The Foreign Policy of the European Union

Stephan Keukeleire
and
Jennifer MacNaughtan
Chapter 1

The Context and Nature of EU Foreign Policy

This book takes three questions as its point of departure. At the start of the 21st century, the international system is a very different place to a 20th century shaped by two World Wars and Cold War bipolarity. Add to this the increasing scope, depth and impact of globalization and we come to our first question: what is the context in which EU foreign policy operates? The conceptualization and study of foreign policy needs to evolve in line with our understanding of the context in which foreign policy operates. If the world is a different place, it is clear that analysis of foreign policy can no longer be based on the conventional state and (military) power-centred concept of foreign policy inherited from a previous era. Any analysis of EU foreign policy must then tackle a second question: what is foreign policy? Once we have understood the context which shapes foreign policy and what foreign policy thus looks like today, we can then turn to the particular case of the EU. The third question is: what is the nature of EU foreign policy? This chapter formulates an answer to these preliminary questions, points to the major themes of the book and develops a conceptual framework to facilitate the analysis of EU foreign policy in its 21st-century setting.

The changing context of EU foreign policy

The 20th-century context

Traditionally, foreign policy is considered to be one of the central tasks, prerogatives and even raison d’être of sovereign states. Through their foreign policy, states define and manage their relationships with each other, defend their security and territorial integrity, and promote their national interests. This conventional view, based on the Westphalian order, was shaped by the ‘hard’ security context of the 20th century. Military confrontation with Germany in the first half of the century and the Cold War with the Soviet Union in the second were at the heart of the foreign policy of the day. The consequence of this continuous struggle for survival was an image of foreign policy rooted in the role of strong states, the existence of military threats from other states and the consequent need to maintain a robust military capability as the core foreign policy instrument. The touchstone of foreign policy became the ability to prevail in military conflict and to use military power to safeguard interests and security.

This context and dominant foreign policy concept heavily influenced European integration and the position of foreign policy therein. It also gave rise to a number of areas of tension which are crucial to understanding the evolution and nature of EU foreign policy. Presented schematically in Figure 1.1 and explained in detail below, these different loci of tension have a major impact not only on the macropicture of EU foreign policy’s evolution but also on the micropicture of responses to specific foreign policy dossiers.

European integration versus Atlantic solidarity

The Soviet threat, Western European military weakness and American military superiority meant that for most member
The Atlantic Alliance and the American security guarantee were the essential prerequisites for security after World War II. The logic of such a choice was confirmed in the early 1950s and 1960s by the failure of French proposals to bring defence within the scope of European integration (the European Defence Community and the Fouchet plans). Initial attempts to develop a European foreign policy through the European Community (EC) and European Political Cooperation (EPC) seemed largely irrelevant next to NATO, since it was NATO that was tackling the main foreign policy concern of the time: the Cold War. It also explains why, when the EC member states cautiously stepped towards developing common foreign policy initiatives in the 1970s, the EC/EPC was conceived and defined as a civilian actor.

East-West confrontation and military dependence on the US not only determined defence policy, but also largely defined the parameters of member states' national foreign policies and EPC. Until the end of the Cold War, foreign policy actions were largely to remain within the constraints of a world structured around the dividing lines of this contest. As has continued to be the case after 1989, depending on an external actor for military security carries a fairly sizeable price tag since the demands of that protector must be taken into account when taking a stand on foreign policy issues. Practically every proposal for a common foreign policy initiative was, and is, reviewed by several member states against what we might call the 'what do the Americans think?' test. The appropriateness and feasibility of an EU foreign policy initiative became measured not solely, or not in the first place, in terms of the EU's potential impact on the issue at hand, but rather in terms of its impact on transatlantic relations. The extent to which the 'Atlantic factor' had to be taken into account would prove to be one of the most divisive issues in the development of a common EU foreign policy. This tension of 'Atlantic solidarity versus European integration' is a first recurrent theme in this book.

Civilian power versus military power
The EC/EPC developed from the early 1970s as a civilian power. The concept of 'civilian power' (Duchêne 1972, 1973) was one of the first and most influential attempts to conceptualize (Western) Europe's status and role in the world and has since been widely elaborated. Duchêne's conception revolved around three principal hypotheses. Firstly, it referred to the transformation of interstate relations within Europe from war and indirect violence towards 'civilized' politics. The EU's recent enlargements demonstrate the ongoing relevance of this point, which also provides an interesting formula for troubled interstate relations elsewhere. Secondly, the civilian power concept focused on the possibility of an actor being a 'power' whilst not possessing military instruments. It is this part of Duchêne's thesis which has received widest attention. From a normative perspective, this enabled the EU's endeavours on the international stage to be conceived in a non-threatening (and thus positive) light. Thirdly, Duchêne considered the role a civilian power could aspire to play. He noted that in a world where security policies were increasingly concerned with interdependence and shaping the international milieu, a civilian power's potential for constructive intervention was significant.

The dominance of the US in the military security arena left the EC/EPC with little other option than to maximize its potential impact as a civilian power. Any contemplation of branching into the 'hard' domain of military power lost relevance when measured against the American military goliath. However, the constraints of being a civilian power in a distinctly uncivil world became painfully obvious during and since the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia of the 1990s. This tension of 'civilian power versus military power' is a second recurrent theme in this book.

