audit underlines, “the approach to integration seems to be based more on deadlines than concrete achievements.”\textsuperscript{[4]} Recently, the AU member states agreed they would establish an African Central Bank to be situated in Nigeria, an African Monetary Fund in Cameroon and an African Investment Bank in Libya, but the process of financial and trade integration is likely to be hindered by the multiplicity of currencies.

Indeed, the RECs are not progressing towards the AEC at the same pace, nor are they following similar procedures and processes to reach that aim. There appears to be no clear evidence that all existing RECs have the long-term continental integration in view, or that there is the political will within all the RECs to submit regional concerns to the overriding imperatives of the Union. This is mainly due to member’s lack of political will and the low level of development. Despite the rhetoric of a continental government conveyed by the current President of the Assembly of the AU, Muammar Gaddafi, African leaders still regard sovereignty as the best

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\textsuperscript{[1]} On average, a third of REC members fail to meet their contribution obligations; rising to more than half in some communities (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and African Union Commission (UNECA-AU), Assessing Regional Integration in Africa II — Rationalizing Regional Economic Communities (UNECA-AU, Addis Ababa, 2006), p. xviii).

\textsuperscript{[2]} The DRC is member of COMESA, ECCAS, SADC and the Central African Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC).


army against uninvited foreign interventions. Although Africa has indeed seen an incontinency of regional institutions, in some cases they remain strategically weak, intergovernmental (or personal) and rooted on consensus decision-making. And without a sense of regional identity, trust and common interests, regional institutions only are what individual member states wish them to be. To a smaller extent, poor regionalism may also be explained by low developmental capacity. As noted by Benedikt Franke: “given the desolate state of Africa’s public finances and governmental structures, its organizational deficits and inexperienced leaders as well as wide-spread corruption and clientelism, it is hardly surprising that its institutions did not develop as clearly, strongly or professionally as they did elsewhere”.[1]

In the military field, the establishment of the African Standby Force, a rapid reaction force comprising 10,000 people (8,000 soldiers and 2,000 civilians) is also facing some problems. Although some progress has been made in doctrine, standard operating procedures, command, control, and communications and information policy, the timing of the establishment of ASF varies considerably from region to region. Whereas ECOWAS (West) and SADC (South) brigades are following the procedures laid out by the AU, the Central and Northern brigades are at a standstill.

4. INSTITUTIONAL DISARTICULATION

A less discussed problem is the fact that five countries — Eritrea, Somalia, Madagascar, Gabon and Djibouti — have not signed or ratified the Abuja Treaty, although they are full members of the African Union, which in its Constitutive Act, incorporating the Abuja Treaty, provides for the RECs to serve as the vehicles for accelerated integration. However, they are members of several RECs adding further obscurity to the integration process. Moreover, Morocco is a full member of AMU and CEN-SAD, the two leading regional communities in Northern Africa, but due to the Western Sahara situation, it has opted for not joining the AU. This disarticulation raises important legal issues.

The 1998 Protocol provided for the establishment of a Committee on Coordination comprising the Executive Heads of the AU Commission, RECs, African Development Bank, and the UNECA with the mandate to ensure policy coordination and harmonisation, monitor the RECs and mobilize resources for the implementation of the Abuja Treaty. But the Committee was not effective. First it did not meet frequently and when it seldom did, not all Chief Executives attended the meetings.

But more critically, the Committee had no monitoring capacity to evaluate the implementation of the Abuja Treaty nor did it provide clear guidelines on how to foment harmonisation between the AU and the RECs. Unlike its predecessor, the 2008 Protocol empowers the Union to enforce sanctions for non-compliance by the RECs with Treaty obligations, particularly incompatible policies or programs that lag behind in time. The Protocol also increases the frequency of the Committee on Coordination meetings to twice a year in order to provide great technical leadership. We should allow some time to ascertain the real impact of the 2008 Protocol.

The institutional disarticulation is often accentuated by the fact that more often than not, RECs tend to perceive the AU as being both slow and a rival. As a Capacity Needs Assessment report noted, RECs tend to be hypnotically focused on their own regions “with continental aspirations receiving little attention.”

5. HARMONISATION

The coordination difficulties between the AU and the RECs, similarly to the ancient tension between Polynices and his brother Eteocles, are far from being incognizant to the peers. To address this issue, several studies have been carried out over the last years.

These studies tend to underscore the sensitive nature of the rationalization debate at the same time that they demonstrate how multiple memberships in RECs have slowed down Africa’s integration process. Some of them have indeed inspired the AU Summit in Banjul (July 2006) and in Accra (July 2007) to put a moratorium on the recognition of new RECs. But what should the next step be?

The three scenarios currently on the table are: (i) the status quo, (ii) Abuja Treaty approach, and (iii) anchor community approach. The first scenario presupposes that all economic communities and groupings of regional vocation should be considered as RECs. This has the “advantage” of not upsetting the established order and to enable the internal dynamics of integration entities to generate natural solutions, but


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on the other hand it encourages multiplicity of programs and policies. The second scenario limits the economic integration entities to the five regions mentioned in the Abuja Treaty (North, West, Central, East and Southern) (article 1-d) and entails the exclusive selection of five regional organizations. This policy would reverse the proliferation of RECs and strictly align the integration process with the stages defined in the Abuja Treaty (article 6-2), but it would likely be marred by political controversies and tensions during the rationalization process. Nevertheless, it seems to be the position adopted by the African Development Bank (ADB). In February 2009, Alieu Jeng, the Resident Representative of the ADB in Ethiopia declared that “all the blocs should be reduced to about five since some of the member states of the AU even had overlapping membership in those blocs.”

The third scenario is a combination of the two and presupposes the singling out of a regional leader, i.e. an organization that will spearhead matters of socio-economic development and conflict resolution. Regional decisions would hence be formulated and taken within the framework of the anchor community and only such decisions would be recognized by the AU. But this would not necessarily imply the dismantling of other regional organizations. According to a study conducted by the African Union, 45 percent of the RECs consulted favoured this anchor community scenario, whereas 22 percent preferred either the Abuja treaty or the status.

Regional integration “is a key component of African development strategies”. But given the present state of affairs, the African Union needs to take ambitious measures to harmonize African regionalism. Even if this will prove difficult because regional multiplication sometimes works as a strategy by member states to amplify their sources of donor disbursements, the AU needs to demonstrate clearly that regional harmonisation is the only viable option for the cogent regional integration of the continent.


EU-AU COOPERATION IN CAPACITY-BUILDING

Benedikt Franke*

Over the last couple of years, the European Union has greatly expanded its cooperation with the African Union in the area of peace and security. While not free of serious problems, its increasingly well-coordinated capacity-building support to AU crisis management projects like the African Standby Force illustrates the extent to which an effective inter-organizationalism can develop between organizations at very different stages of institutional maturity. This article briefly explores the instruments, mechanisms and shortcomings of this inter-organizationalism and points towards some possible improvements in the quality and focus of European support measures.

