The EU-Africa migration partnership:
A case study of the EU’s migration dialogue with Senegal and Ghana

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The recent, yet sudden increase in the intensity of migratory movement between Africa and Europe has encouraged a renewed political engagement from the EU towards the continent. This engagement has mainly taken the form of migration dialogue between the EU and certain migrant-sending countries in Africa, which aims to create channels for communication on migration matters. Migration dialogue with African sending countries has become a crucial part of the external dimension of the EU’s migration policy, or rather the integration of migration policy with traditional foreign policy domains such as development, trade, and security and the establishment of cooperation mechanisms between the receiving and sending countries for the purposes of ‘joint migration management’.

Both on the EU and African side there is an increased recognition that through a coherent and coordinated policy of joint migration management, migration can be beneficial to both countries of origin and destination. The need for cooperation on migration challenges the traditional relationship between the EU and Africa. This relationship has often been qualified as asymmetric, where the EU holds overarching power over a weaker African side. The EU, the Commission, and/or the Member States are thus considered to have the ultimate decision-making power when it comes to relations with African countries. Relations have been conceptualised as driven mainly by the EU’s interests and preferences (see Elgstrom, 2000, 2005; Holland, 2002; Olsen, 2002, 2005). The migration sphere poses a challenge to this notion. The EU’s intensified interest in conducting migration dialogue with migrant-sending countries “has given new strategic importance to certain African countries, [and] this new strategic importance has favoured unprecedented forms of cooperation” (CeSPI/SID, 2006: 10). This article challenges the common notion that power asymmetry necessarily characterises EU-Africa relations. Although power asymmetry is evidenced by the possibility

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1 Thanks to Karen Smith, Gorm Rye Olsen, Mary Farrell, Maurizio Carbone and Gordon Crawford for their feedback on earlier versions of this paper.

2 Joint migration management has been used by the EU and various international organisations to describe the dialogue and policies being negotiated and implemented between countries of origin, transit, and destination in order to maximise the benefits and minimise the disadvantages of migration for all actors concerned. Management essentially refers to policies that aim to reduce irregular migration, promote the rights and protection of migrants, reduce economic pressures that influence outward migration, and regulate labour migration. Countries are ideally to work together to find a common or burden-sharing approach towards migration.
of the EU to implement restrictive measures to prevent and control migration flows, and through the use of coercive measures to induce or even force sending countries to cooperate in prevention and control, despite the significant pull factors for migration originating in the EU, in the migration field the EU does not hold absolute power. The need to engage migrant-sending countries to cooperate in stemming migratory flows challenges traditional power relations. The necessity for cooperation and the increased strategic importance of migration for the EU have created a more balanced relationship in which both parties can make demands and concessions, giving some African governments a new scope for influencing the EU and getting their demands met.

This paper explores the extent to which the EU’s migration dialogue with African countries has impacted on its relations with the continent. More specifically, it looks at how the scope of influence of two major migration countries in West Africa, namely Senegal and Ghana, has been affected by the EU’s engagement on migration. It will be demonstrated that despite the intensification of dialogue with African countries, the EU faces constraints in conducting this dialogue. These constraints negatively affect the EU’s ability to be an effective actor in migration negotiations with African countries. Some African governments, aware of the constraints the EU, have been successful firstly in repositioning the migration agenda in favour of development rather than purely focusing on migration control, and secondly, that they have been successful in driving and establishing ownership over joint cooperation schemes. While the EU’s migration policy towards Africa has been characterised as geared exclusively towards a politics of control, the evolution of the migration agenda towards a more comprehensive approach considering the interests of destination countries can be partially attributed to the leadership of some African governments.

The first section reviews the major developments in EU-Africa migration dialogue. It shows that although the EU has sensitised African countries to the importance of the migration phenomenon, at the same time, agendas often are characterised by diverging interests and concerns. The second section reviews Africa’s views on migration. Here the focus has largely been on making migration a positive tool for development. African governments generally agree with the need to coordinate migration agendas and have been willing to engage in dialogue with the EU provided this considers the concerns of both origin and destination countries. It also questions whether the need for mutual cooperation on migration matters has the potential of changing a relationship (EU-Africa) which is traditionally characterised by inequalities and power asymmetry. The third section considers how migration dialogue has actually played out in practise and to what extent it has offered
migrant-sending countries an increased scope for influence vis-à-vis the EU by considering the cases of Senegal and Ghana. Senegal has managed to reposition the dialogue to more closely consider its own interests, by preventing any movement or agreement on migration issues unless the government is expected to benefit. In Ghana, EU dialogue has been far less intense, and policy processes and outcomes have much more externally-driven, rather than government-owned. As a consequence, the EU has not been identified as the lead actor driving the migration debate, leading to closer cooperation with other international agencies. Based on findings from the case study, the conclusions analyse the EU’s capacities and constraints in formulating an effective and coherent approach to cooperation with migrant-sending countries. Regardless of the EU’s increased efforts in formulating an effective and comprehensive migration policy, institutional and political constraints have weakened its effectiveness, and therefore its ability to meet its preferences in migration dialogue with countries of origin and transit.

Migration in EU-Africa relations

The EU’s commitment to the formulation of a migration policy has grown significantly and rapidly since its initial formation in the Amsterdam Treaty. The gradual institutionalisation of the policy (Geddes, 2000) and the growth of high-level political discourse on migration matters have had significant implications for the EU’s relations with migrant-sending countries. Africa has witnessed an increasing willingness from the EU to engage in cooperation efforts geared at developing a joint strategy on migration. The Cotonou Agreement between the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP), which in linking migration with development and inserting clauses on migration into the text, brought the issue to the forefront of the EU’s relations with Africa. The insertion of a migration clause, Article 13, was amongst the most contentious issues during the Cotonou negotiations, highlighting the weight and importance of the issue for both the EU and the ACP. It defines the parameters of the EU-ACP dialogue on migration, and is essentially the result of a difficult compromise between the parties’ different views and interests on migration.\(^3\) Although the Article considers the EU and ACP’s obligations towards migrants by committing to the right of fair treatment, importantly, the Article also allows the EU to

\(^3\) On the EU side, Member States, under domestic pressure to reduce irregular migration stemming from Africa, strongly endorsed the integration of a readmission clause into the Agreement. On the ACP side, securing the protection of the rights of their migrants’ residing and working in the EU was the most relevant concern (Vanheukelom et al. 2006: 6).
negotiate readmission agreements with individual ACP countries and solicits cooperation in joint migration management.\(^4\)

