The Emergence of a Strategic Culture within the Common Security and Defence Policy

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Abstract. The present article argues that a strategic culture is rising at the moment within the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and provides empirical evidence of its emergence. This research thus applies an original and multilevel analytical framework to the CSDP, based on the operational level, related to the study of the European Union (EU) field interventions, on the top-down institutional level, focused on the analysis of institutional documents and CSDP exercises, and on the bottom-up institutional level, concentrated on the socialization process among the political actors involved in the CSDP in the framework of the Political and Security Committee, taken as a case study. The present article shows that elements of an emergent strategic culture within the CSDP can be found among those that are consistent to these three levels of analysis.

By using an innovative and structured research method backed up by empirical findings, this article aims at deepening the still restricted debate on the nature of the EU strategic culture.

I Introduction

The evolution of the European Union (EU) in the security and political domains is a response to the new security context, which has emerged since the end of the Cold War. An example of this trend is the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), renamed Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) by the Lisbon Treaty,¹ which has rapidly developed since the constitutive Franco-British Declaration of St Malo in 1998. CSDP has been operational on the field since 2003, and up to now, it counts for twenty-three field interventions in Europe, Asia, Middle East, and Africa. This recent and fast implementation of the CSDP, especially in terms of concepts, instruments, and field interventions, generate a number of questions regarding the characteristics and the added value of the EU security and defence approach on the field. The present article addresses these issues through the still controversial notion of strategic culture. The analysis of the restricted literature on the EU strategic culture – very often limited to the ontological question of whether an EU strategic culture can emerge or not – shows that there is an increasing need

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¹ For the sake of consistency, we always refer to Common Security and Defence Policy, even before the Lisbon Treaty, except when European Security and Defence Policy is cited in quotations.
for methodological clarity backed up by empirical evidence while investigating its nature. This article argues that a strategic culture is rising at the moment within the CSDP and provides empirical evidence of its emergence.

What do we mean by strategic culture in the framework of the EU? How can we study it empirically? We start from the literature on European strategic culture (see section 2 below) taking more specifically into consideration the definition of strategic culture given by Meyer as well as an enlarged and updated understanding of strategy as the use of military but also civilian instruments for political objectives linked to security. We define strategic culture as a set of shared ideas, visions, expectations, and common patterns of habitual behaviour concerning the use of military and civilian instruments for reaching the political objectives in the field of security. Taking into account the nature of the EU and this definition of strategic culture, we argue that the emergence of a strategic culture within the CSDP can be tested if we compare the results of different levels of analysis, which take into consideration either the institutional inputs of the EU or its operational activities.

The first section of this article introduces our analytical framework based on three levels of analysis, namely the operational level, related to the analysis of the missions and the operations on the field, the top-down institutional level, focused on the study of institutional documents and CSDP exercises, and the bottom-up institutional level, based on the investigation of the socialization process among the political actors involved in the CSDP. The second section presents the main results of the empirical research for the three levels of analysis, studied on the basis of common analytical variables. The third and concluding section compares these results thus allowing us to identify elements currently characterizing the emergent strategic culture among those that are consistent to these three levels of analysis.

The present article deepens the debate on the nature of the EU strategic culture by supplying, at the same time, empirical data resulting from the use of an original EU ad hoc analytical framework. These results should be used as a starting point for further researches on the characteristics and added value of the EU security and defence approach.

II A Multilevel Analytical Framework to Study the Emergence of a Strategic Culture within the CSDP

The debate on strategic culture started at the end of 1970s, when scholars were wondering why the United States and the USSR, despite being confronted with the same strategic conditions, had different strategic doctrines. The debate that has followed among different scholars, who have been artificially divided into

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three generations by Johnston, has not allowed scholars to reach consensus until now, either on the definition of strategic culture, or on the analytical framework. Moreover, since the beginning, the debate on strategic culture has been mostly stato-centric. This is why talking about the existence of a strategic culture within the EU is still a controversial issue in academic research.

During the last ten years, a restricted literature has emerged on this topic, but up to now the debate has been mostly focused on the limited issue whether the EU can share a strategic culture and to what extent, or why it is unlikely that the EU develops a strategic culture and which are the main obstacles to this process. Some scholars branch out from the ontological debate – can an EU strategic culture exist or not? – and also address within their researches the issue of its content and its characterization. Giegerich and Meyer provide empirical studies based on clear and well-structured analytical framework on the convergence of selected EU Members States’ strategic cultures.

