Abstract: Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in applying the Europeanization concept to the study of foreign policy. Discussing how foreign policy Europeanization relates to Europeanization research in other areas of EU governance as well as to traditional approaches from the International Relations discipline, we examine the added value of studying foreign policy through the lens of Europeanization. As there is by now a considerable diversity of explanations for EU-induced changes of the national foreign policies of EU Member States, we propose important conceptual refinements, providing a clear distinction between the dimensions of Europeanization, their respective outcomes and particularly the mechanisms that drive Europeanization in these different dimensions. Overall, this working paper illustrates that Europeanization research addresses important shortcomings of International Relations approaches dominant in the field of European foreign policy analysis. By focusing on the interplay of “top-down” and “bottom-up” dynamics between the EU and national levels, which have been previously considered as isolated phenomena, the Europeanization concept contributes to a better understanding of the complex nature of European foreign policy-making.
Introduction

Initially developed to examine the consequences of integration in the communitarized first pillar of the European Union (EU) on Member States, recent years have witnessed a growing interest in applying the concept of Europeanization to the study of foreign policy (Major 2005; Miskimmon 2007; Vaquer i Fanés 2001; Wong 2005, 2007). This is a welcome trend as it prepares the ground for a European approach to foreign policy analysis (Manners and Whitman 2000; White 1999) that is sensitive to the distinct environment in which the national foreign policies of EU Member States are constructed. However, as many Europeanization scholars have tended to customize theoretical frameworks, rather than employ and refine established frameworks, there is by now a considerable range of explanations for EU-induced changes of the foreign policies of EU Member States. Moreover, previous conceptualizations of the Europeanization of foreign policy do not offer a clear distinction between the dimensions of Europeanization, their respective outcomes and the mechanisms that drive Europeanization, nor do they provide a clear understanding of how the Europeanization of foreign policy actually works.

In this article we review the increasing amount of literature on Europeanization in the foreign policy realm and put forward important refinements for the conceptualization of the Europeanization of foreign policy. At the outset we discuss how Europeanization research in the area of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) relates to first pillar-Europeanization studies. Subsequently, we turn to the two key dimensions of the Europeanization of foreign policy: the uploading of national foreign policy preferences to the EU level (also called bottom-up Europeanization) and the downloading of policy models and ideas from the CFSP to the national level (referred to as top-down Europeanization). Europeanization in these two key dimensions may lead to two different basic outcomes: the projection of national policy preferences and ideas onto the EU level, and changes of national foreign policy due to EU stimuli and pressures.

As a next step, we present policy learning and socialization as the key mechanisms that drive the Europeanization of foreign policy. Concerning the bottom-up dimension, we argue that the consensus-oriented decision-making culture in the CFSP encourages uploading strategies such as the strategic utilization of norm-based arguments or normative suasion. By moving from a bargaining to an arguing style of decision-making, Member States have enhanced their ability to reach agreement. At the same time, policy learning and socialization in CFSP institutions have led to the adaptation of national foreign policy, or even long-term changes in national
preferences (top-down Europeanization). EU adaptation can thus take place even in the absence of formal enforcement mechanisms and despite conflicting initial policy preferences of Member States. In conclusion, we summarize the main findings of the article and highlight the added value of a refined Europeanization concept.
**Europeanization - No ‘One Size Fits All’ Concept**

As the body of Europeanization literature has expanded substantially over the last two decades, the study of Europeanization has matured at the empirical, conceptual and theoretical levels. In early works, Europeanization was generally understood as “the emergence and development at the European level of distinctive structures of governance” (Green Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse 2001, p3). Europeanization thus described a ‘bottom-up’ process that starts at the level of Member States and results in changes at the European level. Since the late 1990s, however, scholars have become increasingly interested in the effects of European integration on Member States and the ways in which these states are adapting to Europe (Goetz and Meyer-Sahling 2008). These studies understood Europeanization as a ‘top-down’ process, whereby stimuli and commitments that emerge from the EU level produce changes of various aspects at the national level.