Since Cotonou, migration dialogue with Africa has become more regular. Shocking events in Ceuta and Melilla in 2005, in which several unarmed African migrants were killed while attempting to surmount blockades surrounding the two Spanish enclaves in Morocco, further incited a call for migration dialogue with Africa. In 2005 the Council adopted the *Global Approach to Migration*, prompting action in three key areas: strengthening cooperation and action between the Member States, increasing dialogue and cooperation with Africa, and promoting the creation of a framework for funding and implementation of a strategy on migration. In December 2006, the Council urged the establishment of a comprehensive migration policy, which would include partnerships with key migration countries and regions. Ministerial conferences in Rabat, Tripoli and Paris between 2006 and 2008 led the parties agreed to a multi-annual programme of cooperation based on enhancing legal migration, combating irregular migration, and establishing synergies between migration and development. A Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment also became one of the strategic priority areas under the Joint EU-Africa Strategic Partnership agreed in Lisbon in 2007, setting out an ambitious agenda for long and short term cooperation. Lastly, the *European Pact on Immigration and Asylum*, adopted by the Council in October 2008, again reaffirmed the EU’s intent on creating comprehensive partnerships with countries of origin and transit.

Since 2006, the EU has sent diplomatic missions to key African countries to negotiate readmission agreements and secure cooperation in combating irregular migratory movements. The dialogue, based on Cotonou’s Article 13, has been led by EU delegations and embassy staff of Council Presidencies and interested Member States, and ideally covers, “a broad range of issues from institution and capacity building and effective integration of migrants to return and the effective implementation of readmission obligations, in order to establish a mutually beneficial cooperation in this field” (CEU, 2005: 5). In 2006, the first such missions were sent to Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal, and in 2007 and 2008 further missions were sent to Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa.

\(^4\) In October 1999, the Tampere European Council established that readmission clauses would henceforth be included in all EU agreements with third countries. The insertion of this clause in Cotonou was met with fraught resistance from the ACP, on the grounds that the obligation to readmit third country nationals was incompatible with international law (later concurred by the EU’s Legal Service, (Statewatch Bulletin, 2000)). The issue was left unsettled until the final round of negotiations, where the EU and ACP eventually agreed that readmission clauses would be negotiated at the bilateral level between individual countries and the EU.
The EU has used three main instruments in order to incite cooperation with migrant-sending countries, namely financial and technical assistance, increased labour market access offers, and the implementation of border control mechanisms and negotiating readmission agreements. Since 2005, the European Development Fund (EDF) has dedicated some assistance towards migration-related areas. In addition, the Aeneas scheme has provided specific and complementary financial and technical assistance to third countries in support of efforts to manage migration flows.\(^5\) The EU has also taken steps to increase opportunities for legal migration. In 2009, the Council approved the so-called ‘Blue Card directive’, which aims to recruit highly-skilled workers to the EU by offering a single work and residence visa, and the ‘Rights directive’, aiming to facilitate migrant integration by allowing access to a range of socio-economic benefits.\(^6\) The EU has also keenly encouraged the implementation of circular migration schemes, in order to ensure that regular labour migration remains temporary. Recently, the Council has approved the creation of mobility partnerships with third countries, and is currently implementing pilot schemes in Africa and Eastern Europe.\(^7\) These partnerships offer temporary labour market access in exchange for cooperation on combating irregular migration and assistance on border security through Frontex, the EU’s external border agency. Lastly, political engagement has been coupled with an increased use in security instruments to fight irregular migration. Since 2005, Frontex has carried out studies on surveillance systems and risk analysis reports on African migratory routes, and has implemented several border patrolling missions mostly in West Africa. Additionally, the *European Pact* has also evidenced the EU’s commitment to fight irregular migration, by making the strengthening of border controls and ensuring readmission and return of irregular migrants priority areas for action.

Increased high-level dialogue between the EU and Africa and the variety of instruments used to consolidate this dialogue, undoubtedly indicate the EU’s interest and intention to work in cooperation with countries of origin and transit in regulating and managing the migration phenomenon (Gnisci, 2008: 85). The intensification of the EU’s efforts on the continent and the gradual establishment of a framework for cooperation and action have also increased pressure on African governments to consider how migration

\(^5\) Since 2007, this has become known as the *Thematic Cooperation Programme with Third Countries in the Development Aspects of Migration and Asylum*.

\(^6\) While the Commission has expressed its intention to define the conditions of entry and stay for other selected categories of economic migrants, at present the EU’s legal migration policy has focused exclusively on facilitating the recruitment and integration of highly-skilled labour.

\(^7\) Pilot partnerships were launched with Cape Verde and Moldova in 2008 and with Georgia in 2009. Negotiations are underway with Senegal (see case study below).
affects the continent. Although the placing of migration issues on the African agenda has largely been spurred by European pressure, at the same time the interests and issues of concern between the continents have tended to diverge.

The African Migration Agenda

With the growing interest on the EU side to place migration issues high on the agenda, the African side too has begun to consider migration as an important element to be placed on the political agenda. Many African governments now accept that migration cannot be seen in isolation of their development policies (Zoomers et al., 2008: 4). The African migration agenda has tended to focus more on a migration-development nexus, as opposed to migration control. Major issues of concern include the facilitation and institutionalisation of remittance flows; encouraging human capital gains and promoting economic growth; engagement with the Diaspora, facilitating the forging of trade, investment and development links between origin and destination countries; more assistance in tackling ‘root causes’ of migration, such as poverty, unemployment, political and economic instabilities, overpopulation, and natural disasters; and assistance towards national capacity building and training to better cope with migration at the domestic level (Adepoju, 2008; Zoomers et al., 2008).

With migration bringing potential developmental benefits, it should come as no surprise that in cooperation with destination countries, African governments have focused on the positive aspects of the phenomenon. In general, African governments have been willing to engage with Europe provided the dialogue considers the concerns of both origin and destination countries. That said, interests in finding a common approach to migration management diverge somewhat between Africa and the EU. While developments in the external dimension of the EU’s migration policy have tended to combine repressive measures with incentive instruments in order to incite cooperation from sending countries, African governments have instead focused largely on enhancing the developmental prospects that migration provides. Regardless of these diverging strategies, it is now widely recognised that migration can only be effectively managed through mutual engagement from sending and destination countries. This generates a set of interesting questions on whether the migration dialogue between the EU and Africa has the potential of changing a relationship traditionally characterised by inequalities and power asymmetry. Indeed, the necessity for cooperation can be expected to create a more balanced relationship in which both parties can make demands and concessions. Has increased interest from the EU in cooperation with Africa offered
opportunities for African governments to make demands on the EU? How have governments utilised these opportunities? Or has a traditional asymmetry in power dictated the dialogue on migration, thus favouring the EU’s preferences over those of African governments? The next section explores these questions through a case study of the EU’s dialogue with two major migrant-sending countries in West Africa: Senegal and Ghana.