1. THE AFRICA PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

Ever since Ghana’s founding president Kwame Nkrumah called for the establishment of an African High Command in the late 1950s, the idea of an all-African military force that could take over the responsibility for peace and security on the continent has fascinated African and non-African policy-makers alike. While the former see it as a essential step towards the realisation of Ali Mazrui’s ambitious vision of a “Pax Africana that is protected and maintained by Africa herself”[1], the latter understandably feel attracted by the possibility of more equitable burden-sharing and an easing of the pressure on the UN to plan, staff and pay the majority of peace support operations in Africa. With the replacement of the defunct Organization of African Unity with a structurally more promising African Union modelled after the European archetype, the idea of such a force may now finally become reality in the form of the so-called African Standby Force (ASF). Part of a broader African peace and security architecture that also includes a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), a Panel of the Wise and a Special (Peace) Fund and based on five regionally administered standby brigades, this division-size force is supposed to take on the role of an African rapid reaction force capable of deployment anywhere on the continent. Even though the force is still in the early stages of

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EU-AU cooperation in capacity-building

development, the AU and its five regional partner organizations have already made great progress towards meeting the self-imposed deadline of late 2010. For example, important key documents like the doctrine, standard operating procedures and logistics concept have been finalised by the AU and three out of the five regional brigades are nearing full operationalisation.\(^1\) While the capacity-building support of the European Union has been central to this success, much more remains to be done for the EU at both the continental as well as the regional level of Africa’s emerging security architecture if the ASF is ever to become operational in its entirety.

2. EU-AU COOPERATION: CAPACITY-BUILDING AT THE CONTINENTAL LEVEL

The decentralised nature of Africa’s emerging peace and security architecture in which regional organizations like the Southern African Development Community (SADC) or the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) act as pillars of and implementation agencies for continental policy means that the EU faces two very different cooperation and support scenarios. At the continental level, the AU’s lack of institutional capacity remains the most serious impediment to the effective operationalisation of continent-wide projects like the ASF or the Continental Early Warning System as well as inter-organizational coordination with the EU. A recent study for the European Parliament has shown that the AU Commission and its various departments continue to be severely understaffed and hampered by a high staff turnover rate, widespread lack of training, cumbersome recruitment procedures and an inefficient top-down management structure.\(^2\) As a result, crucial parts of the African Union are simply not able to cope with their workload and the organization’s absorption capacity for international support measures has declined accordingly.

Over the last few years, the EU has begun to address some of the capacity constraints of its African counterpart. Since its creation in 2004, the EU-AU military liaison office situated within the European Commission Delegation to Ethiopia has been at the forefront of these efforts. Led by Colonel Reinhard Linz, the office has assisted with the establishment of the AU’s Peace Support Operations Department and \textit{ad hoc} planning cells for the AU missions in Darfur and Somalia, organised the formulation and translation of key ASF documents on the basis of EU Battlegroup

\(^{[1]}\) The brigades nearing full operationalisation are those of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Eastern African Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism (EASBRIGCOM).

concepts and helped with the integration of liaison officers from various regional organizations into the AU structures. More recently, the European Commission has earmarked another €100 million for capacity-building and has established a separate Delegation to the AU Headquarters in Addis Ababa in order to improve its ability to identify AU needs and coordinate EU support activities. Led by the experienced Belgian diplomat Koen Vervaeke and supported by a greatly expanded military liaison office, this delegation is the new spearhead of the EU’s capacity-building assistance to the African peace and security architecture.[1]

While its establishment certainly goes a long way in improving the communication between the AU and the EU through regular meetings and direct contacts at the working level, the new delegation has so far not been able to overcome an important bias in the EU’s assistance policy. Far too much of the EU’s support still goes straight to the AU Commission’s Department for Peace & Security and its various subdivisions like the Peace Support Operations Department without helping to improve the institutional capacity of less glamorous but equally essential departments like finance and human resources. If the AU is to fulfil its continental leadership role, however, it desperately needs effective supporting services. Here the EU could improve on its current capacity-building approach by sharing its considerable organizational expertise with the relevant departments in the African Union Commission and rerouting more of its financial support to their benefit.

3. EU-AU COOPERATION: CAPACITY BUILDING AT REGIONAL LEVEL

The regional support scenario is very different, mainly because the need for institutional capacity-building, though existent, is not as pronounced and urgent as it is at the continental level. For one, almost all of the regional organizations have been in existence for much longer than the AU and thus have already had some time to establish appropriate institutional structures and processes. But also, in the continent’s envisaged multi-layered security architecture institutional capacity is more important for the AU in its role as legitimising institution and coordinating body than for the regions which have to carry the brunt of the military burden. As a result, EU support at the regional level should really focus on enabling the five regions to operationalize their ASF component brigades in line with the agreed schedule. Two structural conditions, however, prevent the EU from doing so effectively.

[1] See also Koen Vervaeke’s contribution hereafter.
First, even though the lack of inter-operable military equipment remains the most serious impediment to the operationalisation of the ASF at the regional level, the nature of the EU’s financial support mechanisms prevents the provision of badly-needed military hardware to the AU’s member states. Its flagship African Peace Facility, for example, is financed through the European Development Fund which does allow the use of funds for conflict prevention, but explicitly prohibits the provision of material with “potentially lethal implications”. While a certain reservation about funding military equipment is perfectly understandable given the meagre human rights record of many African regimes, the outfitting of the regionally-managed depots with armoured personnel carriers and transport helicopters, for example, would already go a long way in addressing one of the most serious needs of the ASF without running the risk of (national) misuse of the provided material.

Second, the same political sensitivities that are responsible for the legal restrictions on the use of European aid for military purposes have also led to an overemphasis on the provision of peacekeeping training. The fact that such training is easy-to-sell to domestic constituencies because of its perceived harmlessness has led many Western actors to focus their support on its provision regardless of the actual needs of the African states contributing to the ASF. The EU, for example, has continuously expanded its support to the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centers in Accra and Nairobi and has recently even begun to “Europeanise” the former French peacekeeping training program RECAMP (Renforcement des capacités africaines au maintien de la paix). Even though both initiatives are certainly useful in the long-run, peacekeeping training simply is not the requirement of the moment, especially so as the relevant experience of many African soldiers is often fresher and more substantial than that of their European trainers (after all, African countries are much more frequent troop contributors to UN peace operations). Instead of providing peacekeeping training years before the envisaged operationalisation of the ASF, the EU should focus its attention on material and military infrastructure support to those regions that lack behind in the creation of their component brigades.

4. THE IMPORTANCE OF COORDINATION

Since the global resource scarcity has hastened Africa’s return into the geo-strategic limelight the number of actors hoping to profit from supporting African security efforts has multiplied. Seeking access to cheap raw materials in order to sustain their economic growth, emerging powers like China, Brazil and Malaysia have begun to compete with established actors like the United Kingdom, the United States, France and Germany for influence on the African continent. While the resultant increase
in donor attention is to be greeted in theory, the lack of coordination between the proliferating activities unfortunately means that the overall impact of international capacity-building support remains far below potential. Even worse, the unnecessary duplication of efforts and the divisive impact of mal-coordinated measures undermine the development of a comprehensive capacity-building approach and multiply the transaction costs for the AU and other aid recipients on the continent. Despite the fact that the G8 Africa Action Plan has been calling for the harmonisation of the international support initiatives ever since 2002, the coordination between the various programmes continues to be hampered by widely differing agendas and political rivalries among the donors. It thus appears to be time for the EU to assume a greater coordinating role. Given its institutional capacities as well as the fact that three out of the four biggest donor nations (France, the UK and Germany) are EU member states, the EU would certainly be much better suited than the G8 or any other body to promote the harmonisation of international support initiatives.

