The Europeanization of development policy: Accommodation and resistance of the Czech Republic

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Abstract

In the first step, a framework for Europeanization, defined as adoption of EU rules by the member states, is adapted to the field of development policy. As the *acquis* in this field of shared competence between the Commission and the member states consists almost entirely of soft law, social learning and, in a lesser extent, global incentives and lesson-drawing are identified as the dominant channels of Europeanization. Thereafter, the EU development policy, characterized by the normative power of the Commission and the strong influence of foreign policy is analyzed, as well as the diverging perceptions of the “old” and “new” member states. Finally, the Europeanization framework is applied to the Czech Republic. The shallow Europeanization of the Czech development cooperation is explained by the differences of values and norms shared at EU and national level, and the difference in the perception of the most efficient level in promoting the long-term national interests. An analysis of the Czech discourse, institutionalization and implementation of the norms on aid quality and quantity, “3 Cs” agenda and EU-ACP cooperation shows that resistance and accommodation are the most frequent modes of dealing with EU rules than their adoption. The paper concludes with a scrutiny of the EU’s failure to promote its norms in development policy among the member states.

Keywords: Europeanization, development policy, development cooperation, Czech Republic
1 Introduction

Despite the ever-growing research on Europeanization since the late 1990s and the rising importance of development policy – at least in terms of the EU’s budget share –, the influence of the European Union on the member states in the policy area of development cooperation has not been paid much attention thus far. In the aftermath of the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, Christiane Loquai has recorded a shift in the meaning of Europeanization from the communitarization of national development cooperation towards the process of coordination, complementarity and coherence between the member states and the European Commission (Loquai 1996). Some others have touched upon the topic in the margin of their accounts of Europeanization of national foreign policy (Torreblanca 2001; Escribano and Lorca 2004).

Only recently has Europeanization of development policy been applied to the “new” EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe generally (Lightfoot 2010), and to Slovakia particularly (Vittek and Lightfoot forthcoming). It was understood as a top-down process of the EU affecting the member states. While the transition of Slovakia from aid recipient to donor was seen as “successful” although “still with work to do” (Vittek and Lightfoot forthcoming), the Europeanization of the whole region “has tended to be shallow” (Lightfoot 2010: 345). Both studies focus mostly on the quantity and geographical distribution of aid and institution building and they give credit to the important role of other external actors and internal factors that have shaped the policy, but eventually they claim that “the biggest drivers were the demands of the EU acquis” (Lightfoot 2010: 347).

While I agree that the diagnostic of “shallow Europeanization” (Goetz 2005) suits perfectly to the case of the Czech Republic, I argue that the country may serve as counterexample that shows insufficient evidence of the dominant role of the EU in shaping development cooperation among the Central and Eastern European “new” EU member states as a whole. This argument is partly supported by the exceptionally early restart and institutionalization of the Czech development cooperation in the mid-1990s, but also by the development of a rigorous analytical framework of Europeanization, understood here as the process of adoption of EU rules, applicable to the particularly complex field of development policy.

Since the Maastricht Treaty, development cooperation has been a shared competency between the member states and the European Commission. The *acquis communautaire* is constituted almost entirely of ‘soft law’, i.e. by measures that have “exploded in 2000” in relation to the ambitious Lisbon Agenda and that do not have legally binding effects (Chalmers et al. 2006: 138). In contrast to “hard law”, enshrined in decisions, directives and regulations, “soft law” is created through the Open Method of Coordination and ‘enforced’ through peer pressure of the member states. Apart from implementing aid as the twenty-eighth EU donor, the Commission has a strong normative power to shape the EU development policy and impose its ideas on the member states (Carbone 2007), an ability that has been supported by the improvement in the implementation of its aid programmes (Grimm 2008). The states remain,

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1 Especially well covered are the internal policies (see Gualini 2004; Jordan and Liefferink 2005; Faist and Ette 2007 for example), and more recently external policies of the member states (Tonra 2001; Wong 2006; Bache and Jordan 2008; Versluys 2008). The member states that acceded the EU after 2004 and/or with largest gaps in the implementation of the *acquis* have received special attention (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Schmidt 2005; Featherstone and Papadimitriou 2008).

2 The “new” EU member states referred here include ten post-communist countries: five Central European countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia and Poland), three Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), and two Southeast European countries (Bulgaria and Romania).
however, the ultimate drivers of their bilateral policies and their responses to the EU may be diverging and/or superficial.

A framework of Europeanization must assess hence all the relevant channels of Europeanization and scrutinize thoroughly the responses by the member states. The sceptical argument on the Europeanization of the Czech development cooperation is based on the complete coverage of development policy from 1995 onwards. It is further strengthened by the insight in the actual implementation of policy declarations that may frequently refer to the EU. At the same time, due attention is given to other relevant actors and factors that may influence the member states. Overall, besides the specific evaluation of Europeanization undergone by the Czech Republic, the paper offers a more general insight in the field of EU development policy and contributes to the theoretical debate on Europeanization.