**Case studies: The EU’s migration dialogue with Senegal and Ghana**

Senegal and Ghana are considerable contributors to migrant flows to Europe. Aside from Nigeria, they are the two sub-Saharan African countries with the highest contribution to migratory flows to OECD countries (see Table 1).

**Table 1: Migrants of selected West African countries in OECD countries, (2005)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>Spain, Italy, Greece, Portugal</th>
<th>Other Europe</th>
<th>North America</th>
<th>Japan, Australia, New Zealand</th>
<th>Number of Emigrants</th>
<th>% Population (2000 UNPD)</th>
<th>% of W. Africans in OECD countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>12,404</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>50,543</td>
<td>13,272</td>
<td>27,411</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>103,986</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>4,376</td>
<td>56,112</td>
<td>21,121</td>
<td>19,954</td>
<td>84,274</td>
<td>3,605</td>
<td>189,442</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>40,222</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>3,622</td>
<td>784</td>
<td>3,680</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>48,508</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>9,591</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>3,993</td>
<td>884</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16,917</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>2,563</td>
<td>88,378</td>
<td>26,435</td>
<td>22,361</td>
<td>150,917</td>
<td>3,190</td>
<td>293,844</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>82,116</td>
<td>723</td>
<td>41,476</td>
<td>3,781</td>
<td>12,739</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>141,134</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD Migration Database, 2005; IOM 2008

While most Senegalese migrants are considered low-skilled, Ghana, on the other hand, has a much more proportionate distribution of skill levels amongst its migrants, where the majority are either medium or highly skilled, rather than low skilled (see Table 2).

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8 This next section is based mainly on interviews conducted with Commission, IOM, and Senegalese government officials in Dakar and Brussels between April 2008 and May 2009.
Table 2: Skill characteristics of Senegalese and Ghanaian migrants, (2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Senegal</th>
<th>Ghana</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of migrants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly skilled</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Skilled</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Skilled</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD Migration Database 2005

Senegalese migration has mostly taken the form of irregular migration, with migrants either overstaying on temporary visas, and to a lesser extent, entering the EU illegally via clandestine overland or sea routes (Gerdes, 2007: 6). Stricter controls along the overland routes in Northern Africa have also transformed Senegal into transit country, with a significant number of non-Senegalese migrants coming through Senegal in order to depart from its coastline (Spaan and van Moppes, 2006: 14; Adepoju, 2009: 21). In 2006, the irregular migration situation intensified significantly with the amount of migrants arriving on Spain’s Canary Islands increasing six-fold from the previous year, with half believed to be of Senegalese origin (Gerdes, 2007: 6). Ghana also contributes to irregular migration with mostly low skilled migrants using migration routes via Morocco and Libya to reach Europe (mainly Italy or Malta) or via the West African coastline to reach the Canaries. However, Ghana’s contributions to irregular migration are not considered as significant as those of Senegal.

Although both countries provide an important source of migrants towards Europe, contributing to both regular and irregular migration flows, as the following section demonstrates, the EU’s engagement with both countries, and the countries’ own response to this have differed quite extensively.

**Senegal**

The Senegalese government considers migration a positive phenomenon, bringing enormous benefits both at the level of the state and the individual migrant. Indeed, the government’s

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9 In 2005, 4,800 migrants arrived on the Canaries. In 2006 this increased to 32,000 arrivals (Gerdes 2007: 6).
10 Two (tentative) examples give some indication of this: in 2000, the Italian Ministry of Interior estimated that the number of irregular Senegalese migrants amounted to around 1,300, while irregular Ghanaians amounted to around 800 (Chiuri et al. 2005: 20); also in 2000, some 20% of Ghanaian migrants in Italy admitted to entering irregularly or overstaying, while 50% of Senegalese in Spain admitted to this (NIDI/Eurostat 2001).
The government’s priorities for migration can be characterised as follows: close engagement with the Senegalese diaspora; facilitating remittance flows and orientating these towards productive use and investment in development; encourage the return of migrants and to facilitating their integration into the economy; mitigating the brain drain and avoiding the departure of skilled and semi-skilled labour by providing increased incentives for potential migrants to remain in Senegal; requesting funding for capacity-building and increasing ownership of its migration phenomenon.

The missions are mainly run by Spanish border patrols services, in joint cooperation with France, Luxembourg, Portugal, Italy and Senegal. During the course of the missions, the flow of irregular migration is said to have decreased drastically, with both Spain and Senegal declaring the mission as largely successful. The missions continued to operate well into 2009 (CEC, 2006; FRONTEX, 2007; Panizzon, 2008).

The RRM provided Senegalese naval forces with the equipment and training necessary to divert and avert departures from Senegal; it supported the reinsertion of repatriated irregular migrants and assisted in the voluntarily return; and it provided assistance to conduct comparative research on legislation in Senegal, Spain, France and Italy concerning the protection of unaccompanied minor migrants, migrant rights, and other legal issues related to irregular migration (Panizzon, 2008).
irregular migration and strengthening Senegalese and regional capacity. Assistance in migration-related areas was also incorporated into the country’s aid allocation under the EDF. The migration profile was allocated €4M under the 10th EDF, less than 1% of the country’s total allocation. Indeed, this funding has been criticised by the government and migration experts as too modest to realistically tackle the challenges faced by Senegal.

Despite these efforts, according to the Senegalese government and IOM officials, the EU began its interactions by pushing a migration control agenda rather than joint migration management. The fundamental interest in conducting dialogue was mainly to find a common position on stemming irregular migration and implementing control measures, and secondly to find agreement on readmission and border controls. Thus, initial dialogue and policy actions in Senegal can be characterised by a systematic divergence in interests and views. On the one hand, the EU considered the Senegalese government largely uninterested in the dialogue, especially towards managing irregular migration. Yet, the difficulties in the dialogue were also partially due to the EU’s own constraints. The EU delegation, which was mandated to follow-up on the dialogue, has admitted lacking the capacity, expertise and human resources necessary to carry out its task effectively. On the other hand, according to the Senegalese government, the EU initiated the dialogue without adequate concern for the government’s interests. For example, the initial use of the RRM was criticised as having undermined government ownership. Indeed, the RRM was employed as a short-term financing instrument almost immediately following initial dialogue, after which the EU Development Commissioner, Louis Michel, assured the government that long-term funding would be provided in order to assist in migration management. This assurance was made however, without a funding mechanism in place that could be immediately employed, hence the use of the RRM. Furthermore, dialogue under Article 13 was also tense and difficult. The government interpreted this as the EU unilaterally soliciting the signing of a readmission agreement without adequate incentives in place for it to benefit from agreeing to such an agreement. This led to a series of difficult negotiations between the Commission and the Senegalese Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning which migrants should be considered for readmission (namely only Senegalese nationals or also transit migrants).