5. THE FUTURE OF EU-AU COOPERATION IN THE REALM OF CAPACITY-BUILDING

With its recently replenished peace facility and other dedicated funds, the European Union is by far the most important supporter of Africa’s emerging security architecture. However, as laudable as its increasing commitment is, it also carries with it an ever-greater measure of responsibility. The AU’s growing dependence on European funds means that the EU is increasingly in a position to determine the character of Africa’s emerging security architecture through the selective application of its financial muscle. While the institutional isomorphism inevitably arising from such dependency may have certain positive side-effects with respect to the bureaucratic efficiency, political sustainability and international compatibility of the resultant African structures, the EU runs the risk of “Westernising” the AU to such an extent as to erode African support for it.[1] For this reason, the EU should adapt its capacity-building approach to African concerns and priorities. Naturally easier said than done, this would certainly have to involve a loosening of the overly restrictive conditions on financial assistance as well as the limited provision of badly-needed military hardware to the regional ASF depots. Additionally, it would necessitate a shift away from the easy-to-sell provision of peacekeeping training and towards more pragmatic measures like technical and language instruction. Lastly, given that capacity-building is a two-way process, the EU should also increase its

efforts to enable the AU and its regional partner organizations to communicate their needs more clearly.

6. CONCLUSION

Despite the suggestions for improvement outlined above, the cooperation between the European Union and its African counterpart in the realm of capacity-building illustrates the extent to which an effective inter-organizationalism can develop between organizations at very different stages of institutional maturity. For over six years now, both organizations have gradually accepted each other’s weaknesses and fostered the emergence of a culture of cooperation in the area of military crisis management. The non-patrimonial nature of this culture adds to more general conditions like the convergence of institutional interests and the existence of clear lines of communications to explain some of the success of EU capacity-building in Africa.
1. INTRODUCTION

The relationship between Africa and the European Union (EU) has seen a major boost in December 2007. The adoption of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) in Lisbon set a jointly agreed framework and clear priorities, opening new avenues of cooperation, notably in the field of peace and security. The African Union (AU) is the natural interlocutor for the EU in this partnership. But also some African regional economic communities (RECs) have become important partners for the EU due to their crucial role in the building-up of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).

It is fair to say that the EU has been one of the key partners in this endeavour over the last years. The EU has supported considerably the laudable efforts of African states with regard to the APSA and the management of conflicts. Although both organizations, the EU and AU (but also RECs), are autonomous organizations, each with its own procedures, aims and working methods, cooperation has been increasing ever since the creation of the AU some years ago. This includes also the area of military crisis management and capacity building. Effective inter-organizationalism between the EU and AU is important, if we want to achieve our common goal of securing peace, security and prosperity on the African continent. As I will detail below, the EU, for its part, is — with all its institutions and instruments — giving its best to ensure that this partnership is fruitful.

2. JOINT AFRICA-EU STRATEGY: A FRAMEWORK FOR THE AU-EU RELATION

The framework for our Partnership is the JAES. It put our relationship with Africa on a new basis. Already before, the EU had adopted a number of strategies intending to address African issues, but for the first time, a joint strategy based on the principles of partnership and African ownership was formulated. Africa and the EU agreed
on a number of key political challenges to be addressed jointly and on common fundamental objectives in four areas of interest: peace and security, governance and human rights, trade and regional integration and key development issues.

Peace and security are jointly recognized preconditions for political, economic and social development. On this basis, the two continents agreed to “promote holistic approaches to security, encompassing conflict prevention and long-term peace-building, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction, linked to governance and sustainable development, with a view to addressing the root causes of conflicts”.

The Joint Africa-EU Strategy was accompanied by a first three-year Action Plan in order to help implement its commitments. In the area of peace and security, three priority actions were agreed:

- enhanced dialogue on challenges to peace and security,
- full operationalization of the APSA,
- predictable funding for African-led Peace Support Operations (PSO).

The cooperation between Africa (AU and RECs) and EU in the field of peace and security is therefore far from being purely related to military crisis management, even though this contribution will concentrate on this aspect.

3. THE APSA: THE AU AND THE REGIONS

The APSA, a project initiated and led by the AU, includes an intervention tool, called African Standby Force (ASF). Initially purely military, this capability is now being expanded and also includes Police and Civilian components to become an integrated capability, allowing, when operational in 2010, the AU to manage crisis situations of various intensities but for limited time[1], reacting quickly (14 to 90 days) and “bridging” before an UN mission is decided and deployed.

In this framework, Africa has been divided into five regions responsible for generating among others five sets of both operational organic and command structures and military, police and civilian human resources while the AU Commission would build the capacity for preparing and implementing political and strategic level decisions. Three Regional Economic Communities (REC) — ECCAS in Central Africa, ECOWAS in the West and SADC in the South — and two Regional Mechanisms — EASBRIG in Eastern Africa and NARC in Northern — have

[1] ASF Vision 2010 — “Conceptually the AU and the UN will be working in harmony because the ASF may have to react quickly on behalf of the UN, it may have to substitute over a longer period for the UN, it may have to hand over an operation to the UN and it may even supply troops for a UN operation outside the African continent in the future.”
become essential elements to the ASF operationalization process, and therefore have to be taken into account — as mentioned above — by the EU and all other AU partners in their supportive effort of APSA.

From a military point of view, ASF should at the end be mainly composed of five brigade type forces, with additional joint capabilities (e.g. Strategic Maritime and Air lift) and their Operational Command HQ. The challenge to be addressed together is to ensure best possible coherence between the AU and the RECs and also among the RECs themselves.

4. WAITING FOR THE ASF...

While working on the build-up of the APSA, the AU is constantly faced with upcoming crises and violent conflicts on the continent and in some cases decided to respond to them in terms of crisis management operations. The most prominent one at the moment is AMISOM, the operation in Somalia. The operation has been planned and conducted by the AU on an ad hoc basis outside the ASF framework. Building on a coalition of the willing without many volunteers providing troops and leading the operation with imperfect structures, procedures and capabilities in place to date have been constant threats to the mission. Without the help of international partners the operation would arguably have had to fail. Sudan/Darfur, Comoros and Central African Republic are yet other examples, where the AU engaged or mandated military interventions in recent years and benefited from generous support of partners, including in particular the EU.

5. EFFECTIVE INTER-ORGANIZATIONALISM BETWEEN THE EU AND THE AU

The EU’s approach to the African Union is a multifaceted one. Several instruments are at its disposal. Different EU institutions are working hand in glove to ensure best possible support to the African Union on both areas mentioned, the immediate crisis management as well as the build-up of long-term capacities. Support through the African Peace Facility is combined with support by other Community instruments, notably the Instrument for Stability, and second pillar activities (in particular the European Security and Defence Policy/ESDP), paired with individual Member States’ contributions.
5.1. EU support to AU peace support operations

The single most important instrument for the support of AU-led operations on the European level is arguably the African Peace Facility (APF). Established in 2004, it provided for the first time a reliable, predictable and sustainable funding source for such operations. Only recently, a new contract was signed for the new African Peace Facility providing another 300 million Euros to the African Union over the coming three years, where most of the funds will again go to PSOs.