The structure of the paper reflects this triple goal of the study: the first part discusses the current use of the concept of Europeanization, and seeks to apply it to the field of development policy, with special attention to the relevant type of Europeanization process, the problem of causality and the relation to foreign and EU integration policy. The second part, based on interviews with relevant actors at EU level, refines the findings on the specific character of the policy, with special attention to horizontal rules and the relation to foreign policy. The final part tackles the case of the Czech Republic from the top-down Europeanization perspective and puts the adoption, accommodation or resistance to EU rules in specific policy subfields in contrast with the successful Czech presidency of the Council of the EU in the first half of 2008.

2 An analytical framework for the study of Europeanization in development policy

2.1 Definition and typology of Europeanization processes

Since the mid-1990s (Ladrech 1994), Europeanization has become a buzzword in European studies. In spite of frequent criticisms it still shows a strong vitality. Since the term Europeanization appeared, there has been no consensus on the significance of the concept: not less than ten different and meanings can be identified in three literature reviews (Harmsen and Wilson 2000; Olsen 2002; Featherstone and Radaelli 2003). An attempt at accommodating existing theoretical approaches in a broader definition of Europeanization proposed “domestic adaptation to European regional integration“ (Graziano and Vink 2006: 7). This approach would allow for integrating both bottom-up and top-down approaches, vertical and horizontal effects, uniform and differential impact of Europeanization. It would also accept “soft issues” such as identity and it could be generalized to regional integration outside the EU.

Even though none of these aspects of Europeanization can be ignored, I adopt a narrower definition of Europeanization as a “process in which states adopt EU rules” (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 7). Since the rules can be formal and informal, explicit and implicit, this definition is open to both rationalist and constructivist approaches and does not exclude ex ante any relevant interpretation. With the emphasis on the “adoption” instead of

3 The right term should be “EU-isation” (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 1). Indeed, the coined term “Europeanization” rhetorically excludes non-EU European countries from making part of Europe. Since the usage of EU-isation is not widespread, I conform to the tradition.
“adaptation”, the process is primarily reduced to its top-down dimension, but if “EU rules” are interpreted more broadly as informal procedural rules of cooperation between the member states, the definition can accommodate for the horizontal dimension as well. More importantly, adoption is a narrower term in that sense that accommodation or even resistance to the rules could also be interpreted as an adaptation. As well as the broader definition of Europeanization, it is not territorially reduced to the current EU members, but it includes also candidate countries.

The types of processes how Europeanization works have been classed according to different criteria: logics of action in an enlargement-adjusted model (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005), mechanism of Europeanization (Knill and Lehmkuhl 1999; Börzel and Risse 2000), or governance patterns in a policy-analytical approach (Bauer et al. 2007). Despite these terminological differences, these classifications do not differ substantially and they may be synthesized and applied to the field of development policy. However, as the previous research did not specifically aim at external policies of the EU, an external incentives model at global level is added as a correlate to domestic competition, resulting in five distinct mechanisms (see Table 1).

Table 1. Typology and relevance of Europeanization processes in development policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Mechanism</th>
<th>Underlying theoretical approach</th>
<th>Relevance for development policy</th>
<th>Justification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Compliance</td>
<td>Conditionality</td>
<td>Rationalism (coercion, extremely high opportunity costs)</td>
<td>Very limited</td>
<td>Limited hard law, development policy absent from EU accession negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic incentives</td>
<td>Competition</td>
<td>Rationalism (logic of consequentialism)</td>
<td>Very limited</td>
<td>Absenting market, concerns only limited funding opportunities for particular actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global incentives</td>
<td>Collective action</td>
<td>Rationalism (logic of consequentialism)</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Collective action serves better individual interests of the member states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social learning</td>
<td>Change in beliefs</td>
<td>Constructivism (logic of appropriateness)</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Mostly soft law, low enforceability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesson-drawing</td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Mix of constructivism and rationalism</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Most horizontal rules institutionalized in the vertical rules</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s compilation and adaptation of Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005), Knill and Lehmkuhl (1999), and Bauer et al. (2007).

2.2 Relevance of Europeanization mechanisms in development policy

Firstly, both conditionality and compliance can be explained in a rational framework by coercion and extremely high opportunity costs as the main driving forces to adopt EU rules at the domestic level. While conditionality is more applicable to EU candidates, compliance is more suitable to the existing member states. In the first case, non-compliance is punished by non-accession; in the latter case it can be enforced by the EU institutions. While candidate countries may be obliged to comply with soft law that makes part of the accession criteria, the existing member states would have to comply only with hard law. In any case, all states would have to make their domestic institutions compatible with the EU rule. In the field of development policy, these mechanisms are relevant only in a very limited extent. The newcomers had to adopt the Cotonou agreement and adjust their trade preferences to ACP
countries, which in some cases used to be more generous than the communitarian tariffs. The issue of development policy was hardly raised as a part of the external relations chapter during the accession negotiations (Lightfoot and Lindenhovius Zubizarreta 2008). Nevertheless, the newcomers as well as the “old” member states could not escape the compulsory contribution to development policy through their contribution to the budget of the EU. As far as the existing member states are concerned, hard law remains marginal as well. The EU-ACP relations have not undergone substantial changes: the attempts to “budgetize” the European Development Fund (EDF) have failed and it still relies on voluntary contributions. Hard law concerns mainly a limited scope of legislation and the financial perspective. Generally, there are no enforceable rules for the member states to provide bilateral assistance to developing countries at the height of their quantitative and qualitative commitments.