Most recently however, a shift in the dialogue towards more positive engagement with the government’s own interests in migration management has occurred. In September

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14 All projects that concerned legal migration or migration management also included an element of migration control, and moreover were implemented commencing in late 2007 or early 2008, while projects focusing on irregular migration were mostly implemented in late 2005 and early 2006.
2007, the EU and Senegal released a joint declaration noting that recent dialogue had proven fruitful, with agendas largely converging. Although the migration dialogue has continued to take account of migration control, the declaration indicates a definite shift in the scope of the dialogue by considering issues of concern to origin countries, such as legal migration, the migration and development nexus, and domestic capacity-building (EU-GoS, 2007). Recent policy initiatives have also demonstrated a closer convergence of agendas. In June 2008, the Council mandated the Commission to commence negotiations with the government on a mobility partnership (CEU, 2008a). Mobility partnerships essentially operate on incentive-based mechanisms, by granting increased labour market access in exchange for cooperation on migration control. At the same time it represents a shift from a purely unilateral control-oriented approach because it aims at joint cooperation in making migration a positive factor for development by facilitating legal and circular migration between the country and those Member States interested in participating in the scheme (Chou, 2009). Thus far the only pilot mobility programme to have been launched in Africa is with Cape Verde. Although the Cape Verdian case provides some insight into what a mobility partnership might entail for Senegal (see CEC, 2008; Chou, 2009), it is noteworthy that the countries face very different socio-economic situations. Cape Verde has the strongest economy in West Africa, it has a low population, and poverty is not as prevalent, thus making it a low-risk for mass migration. Senegal however is a low-income country with a large and mostly poor population. The fact that the EU is willing to enter into this type of agreement with Senegal is significant of the interests in the country, and the importance that Senegal has gained on the EU’s migration agenda.

The evolution of the dialogue is also evident in the intervention strategy adopted for sub-Saharan Africa concerning financial programming for the programme replacing Aeneas. In addition to migration control, the programme prioritises regional and trans-border dialogue and cooperation, strengthening domestic administrative capacity in migration management, implementing labour migration policies, fostering links between migration and development, and even includes migrant rights protection as a priority area (CEC, 2007). According to IOM interviewees, between 2007 and 2008, the migration dialogue between Senegal and the EU moved from purely control-oriented, largely imposed by the EU, to one that more closely considers Senegal’s concerns and interests as a country of origin and transit. Accordingly, negotiations on legal labour migration schemes; increased dialogue on thematic areas, not only control; increased funding for labour migration and circular migration; and engagement from Member States to negotiate labour migration deals with Senegal are an indication of this
changing relationship. At the same time, Senegal has become more flexible on contentious issues such as readmission and border controls.

Dialogue, policy actions, and cooperation on joint migration management between the EU and Senegal have evolved and intensified significantly since 2006. The initially tense and difficult dialogue has moved forward, where both the EU and the Senegalese government are now able to discuss their interests and policy agendas vis-à-vis one another. The mobility partnership currently under negotiation signals a significant step towards a more comprehensive approach. To what extent can this be attributed to the Senegalese government itself, or has this shift been purely EU-driven? In the next section it will become evident that a considerable pro-activeness on the Senegalese side, coupled with intense EU Member State efforts to establish a comprehensive framework have been crucial elements in moving forward the dialogue.

*Senegalese influence in migration dialogue*

The evolution of the dialogue is characterised by increased Senegalese pro-activeness in establishing ownership over its migration phenomenon. As such, the government has keenly focused on enhancing capacity in migration management rather than accepting the unilateral implementation of control mechanisms. Indeed, any Senegalese movement on cooperation in migration control is coupled explicitly with gains in areas related to migration and development, legal and labour migration, and/or domestic capacity-building. Senegal has been successful in exercising leverage in migration dialogue with the EU for two main reasons: its strategic position as a migrant-sending country and its negative perceptions of the EU’s capabilities in migration management, leading to the government’s conscious decision to bypass EU engagement in the interim, and cooperate more closely with specific Member States whose engagement more closely fits Senegalese preferences.

*Strategic position*

At the very basic level, Senegal’s geographic position as a major point of departure for both regular and irregular migrants has certainly placed it amongst the more relevant sending-countries with which the EU is interested in collaborating on migration. Senegal’s contribution to a major influx of irregular and low skilled migrants in Europe is one of the main reasons why the EU has continued to seek engagement with the government, and why it
has often been willing to give concessions to the government’s demands for a more comprehensive framework on migration. Because the EU’s and indeed the Member States’ primary objective for engagement with migrant-sending countries has been to seek cooperation on migration control (through a framework of migration management), it should come as no surprise that Senegal has become a priority partner country from which to seek cooperation. This has also enhanced Senegal’s strategic position vis-à-vis the EU and consequently its ability to make demands that more closely fit its own interests on migration management. As such, the Senegalese government has developed an awareness of its own strategic position within the framework of EU cooperation on migration. Indeed, it has interpreted increased interest from Europe as an opportunity from which it can potentially benefit in terms of development and influence at the EU-Africa and regional levels. Indeed, as one government interviewee claimed:

We Senegalese, we are good negotiators. We know what we want, and we negotiate hard to get it. But we also understand the importance of diplomacy and cooperation to get what we want. In migration negotiations with the EU, we know now that it is the EU that wants our cooperation, and not the other way around. This means that we need to build a partnership together, but that we are also using our new strategic position to get some increased benefits from our cooperation with the EU.

Thus the importance of the migration issue in Senegal’s relations with Europe has allowed the government to use migration as a negotiation ‘instrument,’ by soliciting closer cooperation in exchange for shifting policies closer to its own national interests.

Perception of the EU

Furthermore, Senegal has developed an awareness of the constraints the EU faces in migration dialogue which limit its effectiveness. In fact, Senegalese officials have perceived the EU as constrained on the three levels, namely in its ability to employ the resources and expertise necessary to effectively employ its policies; its inability to deliver a coherent and consistent approach towards migration cooperation by combining migration policies with development policies; and lastly, its inability to coordinate policy preferences and actions on migration between the Commission and the Member States.

