Effective multilateralism on the ground?
EU – UN Co-operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo
(2003 – 2006)

Claudia Morsut
International Research Institute of Stavanger
Norway

ABSTRACT: This article examines the co-operation between the European Union and the United Nations in the Democratic Republic of Congo between 2003 and 2006, when MONUC, the UN Organization Mission in the DRC, received support from the EU in the field of civilian and military crisis management. This pioneering peace operation can offer insights into possible future collaboration between the two organizations in peace and security matters. The first part of this article looks at the EU contribution to the UN MONUC through Operation Artemis, whose good results led to two civilian operations, EUPOL and EUSEC, and one military one, EUFOR. The second part presents some reflections on the EU’s ambitions of becoming a reliable partner for the UN in guaranteeing peace and security.

Key words: European Union, United Nations, peacekeeping operations, co-operation, Africa

Effective multilateralism represents one of the three strategic objectives outlined in the European Security Strategy (ESS) document of December 2003 and is defined as ‘the development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order’. In the current multilateral system, many scholars have noticed that the EU is trying to seek its role as global actor. In this respect, the co-operation with the UN is considered an important instrument to achieve this goal: ‘The fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter. The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority’. Indeed, in its conclusions in December 2003, the Council of the European Union declared that the EU ‘[...] would contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world. [...] Initial work would include effective multilateralism with the UN at its core [...]’.

Previously, the EU had already committed itself through two documents of September 2003: The European Union and the United Nations: The Choice of Multilateralism and the Joint Declaration on UN–EU Co-operation in Crisis Management. One of the most significant parts of the first documents refers to the EU as a front-runner in implementing the decisions taken in the multilateral system through a deeper EU involvement in peacekeeping and peace-making operations. Furthermore, conflict prevention and crisis management are considered issues where the EU and the UN should improve their partnership and work together through specific operations. In addition, the second document affirms the central role of the UN and the collaboration of the EU to implement the aims of the UN; expresses satisfaction with Operation Artemis in the DRC, also as to future developments in that area; promotes the setting up of a joint consultative mechanism in four fields: planning operations, training military and civilian personnel, communication, and exchange of information (best practices).

In order to verify if effective multilateralism works on the ground, this article analyses the EU operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The DRC case is particularly important for this issue since it can be considered the first EU attempt to co-operate with the UN with the full range of tools that the ESDP has at its disposal outside Europe: both military and
civillian crisis management instruments have been deployed. In focus here is a descriptive analysis of the EU’s first autonomous ESDP operation in Africa – ‘Artemis’ – and the two civilian operations (EUPOL and EUSEC) and one military (EUFOR) operation in support the UN Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). The first part offers an overview of these operations, considering the needs of the UN and the capacity of the EU to answer these needs. The second part represents a tentative analysis to draw some common features between the EU and the UN intervention in the DRC. These features raise some questions: for instance, may the EU operations be considered a European concept of crisis management that can be applied also in the future? May the EU operations represent a coherent strategy of intervention? Does the EU’s commitment represent an engaged partnership for the UN in order to build up effective multilateralism?

THE CONFLICT IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC)

MONUC AND HOW THE EU INVOLVEMENT STARTED IN THE DRC: OPERATION ARTEMIS

A brief overview of MONUC operation is necessary for understanding why the UN came to request support from the EU. Since the beginning of MONUC in November 1999, the UN had to face serious challenges. The UN efforts to implement the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, signed in July 1999, were undermined by external and internal problems: on the one hand the weak commitment of the various groups involved in the Agreement, which caused the slow deployment of the Blue Helmets; on the other the lack of financial and human resources in order to control a territory as vast as Western Europe. Some scholars agree that such weak involvement by the European and other Western members of the Security Council was due to a higher focus on the UN missions in Kosovo and in East Timor on one side and on a reluctant commitment in Africa after the failures in Somalia and Rwanda on the other.