Intergovernmental versus Community approaches
Since foreign policy was understood to be a core task of the state, EPC was launched in the 1970s as a purely intergovernmental affair. Intergovernmentalism would equally become one of the defining features of the CFSP, as confirmed in the creation of a separate intergovernmental pillar in the Maastricht Treaty. Member states retained control over decision-making through the dominant unanimity rule in this second pillar. EPC/CFSP were thus formally separated from the EC framework and its Community method, based on an institutional equilibrium between the Council of Ministers, the Commission, the European Parliament and the Court of Justice, and on majority voting for a range of decisions in the Council. The Community method would itself be confined to the first pillar by the
Maastricht Treaty’s institutional construct. The price member states paid for ensuring that the EC’s institutions in Brussels would not meddle in EPC/CFSP was that these policies would not be supported by established institutional mechanisms or by common instruments.

This weakness of EPC/CFSP was made more explicit as its development was paralleled by the growing foreign policy relevance of EC policies (in particular trade policy, development cooperation and association and cooperation agreements) and of the EC mechanism and Community method (with a well-elaborated institutional set-up, significant competences and extensive instruments). EPC/CFSP was often forced to rely on the EC to flesh out or implement its decisions. However, more fundamentally, the EC through its various ‘external policies’ was gradually developing its own unspoken foreign policy dynamic.

Member states differ on where they envisage the appropriate balance between intergovernmentalism and the Community method to lie in foreign policy. This depends not in the first place on considerations of efficiency or cost–benefit analysis but rather on their overarching view of the nature and finalité of European integration. Member states also assess the viability of a potential EU foreign policy initiative in terms of whether it fits within their own conception of European integration. Foreign policy debates in the EU are thus likely to focus beyond the issue at hand, to broader questions of defining policy competences between the EU institutions and between the national and the EU levels. This tension ‘EPC/CFSP versus EC’ and ‘intergovernmental versus Community approach’ is a third recurrent theme in this book.

External objectives versus interrelational, integration and identity objectives

Following the harrowing experiences of two World Wars, France, West Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries launched the European integration process as a radically new method to definitively tackle long-standing enmity between Germany and its Western European neighbours. European integration provided the answer to the security dilemma posed by a European order shaped by the Westphalian system of sovereign, and thus unrestrained, states. Member states were offered a new framework in which to define and manage their mutual relationships and to defend and promote national interests in a less threatening way. Mutual oversight was designed to resolve, or at least contain, the tensions and conflicts arising between member states, enhancing the predictability of behaviour and promoting mutual understanding. In short, European integration was also created to serve as an instrument of interrelational foreign policy, a function which remains essential to the present day.

The interrelational dimension of European integration has important, but underplayed, implications for the analysis of EU foreign policy. It implies that the EU’s foreign policy and specific foreign policy actions do not always aim to influence the external world (external objectives), but could have the management of internal EU relations as their principal goal. Conversely, it can also imply that member states agree not to handle a foreign policy issue within the EU framework out of fear that this would revive mutual tensions and augment internal disagreement and distrust. Thus, in some instances, member states do not measure the effectiveness of an EU foreign policy initiative against its external impact, but rather against its internal impact.

In addition to interrelational objectives, foreign policy initiatives can stem from two further types of objective over and above external goals. Firstly, member states can promote or adopt new foreign policy initiatives which primarily aim to strengthen European integration or influence the nature of the European project (integration objectives). Secondly, member states’ main goal can be to emphasise the specificity of the European approach to international politics, to differentiate the EU from other actors (particularly the US) and to strengthen European identity (identity objectives).

To sum up, in order to understand EU foreign policy we must appreciate that decisions on EU foreign policy are often not only steered by external objectives (aimed at influencing the external environment), but also by various internal objectives: interrelational objectives (aimed at managing member states’ mutual relations), integration objectives (aimed at strengthening or influencing European integration) and identity objectives (aimed at asserting the identity of the EU). The extent to which a member state will give different weight to these types of interest will vary over time and according to the issue at hand. These different types of objective also help to explain divergences in the levels of expectation of political leaders, the general public and the rest of the world; the general public and external actors evaluate EU foreign
policy in terms of its external impact whereas political leaders may be operating according to an entirely different agenda. This tension between the external objectives and the various internal objectives of EU foreign policy is a fourth recurrent theme in this book.

The post-Cold War context

With the conclusion of the all-encompassing global contest between the US and the USSR, and between capitalism and Communism, a period of East-West geopolitical ‘order’ also came to its end. During the Cold War, both superpowers controlled those parts of the world within their respective spheres of influence. This order was achieved through the containment or suppression of latent or manifest conflicts and destabilizing factors. Support was provided to allied governments to maintain order within their territory. A stabilizing impact was even exerted on neutral or non-aligned countries. With the end of the Soviet empire and the East-West confrontation, this ‘stabilizing’ influence disappeared and previously ignored conflicts came to the fore. The world became characterized by the emergence, or re-emergence, of regional or intrastate conflicts between ethnic, religious, political or (para)military groups as they struggled for power, territory, wealth, independence or recognition (SIPRI 2002). The consequences of this new context for EU foreign policy and for foreign policy in general are several. The need to structure and stabilize other regions in the world moved up the agenda and the nature of conflicts and threats changed. New types of military capability became necessary, as did a wider range of non-military instruments.