Firstly, there is a strong conviction that the EU at present is unable to deal adequately with the reality of migration issues facing the country. The government considers the Commission particularly ill-equipped to deal with migration issues. Procedures are described as long and bureaucratic and communication between the delegation and Brussels
headquarters is seen as limited. The delegation of project implementation to external agencies or intermediaries such as the IOM or the UN Development Programme (UNDP), rather than engaging with the government has been perceived as failing to strengthen the government’s own capacity in migration management, undermining ownership, and has led the government to engage more closely with these agencies rather than with the EU. Furthermore, EU delegation staff has indicated that dialogue with the Senegalese government has at times been difficult largely because progress is not possible without indication and approval from the Council. This inability to act autonomously, combined with the constraints in resources, has led to individual Member States adopting a much more pro-active role in liaising with the government on migration (see below).

Secondly, government officials argue that it has been difficult to find satisfactory agreement with the EU in combining migration with development policies, because of the continual evolving nature of the EU’s migration policy. The Senegalese side is convinced that without a coherent or unitary EU policy on both regular and irregular migration, progress will be limited.

Thirdly, the image of this inability to adequately deal with migration matters is further strengthened by the fact that intense Member State engagement has led to what has been perceived as an incoherent EU position on migration vis-à-vis the government. Coordination between Member States and the Commission is seen as lacking. Each Member State active in the country is seen as pursuing its own bilateral interests and political agendas, which are often much more significant and appropriate in relation to Senegalese preferences.

Senegalese perceptions of the EU as incapable, inconsistent, and/or incoherent, have led the government to make a conscious and strategic choice to stall negotiations at the EU-level until satisfactory agreement could be found, while in the meantime, engaging more intensely with Member States and intermediary agencies, which are seen as more capable in meeting its preference. In employing this strategy, the government has been able to begin shifting the dialogue at the EU level to more closely consider its preferences and has asserted significant ownership over national migration management.

*Senegalese negotiating strategy*

In its negotiations with the EU, the Senegalese government has largely employed a strategy of non-compliance and resistance. This has been evident from the very beginnings of the EU’s attempts at establishing dialogue with the government, and has continued into present-
day negotiations. In 2006, the government delayed the employment of the first FRONTEX mission, until guarantees were made as to the treatment of intercepted migrants and additional funding. This issue was eventually settled when in August 2006 the Senegalese government was allowed to participate in the missions and therefore strengthen its own capabilities and expertise in migration management. In 2007, readmission talks between the government and the EU also stalled. The government has resisted the inclusion of non-nationals in a readmission agreement unless sufficient guarantees on funding for capacity-building to effectively manage the large influx of repatriated migrants can be made.  

Commission interviewees have indicated that a Senegalese strategy of resistance had led the EU to consider alternative options for finding agreement on readmission and migration control. A shift in the EU’s approach towards migration dialogue with Senegal was in Order. Due to the stalled dialogue on readmission agreements, the Commission, on the initiative of Member States, began negotiating the mobility partnership with Senegal. However, in March 2009, these negotiations also reached a stalemate, “as a result of Senegalese dissatisfaction with what they were to receive in return for the EU’s terms” (Chou, 2009: 10). Senegalese officials claim that the government has little interest in negotiating the partnership unless it clearly provides for increased development and capacity-building assistance and improved labour market access for Senegalese migrants. Given the availability of alternative agreements already negotiated on the bilateral level with the most relevant destination countries, unless the EU is able to provide significantly improved terms for cooperation, the government remains uninterested in moving the talks forward.  

At the same time that Senegal adopted a resistant approach towards EU efforts, it engaged with certain Member States in bilateral efforts to develop a comprehensive approach to migration management. Bilateral engagement on migration in Senegal is not a new phenomenon, but has intensified since 2006, with the signing of bilateral migration agreements between Senegal and France and Spain. These agreements employ an incentive-based strategy for migration management by offering increased labour mobility, development assistance, or legal migration opportunities, in exchange for cooperation on migration control (Panizzon, 2008: 55). Already in 2000 France and Senegal signed a co-development

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15 Roig and Huddleston (2007) have argued that third-country willingness to sign readmission agreements is dependent on the integration of incentives such as visa facilitation or even EU membership prospects. Since these incentives cannot be offered to many migrant-sending countries with whom the EU is conducting negotiations, readmission agreements are likely to remain stalled.

16 Interestingly, some observers have indicated that following Senegalese resistance in the negotiations, the EU is considering shifting its approach to the negotiations to more closely consider Senegalese demands, provided Member States agree to change the terms of the negotiations.
convention, while in 2006 a more comprehensive, first of its kind, Migration and Co-development Agreement was signed, linking the creation of channels for legal migration and development assistance with cooperation in migration control. Spain has also been particularly active in migration cooperation with Senegal. In an effort to stem the heavy flow of increased irregular migration originating from Senegal, in 2006 the two governments signed an agreement establishing a link between control mechanisms, such as the deployment of Spanish forces in Senegalese waters, and development, by offering technical capacity-building assistance, equipment, and increased labour market access as an incentive for cooperation. Indeed, France and Spain are considered to be at “the forefront of designing these new templates for managing EurAfrican migratory flows” (Panizzon, 2008: 2).

Yet, the intense Member State engagement with countries like Senegal has limited the EU’s movement on the migration front. The EU is bypassed or undermined, because Member States are seen as more closely converging towards Senegal’s interests in migration. At the same time, Member States’ bilateral efforts have also moved EU-wide dialogue with Senegal to consider a broader agenda, which converges more closely with Senegalese preferences. Although Spanish and French efforts surpass the EU’s capabilities in migration, the comprehensive agreements have paved the way for a future EU-wide migration agreement, with the mobility partnership agreement likely to assume similar shape and scope as the bilateral agreements, once the negotiations move forward. The intense bilateral cooperation in Senegal therefore set an important precedent for further cooperation efforts in the country. By providing an alternative and more comprehensive means for the government to engage with destination countries in the face of limited progress at the EU level, bilateral efforts contributed in re-orientating EU-Senegal relations on migration to fit more closely with the government’s preferences. Bilateral cooperation has given the government further incentive to establish ownership over its migration phenomenon. To this extent, although Senegalese interests in formulating a migration agenda were largely a reaction to pressure from external actors, this has also provided a framework upon which the Senegalese government has come to base its understandings, expectations, and consequently its own policy preferences for cooperation on migration not just bilaterally, but also with other actors such as the EU.

Therefore, Senegalese perceptions of the EU’s inability to fully engage with its preferences have led the government to develop a strategy of non-compliance vis-à-vis the EU, while more closely negotiating with individual Member States. Although this does not imply that either Senegal drove the Member States to break ranks with the Commission, or that it was necessarily the only factor pushing the EU to shift its approach to migration
management with the country, it does indicate the effectiveness of Senegal’s strategy. In this sense, Senegal was able to influence migration dialogue with EU because it was able to place its interests and preferences on the EU’s migration agenda, has had its demands taken seriously, and has contributed to modifying the EU’s approach towards migration dialogue with the government. Furthermore, it was able to exert some control vis-à-vis the EU in migration dialogue because it has insisted on close involvement in the implementation of all migration-related actions, and has forgone cooperation when the EU is unable or unwilling to allow for government ownership.