Central to the understanding of top-down Europeanization is the ‘goodness of fit’ argument, which posits that the degree of compatibility of EU and Member State arrangements is a central factor determining changes in domestic polity, policies and politics (Green Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse 2001). The ‘goodness of fit’ argument, which has become increasingly disputed in recent contributions (e.g. Dunia 2007), seeks to account for changes of Member States’ policies in response to EU pressure and in compliance with EU requirements.

Research on Europeanization also examines ways to conceptually link the bottom-up and top-down dimensions. Drawing on evidence from the field of EU environmental policy-making, Börzel (2002) has shown that Member States may respond to top-down pressures of Europeanization by making proactive attempts at exporting their own policy preferences to the EU level. Through this so-called ‘uploading’ of national preferences to the EU level – in contrast to ‘downloading’, which refers to the reception of EU policies at the national level – EU Member States seek to shape EU policies by which they are subsequently affected.

**Methodological Challenges**

The linkages between the bottom-up and top-down dimensions of Europeanization, however, create an important methodological challenge for Europeanization research: If the two dimensions are viewed as mutually constitutive and Europeanization is thus understood as an ongoing, circular movement, the boundaries between dependent and independent variables become blurred and an analytical distinction becomes difficult. Therefore, following authors...
such as Wendt (1987, p364-5), “bracketing” is suggested as a methodological device, i.e. to distinguish between periods during which a focus on the agency of Member States seems warranted, and periods during which Member State agency is taken as given in order to focus on the effect of EU institutions and processes on these states. For Europeanization research, this means that uploading and downloading are separated and examined – one at a time – as different dimensions in the Europeanization process.

A further important challenge for methodology is the problem of equifinality – that is, scholars must differentiate between domestic changes resulting from Europeanization and changes caused by other phenomena in both the international and domestic spheres of EU Member States. There might be other developments against which the impact of the CFSP has to be checked, such as changes in the structure of the international system (e.g. the end of the Cold War), international political events of great significance or changes in government. To deal with these challenges, different research strategies – such as process tracing, comparative case study designs, triangulation and counterfactual reasoning – have been recommended (Major 2005; Mendez, Wishlade, and Yuill 2008). ii

Overall, Europeanization is not a theory but rather a conceptual framework that draws on a range of theoretical and explanatory schemes, and Europeanization studies are often couched in both rationalist and constructivist perspectives (Featherstone 2003, p12). Such an ‘integrative’ approach is not without problems, however, as International Relations (IR) scholars have tended to focus on meta-theoretical debates surrounding the ontological disputes and methodological divides between rationalism and social constructivism. It must suffice here to point out that, given the evidence that integration and cooperation within the EU affects the national level through various mechanisms, certain scholars of EU studies have chosen a pragmatic and problem-driven (instead of method-driven) approach; in order to better capture the complex reality of European policy-making, analytical frameworks have been developed that incorporate both the rationalist and constructivist perspective (e.g. Checkel 1999; Jupille, Caporaso, and Checkel 2003).

Applying the Concept of Europeanization to the Study of Foreign Policy

In contrast to policy fields in the EU’s first pillar, foreign policy has not been extensively studied through the lens of Europeanization for a long time (e.g. Green Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse 2001). This can be attributed, among other things, to the distinctive character of the CFSP as compared to the EU’s first pillar.
White (1999, p37) has pointed out that European foreign policy comprises three different levels of activity: first, the supranational external relations of the European Community (EC) as the EU’s first pillar; second, the CFSP as the foreign policy of the EU on an intergovernmental basis, which constitutes the second pillar in the architecture of the EU; and third, the national foreign policies of Member States. Though bearing in mind that these three levels are increasingly interwoven, the focus of this article is on the question of how far the national foreign policies of EU Member States have been adapted or transformed because of the CFSP, which is seen as the political core of European foreign policy.