However, how is it possible to study the nature of the emergent strategic culture within the CSDP? More in-depth methodological explanations are required while approaching this topic. We consider that a study only focused on the convergence of Member States’ strategic cultures, even if essential for arguing the emergence of an EU strategic culture is not enough to capture its content. Even if the process of convergence between EU Member States’ strategic culture, which is taking place (albeit in a very slow way), is essential, the research on an EU strategic

9 Meyer, 2006, n. 2 above.
cultural has to include other levels of analysis, which take into consideration the characteristic of the EU and, more specifically, of the CSDP. Starting from the elements identified in the definition of strategic culture, we estimate that shared ideas, visions, expectations, and common patterns of habitual behaviour within the CSDP can be acknowledged by applying a multilevel analytical framework to the study of this policy. Considering that CSDP is an intergovernmental policy with its own Brussels-based institutions, operational on the field since seven years ago, we identify three levels of analysis, namely the operational level, the top-down institutional level, and the bottom-up institutional level.

The operational level of analysis focuses on the civilian and military interventions launched by the EU since 2003 with the aim to identify common patterns of habitual behaviour, that is, elements that characterize the EU approach on the field and can be consistently found in all the EU interventions.

The top-down institutional level of analysis focuses on the key CSDP documents and exercises. They express a series of shared ideas on CSDP thus representing the CSDP guidelines given by the institutions according to a top-down dynamic.

Although diplomats and experts seconded by national states and working for the CSDP institutions are supposed to act in the name of the national interests within these institutions, daily interaction in Brussels might socialize them, thus having an impact on their visions of CSDP. This socialization process must be investigated in the framework of what we call a bottom-up institutional level, which analyses visions and expectations shared among actors in response to a bottom-up socialization dynamic.

This analytical framework, based on three levels of investigation whose results have to be put side by side and compared, demands the definition of specific and comparable analytical variables for each level of investigation.

We argue that elements of strategic culture correspond to institutional inputs (shared ideas, that is, top-down institutional level results), which are consistent with field practices (common patterns of habitual behaviour, that is, operational level results) and which are at the same time among the socialization process outcomes (shared visions and expectations, that is, bottom-up institutional level results). Conversely, we consider that those institutional inputs, which correspond neither to the practical reality on the field nor to the socialization process outputs, do not count among those characterizing the emergent strategic culture within the CSDP.

III The Empirical Application of the EU Strategic Culture Framework of Analysis

1. The Operational Level

The study of the operational level implies a comparative analysis of the twenty-three EU interventions in the framework of the CSDP, carried on since 2003. Even if each field intervention is an ad hoc one with its own characteristics, the added
value of this research relies on fact that it identifies common aspects that tell us about the European way of acting on the field within the CSDP, in the framework of a still very restricted literature on the CSDP interventions.\textsuperscript{11} Our research is based on the following investigation variables: The relations between the CSDP intervention and the role and activity of the International Community already engaged on the field; the relations between the CSDP intervention and the more general EU engagement in the same country or region; the geographical dimension of the CSDP deployment and the perception of threats and security, which is translated into the field engagement; the international legitimacy of the CSDP missions and operations including the relation between the CSDP intervention and the local authorities; and finally, the temporality, the typology, and the follow-up of the intervention.

The comparative analysis of the twenty-three CSDP interventions has highlighted the existence of coherent operational trends within the CSDP, based on patterns of habitual behaviour, common to the majority of the CSDP interventions.\textsuperscript{12} More precisely, the analysis has shown that all the CSDP interventions are complementary to the already existing field activities of the International Community and that they take place within a multilateral context. For instance, the EU interventions in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are supposed to complement United Nations (UN) activities on the field, especially within the framework of the UN mission in DRC (MONUC), as it was the case with operation Artemis deployed to allow the MONUC to better reorganize its troops. Moreover, CSDP interventions are part of a broader EU global approach on the field in the framework of an EU long-term and comprehensive strategy within the country or the region. An interesting example is represented by the EU interventions in the Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Within the CSDP, the EU deployed the military operation Concordia followed by two police missions and then specific European Commission programmes were launched. FYROM is now an EU candidate country. Geographically speaking, the majority of the interventions are deployed in the near neighbourhood, namely in the Balkans (six) or Eastern Europe (two interventions in Georgia), in Africa (ten), and in the Middle East (three). Two missions are also counted in Asia, namely in Afghanistan and in Indonesia. This hors-zone engagement implies force projection and translates an enlarged perception of the threats, perceived as being very often far away from the EU borders, as well as a broader vision of security.