The need to create new structures

For EU foreign policy, a first implication of the changed context was its new responsibility for supporting and steering an alternative order in Central and Eastern Europe by developing new political, legal, economic and security structures (with the military security structure being tackled by NATO). On a less ambitious level, the EU also sought to elaborate upon or introduce new rules of the game and new structures in other regions of the world through its association and cooperation agreements and development policies, and through an increased use of conditionality and support measures.

That foreign policy needed to focus more on structures became clear in the aftermath of war in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. These crises demonstrated that wielding military force alone would result in neither lasting peace nor long-term stability. Rather, in the post-war stage, the creation of viable and sustainable political, legal, socio-economic and security structures within states and in the relationships between states was of equal importance. Chapters 8 and 10 assess the mixed results of these policies.

At the start of the new millennium, the need to rethink existing structures also emerged on a global level. Non-Western countries no longer uncritically accepted the international economic order. The status quo of an almost exclusively Western-determined international financial architecture was increasingly challenged by a coalition of developing countries finding, and exercising, their voice. Meanwhile, the dominance of Western values and the almost unbounded expression of Western norms were confronted by anti-Western fundamentalist movements. The EU and its member states, to a greater extent than the US, emphasized the need to respond to demands from southern countries and to tackle the so-called ‘root-causes’ of terrorism and jihadist fundamentalism. However, as we show in Chapter 11, the EU has been reluctant actually to use its power to transform criticized international structures. The extent to which it has focused on shaping national, regional and global structures in the conduct of foreign policy is a fifth recurrent theme in this book.

The EU’s struggle with power

The EU’s civilian power status was seriously challenged in the period following the end of the Cold War. The need to promote and support new political, legal and socio-economic structures in other regions of the world compelled the EU to make more active use of its various non-military foreign policy instruments, most of which fell under the EC pillar. More significantly, it also increased pressure on the EU to behave as a civilian power, willing to exert itself purposefully to achieve foreign policy objectives. But, engagement in Central and Eastern Europe aside, the EU proved reluctant to use its instruments to enforce desired changes or attitudes. The EU, it seemed, was unable to fulfill the expectations of a civilian power at the same time that the disadvantages of being
limited to civilian power alone were becoming very apparent. In two stages, from 1991, particularly in the Balkan wars, and again from 2001, through the effects of September 11, the EU was forced to gradually depart from the familiarity of its status as a non-military power.

The dissolution of Yugoslavia confronted the EU with a typical post-Cold War crisis – war within countries and between different ethnic groups – for which new types of ‘lower-scale’ military operation and capabilities were required. Conflict in the Balkans demonstrated that the EU and its member states were unable to respond adequately as they did not possess the requisite military capabilities for conflict prevention, crisis management or peacekeeping. This was particularly dramatic for European countries because the traditional military security providers (NATO and the US) were initially reluctant to intervene. It was not a coincidence that from 1999, efforts within the ESDP to endow the EU with its own military capabilities focused on peacekeeping and crisis management tasks (see Chapter 7).

The terrorist attacks in the US, Madrid, London and other parts of the world, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the fear of the proliferation of WMD forced EU countries to focus on yet another level of military challenge. For the first time since the height of the Cold War, threats went to the core of a nation’s survival, thus touching the most sensitive foreign policy decisions of national political leaders. Whilst these challenges demonstrated the sharply divisive character of the ‘Atlantic solidarity versus European integration’ dilemma, they also provided the impetus behind developing a common anti-terrorism policy and an EU ‘Strategy against Proliferation of WMD’. In this way, external events centred the EU debate on issues that just two years previously had been completely taboo (see Chapters 6 and 9).

To summarize, the end of the East–West order had a dual effect on the EU’s civilian power status. On the one hand, confrontation with this new world challenged the EU to behave much more as a civilian power. On the other hand, the EU was forced to transform itself from a civilian power into a civilian and military power. This points to the following fundamental question: to what extent does the EU have or want to become a power? The EU’s struggle with power is a sixth recurrent theme of this book.

Globalization

A further major contextual change of foreign policy is the increasing scope, depth and impact of globalization. This process both reinforces the effects of the end of the East–West ‘order’ and carries implications which are fundamental, yet not always acknowledged. Globalization essentially refers to the expanding scale, growing magnitude, speed up and deepening impact of patterns of social interaction and interregional flows of people, trade, capital, information, technological knowledge, ideas, values and norms. Indeed, few areas of social life escape its reach. These increasingly intensive flows are facilitated by different kinds of physical infrastructure (such as transport networks and communication and banking systems), but also by immaterial, normative and symbolic factors (such as trade rules, the spread of Western values and customs, and of English as the lingua franca) (Held and McGrew 2000: 3–4).

As globalization constrains and empowers actors, its impact is profoundly uneven, reflecting and strengthening existing patterns of inequality and hierarchy while also generating new patterns of inclusion and exclusion, new winners and losers (Held et al. 1999: 27). The positive effects of globalization and increasing interdependence are matched by a growing vulnerability in a burgeoning number of interrelated policy areas. This is not only the case in the military field (proliferation of WMD and sensitive military technology, threat of ‘low-scale’ terrorist attacks with large-scale effects) and in the economic field (including energy provision or the vulnerability of information networks). It also extends to policy fields that used to receive less attention: the environment (ecological change, unsafe nuclear plants), public health (HIV/AIDS, avian influenza, TB) and societal security (the preservation of a society’s essential features). Threats are no longer solely posed by states, but increasingly by a wide range of non-state actors, anonymous and diffuse networks and incremental developments that cannot be associated with a specific actor.