European Political Cooperation (EPC) – the forerunner of the CFSP – was originally created as an informal, non-binding forum for discussion outside the EC system, and supranational institutions played hardly any role in this sphere. The strongly intergovernmental character of EPC, and later of the CFSP, led scholars to suspect a “limited impact [of EPC/CFSP] on domestic policy choices” (Hix and Goetz 2000, p6). Consequently, Europeanization was expected to be less likely to occur and its effects to be much weaker and more difficult to trace than in policy fields in the EU’s first pillar, where substantial competences had been transferred to the supranational EU level.

However, more recent works have shown that the distinction between ‘first pillar’ and ‘second pillar’ Europeanization can easily be misleading, as the dynamics of Europeanization also seem to differ in policy areas found in the EU’s first pillar. Bulmer and Radaelli (2004) distinguish between four main patterns of governance in the EU – governance by negotiation, governance by hierarchy in terms of positive and negative integration, and facilitated coordination – arguing that different factors explain Europeanization outcomes for each of these patterns.iii

Conceptualizations of the Europeanization of foreign policy thus have to account for the fact that the dynamics of Europeanization in this policy field differ from dynamics in other policy areas. Very importantly, the ‘goodness of fit’ explanation of Europeanization is not as suitable for the field of foreign policy as it is for policy fields marked by hierarchical governance. In the area of foreign policy, there is usually no “clear, vertical chain-of-command, in which EU policy descends from Brussels into the Member States” (Bulmer and Radaelli 2004, p9). Member States themselves – usually by consensus – shape the decisions they are later affected by, and the level of adaptational pressure in the area of foreign policy does not match the level of pressure in other policy fields, where policy templates are made on the EU level and supranational actors like the European Commission play an important role.
This is not to say, however, that the dynamics of Europeanization in the foreign policy field are insignificant. Rather, it is assumed that Europeanization follows no single ‘logic’ across the various EU policy areas and that, in the realm of foreign policy, it takes place on a more voluntary and non-hierarchical basis (Bulmer and Radaelli 2004, p7). As the review of the literature on the Europeanization of foreign policy in the next sections will show, there has been an observable trend throughout Member States that ‘Europe matters’ with regard to their foreign policies.
Europeanization of Member State Foreign Policy – Dimensions, Mechanisms and Outcomes

There is a growing consensus that the Europeanization of foreign policy is best understood as an interactive process of change linking the national and EU levels (Juncos and Pomorska 2006; Major 2005; Wong 2006, 2007). The distinction between the bottom-up and top-down directions of Europeanization has been observed in the literature on European foreign policy and two distinct dimensions in particular have been identified: (a) the uploading of national foreign policy preferences to the European level and (b) the downloading of EU foreign policy to the national level (Tsardanidis and Stavridis 2005, Wong 2005, 2006, Major and Pomorska 2005). As Member States together initiate and shape the policies to which they later adapt, the two dimensions are linked in practice and Europeanization may also take place during, and even before, the process of sectoral integration on the EU level (Bulmer and Radaelli 2004; Irondelle 2003).

However, further clarification is required with regard to how the different processes work and what mechanisms drive Europeanization (Miskimmon 2007). Previous conceptualizations of the Europeanization of foreign policy do not provide a clear distinction between the dimensions of Europeanization, the mechanisms that drive it, and the respective outcomes (see Table 1). Addressing this research deficit, this section provides a refined conceptualization of the Europeanization of foreign policy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Mechanisms</th>
<th>Outcomes/Indicators</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uploading/Bottom-Up</td>
<td>Socialization</td>
<td>Policy Projection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member States seek to influence EU foreign policy and the foreign policies of other Member States</td>
<td>projection of national policy preferences, policy models and ideas onto the EU level</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Downloading/Top-Down</td>
<td>Socialization/Learning</td>
<td>Policy Adaptation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member States are subject to influences and stimuli from the EU and other Member States</td>
<td>changes of national institutions, processes, ideas and policies due to practices, rules, objectives and norms adopted or prescribed at the EU level</td>
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Although the EU also promotes general principles of political order such as democracy and human rights outside of Europe (Schimmelfennig 2007), the domestic effects of European integration beyond the group of actual and prospective EU Member States will not be dealt with in this article. Moreover, the focus will be on the Europeanization of policy – that is, on changes in the substance, priorities and objectives of national foreign policy in response to Europe rather than on the Europeanization of politics and polity. However, as an absolutely sharp separation is not always possible or useful in practice, institutional changes as well as changes to the policy-making process will be discussed, where appropriate and relevant.