\textsuperscript{12} This article provides the final results of a detailed analysis of each EU field intervention, which is available in A. Biava, Vers une culture stratégique européenne? (Louvain-la-Neuve: Académia Bruylant, forthcoming, 2011), Ch. 4.
CSDP interventions have a strong international legitimacy. The majority of them are based on a direct mandate of the UN (like military operations Artemis and Althea, deployed under the framework of Chapter 7 of the UN Charter) or on an indirect one (like all the interventions in the FYROM, deployed according to the UN Resolution 1371 of 2001, asking the International Community to implement the Ohrid Framework Agreement of August 2001 for the stabilization of the country). The other interventions find their legitimacy on an international agreement authorizing the EU action, like the Aceh Monitor Mission (AMM), based on the Memorandum of Understanding of 2005 foreseeing the EU supervision of its implementation. The only exemption is represented by EUJUST Themis in Georgia, which was deployed following a specific invitation and ad hoc arrangements with the local authorities. The interventions are based, for the most, on an explicit invitation of local authorities or on the basis of their formal or informal agreement. In the absence of these circumstances, the interventions follow an explicit demand of the international organization, as it was the case for Artemis and the Amis II support missions, both deployed in response to an official request of the UN and the African Union, respectively.

The majority of the CSDP interventions are post-conflict and post-crisis and focus on the stabilization or peace-consolidation process, like all the interventions in the Balkans. Nevertheless, although only to a minor extent, the EU also engaged to prevent crisis through the EUFOR RD Congo operation and through the rule of law mission in Georgia EUJUST Themis, as well as to manage immediate crisis, as it was the case for Artemis in DRC and through the Amis II support mission in Darfur.

Concerning the typology of the interventions, the EU has deployed more civilian and civil-military missions (sixteen) than military operations (seven). Regarding the typology of civil missions, the practical engagement is focused on police missions, monitoring missions, security sector reform missions, and rule of law missions. Only EULEX Kosovo foresees executive tasks, even if they are very limited. All the other civilian missions aim at monitoring, mentoring, and assisting the reinforcement of local capacities, on the basis of the principle of local ownership. Regarding the military operations, the analysis has outlined some specific operational trends. They tend to be small scale, to have a very specific mandate limited in time and space (like Artemis, deploying 1,500 troops for three months), to benefit from a direct authorization of the UN Security Council, and to be lead in strict cooperation with either the NATO (EUFOR Althea and Concordia) or with the UN (Artemis, EUFOR RD Congo, EUFOR Tchad/RCA).

The EU approach is becoming more and more integrated and multidimensional on the field. This evolution is demonstrated from the one side from a set of different

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13 EULEX Kosovo represents an ambiguity, because, even if Kosovo’s authorities have explicitly invited the EU to deploy the mission, their legitimacy is nevertheless not unanimously recognized at international level.
interventions, which are complementarily deployed in the same region or country, like the DRC, who has been the theatre of two military operations (Artemis and EUFOR RD Congo), one civil-military mission (Eusec RD Congo) and two civilian missions (Eupol Kinshasa and Eupol RD Congo). This evolution is also shown, from the other side, from the trend to deploy missions, which are more and more integrated and cover different fields. This is the case within the police and rule of law integrated mission in Iraq (EUST Lex), within the security sector reform missions specialized in the field of police (Eupol RD Congo) or of the army (Eusec RD Congo), within the security sector reform mission in Guinea Bissau (EU SSR Guinea Bissau) as well as within the rule of law mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo), specialized in the police, judiciary, and customs area.

Another important issue characterizing the EU approach on the field, coming out from the operational level analysis, is its flexibility and its capacity to progressively and dynamically adapt to the situation on the field. Staff deployed on the field, as well as key activities, can be reconfigured and readapted according to the evolution of the field situation. The Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Eupm), whose mandate has evolved since 2003, or EUFOR Althea, whose strengths have been reduced within the years, are valid examples.