AMIS in Darfur had been supported with some 300 million Euros. For AMISOM, the European Commission, under the APF, has committed and largely paid already 35 million Euros, covering expenses such as troop allowances, airport security equipment, etc. At the recent pledging conference in Brussels, another 60 million Euros were pledged and we engaged already with our African counterparts on how best to use the funds available. This is complemented by a number of contributions provided by our EU Member States on a bilateral basis.

At the same time, innovative ways of supporting PSOs also personnel-wise were found: in the case of AMIS in Sudan/Darfur, the EU, through its ESDP, strengthened the management of the operation by planting EU staff into critical elements of the chain of command to ensure best possible management. It was the first time ever that the EU decided to deploy personnel into another organization’s operation. Although AMIS faces many challenges, the support provided by the EU was considered precious and could show the way for future cooperation as well.

In the case of AMISOM, the European Commission, through its Instrument for Stability, decided to support the Strategic Planning and Management Unit to allow it to recruit staff necessary for the strategic planning of the operation. As recruitment proved very difficult because of mainly procedural issues, the EU even went ahead and provided 5 EU planners for this unit.

On a more long-term note, discussions are ongoing in the framework of the United Nations how best to ensure predictable and sustainable funding for AU-led operations. A high ranking panel under the chairmanship of the former Italian Prime Minister Prodi presented some recommendations. On that basis the UN Security Council has now asked the UN Secretary General to come up with his own recommendations. We stand ready to engage intensively with our African partners to ensure a best possible outcome enabling the AU and the RECs to conduct PSOs.
5.2. Capacity-building

Effective crisis management needs procedures, structures and capacities. The EU is committed to support the AU in this endeavour. Support actions range from financial support to allow the AU to recruit staff in crucial areas and to get the necessary expertise to build up capacities to active engagement and dialogue on areas of mutual interest in order to share lessons learned and own experiences in the recent build up of crisis management capacities.

Turning once more to the ASF: from the beginning, the EU has been supporting the ongoing process of definition and building-up of necessary concepts and structures, both on the continental and regional level.

On one hand, three capacity building programmes, for a total amount of 33.5 M€, have been partially or completely designed since 2004 to respond to the ASF operationalisation process requirements as well as to support other elements of the APSA, both at continental and regional level, but have also been actively tackling the issue of reinforcing the link between the two levels. These funds were made available to cover among others staff salaries as well as training, office equipment and running costs.

On the other hand, the EU has contributed to feed the ASF related conceptual work bringing in its own experience on the field of generation and engagement of a multinational and integrated capability. Last November, the AMANI AFRICA cycle was launched and should, within 2010, help the AU, through trainings and exercises, to validate the ASF strategic planning and command structures and procedures.

In addition to the concepts, structures and procedures, another essential part of ASF will be its human resources, who will have to receive appropriate training, basic and specialized, to reach the expected degree of effectiveness (proper understanding of the environment and of the tasks to be filled, adequate skills to do so). The training issue, recognized as a priority by the AU and the EU, is currently being examined in order to define the support the EU would provide, notably identifying the training centres essential to the ASF process.

Under the new APF, even more activities reaching into the areas of crisis prevention and post-crisis actions will be funded. We are committed to support the capacity building of the AU and the RECs also in the coming years. Under the new APF alone, 65 million Euros are put aside for this. In the coming months, we will engage actively with our counterparts in the AU and RECs to ensure best possible effectiveness of this upcoming support.
6. CONCLUSION

Common challenges in a globalised world, interconnectivity of continents and their problems underline the importance of cooperating in all areas of mutual concern. Thus, the JAES and its Action Plan also lay the ground for cooperation in the area of military crisis management and capacity building.

While many challenges are still ahead of us, I strongly believe that both sides, the EU and Africa, benefit greatly from our joint partnership, in particular in the area of peace and security. While the African side can profit from very generous support in its endeavours to take its fate into its own hands, also the EU can look to African ways of conflict resolution as good examples to be considered when itself involved in such exercises.

Although effective inter-organizationalism might be difficult at times, as organizations have all developed their own way of life, there is no alternative. The EU is one partner of the AU, which benefits from many more partnerships, not least with the United Nations. Cooperation in the triangle AU-UN-EU might be challenging from an institutional point of view, but is for sure a very valid avenue to go, as all three stakeholders would greatly benefit from such cooperation.

In conclusion: any effort to ensure best possible cooperation between organizations, aimed at mutual benefit, is worth pursuing. We will continue to think innovatively and “outside the box” to help the AU, RECs and African countries in the best possible way to take their fate into their own hands and to live up to the most effective inter-organizationalism possible.

The EU Delegation to the African Union is one such example: for the first time ever, Member States and the European Commission decided to bring different components of our external action together under one roof. The Delegation includes personnel from the Commission, the Council Secretariat and Member States and is therefore best placed to address the multiple challenges posed by inter-organizationalism with the African Union.
In 1996 — in the wake of the disastrous peacekeeping failures in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda — the Standby High Readiness Brigade for UN Operations (SHIRBRIG) was created in order to equip the United Nations with a rapidly deployable peacekeeping and distinctly multinational crisis management tool. By the time of its eventual closure in summer 2009, the brigade’s membership had increased from the seven founding nations to 23 members and observers. It included a pool of 16 EU countries as diverse as Austria, the Scandinavian countries, Romania, Spain or Italy as well as non-European countries such as Canada, Chile, Jordan or Senegal. Furthermore, the core group of senior officers at SHIRBRIG’s permanent headquarters — the so-called Planning Element, located near Copenhagen — were responsible for devising common training and operation standards, for organizing joint military exercises at regular intervals, and thereby, for promoting a high level of coherence amongst the brigade’s troop contributors. Initiated and developed in close coordination with the UN Secretariat and within the framework of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations’ (DPKO) UN Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS), it is fair to state that SHIRBRIG came closest to the realization of the long-standing, but yet unfulfilled vision of a permanent UN Army so far.[1]

During its 13 years of existence, SHIRBRIG deployed to five peacekeeping operations in Africa, carried out operational planning assistance for the DPKO and launched a comprehensive capacity-building scheme in support of the build-up of the African Standby Force. It was in the context of these peacekeeping, military crisis management and capacity-building activities that SHIRBRIG had to cooperate extensively with the United Nations’ DPKO and with a wide range of African partner organizations. In this light, the Standby High Readiness Brigade for UN Operations offers valuable insights into the opportunities and pitfalls of inter-

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[1] For an overview of the more than a dozen preceding failed initiatives to establish a standby UN Army since 1945, see Joachim Koops and Johannes Varwick, Ten Years of SHIRBRIG: Lessons Learned, Development Prospects and Strategic Opportunities for Germany (Berlin, Global Public Policy Institute, 2008), pp. 7-11.
organizational collaboration and coordination with a diverse set of institutions and actors, particularly on the African continent.