The Uploading Dimension of Europeanization

The uploading dimension relates to the construction of European foreign policy. The outcome of Europeanization here is the projection of national foreign policy preferences (ideas and policy templates) onto the EU level. From the perspective of rationalist institutionalism, foreign policy cooperation can be understood as an important instrument that allows Member States to pursue their national interests more effectively. The pooling of resources results in a ‘politics of scale effect’ (Ginsberg 1989), which increases the influence and leverage of EU Member States’ governments in world affairs and provides an incentive for Member States to proactively project their priorities and policy styles onto the EU level.

The projection of national preferences is also particularly attractive when Member States pursue goals that they cannot attain through unilateral action, or when Member States wish to externalize national problems to the EU level. For example, such an observation has been made of France in the realm of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)\(^\text{v}\), where French policy-makers sought to commit their European partners to EU interventions in sub-Saharan Africa (Menon 2009). Member States can furthermore use the “shield effect” (Tonra 2000b) of foreign policy cooperation to reduce the costs and risks of pursuing a controversial policy such as political or economic sanctions towards a third country, and national projection can be a strategy to keep adaptation pressures stemming from the CFSP within clear boundaries (Miskimmon 2007).

Uploading ideally results in other Member States’ adoption of the projected policies. However, several Member States will often inject their preferences into EU-level negotiations. In such a situation, intergovernmental IR approaches assume that the unanimity principle in
CFSP decision-making would favour a policy outcome that represents the lowest common denominator of Member States’ preferences.

It has been argued, however, that the institutionalization of European foreign policy cooperation and the emergence of common norms and values have transformed the environment of European foreign policy-making in important ways (see Smith 2004a). Common procedural norms such as the practice of sharing information and the ‘reflex of coordination’ (Glarbo 1999; Smith 1998, p315; Wessels and Weiler 1988) were first developed on an informal basis and specified over the years. They were confirmed in the Single European Act (SEA), which came into force in 1987 and provided a treaty base for European foreign policy cooperation for the first time, and also in the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU) of 1993, though no provisions for their enforcement were stated in either treaty. Besides these procedural norms, important substantive norms, policy positions and objectives that make up the EU’s foreign policy acquis have developed, which set precedents that guide further decision-making.

These changes have affected the strategies that Member States employ to ‘upload’ their preferences onto the EU level, which differ in important ways from inter-state bargaining. Socialization – a process whereby actors of a given community are inducted into the community’s norms and rules – plays an important role, while a further differentiation can be made depending on the nature or ‘quality’ of socialization (see below). Member States may use norm-based arguments (Checkel 2005; Schimmelfennig 2001) to enhance the legitimacy of their claims. This approach has been termed ‘arguing’ and is based on the assumption of ‘strategically socialized’ actors. Here, Member States strategically appeal to common norms, values and policy precedents and make use of ostracisms or peer pressure to advance their interests and sanction defectors of cooperation. As pointed out by Schimmelfennig and Thomas (2009), a Member State’s ability to successfully employ norm-based arguments depends on a number of conditions, including the determinacy of an EU norm and its relevance to a particular policy, as well as the forum for negotiations. For example, Juncos and Pomorska (2006) suggested that Member State representatives in Council working groups make (strategic) use of the opportunities provided by an institutional environment characterized by common norms and rules (playing the ‘Brussels game’).