Secondly, the domestic incentives model, based on competition, is marginal as well. The model of “negative integration” assumes the existence of domestic actors with a particular interest in adopting EU rules. On the quantitative side of EU rules, private companies and non-governmental development organizations (NGDOs) are without doubt interested in the increasing development budgets. However, the rising public expenditures abroad are particularly difficult to defend by the governments as the voters do not agree with their use at their expense of domestic expenditures. Development policy opens only a limited market for the domestic actors. On the qualitative side, improving aid effectiveness, coordination and policy coherence for development (PCD) implies high initial transaction costs and it tends to reduce the role of the domestic actors with the increasing use of partner country systems. Therefore, the final resource and power distribution among domestic actors is negative, which makes it rather a disincentive for Europeanization.

Thirdly, the global incentives model is much more relevant, but it had to be newly fashioned on the external incentives model applied to global level. Development cooperation is an external policy of the EU and the existing rationalist models overlook the possible role of external incentives at global level. Some member states may behave as if the long-term pragmatic interests such as global security or migration prevention were not necessarily better ensured by the collective EU action, but by promoting these interests bilaterally. They focus hence on territories and sectors relevant for their particular interests. Other member states may rather support a collective action of the European Union that induces less transaction costs and eventually may be more effective. Poverty reduction is seen as tool for ensuring national economic and security interests in a long term. Moreover, the Europeanization of development policy may be perceived as the most efficient tool to ensure a strong position of the EU, and hence of the member state in the global arena. This efficiency-oriented type of calculus is build on the belief that collective action at EU level is preferable to individual actions.

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4 Unlike the multilateral and bilateral donor agencies, especially UNDP and CIDA, the Canadian Development Agency, the European Commission contributed to the emergence and institutionalization of development policies in the new member states only with marginal twinning programmes during the pre-accession period. Despite the excellent account of the treatment of development policy in the accession process (Lightfoot 2010: 332-36), the reasons for the omission remain unclear. The tiny support from the European Commission in the pre-accession period to build up development cooperation programmes in the candidate countries contrasts with the substantial amounts of aid within PHARE and other programmes that focused on the reforms to make the CEE markets compatible with the common market (Hughes et al. 2004).

5 Even though the extent of support for deeper or lesser communitarization on the policy varies among member states, there is a consensus on the shared competency with the European Commission. Therefore, I do not scrutinize the “vertical transfer” side of Europeanization (Howell 2004).
action, but the enlarged understanding of the external incentives model can be primarily
classed as a relevant rationalist approach in EU development policy.

Fourthly, and in contrast to the rationalist models, the constructivist model of social learning
appears as the most relevant process of Europeanization. Unless they fall under the
mentioned rationalist model, non-enforceable soft law can be implemented only through the
acceptance of the underlying values. It has been argued that some actors such as non-
governmental development organizations may use the EU rhetoric to promote their particular
interests, especially increases in the development cooperation budget, but these uses cannot be
generalized to the government as a whole. If the implementation of an EU rule does not pass
the test of effectiveness or a collective action fails, the member state will not Europeanize its
development policy unless it perceives the underlying values of the communitarian norms as
“normal”.

Finally, the lesson-drawing model, related to the horizontal dimension of Europeanization can
be tackled only with difficulties. As the horizontal rules concerning coordination and division
of labour between donors make part of the soft acquis, they can be classed under one of top-
down models. The underlying motivations for adopting an institutional model from another
member state are not clear and they seem to respond to a mix of constructivist and rationalist
explanations. Not only it is difficult to identify if a member state takes over a model from
another member state because it has adopted its norms or because it is in its interest, but it is
even more demanding to assess what part the EU played in the process. These arguments are
sufficient to discard the lesson-drawing model from its application to the field of development
policy as far as the study of Europeanization is concerned. By doing this, the existence of
horizontal rules is not denied, but the coordination and communication mechanisms non-
formulated in the soft law would rather concern procedural issues than content issues.
Therefore, this paper pays attention to horizontal Europeanization and procedural norms
between member states, which are necessarily unwritten and informal, without paying
attention to the fuzzy model of lesson-drawing.

While rationalist models may be relevant especially in case that a member state seeks more
effectiveness and support for an EU collective action, constructivist approaches seem to be
the most relevant here. This finding influences the attention given to the domestic level. As
political will and public support are essential for internalizing the underlying values of the
soft norms, the social learning mechanism relates to the identity of the political elites and
citizens. As Knill and Lehmkuhl (1999: 9) have put it, these “policies are designed to change
the domestic political climate by stimulating and strengthening the overall support for broader
European reform objectives”. The support mobilization for domestic reforms works here as
the explanatory factor of Europeanization by changing beliefs and attitudes. This depiction
perfectly fits the EU development policy. Moreover, the states are more likely to adopt norms
considered as legitimate, worth of identification and resonating in the home society
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). The assessment of top-down Europeanization must
therefore pay special attention to domestic values and norms as well and the gap that
separates them from the EU level (see also Jørgensen et al. 2006: 492-93).