Surprisingly, however, SHIRBRIG still remains rather neglected by academic analysts and policy-makers alike. This article therefore seeks to shed some light on the brigade’s activities and its major lessons learned from its inter-organizational interaction and cooperation schemes. As will be seen, despite its promising inter-organizational potentials and despite its rather successful cooperation with two African standby brigades, SHIRBRIG faced severe challenges in its relationship with the United Nations peacekeeping system as well as from the changing organizational preferences of its very own member-nations, who increasingly turned their attention and resources towards NATO and the EU Battlegroups. The rise and eventual fall of SHIRBRIG not only serves as a strong reminder of the persistent difficulties in establishing and maintaining a permanent and lasting multinational UN peacekeeping and crisis management capacity, but it also highlights the limits of a truly effective and coherent inter-organizationalism amongst the major international organizations that have become active in the field of peace and security. Yet, SHIRBRIG’s support to the African Standby Force and SHIRBRIG’s successful cooperation schemes with the Eastern Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) also proved the precise opposite: the opportunities of mutually empowering coordination and collaboration between military organizations and the long-term potentials of fostering an inter-organizational network of peacekeeping actors.

1. Inter-organizational Dimensions of SHIRBRIG’s Core Activities

From the very beginning, SHIRBRIG’s deployments and activities involved and required a high degree of cooperation with other international actors and regional security organizations. This section briefly outlines the brigade’s core activities as well as their inter-organizational dimensions and potentials.

Between 2000 and 2005, SHIRBRIG led, or participated in, five UN peacekeeping operations.[1] In the context of UNMEE (the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea), SHIRBRIG undertook its largest peacekeeping deployment. Between November 2000 and June 2001, it contributed approximately 1,300 troops and provided the mission headquarters. Furthermore, SHIRBRIG’s Commander, Brigadier-General Patrick Cammaert at the time, was appointed as the overall commander.

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Force Commander for the UNMEE mission. SHIRBRIG’s participation required extensive overall coordination and cooperation with the DPKO. Yet, the fact that SHIRBRIG’s member nations could not agree on keeping up with their troop commitments required for sending the entire brigade (5,000 troops) left a bitter aftertaste and dampened some of the euphoria that had surrounded the official opening of SHIRBRIG’s headquarters by Kofi Annan in 1997. In fact, UNMEE remained the organization’s first and last major peacekeeping deployment.

Thus, in contrast to UNMEE, SHIRBRIG’s participation in the other four operations was of a more technical nature, involving mainly the core group of senior officers at the brigade’s Planning Element in Denmark. Their tasks ranged from planning assistance for both the DPKO and regional organizations, to the provision of interim mission headquarters in the crucial start-up phase of several peacekeeping operations in Africa. As a result, from February to March 2003, and in response to a formal request from the DPKO, SHIRBRIG’s Planning Element cooperated closely with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and provided planning assistance for the envisaged UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI).[1] Half a year later, the DPKO asked SHIRBRIG’s Planning Element once again to assist ECOWAS in setting up an interim force headquarters, which was to serve as the core headquarters for the newly established United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). Furthermore, SHIRBRIG was tasked by New York to provide planning and technical assistance as well as “forward support” for the United Nations Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS) between July 2004 and February 2005. UNAMIS prepared the ground for the eventual UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) in which SHIRBRIG once again assisted the DPKO in operational planning and for which the Planning Element provided the initial nucleus of the mission’s overall Force Headquarters as well as a Joint Military Coordination Office. Furthermore, SHIRBRIG’s Commander and Chief of staff served as UNMIS’ Deputy Force Commander and UNMIS’ Chief of Staff respectively.

This brief overview underscores the distinctly inter-organizational nature of SHIRBRIG’s involvement in UN-led peacekeeping activities, involving not only close cooperation with the DPKO, but also with regional organizations and political actors in Africa. In addition to these peacekeeping activities, the senior officers of SHIRBRIG’s Planning Element became since 2003 increasingly and extensively involved in inter-organizational capacity-building schemes in the context of the African Union’s efforts to establish the African Standby Force (ASF). Explicitly modelled on the example of SHIRBRIG, the aim of the ASF is to create five

[1] UNOCI was finally established in April 2004, replacing the political UN Mission (MINUCI). UNOCI is still ongoing.
Effective inter-organizationalism?

regional, multinational and rapidly deployable standby brigades — similar to SHIRBRIG in both purpose and design. Indeed, the African Union’s founding “Policy Framework” Document for the establishment of the core institutions of the ASF scheme stresses that

“the SHIRBRIG concept acts as a very good model for the sub-regional standby brigade groups recommended by the ACDS [African Chiefs of Defence Staff] and endorsed by African Member states.”[1]

As a consequence, SHIRBRIG was approached in particular by the senior staff of EASBRIG (Eastern Africa Standby Brigade) and ECOBRIG (ECOWAS’ West African Brigade) with a request for collaboration in the build-up and development of both brigades. The inter-organizational potentials and opportunities were regarded by all sides as very promising indeed. It was hoped that “eventually more ‘regional SHIRBRIGs’ would be available and [that] a network of training and know-how transfer could be established”. [2] This, it was hoped, could in the near future facilitate the practice of hybrid peacekeeping operations (where the United Nations and the African Union’s ASF would carry out joint mission) and increase the coherence and effectiveness of envisaged SHIRBRIG-ASF co-deployments. The ultimate aim was thus not only the speedy construction of Africa’s own military tools, but also the formation of, as Kofi Annan put it, an “interlocking system of peacekeeping capacities” between the UN, Western powers and regional organizations, particularly in Africa.[3] In this light, the European Union (EU) also expressed its interest in cooperating with SHIRBRIG in the early stages of developing its Battlegroups scheme in 2004. Close cooperation with SHIRBRIG would have also been in line with the EU’s inter-organizational concept of “effective multilateralism”, which emphasized the strengthening of the United Nations, African Union and other international organizations as the EU’s core foreign policy priorities.[4]


However, despite these considerable potentials, the lessons learned from SHIRBRIG’s inter-organizational relations in practice paint an altogether more sobering picture — both for effective inter-organizationalism in peacekeeping and military crisis management and, indeed, for SHIRBRIG’s future itself.

2. SHIRBRIG’S INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED NATIONS
DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

The relationship between SHIRBRIG and the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations was not only the most important one — having been the fundamental and central feature of SHIRBRIG’s concept as a brigade solely dedicated to rapid reaction UN Peacekeeping — but, it also turned out to be the most complicated and problematic one. In 1997, the UN Secretariat and the DPKO both enthusiastically embraced the idea of a highly trained peacekeeping brigade on standby, regarding it as a solution to the UN’s core problem of generating and swiftly deploying desperately needed troops. However, after SHIRBRIG’s partial deployment to the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea, it became increasingly clear that the brigade’s member states were unable or unwilling to actually provide the troops and resources they had pledged.[1] Furthermore, the member states also became more reluctant in general to commit their troops to UN-led operations, focussing instead on alternative organizations, such as the European Union or NATO.[2] Faced with these short-comings, the senior officers of the Planning Element at SHIRBRIG’s permanent headquarters placed greater emphasis on planning assistance and capacity-building activities. Even though it was initially the DPKO that requested SHIRBRIG’s planning assistance in the context of the missions UNOCI in 2003 as well as UNAMIS and UNMIS from 2004 to 2005, SHIRBRIG’s continued focus on planning assistance was increasingly perceived as an encroachment on the DPKO’s field of competence and led to bizarre inter-organizational rivalries at a time when the demand for the rare capacities of both organizations were in more demand than ever.