Member State representatives may also try to influence not only each other’s behaviour but also each other’s thinking through deliberation and ‘normative suasion’ (Schimmelfennig and Thomas 2009; Tonra 2001; Smith 2004b). This would mean that national ideas and policy
preferences are not static but may change over time and come closer to each other, as actors internalize new understandings of appropriateness. From such a social constructivist perspective, actors may start to perceive each other increasingly as partners who have to solve joint problems, rather than negotiating opponents in a bargaining game (Smith 2004b, p102).

Both of these styles of preference uploading may also explain why smaller Member States with less bargaining power might succeed in influencing European foreign policy outcomes. For example, the small Nordic EU members, particularly Sweden and Finland, have generally wielded strong influence in the establishment of the civilian dimension of the ESDP (Jakobsen 2009; Arter 2000; Björkdahl 2008).

Overall, it has been noted that by shifting from a bargaining style of interest mediation to an arguing style of cooperation, EU states have improved their prospects for foreign policy cooperation (Smith 2004b; Juncos and Pomorska 2006). Thus far, however, different ways of preference-uploading have primarily been described empirically. It would be an interesting avenue for future studies to engage in more theory-guided research in order to look at how Member States further their interests in European foreign policy-making, and to examine under which ‘conditions’ Member States employ a particular uploading strategy. It would be conceivable, for instance, that negotiations about less contended foreign policy issues that are not deeply entrenched at the domestic level are more likely to encourage a problem-solving or arguing mode of interest mediation. Highly contested foreign policy issues that are of substantial significance to individual Member States, by contrast, can be expected to promote a bargaining style of negotiations.

It is moreover important to point out that ‘preference-uploading’ might begin at an earlier stage in the EU foreign policy cycle. While this article has focused on uploading strategies available to Member States to influence EU-level decision-making in the ‘negotiation phase’, other routes of influence exist (Major 2008). Very importantly, Member States might seek to shape the EU’s foreign policy agenda and form coalitions with like-minded states to influence the issues that will be subject to EU-level negotiations and deliberations (Miskimmon and Paterson 2003).

*The Downloading Dimension of Europeanization*

The downloading dimension refers to a top-down process where the outcome is national change and adaptation (be it of policies or preferences) in terms of policy-making style, objectives and substance in response to EU stimuli and pressures. Important indicators are,
among other things, an increasing degree of salience of the EU agenda, a contracting scope of national *domaines réservés*, the relaxation of national policy priorities to accommodate progress of common policies, and the emergence of shared definitions of national and European preferences (Wong 2006; Gross 2009). It is important to note, however, that this does not necessarily imply an overall homogenisation across EU Member States. Indeed, perhaps the most contested question for research on the Europeanization of foreign policy is whether a broad convergence can be expected to be the dominant tendency over the long term (Wong 2007: 325).

The general picture that emerges from the growing body of literature is that the trajectories of foreign policy adaptation differ in individual Member States. Domestic factors such as the size of a Member State and the extent of a state’s foreign relations network, as well as historically conditioned variables like national identity (e.g. an ‘Atlanticist’ versus a ‘Europeanist’ orientation) and strategic culture (e.g. views concerning the use of force), seem to influence national Europeanization experiences.

Larger Member States are frequently portrayed as ‘shapers’ rather than ‘takers’ of European foreign policy (Gross 2009; Miskimmon 2007) and the ‘EU impact’ on smaller Member States is usually considered to be more profound (Tonra 2000b). This is not to say, however, that larger Member States are immune to the ‘EU impact’, or that foreign policy adaptation in response to the EU may not have significant benefits for larger Member States. As argued by Wong (2006) in a detailed study of French foreign policy toward East Asia, the impact of EU institutions and the CFSP on French foreign policy behaviour has been more significant than is commonly imagined. Irondelle (2003) has shown that even the anticipated movement towards integration in the defence realm already had an impact on the French military reforms from 1991-96.