In sum, constraints faced by the EU in conducting migration dialogue with the Senegalese government have been coupled with a rather unique level of engagement from interested EU Member States. Faced with this state of affairs, the Senegalese government opted to engage with these bilateral efforts while undermining and bypassing EU engagement unless successful agreement could be reached. Through this bilateral engagement, the Senegalese migration agenda was strengthened and the government adopted an awareness or perception of the country’s strategic position within the European migration debate. This perception has led to the government asserting increased ownership over its migration agenda in relation to the EU by adopting a strategy of non-compliance in order to attain its preferences. Although ongoing cooperation is now more closely aligned with the government’s own agenda, movement has not been possible unless the government has indicated its willingness to negotiate and move dialogue forward.

Ghana

Like Senegal, the Ghanaian government also considers migration a positive phenomenon, which, if managed effectively, can contribute to development.\(^{17}\) The government does not, however, have a clear policy on migration (CEC-GoG, 2006: 13; Anno-Kumi, 2008; Anarfi et al., 2003: 32). In this sense, the government aims to develop a holistic approach to migration management by engaging all major partners both at the international and the domestic levels, including the government, private sector, civil society and trade unions, as well as focusing on increased research and data collection in order to better understand

\(^{17}\) The government’s priorities for migration can be characterised as follows: facilitation of remittance transfers; encouraging the return of highly skilled migrants; and preventing the departure of skilled labour, especially in the health and education sectors (i.e. mitigating the brain drain through circular and temporary migration schemes).
Ghana’s migration phenomenon and its consequences and benefits on the country’s development.

The EU sent its first Article 13 mission to Ghana in 2007. Initial dialogue aimed to establish cooperation mostly in migration control, with a view to encouraging the government to negotiate and sign a readmission agreement (GNA, 2007). Although the opening of the dialogue was considered inimical to the country’s interests, an overall willingness and openness to engage prevailed on both sides. Furthermore, the EU was generally perceived as well-prepared and sincere in its efforts to develop a joint strategy on migration management. Although the EU initially focused the dialogue on migration control, a shift towards a more comprehensive approach occurred almost immediately. This was reflected, for example, in the June 2007 Ghana-EU joint statement following the conclusion of the first round of discussions, noting both sides’ commitment to developing a partnership in joint migration management by adopting a holistic approach and recognising that dialogue should become more systematic and regular in order to develop a more concrete and coherent framework for migration management (EU-GoG, 2007). According to government officials, the EU shifted to a more comprehensive approach because of the realisation that in order for migrant-sending countries such as Ghana to become interested in migration management, the focus needed to be on adopting a wide-ranging approach that took account of development aspects. As in Senegal, the EU has also used financial assistance from the EDF and the Aeneas programme to implement actions in migration management. Thus, migration was integrated into the country’s CSP for the 10th EDF and in 2006 the Aeneas programme funded six projects in Ghana providing specific and complementary financial and technical assistance to support more effective management of migration flows.

Despite these actions however, ongoing migration dialogue and even policy actions have been limited between Ghana and the EU. At present, no dialogue exists specific to migration, but rather only within the context of political dialogue between the EU and Ghana, the ECOWAS, and Africa in general. Most of the discussions between the delegation and the government have concerned mainly the identification of funding opportunities and project formulation, and even this has often been delegated to external agencies, such as the IOM or UNDP. Furthermore, although the government sees the EU as an important partner in terms of funding (CEC-GoG, 2006), in comparison to the other policy areas in which the EU is

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18 The Netherlands, the UK, and Germany have pushed for further dialogue on migration with the government on the basis of Cotonou’s Article 8, namely political dialogue, rather than Article 13.
active in the country, funding for migration has been rather modest and haphazard. EU actions in Ghana in the migration field have therefore been far less intense than in Senegal. While initial dialogue was somewhat tense, this quickly shifted to a more development-oriented approach. However, this approach has yet to develop into a concrete or comprehensive framework for joint migration management. At present, few policy actions have followed or complemented the limited dialogue. Why is it that the Ghanaian case proves to be so divergent from Senegal, where EU and Member State actions have been so intense? Is this due to a government-driven strategy, as in Senegal, or is this EU-driven?

Unlike the Senegalese case, the development of a joint migration framework between Ghana and the EU is not characterised by an increased pro-activeness on the part of the Ghanaian government to align preferences or establish increased ownership over its migration phenomenon. Rather the process has largely been driven by pressure and pro-activeness from external actors, namely increased interest from the EU; some limited involvement from interested EU Member States; and positive and active engagement from agencies such as the IOM and the UNDP, while the government has adopted a cooperative and compromising approach to migration, as opposed to the non-compliant approach adopted by Senegal. The extent of involvement of these three external sources alongside the limited pro-activeness from the Ghanaian government in shaping and driving the migration agenda partly explains why the scope for cooperation on migration between the EU and Ghana has remained narrow. The government has not adopted a leadership role in shaping EU-Ghana migration relations because the overall role of the EU (including Member States) in Ghana has been limited and narrow. This has led to closer engagement with external international agencies, which have come to play a more instrumental role in shaping the national policy environment. Another factor which can explain the lack of leverage and control on the part of the government is found in Ghana’s less than strategic position as a migrant-sending country to Europe. This is further explored below.

**Strategic position**

First and foremost, Ghana’s strategic position (or lack of one) as a migration country in West Africa has had important consequences on its relations with the EU in migration matters.

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19 Funding for migration management in the CSP is significantly less than what other migrant-sending countries received, and constitutes less than 0.5% of Ghana’s entire allocation. Moreover, financing for migration under the 10th EDF has yet to be implemented. With the EDF mid-term review coming-up, it seems that migration funding will be reallocated elsewhere, as the government failed to submit a proposal for this funding scheme.
Arguably, the EU could consider Ghana a strategic partner in the migration debate considering that the country is a major exporter of mostly highly and medium skilled human capital. Yet, as outlined above, the EU’s and the Member States’ main interests in engaging with migrant-sending countries lie in establishing migration management frameworks for the purposes of migration control of mostly irregular and/or low skilled migrants. In this sense, Ghana, much unlike Senegal, is neither geographically nor demographically (in terms of migrant skill levels) placed as a strategic country. Certainly, migration is an important phenomenon in Ghana, but it is one which tends to affect Ghana more adversely (in terms of brain drain) rather than the EU (in terms of irregular or low skilled migrants). In the Ghanaian case therefore, the strategic factors that favoured the exercise of leverage and ownership in the Senegalese case were not present. This has not only led to much less intense engagement on the part of the EU, but it has also contributed to a lack of the Ghanaian government perceiving itself in a strategic position.