A follow-up of the CSDP engagement is always foreseen. All the EU completed interventions have been followed by another CSDP intervention or European Community programme or by another International Community initiative. At military level, this implies that an exit strategy is very often identified at the beginning. For example, AMM was followed by communitarian initiatives on the ground; in the case of Artemis or EUFOR Tchad/RCA, it was decided that the UN would have taken over the EU engagement.

2. The Top-Down Institutional Level

The top-down institutional level of analysis aims at identifying institution’s guidelines on CSDP. Approaching the study of CSDP documents and exercises needs specific choices. Actually, even though CSDP exercises have been of a limited number until now, there are many documents related to CSDP, which have been produced and regularly updated by the institutions since the beginning of this policy. We thus based our analysis on the study of the Presidency Conclusions on CSDP, presented at the end of each Presidency, summing up the most important achievements on CSDP and the related documents. The presentation below selectively focuses on the most important and decisive institutional documents related to the subject of investigation. The analysis is also carried on according to the same
analytical variables used for the operational level of analysis, in order to allow the results’ comparison.

Concerning the relations between the CSDP intervention and the role and activity of the International Community already engaged on the field, institutional document and training guidelines have shown that one of the basic principles of the EU engagement is the strict cooperation and the complementary character of its activities comparing to the ones of the other international actors. To quote some examples, the European Security Strategy (ESS) calls for the promotion of an efficient multilateralism based on the cooperation with other international actors, namely third States and international organizations, and on the reinforcement of the cooperation within the UN.\textsuperscript{15} Several documents related to the typology of civilian missions (police, rule of law, civil administration, border missions, security sector reform missions, and so on) outline the possibility for the EU to launch these missions autonomously or in response to another organization’s request and stretch the importance of a strict cooperation with other international actors already on the field.\textsuperscript{16} At military level, the EU-NATO Berlin Plus Agreement already outlines in itself the importance of the multilateral cooperation on the field, as well as the Joint EU-NATO crisis management exercise of 2003. Moreover, the military exercise MILEX 07 as well as pertinent documents on military cooperation within the UN\textsuperscript{17} foresees a military cooperation between these two organizations, according to the models of bridging operations and standby operations.

Civilian and military instruments within CSDP are meant to be complementary to other EU actions in the framework of its global and comprehensive approach. For example, the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 states that ‘The Council and the Commission will ensure maximum coherence and effectiveness of the EU effort in any crisis area. This will be achieved through close co-ordination and a clear and functional division of labour between Community efforts and ESDP activities. Close cooperation with Community activities in the planning and implementation phases of ESDP civilian missions will be an important element to ensure coherence’.\textsuperscript{18}

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Moreover, the Crisis management exercise of 2004 tests the coordination among all the EU instruments, including the European Commission’s ones.

The ESS and its Implementation Report\(^9\) foresee the possibility for the EU to intervene all over the world and do not fix geographical limits to the CSDP engagement. At the same time, these documents reveal a multidimensional and enlarged vision of security, which very often requires out of border interventions: the Cold War self-defence paradigm is outdated. Current threats like, among others, terrorism, world mass destruction weapons proliferation, regional conflicts, failing states, organized crime, cyberterrorism, energy security, climate change, and piracy are non-conventional and need multidimensional answers, very often far away from the EU, based on an integrated combination of different instruments.

Institutional documents and CSDP exercises outline the importance of the international legitimacy of the CSDP interventions. ESS reinforces the respect of the UN Charter principles. MILEX 08 and MILEX 09, two military exercises, foresee an ad hoc Resolution of the UN Security Council. MILEX 07 simulates a bridging operation aiming at helping the UN, following a specific UN request. According to the institutional documents, civilian mission deployment requires invitation of local authorities, or Security Council authorization or conformity within the UN Charter principles: ‘As a prerequisite for the EU to undertake or contribute to a Monitoring mission an invitation from the host State or an authorization by the UN Security Council or otherwise in accordance with the UN Charter or another authorization permitted under international law will be necessary’.\(^{20}\)

According to the civilian and military Headline Goals 2003, 2008, and 2010\(^{21}\) in line with the Petersberg tasks, the CSDP engagement should cover the whole spectrum of a crisis and a conflict, from its prevention up to the peace consolidation: ‘The availability of effective instruments including military assets will often play a crucial role at the beginning of a crisis, during its development and/or in the post conflict phase’.\(^{22}\) From the civilian side since the Council of Feira in 2000,


\(^{22}\) EU Council, ‘Headline Goal 2010’, n. 21 above.
the accent has been put on the preventive initiatives. Moreover, MILEX 05 simulates a preventive intervention, while MILEX 07 and MILEX 08 are focused on a crisis management situation and MILEX 09 foresees post-conflict stabilization activities.