Moreover, integration-related factors, such as the duration of EU membership, seem to play an important role. Unlike old Member States, new members were unable to influence the EU foreign policy *acquis* from the outset of European foreign policy cooperation. Adaptation thus followed a top-down direction as new members adjusted their national foreign policies to pre-established European foreign policy positions. Greece and Spain, for instance, which joined the then EC in 1981 and 1986 respectively, downgraded the importance of central traditional policy positions to bring them in line with the EU’s *acquis politique* (Economides 2005; Ioakimidis 2000; Kennedy 2000).
Finally, it seems important to caution against the risk of overstating the EU’s impact on national foreign policy. The Europeanization of foreign policy may be reversible, and there may be processes of ‘de-Europeanization’ or ‘renationalization’. For example, EU Member States may fall back on their own resources and individual strategies during political crises or after changes in government if domestic actors who oppose EU-inspired changes are empowered.
Mechanisms of Europeanization

As pointed out above, processes of elite socialization and the emergence of common EU foreign policy-norms have affected both the strategies available to Member States to upload their national preferences to the EU-level and the way Member States adapt their policies and preferences to the EU. Learning, by contrast, results in changes of beliefs, cognitions and attitudes of political elites that, in turn, can lead to changes in foreign policy and national adaptation.

Learning

Learning has been identified as a key mechanism that drives Europeanization and leads to policy adaptation (Wong 2005; Smith 2004a,b). In policy areas like employment and social protection, the EU has established the ‘Open Method of Coordination’ to provide a platform for collective learning. In the foreign policy realm, where no such learning platform has been put into practice, policy makers are more likely to learn from critical experiences, such as crises and policy failures, which put into question the policy that has been followed hitherto rather than from common benchmarks and best practices (Bulmer and Radaelli 2004).

This is not to say, however, that in the framework of EU foreign policy cooperation Member States do not also learn from each other. As it has been shown in France’s trade and investment relations with China, France’s foreign policy was Europeanized in terms of learning and emulative transfer from the ‘German model’ (Wong 2006). Still, it is commonly understood that the most substantial shift in national foreign policy positions and preferences were driven by critical external events. It has been observed that Member States’ experience with helplessness in collectively dealing with international conflicts and crises led to enhanced efforts to strengthen the EU’s capacity for joint action, and to speak with one voice in international affairs. The EU’s inability to effectively respond to the violent break-up of former Yugoslavia, for example, has been identified as a key factor that has driven the development of ESDP. And European disunity during the Iraq crisis of 2003 has been an influential factor in the development of the European Security Strategy (Mahncke 2004).

Two forms of learning can essentially be distinguished (Radaelli 2003, p52): Whereas it is assumed that ‘thin learning’ occurs when actors readjust their strategies in order to achieve their unwavering goals, ‘thick learning’ entails that the belief systems and preferences of actors are modified and their values reshaped. However, the phenomenon of learning from
joint European foreign policy experiences has rarely been studied in an in-depth, theoretically-informed manner. In part, this might be because of conceptual and methodological challenges encountered by theories of learning, as learning is difficult to define, operationalize and measure empirically (Levy 1994). An interesting new research avenue would thus be to examine with regard to concrete key foreign policy issues to what extent the frequent deliberations among CFSP participants have led to the emergence of shared understandings and beliefs and a streamlining of national preferences concerning key international issues, and whether such cognitive changes have long-lasting effects on subsequent decisions about foreign policy and strategy.

The Socialization of CFSP Participants

To derive a more fine-grained explanation of Europeanization, scholars moved down the ladder of abstraction from the state level (macro-level) to the level of Member State representatives in EU-level institutions (micro-level). In the realm of the CFSP, research on socialization has largely focused on the Political and Security Committee (PSC) (Duke 2005; Duke 2007; Juncos and Reynolds 2007), its forerunner the Political Committee (Jørgensen 1997; Nuttall 1992), as well as the Council working groups (Beyers 2005; Juncos and Pomorska 2006). Drawing on insights from social constructivist research, a number of empirical studies on the CFSP (Tonra 2000a, 2001) and the ESDP (Cornish and Edwards 2001; Meyer 2005) have argued that EU-level institutions have the ability to socialize their agents. These studies generally identified the ‘club-like atmosphere’ and Member States’ willingness to coordinate their foreign policy actions, share information and comply with common procedural norms in the absence of ‘robust’ compliance mechanisms as evidence for elite socialization.