Perceptions of the EU

Secondly, the way in which Ghana has perceived the EU’s capabilities in migration is important in understanding the government’s approach to cooperation on migration management with the EU. On the one hand, the EU has been perceived as a leader in terms of its ability to sensitise African governments and to place migration on the African and national development agendas. Unlike Senegal, the government has not sought to bypass or surpass the EU’s engagement in order to establish increased ownership; rather, it has chosen to engage with the EU’s initiatives and follow its lead. Indeed, as one government official claimed, “It is really thanks to the EU that Ghana is now starting to take its migration phenomenon seriously, and is starting to integrate migration into our national development agenda. The EU and Europe have been the main drivers of this.” On the other hand, the government also recognises that the EU is constrained by a rather narrow mandate for conducting dialogue on migration matters. The issues that interest the government, such as increased labour migration opportunities or temporary and circular migration schemes, essentially go beyond the EU’s competences. At the practical level, therefore, the EU’s role in implementing concrete initiatives and creating a working relationship with relevant national stakeholders has been rather limited and constrained to either providing limited funding opportunities, or supporting Member State initiatives (CEC-GoG 2006). Thus, the Ghanaian government perceives the EU as capable and influential in the migration debate,
leading the government to opt for a strategy that is more consensual with the EU’s leadership role in sensitising African governments to place migration issues on their national agendas.

*The Ghanaian negotiating strategy*

Because the EU’s practical role in Ghana has been limited and narrow, this has led to the government identifying other actors as more relevant in terms of meeting its preferences. EU Member States have a larger scope for more intense engagement at the national level, since as demonstrated in the Senegalese case, migration management at the bilateral level can offer significantly more incentives for cooperation (labour schemes, financial and technical assistance, etc.) than at the EU level. Member State involvement in Ghana has been mostly positive, and has concentrated on migration and development by furthering links with the Ghanaian diaspora or developing legal labour migration schemes. The Ghanaian government has largely welcomed this engagement from Member States, seeing the combination of EU and bilateral interest as providing a good source of funding for migration-related projects and contributing towards the formulation of a national policy framework. At the same time, their engagement has also been rather limited, lacking in comprehensiveness, coordination, and intensity. Member State actions have taken a project-based approach, rather than overarching political agreements for cooperation. Projects usually focus on the short-term and limited aspects of migration, rather than linking legal and illegal migration or ethical recruitment and labour migration policies. Coordination amongst different Member States and the EC is also limited, with the government recognising that each actor operates according to their own agenda, with coherence sometimes undermined. To this extent, the different needs and priorities of Member States have led to a variety of initiatives being forwarded, but little concerted policy action. This lack of intense effort to develop a comprehensive framework for bilateral migration management has also constrained the possibility of Ghana asserting increased ownership or at least pro-actively engaging outside of the narrow framework for bilateral cooperation. Certainly if the Senegalese case serves as any indication, intense Member State involvement can offer an alternative means to establish more ownership over migration policy vis-à-vis the EU, by creating an important precedent for future cooperation, providing the country with the means to adopt non-compliant behaviour in order to gain increased concessions, and increasing awareness of a country’s strategic position in the migration debate.
While EU and bilateral efforts have contributed to the formulation of a national migration agenda, neither has taken a leadership role in Ghana. Rather this has been attributed to external international agencies that have been particularly active at the practical level in implementing migration-related and capacity-building projects in cooperation with the government. The IOM, and to a lesser extent, the UNDP, have worked in close cooperation with the government in the formulation of policies and implementation of projects. Indeed, both at the bilateral and EU levels, almost all migration-related projects have been coordinated and implemented by the IOM and UNDP. The delegation of project implementation has especially strengthened the IOM’s role in Ghana’s migration debate, as it has worked closely with relevant national and international stakeholders on the ground, rather than merely at the level of high-level dialogue, agenda-setting, or project formulation, as is the case for the EU and many Member States. At the same time, delegating competences to the IOM has also contributed to the image of the EU as limited in its involvement in direct cooperation with the government, with the IOM instead seen as spearheading progress at the national level. The agency is directly interacting with the government in formulating a strategy on migration and building this into the national political agenda.

In sum, in Ghana, both EU and Member State engagement at the national level has been limited in terms of establishing a comprehensive and overarching framework for cooperation on migration, with efforts characterised as uncoordinated, narrow, and lacking in intensity. Arguably, without a broad bilateral agreement providing a model for possible future cooperation at the EU-wide level, the Ghanaian government has not had the opportunity to either bypass or surpass cooperation at the EU level (were this in their interests), nor does it have the previous experience of negotiating and formulating a framework for joint migration management. The limited roles attributed to the EU and individual Member States have given way to other international agencies playing a much more instrumental role in formulating a national migration policy and incentivising the government to adopt more ownership over its migration phenomenon. The practical work of the IOM, and the UNDP, mostly in terms of project implementation and coordination, have required close cooperation with the government, and have consequentially led to the perception that these agencies currently lead national migration management efforts. In the Ghanaian case therefore, the government chose to adopt a more consensual strategy vis-à-vis the EU, namely because the government did not actually identify the EU as the lead actor which could meet its policy preferences and because engagement from the EU and the Member States was not intense enough to establish these as the central actors with whom to engage with in the first place.
Conclusions: EU constraints and African leverage

The two case studies have illustrated the extent to which some migrant-sending countries in sub-Saharan Africa can extend their influence in migration dialogue with the EU. Three important conclusions can be drawn about firstly, the countries’ strategies in relation to the EU, secondly, on trends in the EU’s migration policy towards Africa, and thirdly, on a country’s ability to challenge the traditional power asymmetry that exists in EU-Africa relations.

First, it is clear that the countries’ strategies and approaches adopted vis-à-vis the EU are quite divergent, and as a consequence have led to more or less influence in the migration debate. In Senegal, a rather non-compliant approach and often critical perceptions of the EU, combined with the confidence that it can promote its interests in migration relations with the EU, have allowed it to translate negotiating strategies into considerable negotiating weight, despite this traditional power asymmetry which characterises EU-Africa relations. In the formulation of a framework for migration management with the EU, Senegal has maintained its position by preventing any movement or agreement on migration issues unless the government is expected to mutually-benefit from this. In Ghana, policy processes and outcomes tend to much more externally-driven, rather than government-owned. Ghana has adopted a more consensual approach towards the EU, due in part because of its perception of the EU as a leader in migration matter, but also because often the EU is not necessarily identified as the lead actor to be influenced as regards practical implementation of migration initiatives.