Linking globalization to foreign policy leads to a dual paradox. Firstly, globalization reflects a growing predominance of economics over politics and of foreign economic relations over foreign policy. Yet at the same time, the implications of globalization and the vulnerabilities it causes make foreign policy more...
essential than ever. So, secondly, there is a need for more foreign policy and for a different kind of foreign policy. Yet national governments find themselves increasingly irrelevant in addressing the challenges as their traditional foreign policy is important in the face of multiplying vulnerabilities.

There is a rather ambiguous relationship between European integration and globalization, with the European Union acting both as a shield against and an agent of globalization (Wallace 2000: 48–9). The EU functions as an instrument to protect its member states from the negative consequences of globalization and to try to contain, manage and order this process. Increasingly helpless, member states’ governments turn to the EU to respond to questions they are incapable of answering. The EU’s rich cross-border legal mechanisms and the Europeanization of an increasing number of ‘internal’ policy fields within the framework of the first pillar, helped member states to control some of the repercussions of globalization and to protect themselves from turbulent global events. Vulnerability in traditionally ‘domestic’ or ‘internal’ policy fields, such as health, the environment, energy or communication networks, explains the pressure to gradually elaborate an EU foreign policy in these fields (see Chapter 9).

However, the EU also functions as an agent of globalization. It promotes multilateralism in an attempt to protect itself from globalization. But, in so doing, it acts as an agent of this very process. More fundamentally, the EU contributes to globalization through its trade policy and its support for a global free-market economy and neo-liberal international order (including through the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, and through its initiatives to create free trade areas with other regions of the world). The EU has not sufficiently considered the consequences of its policies: it contributes to international structures that, whilst positive in many ways, also reproduce and reinforce patterns of exclusion, alienation and uncertainty (see Chapter 10).

In terms of foreign policy, globalization has several implications. The interrelatedness of the international system means that occurrences can have a serious impact domestically, while local developments can in turn engender significant global repercussions (Held and McGrew 2002: 3). Furthermore, while globalization generates or emphasizes new patterns of inclusion and exclusion, expanding communication networks and a proliferation of arms provide the ‘losers’ with easy channels to strike back.

**Updating the concept of foreign policy**

We define foreign policy as that area of politics which is directed at the external environment with the objective of influencing that environment and the behaviour of other actors within it, in order to pursue interests, values and goals. Foreign policy thus differs from external relations since the former is about influencing the environment and external actors while the latter is about maintaining relations with external actors.

It is archaic to assess the foreign policy of the EU, or any other actor, using a conventional understanding of foreign policy as strictly centred on state and military security. Today, we require a more comprehensive understanding of foreign policy (see Kubálková 2001; Carlsnaes 2002; Cooper 2003; Hill 2003). This might seem self-evident to most scholars of international relations. However, despite the fact that scholars readily acknowledge the complexity of international relations, when it comes to assessing the foreign policy of an actor, a one-sided understanding of foreign policy is still often used as the main or only benchmark against which foreign policy is measured and as the main lens through which foreign policy is conceptualized and ‘recognized’.

The purpose of the next two sections is to present tools through which we can analyse those dimensions of foreign policy that tend not to be central to either the study, or the conduct, of foreign policy. The first tool presented here is a checklist of both dominant and other dimensions of foreign policy, which links relevant concepts from various approaches in International Relations research to the study of foreign policy. The second tool is a conceptual framework that ties these concepts together, encompassing both dominant and other dimensions of foreign policy. This framework is based on comparing a conventional understanding of foreign policy to what we call a structural foreign policy.

Table 1.1 provides a short (and non-exhaustive) checklist of both the traditionally dominant and the other dimensions of foreign policy. The ‘dominant dimensions’ refer to those aspects
Table 1.1 Dominant and other dimensions of foreign policy

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<th>Dominant dimensions of foreign policy</th>
<th>Other dimensions of foreign policy</th>
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<td>States</td>
<td>Non-state actors, networks</td>
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<td>Elites</td>
<td>Population/society</td>
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<td>Heads of state/government, Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Defence</td>
<td>Other governmental actors</td>
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<td>Governmental actors</td>
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<td><strong>Interests and objectives</strong></td>
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<td>Self-regarding interests</td>
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<td>Myopic self-interests</td>
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<td>Possession goals</td>
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<td>Milieu goals, Global public goods</td>
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<td>Military security</td>
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<td><strong>Power and capabilities</strong></td>
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<td>Military instruments</td>
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<td>Material instruments</td>
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<td>Hard power</td>
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<td>Relational power</td>
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<td><strong>Focus</strong></td>
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<td>Actors, events, crises, and conflicts and conflicts</td>
<td>Structures, processes, contexts</td>
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<td>Material aspects (economy, military security)</td>
<td>Instrumental aspects (identity, culture, beliefs, legitimacy)</td>
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The nature of actors in international relations has evolved. State actors do not cease to be relevant. However, other governmental actors, such as ministers of finance or interior affairs become relevant in addition to the traditionally central actors of foreign policy (Heads of State or Government, foreign ministry, defence ministry). More importantly, taking states as the sole actors in foreign policy is no longer tenable. The state is not the sole reference point for foreign policy because a wider spectrum of subnational and transnational actors and entities, including religious and ethnic groups, societies, multinationals, international organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and criminal organizations are increasingly relevant foreign policy actors (Josselin and Wallace 2001). Diffuse and ambiguous entities, perceived more as networks than as concrete and well-defined actors, should also be understood as actors in foreign policy. Financial networks or al-Qaeda terrorist networks are examples (see Castells 2000). Such a change in focus also implies that foreign policy should no longer be a solely elite-centred activity, but should become more population- or society-orientated.