2.3 The problematic causality and depth of the EU effect

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6 Social learning is understood here as the process of accepting norms and values from other actors without any
ambition to synthesize the approaches and overcoming the rationalist/constructivist divide (Checkel 2001).
The identification of the relevant channels of Europeanization in the field of development policy is a first step in developing a framework for its application. Nevertheless, evidence of the “EU effect” may be limited by the presence of other significant internal and external factors that lead to the same result, and the alleged implementation of the declared conformity to EU norms. While the problem of causality between EU norms and their domestic implementation necessarily enlarges the scope of study, the scrutiny of the depth of Europeanization requires a more detailed insight in the policy-making, which does not ease the research.

As far as causality is concerned, the European Union has been identified as the most important factor in the resurgence of development cooperation in the “new” member states (Lightfoot 2008, 2010; Vittek and Lightfoot forthcoming). At the same time, however, the path dependency on the communist past and the subsequent transition experience has been taken accountable for the current development cooperation models in post-communist Central Europe. The countries of the Visegrád Group\(^7\) could not “simply imitate Western European practices” because of their history (Szent-Iványi and Tétényi 2008: 574). In addition to that, the EU has not been given a particularly preferential place among other actors such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the United Nations Programme for Development (UNDP). Recommendations made by the United Nations and the principles of aid effectiveness, promoted by OECD at multilateral level, have been included in the EU rules, and therefore it is difficult to judge whether the EU member states implement them directly or indirectly.\(^8\) Globalization as such may be another important factor in the presumed Europeanization of the “new” EU members states (Grabbe 2003: 313) and the changes in development policy might not be necessarily induced by the multilateral bodies.

Alongside the role of other external actors, it is necessary to pay attention to the domestic context as well. Indeed, many “new” member states do not consider development policy as an autonomous policy, but as an integral part of their foreign policy with less autonomy than the “old” member states (Orbie and Versluys 2008). In many of the latter, the development agenda has gained more independence and development interests are represented at ministerial level alongside the foreign policy interests. The research on the Europeanization of foreign policy has mainly concentrated on “old” member states (see Tonra 2001; Wong 2006; Bache and Jordan 2008), but available studies on Spain and Greece are of particular relevance here as they touch upon development cooperation. Both countries undertook the accession to the EU only in 1980s and their foreign policy priorities were different from the EU priorities. Even though Spain was more successful in “nationalizing” the EU development policy, both countries preserved territorial priorities in development policy that corresponded to their historical rights, economic and security interests.\(^9\) The attitude of a country towards the European integration makes part of its foreign policy and it simply cannot be ignored.

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\(^7\) The Visegrád Group consist of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.

\(^8\) Markus Haverland (2005) has advanced some proposals to avoid the trap, such as comparing the Europeanization of members states with non member states as a control group, but their operationalization is extremely difficult.

\(^9\) Greece is a small country with a similar pattern of its development cooperation to the NMS: modest in disbursements and focused mainly on its neighbouring middle income countries (OECD 2006). Europeanization enlarged the geographical scope of the Greek foreign policy mainly through its higher involvement in humanitarian and peacekeeping operation (Economides 2005: 483). Greece would fail to Europeanize because it did not abandoned its past national priorities (Tsardanidis and Stavridis 2005: 220). In contrast to that, the Spanish case attests the policy convergence of the national and EU foreign policy and the resignation on special relations with Latin America (Torreblanca 2001). According to Escribano and Lorca (2004) there was a
The studies of Europeanization may present a case where at the first sight, the undertaken reforms seem to go in the EU direction. Nonetheless, when assessing the Europeanization of a member state, it is vital to recognize how deeply (or superficially) the norms are adopted. It matters indeed if a country only pledges to EU norms in its outward-oriented discourse, if it takes over the rules and integrates them in the domestic norms, or if in addition to these, it implements them in practice. In consequence, three levels of implementation can be differentiated:

- **Discursive level**: the actors refer to EU norms in their discourses;
- **Institutional level**: EU norms are institutionalized domestically by the member state;
- **Behavioural level**: the actors act in compliance with EU norms.

This scale of implementation does not make part of the mainstream Europeanization frameworks, but it can be related to the focus on “construction, diffusion and institutionalization” in an alternative definition of Europeanization (Featherstone and Radaelli 2003: 30). While a yes-no reply in assessing Europeanization in a specific policy area would be too simplistic, the three criteria allow testing the rule adoption at the level of discourses, institutions and practices and recognize possible reactions to Europeanization such as absorption, accommodation of existing policies, or even rejection (Börzel 2005: 59). With the potential non-written rules, testing the depth of adoption of the norms spelled in the EU development policy (bilateral aid quantity and quality; the “3 Cs” principle: aid coordination and complementarity, policy coherence for development; and the EU-Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) agenda) should give a complete picture of the extent of Europeanization of a member state.