Concerning the typology of the engagement, institutional documents and CSDP exercises show that the EU aims at developing both civilian and military capabilities. From the military point of view, the Headline Goal 2010 focusing on the Battlegroups concept highlights the importance of a reactive, targeted, limited in time and space, small-scale, flexible, and punctual approach on the field, foreseeing an exit strategy. On the civilian side, the Feira European Council of June 2000 identified four priority areas, namely the police, the rule of law, the civilian administration, and the civil protection, as well as two civilian mission typologies, namely the substitution missions with executive tasks and the support missions aiming, monitoring, and mentoring. The Civilian Headline Goal 2008 enlarged the civilian priority fields to include different kinds of monitoring missions as well as support to Special Representatives of the EU. This engagement will include, *inter alia*, activities such as security sector reform and support disarmament and demobilization/reintegration processes. The same document also recommends an integrated and flexible approach, aiming at coordinating in an ad hoc way and adapting all the multidimensional instruments to the specific needs on the field: ‘The EU will seek to deploy integrated civilian crisis management packages which respond to the specific needs on the ground and make use of the full range of its crisis management capabilities. The size, composition and tasks of these ESDP civilian crisis management packages will vary according to the specific needs’. This also includes coordination with the military instruments. The need for the capacity to react rapidly on the field within five days is also emphasized. In line with this principle, since 2005 the Civilian Response Teams have been implemented with the intention of strengthening multifunctional civilian crisis management resources in an integrated format. A lot of attention is also given to the development of a civil-military approach. In this regard, the Civil-Military Cell has been operational since 2005 and is allowed to activate the EU Operations Centre, including civilian and military elements, available since the beginning of 2007. Moreover, the Crisis management exercise of 2002 aims at testing the coordination among civilian and military CSDP instruments, while MILEX 07 checks for the first time the functioning of the EU Operations Centre.

Finally, concerning the follow-up of the interventions, at civilian level the accent is focused on the importance of coordinating CSDP and European Community activities for the definition of a long-term follow-up: ‘In defining end-states

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The Emergence of a Strategic Culture within the Common Security

and exit strategies it will be of particular importance to focus on the coherence of ESDP and Community assistance, in particular taking into account planned and possible future community activity, both crisis management and longer term post conflict reconstruction efforts. At military level, the development of the Battlegroups concept – foreseeing a six-month temporary engagement – includes in itself the emphasis on a pre-identified exit strategy. Moreover, both the typology of the interventions, conceptualized in the framework of the EU and the UN military cooperation, namely the bridging operations and the standby operations, imply the pre-definition of the follow-up of the EU military engagement.

3. The Bottom-Up Institutional Level

Howorth considers that the development of a common strategic culture at EU level will imply much more than simply erasing divergences. Indeed, it ‘will require a socialization process – in Brussels – among the growing ranks of officials concerned with policy-shaping’. Our study of the emergence of a European strategic culture actually assumes the existence of bottom-up institutional inputs, namely a set of common visions and expectations concerning CSDP, representing a shared cognitive luggage resulting from a socialization process among the actors involved in CSDP development and implementation. Therefore, we turn to constructivist and institutionalist approaches. We define socialization as the process of inducting actors into norms and rule of a given community, allowing them to develop a shared cognitive luggage in the context of the enclosure within which they interact.

We thus argue that, within the institutions working in the framework of CSDP, a European socialization process is going on. It allows actors coming from different national backgrounds, who interact in Brussels, to progressively detach from strictly national visions and expectations on CSDP, developing, at the same time, a more common European interest-oriented approach. From the one side, within the CSDP institutions, a set of socializing norms develops and influences actors working within these institutions, by socializing them. From the other side, actors progressively socialized by these norms develop a set of shared visions and

26 Howorth, 2007, n. 11 above, 196.
expectations on CSDP, representing bottom-up institutional inputs to the development of a common strategic culture.