More damaging than those prestige rivalries, however, was the fact that the SHIRBRIG-DPKO relationship suffered from in-built institutional deficiencies. When the brigade was set up, little thought was spent on how to structure the inter-organizational channels for permanent SHIRBRIG-DPKO communication.


[2]  On this aspect, see also Thierry TARDY’s contribution to this volume.
and cooperation in the most effective way. The so-called SHIRBRIG “Contact Group”, which was officially tasked with performing this function, merely consisted of the ambassadors and military advisers of the national permanent representations to the UN of the SHIRBRIG member states. Since the member states did not commit additional staff to their permanent representations for dealing with SHIRBRIG matters, the SHIRBRIG-DPKO relationship lacked an effective liaison and inter-linkage mechanism. Rather tellingly, a proposal for establishing a permanent SHIRBRIG liaison officer at the DPKO — first suggested as early as October 1999 — was persistently vetoed by member nations who feared an encroachment on the role of the national officials at their respective permanent representations. National preferences and sensitivities, as is so often the case in inter-organizational relations, certainly trumped growing concerns about ineffectiveness and inefficiency. Yet, SHIRBRIG’s past experience has also forcefully shown that a competent individual — familiar with both UN Peacekeeping and SHIRBRIG — can make all the difference. After all, the “golden period” of effective and productive SHIRBRIG-DPKO relations was from 2002 to 2005, when SHIRBRIG’s former Commander, Major-General Patrick Cammaert, held the influential post of Military Adviser at the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. In terms of inter-organizational theory, this example also underscores the so-called “alumni effect”: this assumes that cooperation between two organizations becomes significantly facilitated when the leader of one organization has a firm understanding of the partner organization, due to having been an “alumni” of the partner organizations – i.e., due to having held a senior position at the partner organization before.[1]

However, even if the institutional deficiencies would have been addressed in a satisfactory manner, the SHIRBRIG-UN relationship faced opposition from many corners from the start. As a rather bad omen, shortly after SHIRBRIG was created, a peacekeeping working group of the Non-Aligned Movement in the UN General Assembly voiced its opposition to the initiative, fearing that it merely represented a Western coalition that would both monopolize and polarize UN peacekeeping. Instead of considering to join SHIRBRIG, the member nations of the working group instead requested that any reference to the “United Nations” should be dropped from SHIRBRIG’s name and official documents.[2] This also serves as a strong reminder that effective inter-organizational collaboration depends not


only on appropriate institutional cooperation channels, political will by national
governments and the avoidance of prestige rivalries, but also on the facilitation of
an integrative consensus between the extreme positions and interest groups within
each partner organization.

3. SHIRBRIG’S INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONS WITH AFRICAN
SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS

In contrast to its complex and at times rather tense relationship with the UN
DPKO, SHIRBRIG’s cooperation with ECOWAS and the Eastern Africa Standby
Brigade can be seen as an example of effective and mutually empowering inter-
organizationalism.

3.1. Cooperation with ECOWAS / ECOBRIG

SHIRBRIG’s first point of contact with the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) was in spring 2003, in the context of the preparations for the
United Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI). SHIRBRIG was tasked with providing
operational planning assistance to ECOWAS and with facilitating a smooth transi-
tion from the existing political UN Mission (MINUCI) to the complex UNOCI
mission. Within less than three weeks of the request, a small SHIRBRIG planning
team arrived in February 2003 in Abuja and liaised with senior officers from the
ECOWAS headquarters. The clearly identified tasks and the relatively small number
of involved officers greatly facilitated the level of effectiveness of the cooperation.
Joint groups of ECOWAS and SHIRBRIG officers identified key challenges and
operational requirements. Within ten days, the planning documents were final-
ized and handed over to ECOWAS. The intense interaction also increased mutual
organizational awareness and understandings, which laid an important basis for
the following instance of ECOWAS-SHIRBRIG collaboration in the context the
United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). In September 2003, SHIRBRIG
deployed a team of 17 officers to assist ECOWAS’ Monitoring Group (ECO-
MOG) in setting up the mission’s interim headquarters. This further deepened
their inter-organizational relationship, leading to SHIRBRIG’s eventual support
to the build-up of ECOWAS’ Standby Brigade (ECOBRIG) in the framework of
the African Standby Force. An important prerequisite for the relatively successful
inter-organizational cooperation were a certain level of “gradual incrementalism”
in terms of both the scope and difficulty of each succeeding inter-organizational
project. The comparatively straightforward task of operational planning for UNOCI
allowed both parties to become familiarized with each others’ working methods and organizational peculiarities, before embarking on the more demanding inter-organizational projects of setting-up an interim headquarter and of long-term capacity-building cooperation.

### 3.2. Cooperation with EASBRIG

SHIRBRIG’s Capacity-Building support, provided to the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG), can be seen as its most extensive and most promising inter-organizational project.\(^1\) Having identified SHIRBRIG as a useful organizational model and institutional blueprint, EASBRIG officers approached SHIRBRIG’s Planning Element in 2003 with a request for cooperation. In this light, the beginning of the SHIRBRIG-EASBRIG cooperation scheme can be seen as a perfect example of what the organization scholars Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell have referred to as *mimetic institutional isomorphism*: the tendency of organizations to become similar through, in this case, the process of one organization modelling itself on the institutional set-up of another organization.\(^2\) A certain level of similarity, it was hoped, could also facilitate future SHIRBRIG-EASBRIG co-deployments in the field. In 2004, SHIRBRIG Planning Element officers launched a comprehensive scheme for transferring their peacekeeping and planning experience to EASBRIG, and for providing advice on developing common operational standards, procedures and training. A particular successful aspect of SHIRBRIG’s inter-organizational approach was the full integration of EASBRIG “visiting officers”. For up to 6 months, these officers were fully integrated into SHIRBRIG’s permanent headquarters in Denmark. This allowed for intensive collaboration, training and knowledge transfer.\(^3\) A key draw-back, however, was the high frequency of EASBRIG’s staff rotation and turn-over, making long-term planning difficult and, on many occasions, forcing SHIRBRIG officers to repeat the training cycle with every major turnover within EASBRIG. Nevertheless, during the 5 years of SHIRBRIG-EASBRIG relations a substantial and promising knowledge transfer took place, which contributed considerably to the build-up of EASBRIG’s capacities and institutional structures. In many ways, SHIRBRIG-EASBRIG inter-organizationalism had a “mutually empowering” effect: whilst EASBRIG benefited from the know-

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\(^1\) See also Christof Tatsch’s article in this volume.


\(^3\) See Christof Tatsch’s contribution below for more details.
how and expertise of its partner, SHIRBRIG benefited from the partnership by gaining further legitimacy and a reputation amongst military experts and African observers as an effective capacity-builder. Hence, the SHIRBRIG-EASBRIG relationship provided a leading example for opportunities and potentials of effective inter-organizational cooperation schemes.