Research on CFSP committees and working groups has shown that Member State representatives – which are formally ‘agents’ of their states who receive instructions from their governments – have considerable leeway in influencing foreign policy decisions. As a matter of fact, according to estimates only 10-15 percent of the foreign policy issues – although usually issues that are of particular salience to one or more Member State(s) – on the agenda of the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) are actually decided by the Council (Hayes-Renshaw 2002). The majority of issues have been not only prepared but also agreed upon at the level of CFSP committees and working groups before they reach
the Council. Europeanization might thus occur through the influence of Member State representatives placed in Brussels on national preference formation.

Still, it is important to notice that the effects of socialization are not limited to the lower-level bodies of decision-making. As Thomas (2009) has argued, key procedural CFSP norms, i.e. the normative commitment to joint action and to maintaining consistency and coherence, characterize EU foreign policy negotiations in all forums of decision-making, including the GAERC. Yet, given the high frequency of interaction between Member State representatives in CFSP committees and working groups, the effects of socialization are expected to be especially profound in these institutions.

A particularly important question when trying to understand the impact of socialization on European foreign policy outcomes concerns the nature of socialization in CFSP institutions. Drawing on Checkel’s (2005) distinction between two types of norm internalization, it has been examined whether actors simply take the normative context of the CFSP into account when they pursue their national objectives (type 1 internalization/strategic socialization), or if CFSP institutions transform the properties of actors, i.e. their national identities and foreign policy preferences (type 2 internalization). With regard to strategic socialization, CFSP norms constrain the behaviour of actors, while in instances of type 2 internalization, CFSP institutions and norms have constitutive effects.

**Table 2: Socialization and Europeanization Outcomes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of Socialization</th>
<th>Instruments/Interest Mediation</th>
<th>Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type 1 Internalization</td>
<td>Norm-Based Arguing</td>
<td>Adaptation of Behaviour to Constraints</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(strategic socialization)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 2 Internalization</td>
<td>Normative Suasion</td>
<td>Preference/Identity Change</td>
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</table>

In a study on Council working groups, Juncos and Pomorska (2006) argued that EU-level diplomats comply with a group’s procedural norms and rules because they calculate that doing so helps them reach their national goals more effectively. Here, the main mechanism behind socialization is ‘strategic action’ (Checkel 2005), and no internalization of European norms has (yet) occurred.
In situations of repeated negotiations, as in the case of the CFSP, reputation-building enhances a Member State’s ability to influence decision-making. In this view, it can be expected that adaptation follows a strategic calculus; actors may adapt to EU policies and positions because they are willing to trade the losses of one round of negotiations against the higher benefits of a subsequent round, gained by accomplishing a cooperative reputation. Non-cooperation, in turn, entails the risk of being isolated and marginalized in the decision-making process.

Scholars such as Smith (2004a) and Tonra (2001) have taken the impact of participation in EU foreign policy-making on national foreign policies a step further. Drawing on insights from sociological institutionalism, they argue that foreign policy cooperation has led to the emergence of a common ‘role identity’ among CFSP participants. Member States support EU positions and policies as they are convinced that doing so is appropriate in terms of promoting common European objectives, norms and values. Here, socialization goes beyond conscious role-playing and requires type 2 norm internalization and a change in the values and preferences of actors. As a result, actors increasingly identify themselves with common European objectives and try to find solutions in the interest of a common European good (Beyers 2005).