Therefore, despite several UNSC Resolutions calling for respect of the ceasefire, the lack of security guaranties for the UN officials and the violence and destruction in most of the country made impossible for the UN to fulfil its mission throughout 2000. Some scholars note an improvement in the situation when Joseph Kabila assumed the presidency after his father’s murder in January 2001. Kabila Jr’s commitment to make the ceasefire respected helped the UN to take control of the territory and begin the operations of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in October, also thanks to an increment of financial and human resources and improved co-ordination among the various actors. In October 2001 the Inter-Congolese Dialogue started the complex phase of negotiations with the various actors involved and was able to produce the Global and All-inclusive Agreement in Pretoria (December 2002) for implementing the government of National Unity and Transition and the parliament. The Pretoria agreement officially ended the war in the DRC. In April 2003, the Final Act was signed in Sun City. The new government took up its duties on 1 July 2003. However, the violence did not stop, especially in the Ituri region, in the northeast of the country, where ethnic conflicts mixed with the presence of the armies from Uganda, Rwanda and the Kinshasa government. In April 2003, MONUC established the Ituri Pacification Commission with good results, but in May the fighting exploded again especially in the capital city Bunia. While stressing the challenges and difficulties that the UN had to face in the DRC, all the scholars agree on one point: MONUC was coping with a serious problem of overstretching, since not enough soldiers were deployed in a critical area like the Ituri region and in particular in Bunia, where a security vacuum exploded in all its gravity after the withdrawn of the Ugandan troops in May. MONUC soldiers were not able to stop the violence and protect the civilians in Bunia. Even the MONUC headquarters were attacked.

In this respect, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s request for help to French President Jacques Chirac can be seen as the answer to this UN failure. This article does not investigate the reasons why Annan did not hesitate in May 2003 to turn to France. Other scholars have offered full
This article investigates instead how fast the EU was able to set up its first ESDP operation in Africa under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: on 8 May 2003 the EU approved the Common Position 2003/319/CFSP, which stressed the importance of halting the violence in the DRC and expressed its full support to MONUC. On 28 May, France agreed to act as the lead country in such an operation, offering headquarters in Paris with personnel and facilities, and sent a draft resolution to the Security Council. On 30 May, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1484 authorizing ‘the deployment until 1 September 2003 of an Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) in Bunia in close co-ordination with MONUC’, under Chapter VII of the Charter. On 5 June, the Council of the European Union established Operation Artemis, and on 12 June the Operation was launched. The presence of EU soldiers allowed MONUC to take time and prepare the deployment of almost 5,000 military personnel (the UN Ituri Task Force). The operation officially ended on 1 September 2003.

As it is clear from these dates, in one month the EU Council was able to approve two Common Positions and a Decision and to launch an operation whose aims were ‘the stabilization of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia; to ensure the protection of the airport, the internally displaced persons in the camps in Bunia and, if the situation requires it, to contribute to the safety of the civilian population, United Nations personnel and the humanitarian presence in the town’. Moreover, operation Artemis acted under a specific UN mandate in terms of time and space, recognising that the stabilization of Ituri was central for implementing the peace process in the DRC.

Operation Artemis offers two main lessons: firstly, if there is a political will, the EU can act rapidly. After the disagreement due to the war in Iraq, there was a general consensus among the fifteen member states on the operation, and the decisions within the EU Council were taken without delay. Secondly, the EU has shown that it can guarantee highly professional help in support of UN operations at short notice. On the contrary, critics argue that the operation reached its goals only because it was limited to a very small area of the DRC, and one nation – France – bore major responsibility for the operation.

As far as the co-operation with the UN is concerned, one aspect that can not be ignored is the mutual and constant exchange of information at institutional level and on the ground thanks to clear and simple procedural rules. The operation represented the first example of military co-operation between the EU and the UN through a rapid reaction force, ‘a remarkably positive experiment in co-operation between the UN and a regional organization, in the domain of peace and security […]’ as the MONUC Head Officer in Bunia, Alpha Sow affirms. However, Sow also acknowledges some weaknesses in the operation: firstly, the time limitation that left Bunia as a ‘weapons-invisible’ zone, rather than a ‘weapons-free’ zone; secondly, the space limitation, since the troops were active only in Bunia, while elsewhere in Ituri atrocities were committed against the population; thirdly, the presence of few foot patrols, which would have been more effective than vehicle patrolling in such a setting; fourthly, some overly forceful behaviour on the part of EU soldiers – for example, involving damage caused by house-searches – that did not help to build confidence between the population and the soldiers. Furthermore, at the beginning of the operation, some UN officials doubted about the EU’s capabilities: the main argument was that the industrialised countries, and not least the EU member states, had always given few contributions in personnel to the UN peace operations. In addition to this, in the pre-deployment phase there was a lack of information on the deployment of EU troops, and UN officials on the ground feared an overlap between the EU troops and the Blue Helmets.