In sum, a review of the existing literature and its application to the understudied field gives a picture of EU development policy as an area predominantly structured by soft law where social learning constitutes the dominant process of Europeanization and where member states see their national interest in a better impact of the EU at the global level. The gap between EU norms and their implementation by the member states can be hence explained by the differences of values and norms shared at EU and national level, and the difference in the national perception of the most efficient level in promoting the long-term national interests. Development policy is also characterized by the presence of other normative actors at multilateral level and a strong influence of the domestic foreign policy so that any scrutiny should not lose from sight counterfactual evidence of non-Europeanization.

### 3 Attitudes to the Europeanization of development policy at EU level

#### 3.1 Understanding of the concept and relevance of mechanisms by the practitioners

This part of the paper seeks to enrich the understanding of the Europeanization of development policy with the perception of its main actors. A part of EU rules is clearly expressed in diverse EU documents: the treaties, communications and working papers by the substantial policy transfer to the EU, accompanied to some extent, however, by a policy substitution: aid to Latin America used to represent almost a half of the Spanish bilateral development assistance with a decline only during the last years. And this is the case of Greek bilateral cooperation to South-Eastern Europe as well (OECD 2007).
European Commission, approved consensually by the member states in the form of Council Conclusions. But horizontal norms of what is acceptable or unacceptable among member states are not formalized. It is hence through interviews with the relevant actors of the EU development policy that these unwritten rules can be uncovered.

Semi-structured interviews with the staff from the European Commission, European Council, European Parliament and national representatives to CODEV, the working group on development at the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), have been carried out in Brussels in September 2009. Six member states have been chosen to represent equally bigger and smaller EU countries, and to cover different amplitudes of commitment to development. National representatives from six member states have been chosen according to their accession to the European Union before 1980, from 1981 to 1999, and after 2000. Both big and small/medium member states make part of each of these subgroups. The focus of this research remains centred on states and EU institutions.

In order to not impose the selected definition of Europeanization and to check its relevance and scope, the interviewees were firstly asked to provide their own understanding of the concept and to identify its driving forces. While the EU representatives assessed the Europeanization of the members states as a whole, the national representatives characterized the efforts and obstacles encountered by their governments, and the underlying reasons for implementation in a particular field. All of them were also asked on their opinion on the informal rules and expectations in EU development policy, and the relation between development, foreign, and EU integration policy. Spontaneous references to other governance levels were noted in order to check other possible explanations of the processes at play and not to overestimate the EU effect.

Although the term Europeanization has acquired the sense of “EU-ization” in the academia almost two decades ago, it has not been largely adopted by the practitioners unlike other concepts such as multilevel governance, borrowed from European Studies (Marks et al. 1996). Indeed, the low awareness of the concept among the interviewees may be due to the multiple understandings of Europeanization. Only one interviewee with an academic background has proposed a definition similar to this paper, and another one has proposed the definition of European integration. Others have implicitly advanced top-down and/or bottom directions. In addition to that, the representatives of a big EU member state and the European Commission have mentioned the importance for the EU to have unique position at the multilateral fora, a coordinating dimension generally neglected in Europeanization literature.

The reported reasons for Europeanization in the area of development policy fall under both constructivist and rationalist models. The objectives and values of the EU development policy such as poverty reduction are not mentioned explicitly: interviewees referred rather to the values of the European integration: “doing things together”, “to be a good member” and “a real EU partner”, “building of the consensus”. Nevertheless, the values underlying the development policy must be shared implicitly to give some sense to the rationalist arguments for Europeanization. Indeed, the second group of justifications refers to effectiveness and efficiency of development policy, including “less transaction costs” and “doing things better”, Only one interviewee has mentioned the improvement of the international image of his/her country as one partial reason for “adapting to EU standards”.

Even though the number of cases is not sufficient enough to generalize, this mix of constructivist and rationalist arguments seem to be shared mostly by the member states who
have been involved in the policy for a longer period. The representatives of recently acceded member states did are closer to a liberal intergovernmental approach (see Moravczik 1993). Countries which “are not strong enough” at bilateral level would not have other choice than “going European” and the positive guidance of the EU should be carefully weighted with the limitations imposed on the bilateral policy.

Against the initial expectations, the general reasons given for Europeanization of development policy are not necessarily specific to this policy field: to be Europeanized has not been identified with the values and norms as the content of development policy (e.g. poverty reduction) but rather with procedural rules and interests. The field of development may not be that different from other fields and a general attitude to EU integration may be the determining factor, which has to be explored further. Nevertheless, a dividing line seems to be drawn between “old” and “new” member states in the emphasis on effectiveness as driving force for the Europeanization of development policy.

3.2 Reasons and obstacles for adopting EU rules by the member states

The depth of implementation of EU rules by individual countries and the underlying catalysts and inhibitors have been studied along the main issues of the EU development agenda: aid quantity and quality, aid coordination and complementarity, policy coherence for development, and the geographical focus of the EU on Africa. The reasons given by the interviewees concur with both constructivist and rationalist models at domestic level and they are generally specific to these issues.