Interests and objectives

To defend and promote an entity’s own interests and achieve its foreign policy objectives, protecting global public goods (for example the environment and health) (Kaul et al. 1999) and acknowledging or even promoting the basic interests of other states and non-state actors (for example ethnic and religious groups) becomes essential. George and Keohane (1980: 221) make a useful distinction between, on the one hand, the usually promoted and emphasized self-regarding interests (where the state in question is first and foremost the interested party), the less emphasized collective interests (where several states and actors enjoy advantages in common) and the usually ignored other-regarding interests (where the interests of other actors are dominant, but where the state in question can derive indirect benefit from the improved situation of other actors).

In a 21st-century context of mutual dependence and vulnerability, factoring collective interests and other-regarding interests
into foreign policy choices is more a question of efficacy and far-sighted self-interest (Keohane 1984: 122) than of idealistic, naïve altruism. However, pursuing collective and other-regarding interests is a task of such magnitude that most national governments are incapable of doing so. As national governments struggle to justify such interventions to parliament or their electorate, the relevance of international organizations, such as the EU, increases.

In terms of objectives, ‘milieu goals’ as well as the more traditionally emphasized ‘possession goals’ are increasingly relevant to foreign policy. Following Wolfr’s formulation, milieu goals aim to shape the conditions beyond a state’s national boundaries, that is the international environment in which a state operates, while possession goals refer to the realization of objectives that directly benefit the state concerned (1962: 73–6).

Security

The state’s principal foreign policy objective remains to guarantee its security. However, this is complicated by a security agenda which has become both deeper and broader. Focussing solely on military security is insufficient. Survival becomes equally dependent on fields such as environmental security and health security (Buzan et al. 1998; Kaul et al. 1999). Security can no longer be defined solely at a state level. Globalization and the end of the East–West order compel foreign policy to look beyond national territorial security and towards both the global level (collective interests) and the societal and individual levels. The following points explain the less well-known security concepts presented in Table 1.1 that complement the (territorial/national/military) security concepts which conventionally prevail:

- Global security refers to issues such as the uncontrolled proliferation of military technology and WMD. ‘National’ security cannot be assured without tackling such elements of global security.
- Societal insecurity refers to the ability of a society (largely defined on an ethnic or religious basis) to persist in its essential character. It is about the sustainability, allowing for an acceptable level of evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, values and religious, ethnic or

national identity (Waever 1993: 23). Societal insecurity can be the result of internal pressure within a state or of direct external pressure from other states or societies. It can flow from indirect external pressure in the international system, for instance through the homogenizing impact of globalization, Westernization and capitalism (Buzan 1993; Latouche 1996).

- Human security refers to the security situation of individuals. It encompasses both the freedom from fear (of violence, violations of human rights, crime) and the freedom from want (of hunger, poverty, disease, environmental degradation) (UNDP 1994). Peace, stability, democracy and economic development cannot be achieved unless individuals have human security.

- Desecuritization refers to the process through which an issue is no longer considered or ‘felt’ to be a security problem and is gradually moved from the security agenda into the ordinary realm of politics. The concept of desecuritization indicates that in addition to developing measures to fight a particular threat, foreign policy will only be successful if this threat not only disappears, but if it is also perceived to have disappeared. Policies can also aim at keeping issues desecuritized – that is keeping an issue off the security agenda and ensuring that it is not considered or defined as a security problem. An example of desecuritization is the Franco-German relationship after World War II (see Chapter 2). The opposite of desecuritization is securation – bringing a relationship or an issue into the realm of ‘security’ and considering or presenting it as a threat, which thus requires emergency measures (Waever 1995; Buzan et al. 1998: 21–47). Migration, health or drugs are all examples of issues which have been securitized.

Power and capabilities

The challenges evoked by the 21st-century context mean that military and diplomatic power and instruments are essential, but are also insufficient to achieve foreign policy goals. Military power and military instruments must be complemented by economic and financial power and instruments. And hard power needs to be complemented by soft power. Hard power is essentially based on
coercion. It can rest on both inducements and threats ('carrots' and 'sticks') and can involve the use of military, economic or other instruments. Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others and to get others to want the outcomes that you want. It arises from the attractiveness of an entity's culture, values, political ideals and policies, or from the perception that these are legitimate (Nye 2004).