**UN AGAIN NEEDS A EU MILITARY FORCE: EUFOR DR CONGO**

Unlike the case of Operation Artemis, there was some initial uncertainty as to which country should be in the lead in the second EU military operation EUFOR DR Congo. France insisted that Germany should get that position, thereby showing its willingness to contribute to the development
of the ESDP, despite the failure of the national referendum on the European Constitution.\textsuperscript{28} It should also be noted that France did not have at its disposal combat-ready groups as in the case of operation Artemis – but Germany did. Consequently, Operation Headquarters in Europe were established in Potsdam.\textsuperscript{29} This choice led to the official launching of the operation on 12 June 2006.\textsuperscript{30}

It is possible to observe some common features between Artemis and EUFOR DR Congo. First, the UN was suffering again of a shortage of UN soldiers, this time during the election period. It seems plausible to assume that since the Security Council did not meet Annan’s request to send more troops to the western part of the DRC, while many Blue Helmets were engaged in the more troubled east, Annan side-stepped this internal constraint by sending a new request to the EU in December 2005.\textsuperscript{31} Secondly, the following chronological outline shows that also in this case the EU took a decision quite rapidly: on 23 March 2006, the EU Council approved an option paper that accepted the new challenge, and on 27 April it agreed to support MONUC with the Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP, following UNSC Resolution 1671, unanimously adopted two days before.\textsuperscript{32} That Resolution mandated the EU to deploy a EU force with the following tasks: ‘to support MONUC to stabilize a situation, in case MONUC faces serious difficulties in fulfilling its mandate [...], to contribute to the protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence in the areas of its deployment [...], to contribute to airport protection in Kinshasa, to ensure the security and freedom of movement of the personnel as well as the protection of the installations of EUFOR R.D. Congo, to execute operations of limited character in order to extract individuals in danger’.\textsuperscript{33} On 23, May the EU Political and Security Committee (COPS) approved the Operation Plan and the Rules of Engagement, which were further discussed and approved by the Council of Ministers on 29 May.\textsuperscript{34}

Thirdly, the mission was clearly limited in time and space: it was meant to last four months with a deployment of troops in the capital city Kinshasa. After 30 November the EU troops started to leave - marking the official end of the EUFOR operation - since they had fulfilled the tasks stipulated in the SC Resolution and were no longer in a position to intervene.\textsuperscript{35} In this respect, it is important to stress that Germany did not want to have to go through another vote in the Bundestag on this issue, although the UN had asked the EU to keep its troops on the ground longer, under an extended mandate.\textsuperscript{36}

Finally, the co-operation with MONUC functioned smoothly and the intervention of EUFOR troops was crucial in settling the situation in Kinshasa during the August riots, while the co-ordination between EUFOR and EUPOL and these two with MONUC was good.\textsuperscript{37} On the other hand, the October 2006 International Crisis Group Report argued that MONUC and EUFOR should act more promptly to avoid the violence, serving as an interposition force.\textsuperscript{38} However, here it is important to note that EUFOR was engaged under a specific mandate by the UN – as operation Artemis- and could intervene only on official request from MONUC.\textsuperscript{39} Furthermore the EUFOR combat troops were too few. For example, only the 130 Spanish solders played an active role in the fights, whereas the Polish were charging with protecting the administrative and logistical personnel. Here it should be stressed that in Kinshasa a great many weapons and guns were still in circulation, in the hands of the private guards of the two main players, Kabila and Bemba, since the Memorandum of June 2003 had failed to specify the size of the presidential guard, which operates outside any military chain of command chain.\textsuperscript{40}

\textbf{THE FIRST CIVILIAN EU OPERATION: EUPOL DR KINSHASA}

Unlike Operation Artemis and EUFOR, the first EU civilian mission in Africa (EUPOL DR Kinshasa) did not come about as a response to a specific UNSC Resolution. However, there were important precedents, such as the Global and All-inclusive Agreement signed in Pretoria in December 2002, Memorandum II on Security and Army signed in June 2003, and SC Resolution 1493, all calling for the implementation of an Integrated Congolese Police Unit (IPU).

At the same time, the UN was facing very complex and broad tasks in civilian crisis
management: the UN Civilian Police had been operating since October 2001, mainly offering advisory, planning, training, and assessment support to the local authorities in Kinshasa, Kisangani and Bunia. When it started to plan, assess and advise the formation of an Integrated Police Unit (IPU) in Kinshasa, the UN realised that, also in this field, assistance from the EU would be significant. Also the DRC government asked the EU for support in setting up the IPU in October 2003.