Second, the case studies have shown the extent to which the EU is often constrained in the migration field, limiting effectiveness in migration dialogue and the implementation of policies in its relations with migrant-sending countries. These constraints can be found on three main levels, namely capacity, policy coherence, and coordination.

Firstly, in terms of capacity, the EU is limited in its capacity to engage fully with governments of migrant-sending countries in Africa. The increased salience of migration issues on the EU-Africa agenda calls for relevant funding and policy expertise, requiring both sufficient financial and human resources. Yet, the provision (or lack thereof) of adequate resources can be a significant impediment to progress. For example, although delegation staff are expected to engage in migration dialogue with African governments, the challenge in effectively managing the policy lies partly in allocating sufficient financial and human resources and time to the policy, and in building up relevant policy expertise to handle an
increasingly important profile. Yet migration-related programmes are mostly managed through intermediary or external agencies. Since African governments are therefore not directly working with the EU, it is sometimes perceived as incompetent in handling the profile and this has negatively affected the type of relationship the EU is trying to establish in the country. In Senegal, IOM coordination and implementation of EU-funded projects is perceived as restricting country ownership, while in Ghana these external agencies have adopted a leadership role, and the EU is seen as a secondary actor in shaping the national migration debate. Furthermore, to induce countries of origin to engage fully and willingly with the EU’s migration initiatives, increased assistance is essential. Although increased resources are now being invested in the policy and migration-specific financing instruments have been set up, as the case studies show, funding has often been too modest, as in Ghana, or too oriented towards control rather than development, as in Senegal.

Secondly, the EU is constrained with regards to policy coherence. The case studies have clearly shown that the EU has started to move towards increased coherence between migration and development, as demonstrated by the evolution of dialogue and policy initiatives. At the same time, migration and development, and even migration and labour policies, are linked only insofar as this creates incentive mechanisms meant to induce countries to comply with joint cooperation in tackling irregular migration to the EU. Although the EU’s approach towards migration matters in Africa has indeed become more comprehensive, the field continues to be embedded in a security-oriented approach in that the purpose is still migration control, rather than reaching development goals through joint cooperation and policy coherence. This last observation was clearly shown in the extent to which the EU has engaged much more intensely with Senegal as opposed to Ghana, largely because the former is much more closely aligned with the EU’s strategic interests in migration management as opposed to the latter. Furthermore, the fact that at the practical level migration has remained embedded in the security field rather than being linked to other relevant policy fields demonstrates incoherence between stated policy objectives and actual implementation. The dominance of a security-oriented approach in migration constrains the EU’s capacity to engage fully with countries of origin, largely because the EU’s interests and policy objectives diverge from those of the countries of origin, which are instead seeking a more ‘open’ approach to migration.

Thirdly, as regards coordination, the paper showed the extent to which the multi-level structure of the EU can pose a constraint on effective coordination amongst the different actors interested and active in the EU’s emerging migration policy towards Africa. Although
decision-making and policy implementation should ideally be coordinated firstly amongst the
different levels of the Commission, namely between the delegations and headquarters in
Brussels, and secondly between the Commission and EU Member States, both the Senegalese
and the Ghanaian case indicate that coordination and coherence is often lacking, and more
importantly, these gaps have consequences for the effectiveness of the EU’s policy objectives
projected abroad. The EU is often perceived as incapable of engaging with migrant-sending
countries at the level espoused in the rhetoric on migration cooperation. At the level of the
delégations, both Senegalese and EU observers noted problems in communicating decision-
making processes between Brussels and the delegation. Accordingly, such delays in policy
decisions and implementation have contributed significantly to the Senegalese strategy of
closer engagement at the bilateral level, as Member State engagement has been seen as more
closely aligned with Senegalese preferences and demands. Further to this, the extent of
Member State efforts in the different countries also highlights these coordination gaps in the
EU’s migration policy. The Senegalese case demonstrates how intense Member State
involvement provided an alternative means to establish more ownership over migration vis-à-
vis the EU, by allowing the government to bypass Commission efforts while creating an
important precedent for future cooperation at the EU level. The lack of intense Member State
involvement in Ghana shows how Member State involvement affects the EU’s policy
effectiveness, in that a lack of coordinated and intense engagement has weakened the EU’s
overall position in shaping the national policy framework on migration.

The case studies have also demonstrated the extent to which a country’s perceptions
of the EU’s capabilities and its constraints are important in shaping its position and strategies
in the migration debate. In Senegal, the EU has been perceived as lacking in coherence and
having a rather weak capacity to engage fully with the government in the migration agenda.
This is seen as constraining the extent to which it can act as a positive force in shaping the
migration agenda and negotiating with the government. For Ghana the EU is seen in a more
positive light, having played a crucial role in sensitising African governments to insert
migration into national, regional, and continental debates and to integrate this into domestic
development policies, but at the same time, having limited interaction with the government at
the level of domestic policy making and implementation. Both countries’ perceptions of the
EU have in turn shaped their position in the migration debate. Senegal adopted a pro-active
and strategic position in cooperating with other actors for closer collaboration, while Ghana
adopted an accommodating approach in which it has willingly engaged in high-level dialogue
with the EU, while the formulation of a national policy has been carried out alongside intermediary and external agencies specialised in migration matters.

The perception that the government holds of itself vis-à-vis the EU also contributes to the strategy that it chooses to adopt in relations with the EU. In this sense, the Senegalese case evidences the changing power relations between the EU and migrant countries and the extent to which this can place these countries, “in a strategic position on which they can capitalize” (Cassarino, 2009: 2). As Senegal has come to perceive its position within the migration debate as strategic, it has not only strongly asserted ownership over its migration policy, but it shifted the migration dialogue to more closely consider the country’s concerns and interests. Due to its different geographic and demographic position, Ghana has not been considered strategic as a major migrant-sending country to Europe, assuming a more passive approach in the migration debate, even if this is starting to shift towards increased pro-activeness. Thus while in Ghana pro-activeness was a result of an increasingly closer alignment of agendas between the EU, and other actors, and the government, the opposite is true in Senegal, where pro-activeness on the part of the government and other actors instead resulted in the EU having to more closely align its strategy with the government’s.

This paper has aimed to illustrate how one African migrant-sending country has been successful in putting forward its preferences and influencing the EU. Importantly, in order to provide a more complete account of the power relationship between the EU and migrant-sending countries in Africa the limitations and constraints of both parties need to be taken into consideration. In considering the EU’s constraints and limitations in migration relations with Africa, it becomes evident that the increased awareness of some countries of these constraints has changed the dynamics of the traditional power relationship.

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