4. CONCLUSION

SHIRBRIG’s relations with its major partners provided some rather unexpected lessons. Whilst it encountered a wide range of severe and, in the end, insurmountable difficulties where it was least expected, namely in its relationship with the UN’s DPKO, there was also astonishing progress where impasses would have seemed most likely, namely in its African Capacity-Building scheme. SHIRBRIG’s relationship with ECOWAS and EASBRIG revealed the substantial potentials for contributing to the formation of an effective network of international organizations in the field of peace-keeping and rapid military crisis management.

In the end, however, the inter-organizational successes of SHIRBRIG’s African Capacity-Building could not mask the organization’s growing failure to fulfil its original goal: to provide the UN with a readily available and rapidly deployable brigade. The unwillingness on part of the brigade’s core members to provide the necessary resources and political will to actually contribute the troops they had formally pledged meant the end of a flawed, but unique and valuable peacekeeping organization and inter-organizational capacity-builder.
SHIRBRIG’S SUPPORT TO THE AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE: A VIEW FROM PRACTICE

Christof Tatschl *

Since its creation in 1996 until its closure in 2009, the Standby High Readiness Brigade for United Nations Operations (SHIRBRIG) concentrated its main peacekeeping focus and core activities on the African continent. In actual fact, the main motivation of the founding member states was to ensure that the UN’s humiliation and the shameful inaction of the “international community” in the early 1990s, particularly in the context of the Rwandan genocide, was not to be repeated. As a result, SHIRBRIG did not only conduct and/or participate in vital peacekeeping operations in Ethiopia/Eritrea, Liberia, the Ivory Coast, Sudan and the Tchad/ Central African Republic, but more recently, SHIRBRIG has also been extensively involved in supporting the African Standby Force.

In the following article I will outline and analyze some of the key features, problems and successes of SHIRBRIG’s African Capacity-Building (ACB) initiative. Close cooperation with the ECOWAS Standby Brigade (ECOBRIG, set-up by the Economic Community of West African States) on the one hand and, more intensively, with the Eastern African Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) on the other has been at the core of SHIRBRIG’s ACB scheme. Despite several challenges, the remarkable progress made so far highlights the potential and importance of inter-organizational military partnerships for advancing peace and security in Africa in the long-run. In this light, the decision by the member states to close down SHIRBRIG in June 2009 will unfortunately also terminate one of the most valuable and effective Western contributions to the strengthening of the African Peace and Security Architecture.

1. THE ORIGINS OF SHIRBRIG’S AFRICAN CAPACITY-BUILDING (ACB) INITIATIVE

SHIRBRIG’s involvement with two of the five regional brigades of the African Standby Force (ASF) was initiated in 2003 by a cooperation request from the Eastern African Standby Brigade (EASBRIG). As the ASF framework itself was explicitly

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modelled on the SHIRBRIG concept, EASBRIG’s military leadership contacted SHIRBRIG’s Planning Element in order to establish a formal relationship.

After several visits, the Commander of EASBRIG sent two officers for half a year to SHIRBRIG’s Headquarters in Denmark. SHIRBRIG’s Planning Element integrated these officers in the staff structure and included them in all training and exercise activities. This was the first step towards establishing a common basis, mutual trust and cooperation.

After this successful precedent, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) followed the example of EASBRIG and approached SHIRBRIG a few months later with the aim of establishing similar links.

After this “initiating and the integration phase”, SHIRBRIG and its partner organizations focussed on selecting and institutionalising concrete projects where both organizations could work together. The SHIRBRIG leadership was convinced that only a close, practically relevant cooperation — where SHIRBRIG and EASBRIG officers were working on the same level and were pursuing the same objectives — could eventually lead to sustainable success. Consequently it was decided to support EASBRIG and ECOBRIG by providing training, guidance and technical advice on a wide range of peacekeeping and rapid intervention issues.\(^1\)

### 2. SHIRBRIG’S AFRICAN CAPACITY-BUILDING: TOWARDS PEACE AND SECURITY THROUGH GENUINE PARTNERSHIP

Africa remains a crisis hotspot. This is also highlighted by the fact that almost half of all the current UN-missions is operating on the African continent. It is very unlikely that this need for international commitment and engagement is going to decrease in the near future. The UN-member nations had, and continue to have, significant problems in matching the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations’ (DPKO) requests for troop contributions — both in terms of quality and quantity.

The African Union’s (AU) initiative to build brigade-size multinational regional brigades, which are able to intervene in African conflicts at a very early stage, is a promising step towards self-sufficiency and increased security in Africa. Experience has shown time and time again that even relatively small forces — if they react

\(^1\) In addition, the CIMIC (Civil Military Cooperation) Start-up Kit project which as well has the potential to serve as a pilot project for other future projects was added.
quickly — can make a huge difference. If this initiative will actually bear fruits, the AU will be able to deal with conflicts at a very early point of time. This ability will help to avoid a lot of human suffering and economic devastation in the future. The expected increase of security will significantly enhance the development of Africa and its crisis-shaken regions. In short, Africa will be able to shed its dependence on the good will and the military resources of non-African nations for dealing with African conflicts. On the other hand, non-African nations will cease to find themselves compelled to stretch their resources for dealing with African problems.

Getting more and more involved in the African Capacity-Building business, it was time to develop a coherent SHIRBRIG ACB vision and concept. The guiding fundamental principle for the programme was already obvious: SHIRBRIG wanted to transfer its knowledge and expertise to its African partners in order to further their ability to “help themselves”.

It needs to be kept in mind that SHIRBRIG was created to act as a rapidly deployable peacekeeping force world-wide — just in the same way as the African Standby Force is expected to act on the African continent. This match made SHIRBRIG a useful model for the development of the ASF brigades and provided an important basis for a solid military partnership.

Since 2004, SHIRBRIG officers used their common standards and procedure for supporting the development of EASBRIG’s and ECOBRIG’s procedures, guidelines and principles. This common conceptual basis, the similarity of set-up and purpose and the close cooperation scheme also provided a good basis for the possibility of combined future deployments of the regional ASF brigades alongside SHIRBRIG in a UN peacekeeping operation.

In order to strengthen SHIRBRIG-ASF compatibility and in order to support the development of the ASF itself, SHIRBRIG officers were sent to EASBRIG’s Planning Element in order to act as facilitators and mentors. During the last five years of cooperation, practical and conceptual collaboration has increased and the extent of mutual understanding and trust has reached a very high level indeed. During exercises, we invited staff-officers from our partner organizations to fully participate; due to their high skills and the growing conceptual coherence they could easily and quickly be integrated into the SHIRBRIG staff. This made the eventual goal of a possible combined SHIRBRIG-ASF deployment increasingly achievable.
3. CHALLENGES AND SUCCESSES OF SHIRBRIG’S MAIN ACB ACTIVITIES

The main focus of SHIRBRIG’s inter-organizational African Capacity-Building initiative was placed on ECOBRIG and EASBRIG. Both regional brigades are making substantial progress, even though their goal of reaching initial operational capability in 2010 might turn out to be over-ambitious. Nevertheless, the advances made by both brigades are truly impressive.

In November 2008, EASBRIG conducted its first Command Post Exercise (CPX). The SHIRBRIG team was involved in the planning and executing of this exercise in a decisive role. Adjusted to actual needs, we supported EASBRIG with developing standard procedures and the scripting of the needed exercise documents. During the exercise, the SHIRBRIG team was acting in a supporting role for the exercise control structure.