The level of support for increasing official development assistance (ODA) budgets is unsurprisingly related to political will and public support. The later may not be necessarily of humanitarian nature and related to the missionary tradition, but also to the existence of diasporas and to the perception of global problems as threats to domestic stability. Domestic economic growth and major political shifts at government level were mentioned as well. As seen by the Council, the quantity of aid is directly related to the ability of the domestic development community to “mobilize resources”. In the context of the economic crisis, some member states acknowledge that the reiterated soft commitments on aid volume help to preserve domestic budgets. An interviewee has criticised the different commitments for “new” and “old” member states institutionalized by the European Council in 2005 since they seem to deepen the already important gap between member states created by the 2004 and 2007 enlargements.

The reasons for promoting aid quality are expressed in terms of domestic obstacles and incentives: national interests undermine the efforts for strengthening the ownership of partner countries, and national administrative and legal rules are an obstacle for using partner country systems. At the same time, especially those countries that have recently increased budgets of Official Development Assistance (ODA) in a substantial way lack sufficient know-how and capacities to ensure the best use of their aid. Their institutional culture is often distant from the recently approved principles of aid effectiveness. Therefore, the strive for effectiveness is not necessarily perceived as an external imposition, but firstly as a domestic need to which the rules at the EU level can respond. At the same time, following the EU framework can be also seen as a goal per se and a “school” with and “educational function”, referring directly to social learning. Political and historical arguments enter the debate of coordination and complementarity, with an emphasis on the division of labour. The need for national visibility
and the difficulty to “leave” a country have been identified as the main obstacles for aid concentration, especially in the case of the former colonial powers.

As far as these three areas are concerned, the “new” member states have given a quite different picture from the “old” member states. Against the opinion of the European Commission, they think that due to low development budgets they either have “nothing to coordinate”, or they recognise the need for coordination and its institutionalization at national level but at the same time they admit that there is “no time and capacities” for the agenda and that “nobody cares that it is not happening” at the domestic level. While experienced donors acknowledge a gap between commitments and implementation, the representatives of “new” member states seem to be more sceptical on the coordination among donors and judge that eventually “every state is doing what it wants”. The aid effectiveness agenda is sometimes identified as a threat to the national interests of the newcomers, especially when untying of aid is at the stake: outsourcing bilateral development cooperation would prohibit them to build up the national capacities of development constituency.

Despite the institutional arrangements to promote policy coherence for development at government level and by permanent representations of some member states, very modest outcomes have been recorded due to the fragmentation of power and struggles over the use of development finance in non-development agendas. There would be a risk that the acknowledgment of the development dimension of climate change and migration may lead to a deconcentration of development cooperation to the ministries, which are generally responsible for thses agendas. The issue of policy coherence for development was raised by the interviewees without discrimination. The interviewed representatives from “new” member states saw policy coherence as even more important than aid.

If the implementation of policy coherence by the “new” member states is hampered by the low capacities and weak bargaining power of their development constituencies, the geographic focus of the EU development policy on Sub-Saharan Africa does not help much to their strengthening. As their foreign policy priorities and experience are placed in Eastern and South Eastern Europe, they feel less concerned by the African agenda. So far, their attempts at enlarging the geographical scope of the EU development cooperation were acknowledged by some member states but they were doomed to failure by the division of labour at the European Commission. The diversification of geographical priorities by other member states towards Sub-Saharan Africa is related both to the focus on extreme poverty and the rising perception of national interests in the area of security, trade and energy.

To sum up, the top-down Europeanization of development policies of the member states is characterized by both social learning and external incentives models. While a number of references to norms and values are related especially to aid volume, the aid effectiveness agenda appears as a field where development effectiveness interests are disputed with other national interests, a problem analyzed later in this paper. Similarly to the precedent general assessment of Europeanization by the member states, there are few explicit references to the underlying goals and values of development policy, but again they seem to be shared as far as the interviewees point out mostly to the obstacles in their implementation.

### 3.3 Informal rules and the normative power of the European Commission
The conceptual framework for Europeanization adopted in this paper includes horizontal rules, especially those that are not explicitly mentioned in EU soft law such as the need for coordination and division of labour. This subsection draws on the interviews to make these informal rules and norms explicit and complete the picture of Europeanization in the development policy field. It is particularly focused on the unwritten rules in CODEV, the working party on development cooperation of the Council of the EU and its relations with the European Commission.

While this paper has not proposed the distinction between “old” and “new” member states ex ante, it spontaneously appeared during the interviews as the most important dividing line among EU member states. In any other issue area, the gap is not as wide as in development policy. The states have different abilities to “go European” and there is a correlation between the activity of a member states in CODEV and its part on the total volume of ODA of the Union. Since the total weight of the countries which acceded to the EU in 2004 and 2007 corresponds roughly to 1%, their effective part on decision making is seemingly overrated and the consensus in CODEV is more difficult to be found now. While a rule that assigns the importance of a country to its aid performance highlights the experience and analysis of the most advanced donors, it reduces further the possibility of substantial changes in the EU development policy since the member states with largest aid volumes are likely to be more path-dependent and the “new” member states are unable to mobilize their know-how. Experienced donors see the “new” member states as socializing and struggling with the domestic acceptance of the development policy, which is considered to be “only human”.