The Political and Security Committee, our case study, was established in 2001 by the Treaty of Nice and its responsibilities cover all aspects related to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including the defence issues in the framework of CSDP. The twenty-seven PSC Ambassadors are based and work in Brussels, where they meet officially twice a week (on Tuesday and Friday) and where they have informal daily contacts. Some studies on the PSC based on empirical interviews underline the *esprit de corps* and the socialization process that develop within this institution. Our case study is based on twenty-seven semi-structured interviews conducted in Brussels between November 2007 and February 2008 with fifteen PSC Ambassadors, fifteen officials working on CSDP for the PSC within the Member States’ Permanent Representations, and two officials coming from the intergovernmental world having worked closely within the PSC on CSDP issues. Our interviews were organized into three sets of questions concerning, first, the negotiation process within the PSC, in order to capture the existence of socializing norms; second, the nature of CSDP, for understanding the common visions on CSDP; and third, the expectations concerning the future developments and implementation of CSDP.

Concerning the first set of questions, we were asking how, during the formal and informal negotiation processes related to CSDP interventions, twenty-seven Ambassadors coming from countries having different strategic priorities manage to find the consensus necessary for the launch of missions and operations. We were also asking to provide concrete examples. Interviewees put the accent on the fact that actors’ behaviour is driven by the necessity to find a constructive consensus in the name of the more general European interest and according to the principle of solidarity. This implies that even a Member State does not have a national-specific interest in a proposed CSDP intervention, it does not block the process, and sometimes it even participates in the missions or operations, showing awareness of a broader European interest and manifesting supportive concern for other’s state priorities within the EU. With respect to this, one interviewee commented: ‘The impression I have is that PSC is not purely intergovernmental where states just arrive with their national interest to protect. It is much easier to create a common interest. Representatives interiorize this thank to the fact that they see each other a lot and are far away from the home capitals’. Another official stated that: ‘Inside the PSC everyone agrees in principle that not everybody can reflect

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29 Ambassadors and officials interviewed are quoted below in an anonymous way, as agreed during the interviews.
the national position entirely (...). Although twenty-seven Member States don’t think the same, we agree on something very specific which is not always the lowest common denominator’. Another Ambassador said that: ‘The support on the basis of solidarity process is expected. Even if XXX does not have a national interest, it just works in the name of solidarity’.

The analysis of the interviews has shown that, to a different degree, actors are socialized around the norm of the promotion of European interest and around the norm of solidarity. This socialization affects the actors’ behaviour during negotiations and pushes them to act in the name of a constructive consensus.

We turn now to the second set of questions concerning the nature of CSDP, aiming at investigating the existence of common visions on CSDP. We were asking which are, according to the interviewees, the most important elements to be taken into account while deciding to deploy a mission or an operation and which is the added value of the CSDP interventions, in relation to that of other international organizations. We were wondering, more generally, which are the most important characteristics of CSDP for the interviewees as well as their opinions on the temporality of the EU engagement and on the CSDP and NATO relations.

The related answers show that the interviewees share the following common visions. Concerning the main factors to be taken into account while launching a CSDP intervention, the engagement should be based on a strong international legitimacy, which implies furthermore the acceptation of host countries in the framework of civilian missions. Military engagement must be restricted in size, time, and space and must imply a specific and detailed mandate as well as an exit strategy: ‘We should know since the beginning to what we engage and for how long (...) we have to pay attention to disengagement (...) and we have to ensure a successful transition’. The engagement must foresee a specific follow-up and promote the principle of local ownership: ‘We want to create a security which is acceptable to the country for the future. We don’t want to create another type of colony. The local ownership is very important in our way of planning and conducting operations’.

Concerning the added value of the EU action within the CSDP and its characteristic in general, CSDP interventions are part of a broader global approach of the EU and of the International Community. CSDP action is thus complementary to the larger and long-term EU action and to the activities of the International Community. CSDP interventions are based on multidimensional instruments that can be deployed in an integrated and ad hoc manner, according to field-specific needs on the basis of a holistic, flexible, and comprehensive approach, which implies an enlarged vision of security and a multidimensional perception of threats: ‘EU can come with different instruments and intervention [to manage a crisis] and can act more precisely [in comparison to other international organizations]: it goes directly to the problem and it assesses exactly where to act inside the system [of crisis management initiatives]’.
Interventions are characterized by a follow-up. Military operations, apart from sharing the elements mentioned above, have the vocation of constructively articulating themselves with civilian means already deployed on the field. Therefore, according to the interviewees, the added value of the CSDP action relies on its capacity to articulate civilian and military instruments, on the capacity to flexibly articulate different instruments for ‘tailored’ interventions and on the follow-up foreseen for each intervention: ‘Civil-military is something that nobody else have. If we only have military, then we duplicate instruments that other organizations of whom we are members already have’. ‘Nowadays, crisis management is not 100% military. Therefore, instruments should not be only military. The emerging civil-military approach is a winning one and it is part of our history’. Concerning the CSDP and NATO, actors share the visions that the two organizations are complementary on the field and that cooperation must be extended on the civilian side.