Against this background, an especially promising avenue for further investigation will be to specify the conditions under which policy makers may internalize common norms and ideas in order to shed additional light on the links between CFSP institutions, socialization and changes in national foreign policies. It would be conceivable, for instance, that internalization is more likely to occur if the meetings of the respective committee or working group are relatively insulated (Lewis 2005). In addition, the length and intensity of a national representative’s exposure to an EU committee/working group may also play a role (Beyers 2005).
Conclusions

While previous conceptualizations of the Europeanization of foreign policy have differentiated between different schools of Europeanization research (Wong 2005; Gross 2007), this article has emphasized the need to further explore and specify the way in which these different ‘branches’ of research are linked, rather than treating them as separate phenomena. Distinguishing between dimensions (uploading and downloading), outcomes (national projection and foreign policy adaptation) and especially mechanisms of Europeanization (socialization and learning), we have attempted to better capture the complex dynamics of the Europeanization of foreign policy, which differ in important ways from areas of hierarchical governance located in the EU’s first pillar. Very importantly, Europeanization processes in the foreign policy area are more voluntary and less hierarchical in nature.

In our view, the central added value of studying European foreign policy through the lens of Europeanization lies in the fact that Europeanization concepts shift the attention to the interactions between the national and EU level. On the one hand, we argued that mechanisms such as learning and socialization can explain why European foreign policy cooperation worked in the absence of formal enforcement mechanisms and against initially diverging policy preferences of Member States. Very importantly, adaptations of their foreign policies can result from evolving social rules for convergent behaviour, as well as from emulative policy transfer and learning from foreign policy experiences. At the same time, Member States might be willing to adapt their individual foreign policies to EU objectives and adhere to procedural norms if it is in their (long-term) interest (strategic socialization), or if they become convinced that doing so is appropriate to pursue common European objectives (norm internalization).

On the other hand, we argued that the fact that European foreign policy negotiations take place in an increasingly institutionalized space has impacted the ways in which Member States seek to upload their preferences to the European level. Assuming the existence of strategically socialized actors, Member State representatives will be encouraged to switch from a ‘bargaining’ to an ‘arguing’ mode of negotiation, and will try to influence each other’s behaviour by framing their policy preferences as consistent with common EU norms. As a result, Member States with divergent preferences might be compelled to adapt their positions if they feel that the social rewards exceed the costs of concession. At the same time, we highlighted that socialization processes can have an even more profound impact and result in changes of national preferences and identities. In this view, agreement and preference
convergence can be attained through ‘normative suasion’, and the interactions of Member States may be marked by a collective orientation of ‘problem-solving’, so that common definitions of problems and philosophies for their solution may emerge.

While this article has set out significant refinements of previous conceptualizations, we also highlighted the need for further research to enhance our knowledge of the Europeanization of foreign policy. As far as the downloading dimension is concerned, the phenomenon of learning from joint European foreign policy experiences has certainly remained under-researched. A promising avenue for further investigation would thus be to examine how processes of learning in CFSP institutions encourage joint understandings and beliefs among EU-policy makers. Regarding the uploading dimension, further research is required as to how Member States further their interests in European foreign policy-making, and in which situations they employ a particular uploading strategy. As pointed out above, recent works have made a first attempt to specify conditions that are conducive to a certain negotiation style. So far, however, research has produced only tentative results, and the scope conditions for uploading strategies need to be tested more systematically.
References


In a broad sense, foreign policy is understood as referring to all activities that extend beyond the borders of a nation or similar entity. This article concentrates on the political core of these activities, including questions related to security and defence policy.

Process tracing in particular is considered as a key method that allows for the examination of links between potential causes and observed outcomes, and thus clarifies whether supposed correlations and causal mechanisms between integration and co-operation at the EU level, on the one hand, and changes of various aspects at the Member State level, on the other, are correct (George and Bennett 2005).

Foreign policy falls under the pattern of facilitated coordination, i.e. policy processes are not subject to European law, the powers of supranational actors are weak and decisions are taken by unanimity.

Some authors have also referred to ‘crossloading’ as a further dimension of Europeanization, emphasizing that changes may not only be due to the EU but may also occur within it (Major and Pomorska 2005; Wong 2007). In this article, the horizontal interactions and exchanges between Member States are also considered to fall under the notion of Europeanization as ‘uploading’.

In this article, the ESDP is considered to be a part of the CFSP.