At the same time, new expertise brought by the “new” member states, mostly on democratic governance and transition, is appreciated. The Czech presidency in the first half of 2008 has played the role of catalyser for the “new” member states to emancipate and lose the fear of presenting their opinions. The dividing line should not to be exaggerated as new member states manage to create alliance with old member states and “do not tear the bunch apart”, however it remains relevant on the majority of issues dealt in the Council: low aid commitments, weak interest in EDF, the focus on the neighbourhood, and technical project assistance as a main tool of bilateral cooperation. A representative of a “new” member state has admitted that sometimes the colleagues from “old” member states unofficially agree with non-mainstream opinions of the newcomers, but they do not venture in presenting them officially.

The accession of new EU member states should not turn the attention from other substantial changes in the working of CODEV that happened in last years. If the pre-accession “family-like” ambiance turned into a more formal arrangement, the dominant role of the European Commission has changed. As acknowledged by both the European Commission and the member states, the first does not want to be a “pupil” of the latter. The role of the Council vis à vis the Commission has changed from “controlling the Commission” to the “joint approach” see also (see also Carbone 2007). Nevertheless, the Commission stands at the origin of the large majority of proposals and the margin of the member states including the presidency is very limited. If the EU development “bible” is composed of communications and staff working papers elaborated by the Commission and the political conclusions agreed by the Council commitments, the Commission “puts the string” and its position is simply acknowledged as “the big role”.

10 There is generally a “paradoxical situation” where the member states with the lowest policy-making capacity in a policy area bear the highest implementation costs (Börzel 2005: 63). Its consequences are debated in the conclusion.
Moreover, once the Commission has puts an issue on the agenda, it cannot be easily discarded, but at most delayed with difficulties. The member states cannot defy their precedent positions, the “agreed language” and they can only resist the progress on an agenda only by reconfirming its positions. These features give the EU development policy agenda a cumulative character. Since the European Council is a forum for influencing the policy framework, it does not offer any space for lesson-learning among the member states, which only underlines the leading role of the Commission in terms of content of the policy, slightly balanced by the Council. The cumulative process of EU development policy-making is generally described as inertial and slow. The European Commission and not rather the member states are hence at the origin of a steady “normative power Europe” (Manners 2002) in development policy.

Other informal rules do not seem to have the same importance. On the procedural side, informal rules are often related to the presidency. As far as the content of the policy is concerned, it is not acceptable that a member state “steps” in the traditional area of expertise of another member state. The member states do not come up with politically incorrect or otherwise unacceptable positions and generally follow the mainstream, they try to influence the policy if it their vital preferences are threatened and for this reason to they form alliances with other member states, but their margin of manoeuvre is very narrow. The limits of acceptability are also defined by their foreign policy, an issue tackled in the following subsection.

3.4 Relation to foreign and EU policy as a source of domestic resistance

Even though the Europeanization of development policy tackles the processes of aid effectiveness, it virtually ignores the internal institutional arrangements of the member states. This blind spot appears as natural if we take in account the diversity of models of organizing the system for providing development cooperation in the EU, and therefore the impossibility to find a consensus on a single model. The main differentiating feature of model is the autonomy of development policy vis-à-vis the foreign policy. Even though there is not a straightforward relation between the autonomy of the development policy and the depth of Europeanization by a member states, it is an important factor in the attitude of a member states towards the implementation of EU rules.

Among bigger member states, Germany and United Kingdom have cabinet ministers, but in France, Italy and Poland, for example, foreign policy priorities are strongly reflected in their development cooperation. In Spain and the Netherlands the development departments are more autonomous. Among smaller member states, for example, Sweden would lay on one extreme while the Czech Republic on the other one. The institutional arrangement is not the only factor to explain the commitment to EU norms as the Netherlands, for example, has been defending the aid effectiveness agenda. It has been emphasized that a separate cabinet ministry serves as a “logo” for protecting the quality of aid and that “development people” have a long-term vision compared to diplomats, who are subject to the use of conditionality and react swiftly to political events.

However, what some member states call autonomy, others apprehend and criticize as depoliticization. The autonomy may also be fictive, as several members of CODEV have noted that the positions defended by the UK representative in CODEV are not in line with the
positions of the British government. A representative of a “new” member state has severely criticized the depoliticization of the EU development policy. In fact, EU would not even have any real development policy, but only “ODA”, managed by the Directorate General (DG) Development as a former administrator of technical assistance, subject to an “NGO attitude” and living in a “ghetto” of long-term staff without experience outside the development area. The good aid performers such as the Nordic countries are seen as the victims of the humanitarian “ideology” of aid giving because of “feeling guilty”. EU development cooperation is hence seen as ineffective for not using conditionality as a powerful tool for domestic reforms – the same tool that the “new” EU member states had to accept in order to receive the pre-accession aid.