Less utilized but arguably even more useful concepts are relational and structural power, which are to be seen as two sides of a continuum. Relational power refers to the power of one actor to get another actor to do something it would not otherwise do. Elaborating on the description provided by Holsti (1995: 69), structural power refers to the authority and capacity to set or shape the organizing principles and rules of the game and to determine how others will play that game. Structural power involves more than coercive capacity as it includes unstated assumptions about standards and rules. The possessor of structural power can 'change the range of choices open to others, without apparently putting pressure directly on them to take one decision or to make one choice rather than others' (Strange 1994: 31). The range of options available for an entity could be extended through the development of new opportunities, or restricted through the imposition of costs or risks, rendering some choices more attractive, and others more difficult. In altering the context in which other actors operate, the use of structural power can lead to fundamental and enduring changes in the actions, behaviour and identity of actors.

FOCUS

Being effective in the changed 21st-century context requires that an 'actor', 'conflict' and 'event'-orientated foreign policy approach be complemented by a 'process', 'structure' and 'context'-orientated approach. To explain: the focus of foreign policy should not only rest on events and actors or on conflicts between those actors. It should also consider the underlying structures and processes which are at the root of conflicts or solutions, or which provide the context in which problems and conflicts multiply or opportunities arise. Structures (such as the Western-dominated international financial system) and processes (such as climate change, democratization, the transition to an open market economy, or the rise of anti-Western sentiments) have an impact on an actor's behaviour and provide the framework in which it operates.

In addition, foreign policy must look beyond the material realm of military security or economic well-being towards immaterial issues such as culture, beliefs, identity and legitimacy (see Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Katzenstein 1996; Hudson 1997). Culture, beliefs and identity shape the perception and behaviour of actors, influence how they define their interests and what kind of role they want to play in the international system. As Pratt (1998: 19) argues, identity 'serves not only as the primary link between the individual and society, but between a society and the world'. These factors, combined with legitimacy, also determine the potential impact of a foreign policy. For example, while in objective terms a foreign policy may succeed in removing a specific military threat, states, societies or individuals might continue to act as if this threat remained and continue to feel insecure until the less tangible immaterial aspects have also been tackled. This dimension points to the importance in foreign policy of 'winning the hearts and minds'.

Conventional and structural foreign policy

Having identified various dominant and other dimensions of foreign policy, we now reconceptualize foreign policy to incorporate some of the generally overlooked 'other' dimensions and to take into account the challenges posed by globalization and post-Cold War instability. Comparing a conventional conception of foreign policy with a 'structural foreign policy' allows us to broaden what we understand as foreign policy (Keukeleire 1998, 2002, 2003, 2008):

- Conventional foreign policy is orientated towards states, military security, crises and conflicts (including most, though not necessarily all, of the 'dominant' dimensions in the left columns of Table 1.1).
- Structural foreign policy refers to a foreign policy which, constructed over the long-term, seeks to influence or shape sustainable political, legal, socio-economic, security and mental structures. These structures characterize not only
states and interstate relations, but also societies, the position of individuals, relations between states and societies, and the international system as a whole.

Both conceptualizations of foreign policy are relevant in today's international system. The breakdown of the Westphalian and East–West orders has undermined the structures which supported these orders. This process can encourage states to strengthen their own (military) capabilities in order to try to survive in this increasingly dangerous and unpredictable world. The result is a renewed emphasis on foreign policy as it is conventionally understood, and particularly on the need for military instruments. However, the breakdown of the old structures also implies that foreign policy must try to reorder or restructure the international arena to diminish vulnerability and uncertainties. This process takes into account new or emerging actors, processes, challenges, dangers and opportunities. The capacity to 'structure' the global environment and influence long-term developments becomes critical.

Comparing a conventional understanding of foreign policy with a structural foreign policy concept is a useful lens through which to analyse past as well as current foreign policy. An example of a successful structural foreign policy is American foreign policy in the decade following World War II which aimed to establish new structures in Western Europe and definitively resolve Franco-German hostility (see Chapter 2). Other examples are the EC/EU's policy vis-à-vis Central and Eastern Europe as well as the Stabilisation and Association Process aimed at restructuring and stabilizing the Balkans following conflict in the 1990s. Examples of failed structural foreign policies are the policy of the EU towards the Palestinian Territories and towards the Mediterranean (see Chapter 10) and the policy of the US in the early 2000s to spread freedom and democracy to the Middle East.

Structural foreign policy and conventional foreign policy are not mutually contradictory and can even be complementary and mutually dependent. For example, structural foreign policy towards the Balkans became possible only after successful conventional foreign policy actions (including military operations and diplomatic initiatives). However, that this success would be enduring was only assured through the creation of a comprehensive set of new structures to make peace sustainable in the long term.

Before we go any further, it is useful to explain the basic features of a structural foreign policy: the focus on structures, sustainability, comprehensiveness and the importance of mental structures.

Structures consist of relatively permanent organizing principles and rules of the game that shape and order the political, legal, socio-economic and security fields. Structures are made operational through a complex organizational and/or institutional set-up that can vary from country to country, from society to society, and from region to region. For example, 'democracy' is an organizing principle that shapes politics in many states. However, the way in which it is made operational differs between, for example, the US, Germany and Japan.

The objective of a structural foreign policy is to influence, shape or create structures that are not only viable in the short term, but that are equally sustainable in the long term, including when external pressure or support has disappeared. In view of their relatively permanent quality, influencing or changing the structures within which actors operate can be harder and take more time than influencing or changing the behaviour of actors in specific crises. However, if successful, the impact of these efforts can be both more profound and more enduring.