Despite all these common visions, the analysis has shown that, as long as the temporality of the CSDP interventions is concerned, actors are not socialized and do not share the same views. We were asking at which moment of a crisis the EU is mostly ready to engage and why there is a disproportionately high number of post-conflict interventions, compared to the low number of preventive or immediate crisis management deployments. The answers were different. Some interviewees considered that the EU is willing and ready to engage in all types of crisis and that this disproportion is merely due to lack of specific circumstances. Others considered that the EU prefers to engage in post-conflict because it is easier in terms of political consensus. Other interviewees stressed the point of field capacities and financing, which are more complex in the framework of immediate crisis management and preventive actions than in case of post-conflict interventions.

Concerning the third set of questions related to the common expectations on CSDP, we were asking if the interviewees foresee a future engagement implementing civilian and/or military instruments and if CSDP has the vocation to became global, under geographical terms, or if it will remain focused on the current main area of interventions, namely Europe, Middle East, and Africa. Expectations represent a synthesis between an ideal approach based on what one would like to see in the future and a realist approach based on possibility calculations linked to the reality.

Concerning the first question, interviewees do not agree whether CSDP will keep on developing both civilian and military instruments. While certain interviewees consider that both typologies of instruments will be implemented in the future, others put the accent on the civilian side: ‘Today the engagement is more civilian than military. This is the reflection of the trend of the world: the military is less needed. There is much more work in the civilian field. After a conflict, a country needs much more civilian reconstruction approach. The EU is thus responding to the demand of reality’. There are no common expectations on this side. Nevertheless, there is a common expectation that the EU will strengthen the implementation of the civilian-military cooperation.
Concerning the typology of the civilian engagement that interviewees foresee to be implemented, while they agree on the fact that the actual trend is to deploy civilian instruments on integrated basis, they do not share the common expectations on the implementation of all the civilian fields identified by the Feira Council. We were actually wondering about the future of civilian administration and civil protection, identified by the Feira European Council as priority field of interventions, but practically never implemented on the field. Answers were different, stating either a lack of political will with no expectations for the future or a lack of practical circumstances and positive expectations.

No common expectations have been found concerning the geographical engagement of CSDP in the future. While some officials and Ambassadors are persuaded that the CSDP will become global and is potentially able to act everywhere in the world, if its engagement is appropriate, others consider that, in practice, according to political calculation, the EU will never engage in such areas that are sensitive in terms of EU-Russia or EU-United States relations. The two different expectations can be easily understood by comparing the following two statements: ‘There are no boundaries to the EU action. Why shouldn’t we engage in Latin America in the framework of ESDP? If there is a call to Colombia and if it fits other criteria of comparative advantage and high degree of success, why shouldn’t we go? We have to see if there is a security interest’. ‘The EU has a potential to move beyond the traditional regions where it is engaged in the framework of ESDP. But I think that realistically, it will never go to Latin America as the USA will never accept it, neither to Central Asia, as the Russian will never accept it. The aspirations are there, but then there are other concerns’.

IV Conclusions: Elements of an Emergent Strategic Culture within the CSDP

On the basis of the previous analysis, it is now possible to identify elements of the emergent strategic culture within the CSDP, by comparing the results of the three levels of analysis. Table 1 shows the convergences and the divergences between the operational activity of the EU and the top-down institutional inputs, namely between the common patterns of habitual behaviour and the ideas spread by the institutions through CSDP documents and exercises.