ECOBRIG plans to conduct its first Field Training Exercise (FTX) with the focus on their logistic capabilities this summer. Supporting this project, SHIRBRIG will mainly contribute with expertise in the logistics field.

SHIRBRIG support has so far always been requested for areas that require hands-on, technical expertise that cannot be covered by other external supporting agencies. This way of operating requires a high amount of adaptability and flexibility from us, but definitely supports our partners exactly where and when they need it.

Indeed, when I visited the headquarters of our ASF-partners for the very first time, I was struck by the sheer number of other external organizations and advisers that are involved in supporting the ASF scheme. Yet, SHIRBRIG has established itself as one of the most valued partners and enablers. Its high reputation has hardly been based on the financial resources it could offer. Nations like the USA, Great Britain, France, Germany and others have been providing significant budgetary support and have well-paid liaison officers and support elements on the ground. SHIRBRIG, in turn, had a very limited and modest ACB-budget that just about covered the bare necessities. Money is the basis of all operational progress and impactful support activities, but obviously it does not do the trick alone. If money fails to be linked properly to a well-tuned support programme it might even develop adverse effects.

Our experience has clearly shown that the key of our successful cooperation scheme has been our expertise and our effective knowledge transfer to our African partners. This seems like an easy enough task, but several factors made the knowledge transfer process more complicated and challenging than expected.
Due to the traumatising experience of colonial rule, due to the failures of the international community and the United Nations to effectively stop African conflicts during the 1990s, and due to the renaissance of neo-colonial interest in African resources from all sides of the globe, some African partners have developed a certain level of caution and scepticism towards external “advisers”. Hence, cultural awareness and respect for the partners are of highest importance. In my experience, if somebody drives a hidden agenda or feigns respect and understanding, he will be unmasked and will never be able to gain the necessary trust for an effective cooperation again.

In this respect, SHIRBRIG certainly had all the necessary characteristics for success. It was perceived as neutral (due to the absence of “great powers” among its members), had no hidden agenda, no material interest and no missionary objectives. Furthermore, SHIRBRIG had no major financial resources to distribute, which avoided any kind of unequal rich-donor or poor-receiver relationship. Most importantly, an essential precondition for building mutual trust and confidence easier and faster than other organizations was that SHIRBRIG had no colonial history and no hidden neo-colonial agenda.

SHIRBRIG officers who had volunteered to work in the African environment showed patience, confidence and respect for their African partners. The personnel did not act like teachers or leaders but like partners, sitting in the same boat or indeed hiking through the jungle, searching for the best way out. Persons have to be open-minded to accept unconventional solutions and to learn from their counterparts. It is crucial to accept the fact that one has to find an appropriate and carefully customized way to success. Even if, in one’s opinion, the supported pace is too slow, one has to adapt to the situation. From time to time when the development lags behind and targets are not yet met, mentors are tempted to take the lead and take over complete control in order to achieve faster success. If supporters are not able to adjust to the situation and give in to the temptation of taking over responsibility, which actually has to stay with the supported organizations, they will jeopardize a true partnership by reverting to an unhealthy top-down relationship. This does not mean that the capacity-builder is obliged to continuously adapt the objectives. On the contrary the objective has to stay firm, but the way how to reach it must stay flexible in order to be able to come to terms with unforeseen challenges. Reasons for failures and not reaching interim-objectives have to be clearly and openly discussed and plans have to be adapted by the responsible persons accordingly. The feedback and discussion process, which requires experience cultural and social skills, is an important part of the inter-organizational knowledge transfer.
In my experience, the knowledge transfer does not work in a teacher—pupil relationship. Due to different life-experience, diverse professional and cultural backgrounds and language problems you cannot assume that everything you teach and say will be received how it was meant to be understood. The only successful way is to try to act as a role model and as an inspiring example: it is important to work side by side through the given tasks — just in the same way as it would be the case during a common mission deployment. If you really want to help, you actually have to leave the comfortable “top-down position”. This means that the capacity-builder has to put his own ego and feeling of self-importance aside, that he should not shy away from getting his hands dirty himself and that he continuously transfers his expertise and knowledge effectively.

SHIRBRIG as a whole was highly suitable for working with the regional ASFs. In the course of the ACB scheme, EASBRIG more and more became an “intelligent mirror” of SHIRBRIG. As an intelligent mirror they copied the well-functioning areas, adapted them and actually enhanced and improved others. This similarity and the common standard procedures allowed SHIRBRIG to support and cooperate in a very effective way. The permanent Planning Element of SHIRBRIG comprised officers with high experience and professional skills in all fields. Moreover, if the permanent staff could not offer the requested expertise or skills, SHIRBRIG could rely on the non-permanent part of the staff which offers the knowledge, expertise and professional skills of a further group of approximately 80 officers from SHIRBRIG’s member nations. These high-quality resources made it possible to cover all demands in a highly sufficient way. Furthermore, these non-permanents, being available like a reserve, allowed us to react in a very adaptive and cost-efficient way. Other organizations or nations working in the same field have often only one single person on the spot. He has to coordinate with others and will not be able to cover all fields.

SHIRBRIG as a single organization, which had the expertise to cover the development support needed in all fields, was able to approach the supporting task in a very organized and planned way. The availability of a complete staff organization meant a clear advantage for SHIRBRIG. Yet, SHIRBRIG’s inter-organizational deficiency was the lack of a liaison officer, permanently co-located at our partners’ headquarters. This hampered the information flow and made us dependent on the goodwill of others. Especially in the African environment, where the likeliness of changes is high, the lack of direct liaison mechanisms generated some frictions and clear disadvantages.
4. CONCLUSION

It is not new that enterprises, governmental and non-governmental organizations have realized that knowledge is the means of the production of highest value today. The tough competition on the free market on the commercial side and the more and more limited public financial resources on the public side make knowledge exchange a must for all kinds of organizations. This is particularly true for organizations that are active in the field of military crisis management and capacity-building, especially on the African continent.

The precondition for effective cooperation between organizations operating in this special field is to develop a truly equal inter-organizational partnership. Mutual respect, trust, neutrality (on part of the external supporting party) and common goals are the foundations for productive cooperation between organizations. It is hard work over a long time to reach the required level of quality of collaboration, but in the end, a mutually beneficial relationship will not only strengthen each partner organization’s capacities, but it will also reinforce the overall prospects for peace and security in Africa itself.

SHIRBRIG has provided, according to numerous academic observers, military experts and our partners themselves, vital contributions to the build-up of the African Standby Force by replicating itself as a model, by transferring its knowledge and by diligently and effectively working with its partners. The ill-conceived and hasty closure of SHIRBRIG in June 2009 will not only represent a regrettable blow to the international struggle for equipping the UN with the well-trained and rapidly deployable troops it desperately needs, but it will also leave behind a considerable gap in the efforts to support the promising build-up of the African Peace and Security Architecture. It remains my strongest hope that the five African Standby Brigades will outlive SHIRBRIG’s all too short existence by many decades to come, until the very need for military intervention will hopefully have become obsolete itself.
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Military crisis management: The challenge of inter-organizationalism

edited by Joachim A. KOOPS