A structural foreign policy can generally only be effective and sustainable if it is comprehensive and if it simultaneously focuses on the various relevant interrelated structures (political, legal, socio-economic and security) and levels (individual, state, societal, relations between states and societies, interregional and global). Neglecting one or more relevant levels or structures can undermine the foreign policy achievements at other levels and structures. Being comprehensive necessitates the use of a wide variety of instruments. Combined with the fact that sustained effort is required over the long term, this explains why a structural foreign policy is beyond the capacity of most individual states – and why the EU is a potentially interesting locus for member states to develop such a policy. Figure 1.2 presents the dimensions of a comprehensive structural foreign policy, also offering a useful checklist to analyse the structural foreign policy of an international actor.
Figure 1.2  Structural foreign policy: structures and levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRUCTURES</th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Legal</th>
<th>Socio-economic</th>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Mental</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>Individual</td>
<td></td>
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<td>E</td>
<td>State</td>
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<td>V</td>
<td>Societal*</td>
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<td>E</td>
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<td>L</td>
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<td>S</td>
<td>Global</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* Societies can be situated within one state or can be transnational.

Whether changes to structures are sustainable depends on the extent to which they are seen as legitimate and are (or are becoming) part of the mindset, belief systems or mental structure of the people concerned (population as well as elites). Changes to structures will be more enduring when they are seen as desirable and legitimate, and not just as the result of external pressure or of a purely rational cost–benefit calculation (acquiescing in order to gain economic support, for example) [see Wendt 1999: 266–78]. This explains why a structural foreign policy is more likely to be successful if the promoted structures take into account, or are embedded within, endogenous traditions or processes in the target country, society or region. Where the elite and population share the same values, and view the structures being promoted as desirable, these will be more readily internalized. Acting on other-regarding interests and possessing soft power can also help increase the legitimacy of the policy and the prospects of the promoted structures being accepted and internalized.

The nature of EU foreign policy

Having explored the generic concept of foreign policy, we now use this analysis to help us examine the nature of EU foreign policy. We understand the foreign policy of the EU as being the multipillar and multilevel foreign policy of the EU as a whole. It thus includes the foreign policy developed across all three EU pillars, through interaction between those pillars, as well as through interaction with the foreign policies of member states. As such, in this book, EU foreign policy is not considered as being the same as:

- **CFSP/ESDP**: the preceding sections indicated that it is untenable to narrow down foreign policy to the decisions and actions adopted in the EU’s second pillar.
- **European foreign policy**: as the EU does not include all European states and is only one of the various ‘European’ multilateral frameworks through which foreign policy is developed, the EU cannot be equated with ‘Europe’.

The sum of the national foreign policies of EU member states: the foreign policy of the EU is neither all encompassing nor exclusive. This implies that member states maintain their own national foreign policies, which may in part be defined and developed with no or minimal involvement from the EU. The label ‘EU foreign policy’ only includes national foreign policies in so far as these are developed at least to some extent through interaction with the EU mechanism.

Having clarified these basic conceptual choices, it is useful to point to their consequences for the analysis of EU foreign policy in this book, to situate this within the broader debate on European integration, and to point to some major recurrent themes that will be tackled throughout.

Multipillar foreign policy

As noted in the Introduction, the Maastricht Treaty gave the EU a three-pillar system: the CFSP as a distinct intergovernmental second pillar; a third pillar, which was to deal with provisions on cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs; and a first pillar – the EC – which brought together policies including the internal market, common agricultural policy, trade and development policies. The precise attribution of policy fields among the three pillars has gradually evolved, with CFSP for example being complemented by ESDP and the third pillar being refocused on police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. However, this
and the practice of EU foreign policy does not always follow the formal categorization of the treaties.

Within the individual pillars, there are major variations in competence and policy-making method (see, for example, the substantial differences between trade and development policy). This points to the much larger complexity of, and diversity within, the EU's foreign policy mechanism than the simplistic categorizations ‘EC versus CFSP/ESDP’ and ‘Community method versus intergovernmental method’ indicates. It might be more accurate to characterize EU foreign policy as existing on a continuum, going from various degrees of supranational integration, over various degrees of intergovernmental integration, to purely intergovernmental cooperation. Although there is a clear boundary between the three pillars (which has significant repercussions for EU foreign policy), in practice there is also a strong interaction and sometimes even symbiosis between them, which can make the pillar system sometimes less relevant. As Stetter (2004: 720–1) argues, the functional indivisibility of foreign policy led to a gradual and partial erosion of the pillar structure and to the rise of cross-pillar politics. In any case, we should question a one-sided emphasis on CFSP/ESDP in assessments of EU foreign policy. Depending on the foreign policy issue at hand and the time period under discussion, the centre of gravity in terms of the site of policy elaboration will differ. Whilst CFSP is formally considered the motor of foreign policy-making, on several major issues the political and operational heart of EU foreign policy is the EC and not CFSP.

Multilevel and multilateral foreign policy

Characteristic of EU foreign policy is the interaction between the national and EU levels, with the centre of gravity and the nature of this interaction varying according to the issue at hand. However, EU foreign policy is not a simple two-level game. The national and EU levels are not nearly separated from each other and policy-making also occurs on other levels (see below). To a large extent, EU foreign policy can be conceptualized as a complex multilevel foreign policy, with actors that are linked to each other through formal or informal relationships. Depending on the policy issue and policy framework these actors have different competences, legitimacy, obligations and resources. EU
foreign policy can thus be characterized as an example of multilevel governance, including a range of mutually dependent actors across different policy levels, with multiple powers and interests, complementary functions and overlapping competences (see Schimmelfennig and Wagner 2004).