Consequently, the EU approved Joint Action 2004/494/CFS in May 2004 and established EUPOL DR Kinshasa through Council Joint Action 847 of 9 December 2004: ‘EUPOL Kinshasa is to monitor, mentor and advise on the setting up and the development of the Integrated Police Unit (IPU) in Kinshasa’, and especially to protect institutions and the highest authorities. EUPOL DR Kinshasa, officially launched on 12 April 2005, implemented the IPU through staff generally chosen by the three main ex-belligerents who signed the Lusaka Agreement. All staff members – around 1000 – attended an EU Commission-sponsored training programme on how to protect democratic institutions and political leaders, and succeeded in becoming a disciplined group of police officers.

The operation was originally intended to last until 30 December 2006, but Joint Action 2006/913/CFSP extended its mandate until 30 June 2007 in order to allow EUPOL to complete its IPU-related assistance and to provide early support to the Congolese authorities in the preparatory steps towards the reform of the Congolese police, within the larger Security Sector Reform process in the DRC. In order to assist the UN also during the electoral process, the EU Council adopted Joint Action 2006/300/CFSP on 21 April 2006, establishing the temporary reinforcement of EUPOL in support of Congolese crowd control units in the capital city, for a period up to five months until 31 March 2007.

The first testing ground for the IPU was the initial round of the legislative and presidential elections on 30 July 2006. Elections took place in a relatively quiet atmosphere and represented the largest and most complex UN electoral assistance ever set up. The IPU was well distributed in Kinshasa and managed to control the population in a relatively professional way. No serious accidents occurred and no police officers were killed. On the other hand, the riots of 20 to 22 August represented a serious danger for the peace process: some hours before the announcement of the presidential results by the Independent Electoral Commission, acts of violence in Kinshasa started between the presidential guard and elements belonging to the vice-president Bemba’s troops. The IPU played an important role in protecting the authorities and the Electoral Commission members, and intervened to tackle the riots in various parts of Kinshasa, paying with the loss of almost dozen officials. The use of heavy weapons by the presidential guard and Bemba’s supporters impeded the IPU in its intervention work. IPU received advice on steps to follow by EUPOL officials from the National Centre of the Operations. EUPOL played important role also during second round of the elections on 29 October 2006, conducting a well-planned action to ensure that voting in the capital could take place in a secure environment for the population.

As far as the co-operation with MONUC is concerned, it is important to note that while EUPOL DR Kinshasa focused on implementation of the IPU in the capital city, MONUC has been working to support the Congolese National Police countrywide. Good co-ordination and a fruitful relationship between the two missions and the labour division helped MONUC to fulfil its tasks better. Otherwise, EUPOL maintained close co-operation with EUFOR through the exchange of intelligence and information and security-back up during the election period in the DRC.

THE EU’s OWN INITIATIVE: THE SECOND CIVILIAN OPERATION EUSEC DR CONGO

Like EUPOL DR Kinshasa, the second civilian operation – EUSEC DR Congo – was established following a request from the DRC government in agreement with the UN in April 2005. Although there is no specific UNSC Resolution underpinning the operation, both Resolution 1565 of 30 October 2004 and Resolution 1592 of 30 March 2005 called for help in order to give the
Congolese authorities the necessary support for reform of the security sector.\textsuperscript{52} The Council Joint Action 2005/355/CFSP of 2 May 2005 established the operation EUSEC DR Congo with the mandate to ‘provide advice and assistance for security sector reform [...] with the aim of contributing to a successful integration of the army in the DRC’.\textsuperscript{53}

EUSEC DR Congo was launched on 8 June 2005 and is still running. Already in November the EU Council could appreciate the first positive results,\textsuperscript{54} and it agreed to start a new programme (the Chain of Payment Project) in order to assure the soldiers a steady wage for their work. Indeed, one of the several problems that MONUC had to face was the consequences of a non-functional chain of payment for the soldiers that degenerated in corruption. In theory, soldiers could choose between a return to a civilian life and a job in the national army. However, those who decided to stay in the army were not paid, so they lived off the very population they were sent to protect – with a bad impact on population vulnerability. MONUC recognized that this situation was unsustainable and welcomed the EUSEC programme.\textsuperscript{55}