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<th>Analytical Variable</th>
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<th>Analytical Variable</th>
<th>Elements of Convergence</th>
<th>Elements of Divergence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| The relations between the CSDP intervention and the more general EU engagement in the same country | – Complementarity  
– Long-term approach |  
Institutional level: no geographical limits to the CSDP engagement  
Operational level: field engagement mostly focused in South-Eastern Europe, in the Middle East, and in Africa |
| The geographical dimension of the CSDP deployment and the perception of threats and security, which is translated into the field engagement | – Comprehensive approach  
– Enlarged vision of security  
– Multidimensional threats, far away, against which civilian and military instruments are needed |  
Institutional level: the whole temporal spectrum of a crisis/ Accent put on prevention/Concept of Battlegroups for immediate crisis management  
Operational level: post-crisis deployment/few prevention and immediate crisis management deployment (no Battlegroups deployment until now) |
| The international legitimacy of the intervention including the relations the CSDP intervention and the local authorities | Strong international legitimacy either for civilian missions (invitation or approval of local authorities) or for military operations (UN mandate + informal approval of local authorities or demand of an international organization) |  
Institutional level: the whole temporal spectrum of a crisis/ Accent put on prevention/Concept of Battlegroups for immediate crisis management  
Operational level: post-crisis deployment/few prevention and immediate crisis management deployment (no Battlegroups deployment until now) |
| The temporality of the intervention |  |  |
| The typology of the intervention | – Trend to implement an integrated approach (missions specialized in different fields)  
– Trend to implement a civil-military approach  
– ‘Tailored’ and ad hoc interventions, based on a flexible use of multidimensional means  
– Military operations limited in time, space, mandate, and size, with an exit strategy  
– Implementation of local ownership |  
Institutional level:  
– Civilian means: implementation in the field of police, rule of law, civilian administration, civilian protection, monitoring, security sector reform/executives, and non-executive missions  
– Military means: Concept of Battlegroups  
Operational level:  
– Civilian means: implementation of only police, rule of law, monitoring, and security sector reform missions/non-executive missions only (within EULEX Kosovo, for the first time some executive tasks are implemented) |
If we analyse the results of this table (top-down institutional level versus operational level) with those of the bottom-up institutional level, we notice that actors do not share common visions or expectations on issues around which Table 1 shows divergences between the operational and top-down institutional levels. Conversely, we notice that actors are socialized around shared visions and expectations that correspond to elements of convergence between the common patterns of habitual behaviour on the field and the shared ideas spread by the institutions in the framework of CSDP. According to our definition of strategic culture and our framework of analysis, on the basis of the results issued from this comparison, we are now able to identify elements of the emergent EU strategic culture within CSDP, among the convergent issues (see table above), which correspond to shared visions and expectations.

The EU emergent strategic culture is thus based on the principle of the projection of forces within a multilateral framework, which implies constructive cooperation and complementarity with International Community efforts and with EU long-term approach on the field relying on Communitarian instruments. The EU strategic culture is also focused on the principle of international legitimacy and implementation of local ownership. It relies on a flexible, comprehensive, dynamic, and long-term approach, based on an ad hoc and integrated (including civil-military) use of multidimensional instruments, according to the circumstances on the field, on the development of local capacities, implying a coherent follow-up of the field intervention. Concerning the military side, the EU strategic culture is based on a restricted use of military means, deployed on the basis of a mandate limited in time and space, foreseeing an exit strategy. If we take into account the elements of divergences among the three levels of analysis, we can also conclude that, at the moment, we are not able to qualify the EU emergent strategic culture in terms of reactivity in the framework of the temporality of the engagement, nor in terms of universality, concerning the geographical areas of CSDP interventions.

The post-Lisbon foreign and security policy context might encourage further developments of the EU strategic culture. From the one side, the Lisbon Treaty creates the new post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy/Vice President of the European Commission as well as the new External Action Service composed by Council, Commission, and national officials working on EU external affairs, including security issues. This new institutional asset should push cross-institutional socialization in the field of CSDP in Brussels thus strengthening more coherent bottom-up institutional inputs. From the other side, the Lisbon Treaty enlarges the Petersberg tasks and introduces the concept of structured cooperation within the CSDP. The operational activity of the EU might thus be strengthened thus reinforcing common patterns of habitual behaviour.

Therefore, the same framework of analysis should be used, within a few years, to study the progressive developments and evolutions of a more consolidated EU strategic culture, on the basis of the analysis of new interventions on the field and new institutional documents and exercises to be completed with a new round of interviews.