Understanding EU foreign policy as being multilevel also has wider dimensions. Although we may focus on the EU, we must avoid the trap of EU-centrism, giving the false impression that for member states the EU is the only, or even the main, international framework in which to develop foreign policy, promote foreign policy goals or fulfil commitments. As Krahmann (2003) rightly emphasizes, EU foreign policy is in turn embedded within a wider set of multilevel foreign policy networks, including other multilateral settings such as NATO, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe and the UN (see also Knodt 2004). Nearly all foreign policy actions undertaken by the EU are developed either in cooperation with other international organizations (and sometimes also on their initiative or at their request) or in parallel to (and sometimes also in competition with) the actions of these organizations. Following Wallace (2005: 78), it may be more accurate to speak of a multilevel foreign policy, to avoid the notion of hierarchy often implied by the multilevel concept and to indicate that the EU is only one among the various relevant locations for foreign policy-making. This implies that the member states perpetually weigh up the pros and cons of developing foreign policy in the EU rather than in another foreign policy forum.

Zero-sum and positive-sum games

Many studies of the EU's external relations or foreign policy focus on the EU's capabilities as an international actor and its capacity 'to mimic the features of a nation-state within the international system' (Rosamond 2002: 175). This becomes obvious in the plethora of publications about the famous 'capability-expectations gap' (Hill 1993) and about the EU's 'actorness' or 'presence' (Sjöstedt 1977; Allen and Smith 1990; Caporaso and Jupille 1998; Bretherton and Vogler 2006).

This book questions the tendency to evaluate EU foreign policy mainly or exclusively against the yardstick of the foreign policy of individual states. It can be useful or even necessary for EU foreign policy to gain some of the capabilities and characteristics of states' foreign policy. However, it is questionable whether EU foreign policy must automatically, and on all levels, be seen as a substitute or as a transposition to the European level of individual member states' foreign policies. The specificity and added value of an EU foreign policy can be precisely that it varies on certain points, tackling different sorts of problems, pursuing different objectives through alternative methods, and ultimately assuming a form and content which differs from the foreign policy of its individual states. At a time when globalization is demonstrating the limitations of nation states and conventional foreign policies, it seems odd that we would look to the EU to develop a foreign policy equivalent to that of a state.

This book thus also questions the tendency to automatically perceive the relationship between the foreign policy of the EU and that of its member states as a zero-sum game. Such a perspective implies that a fully fledged European foreign policy can only emerge to the extent that it takes the place of member states' policies, which are to disappear in the process. Or, conversely, that as long as national foreign policies continue to exist, there can be no true European foreign policy (see Allen 1998). This book's point of departure is that the relationship between the foreign policies of the member states and the EU can be a zero-sum game (with a stronger EU foreign policy leading to weaker national foreign policies), but that in other cases it can be a positive-sum game (with EU foreign policy complementing and even strengthening national foreign policies and foreign policies developed in other international fora). The question of whether, and under what conditions, the relationship between EU and national foreign policies is to be seen in either this negative or positive light is one of the most essential and sensitive aspects of EU foreign policy.

Conclusion

Today's world is a markedly different place to that of a 20th century defined by two World Wars and subsequent bipolarity. Today, the Cold War is in the past, and the increasing impact of globalization throws up new sets of opportunities and challenges.
The context in which (EU) foreign policy is designed and operates has thus changed. Foreign policy has had to evolve in line with this changed environment and our understanding of what constitutes foreign policy must make a similar journey. We propose a conceptual approach – conventional foreign policy and structural foreign policy – on which we base our analysis of EU foreign policy in the chapters which follow. These concepts are complementary, not contradictory – they help us understand more dimensions of foreign policy challenges and how these are being, and could be, addressed. Building on this understanding of the context and definition of foreign policy, this chapter has begun an exploration of what constitutes EU foreign policy specifically. We understand EU foreign policy as multipillar and multilevel, operating within a complex multilocal web of interlocking actors and processes. These ideas form the conceptual backbone on which the rest of this book is based.

Chapter 2

European Integration and Foreign Policy: Historical Overview

The relationship between European integration and the development of a European foreign policy has remained ambiguous from the end of World War II to the present day. Nevertheless, over the last half a century, European integration has evolved from a primarily economic endeavour to one with a substantive political and foreign policy dimension. This chapter charts this progress. In providing a historical overview, it quickly becomes clear that many of the obstacles that were highly problematic in the earliest stages of the process continue to be the stumbling blocks of EU foreign policy today.

European integration: the product of a structural foreign policy (1945–52)

The Marshall Plan of 1947 and the Schuman Declaration of 1950 launched a highly successful structural foreign policy towards post-war Western Europe, in which the process of European integration played a crucial role. To use today's terminology, the Marshall Plan and Schuman Declaration proposed to tackle the “root causes” of the wars and economic and political crises that had characterized Europe in the first half of the 20th century by creating new structures to govern both the new (West) German state and its relations with its neighbours. This policy towards West Germany was one of the greatest successes of post-war American and French policy, precisely because it deviated from both the conventional concept of a foreign policy and the traditional approach to defeated nations.