The assistance to the Congolese authorities is based on the promotion of respectful policies of democratic standards, human rights, international humanitarian law, transparency, rule of law and of the principles of good public management. It was recommended that the Head of Mission should work in cooperation with EUPOL and MONUC.\textsuperscript{56} EUSEC has also an innovative aspect, being the first mission in the field of Security Sector Reform. Its experts are tasked with working in various branches of the Congolese administration: the private office of the Minister of Defence, the general military staff, the staff of the land forces, the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-assignment (CONADER), the Joint Operation Committee.\textsuperscript{57}

\textbf{EFFECTIVE MULTILATERALISM? SOME CONSIDERATIONS}

The EU operations described above give raise to some considerations about the EU as a reliable partner for the UN in guaranteeing peace and security. The EU and the UN are organisations with different structures, agendas, goals, and means, although both devote considerable amounts of time and effort towards improving peace and security. On the one hand, if the EU wants to be stronger and more respected in the international arena, it needs to contribute to building up a stronger UN in areas where the latter requires assistance, as in crisis management. On the other, the UN has found in the EU an engaged partner interested in effective multilateralism, which is one of the aims of the UN Charter and the European Security Strategy. Both documents \textit{European Union and the United Nations: The Choice of Multilateralism} and the \textit{Joint Declaration on UN–EU Co-operation in Crisis Management} answer the UN request for effective multilateralism. In the ESS and in these documents, the EU aims to reinforce the UN, by offering the tools to do its work more effectively.

In the first instance, the EU has demonstrated good capabilities in civilian and military crisis management in the DRC. Although the EU can be considered a nascent peacekeeper, it shares the same view about the new dimension of peace operations. After the Brahimi Report, the UN has consistently reviewed its approach and is currently developing an Integrated Mission model which takes into account political, security, humanitarian, development and human rights dimensions.\textsuperscript{58} The EU follows a similar approach: its civilian and military dimensions allow an on-the-ground presence throughout the process of pacification, as in the DRC, where the convergence with the UN led to good labour division. In the case of EUPOL, the EU and the UN worked in a complementary way: while the European operation focused on implementation of the IPU in the capital city, MONUC worked for a countrywide reform of the CNP. This differentiation has helped to strengthen the good co-ordination between the two missions, even if relations have occasionally suffered from a certain lack of communication.\textsuperscript{59} At the same time, Artemis and EUFOR served as a complement to the MONUC troops, supporting the Blue Helmets when they faced serious difficulties. However, it may be argued that this labour division worked well since the EU engagement was limited in space and time in critical areas of the country and under a specific and
clear UN mandate. May this be the UN’s preferred strategy also in the future? Or is it preferable for the UN to negotiate directly with the EU states in order to obtain support in larger operations?

These questions lead to a further consideration about the EU internal constrains. Any UN intervention depends on a decision of the Security Council, whereas simplification of EU decision-making rules was established in the Treaty of Nice (February 2001), but not in the military and defence area. In the case of the DRC, the decision about intervention was agreed by all EU member states, and this allowed the necessary forces to be mobilised quickly, as with Artemis. In that occasion the EU member states showed a strong desire to work together with the UN. However, it may turn into a negative factor the reluctance or the disagreement of the EU member states to participate in operations when requested by the UN. As Martin Ortega suggests, in order to avoid a stalemate, EU member states should use the method of ‘constructive abstention’ (as in Article 23.1 of the TEU) when it comes to taking a decision on military intervention: that means that one or more states may declare their abstention in regard to a military intervention, but they must guarantee their political support. But may this be a solution acceptable for the UN? Which kind of message may the EU send worldwide, after having declared its strong commitment to effective multilateralism in the ESS and ensuing documents? In a way, operation EUFOR is the demonstration that this danger exists: although the UN had asked the EU to keep its troops on the ground longer under an extended mandate, the leading country - Germany - was not willing to have to undergo another voting in its legislature, the Bundestag. In addition, this restriction on the national level influences as well the amount of forces the EU can deploy: while the UN has at its disposal huge numbers of personnel and troops, some EU member states may have already deployed troops elsewhere, or do not have a large number of troops, or can perhaps offer support for a short time only. However, it should also be noted that what the EU can provide is small but well-equipped and useful forces capable of reacting promptly and reinforcing UN shortage in troops.

In this respect, another danger that can undermine the choice of effective multilateralism is what Thierry Tardy describes as the ‘ambiguity’ of the EU to act under the UN framework. On one side, the EU is disposed to perform as an engaged partner for the UN in order to build up effective multilateralism. On the other, the EU is willing to keep a free hand, in case of intervention without a UNSC Resolution and it stresses that the EU battle-group concept was never meant for use solely for UN purposes. This attitude was evident in the DRC: Artemis and EUFOR were deployed following such a Resolution, but neither EUPOL nor EUSEC were created in response to a specific UN mandate. Furthermore, the EU countries have offered a modest contribute in sending troops under UN command: the Blue Helmets deployed are often soldiers belonging to the national armies of developing countries. In this respect Michael Pugh pointed out that there is the risk of ‘peace keeping apartheid’ in case the co-operation between the EU and the UN would continue on the pattern described for the DRC: the EU can guarantee better trained and equipped solders who may be less willing to co-operate with those from developing countries. However, a UN official noted that it helped to have French and Belgian solders in the DRC, speaking the same language as the local and knowing the background of the country since the DRC was a Belgian colony.

CONCLUSION

In the DRC, the EU followed the path of active support to the UN operation, implementing the UN objectives and principles through the means at its disposal. The EU has achieved a more formal, concrete and strategic partnership with the UN thanks to the ESS and the ensuing documents of late 2003. This partnership has continued to improve, with further commitments such as the EU report The enlarging EU at the UN: Making multilateralism matter (April 2004) and the EU contribution to the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (May 2004). Moreover, the EU showed to carry out its responsibilities on the ground thanks to the development of tools of action in civilian and military crisis management.
Nonetheless, it is reasonable to conclude that the EU ambiguity will continue in the future, although the EU commitment towards the UN has been formalised by documents and best practices: the EU is keen to be considered as an independent global actor, with a sort of distance from the UN, and seems focus on a more pragmatic than institutionalised approach in the co-operation with the UN. This attitude may lead to ‘a form of ghettoization’, with the EU showing reluctance to intervene in those parts of the world where it does not have interests. However, it is reasonable to say that the co-operation in the DRC has established a sort of model: the UN accepts the help from the EU under the circumstance of a SC Resolution that establishes clear rules of engagement in order to supply to a UN deficit. In this way, the UN remains the pivotal organization in leading the process, whereas the EU offers its capabilities in those areas where the world organization either needs additional support or cannot act effectively. May this pattern be repeated in the future, leading to an increasingly binding kind of co-operation between the two organisations?

2 See above.
5 The descriptive analysis is based on secondary literature, internet sources, and interviews.
8 The Agreement was signed by the Heads of State of the DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe and Angola’s Minister of Defence, all countries involved in the war. On 1 August the Movement pour la Liberation du Congo (MLC) sustained by Uganda also signed the Agreement, followed by the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democraties (RDC), split into two factions on 31 August.


Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, ‘Who’s keeping the Peace?’, International Security, Vol.29, No.4, 2005. The authors called this operation a ‘coalition of the willing’ because of the French leadership and the presence of non-EU countries such as Brazil, Canada and South Africa. See footnote 25, p. 169.


See: www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.asp?id=1095&lang=en. France and Germany shared the main burden of the operation together with Austria, Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden.


39 Interview by author with Rachel Scott-Leflaive, Desk Officer, Coordination and Response Division, UN OCHA Geneva, 29 Nov. 2006.
40 International Crisis Group (see n.38 above), pp. 4–5.
48 Interview by author with Thierry Baud, General Secretariat of the Council, DGE IX, Police Unit, 29 Oct. 2006; Interview by author with Rachel Scott-Leflaive, Desk Officer, Coordination and Response Division, UN OCHA Geneva, 29 Nov. 2006.
49 Interview by author with Thierry Baud, General Secretariat of the Council, DGE IX, Police Unit, 29 Oct. 2006.
50 Interview by author with Thierry Baud, General Secretariat of the Council, DGE IX, Police Unit, 29 Oct. 2006.
55 Interview by author with Rachel Scott-Leflaive, Desk Officer, Coordination and Response Division, UN OCHA Geneva, 29 Nov. 2006; Institute for Security Studies (ed.) (see n.42 above), p. 409; Martinelli (see n. 43 above), p. 393.
56 Institute for Security Studies (ed.) (see n.42 above), pp. 98–104.
57 Martinelli (see n. 43 above), pp. 392 – 393.


61 Tardy (see n.4 above), p. 51.


64 Interview by author with Rachel Scott-Leflaive, Desk Officer, Coordination and Response Division, UN OCHA Geneva, 29 Nov. 2006.


67 Pugh (see n.63 above), p. 42.