Furthermore, the resistances to Europeanization are amplified by the hesitant attitude of some member states towards the European integration as a whole. Their national positions to the proposals submitted to CODEV are predictable, with a special “aversion” to the adjective “joint”. These countries “do not want the EU flag”, they “fear losing their freedom” and simply block the proposals as consensus is the general rule of taking decisions in CODEV. A substantially different position on foreign policy is also understood as the single excuse for the positions towards development policy that step outside the mainstream, such as Italy’s reluctance to increase development budgets with the argument of substantial costs of receiving immigrants.

The problem of (de)politicization of development is also reflected in the different configurations of administrative responsibility and personal representation in the working groups CODEV, ACP and COAFR. The view of a new member state that the group ACP is “redundant” apart, the member states with more integrated development policies tend to associate ACP with COAFR rather than with CODEV because they put emphasis on the political aspect of the Cotonou agreement. At a more general and substantial level, the different emancipation of development policy from the foreign policy is reflected in the critical views of the division (and duplication) of labour between DGs Development and External Relations not only because of their historically conditioned geographical focus on the ACP countries, but also for the already mentioned problem of coherence with foreign policy. There was a widespread expectation to resolve these problems after the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty.

Eventually, the autonomy of development policy can be related to the domestic political support for development cooperation and in some extent to the support for the Europeanization of development policy, compatible with both constructivist and rationalist approaches. Both explanations are also valid for the support of the EU integration at domestic level. At the same time, the Europeanization of development policy must be recognized as a process of delinking development cooperation from foreign policy and to some extent strengthening its path dependency and historical focus on ACP, which may tone down the interest of the recently accessed EU member states to Europeanize their development policy. In this sense, the field of EU development cooperation is quite similar to the field of humanitarian aid where the problem of national visibility was identified as a major obstacle to coherence, harmonization and a larger consensus than on “broad objectives and general principles” (Versluys 2008: 223). The field of development policy shows, however, that even the minimal consensus may absent among the member states.

4 The Czech response to Europeanization
4.1 Europeanization in the perception of policymakers and official documents

The claim that the Czech development cooperation has Europeanized, i.e. adopted EU rules only shallowly, is not to deny the existence of the EU effect as such. Its relevance was spontaneously raised in the interviews with the representatives of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). The development cooperation of the Czech Republic was defined as a new policy, determined by the EU requirements that the ‘old’ member states have adopted before the accession on the one hand, and the continuity of the Czech aid since the times of Czechoslovakia on the other hand.11 This ambiguous position does not mean, however, that bilateral cooperation would simply move from its post-communist past to a clearly defined European future since the EU aid is considered as “too distant from the foreign policy”.12

The relation to the foreign policy is the key feature for understanding the success and failures of the Europeanization of the Czech development policy. The officials at the MFA often emphasize when they are criticized for the low focus on poverty reduction in the South that the “Foreign Development Cooperation”, which is the official term for the policy, is an “integral part of the Czech foreign policy”. In terms of identity, the European Union is almost always represented as an external body (them) and not as a part of the self (we). Its role is often perceived as instrumental and its normative power is highlighted as a mean of promoting the interests of the MFA. The “pressure from outside, like from the European Union” is “in some extent useful” to get other Czech actors involved in the policy. The issue of policy coherence for development, for instance, and other EU initiatives would be “as if falling upon us from the European Union” and bringing the “positive trend” in setting the agenda. However, “our principles and goals” are excluded from this. For example, the Czech Republic is said to be “resisting” the mainstream preference for the Sub-Saharan Africa and general budget support.

The main pressure on the emergence of the development policy would not actually be internal: the “changing position of the Czech Republic in the world” and not only “external pressure” related to the OECD and EU accession, and the World Bank graduation.13 These examples taken from the interviews with the policymakers question the generally overstated influence of the EU on the restart of the Central European countries as a whole. As mentioned already, the Czech Republic institutionalized the “Foreign Development Aid” in March 1995 on the eve of the approaching OECD accession in December.14 Even though the Czech Republic has deposited the official application for EU membership as soon as in January 1996, the first government decision on the Principles for Providing Foreign Aid does not refer to other multilateral and regional organizations than the United Nations and OECD (Vláda České republiky 1995).

The first strategy paper, of which the government took note in 2002, includes a paragraph that summarizes the preparation of the EU accession, but concretely mentions only the consequences of the ratification of the Cotonou Agreement and the subsequent changes in the preferential tariffs to ACP countries and the expected contribution to the EDF. Apart this

11 Interview with a Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26 October 2007.
12 Interview with a Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27 November 2008.
13 Interview with an Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 November 2007.
14 And hence at least five years earlier than after the turn of the Millennium, as alleged by Balázs Szent-Iványi and András Tétenyi (2008: 577).
short review of hard law only the opportunities for the Czech entities in EDF tenders and the influence on the redistribution of EU aid according to the priorities of the foreign policy are highlighted; no commitments for the Czech republic are mentioned otherwise. The paper mentions the “coordination with the development activities of the EU, OECD and other multilateral institutions” among the activities of the MFA (Vláda České republiky 2002: 11) and foresees ODA flows after the EU accession, but at the same time, it aims at decreasing the part of multilateral aid to 30% of the total.

The subsequent update, the Principles of Foreign Development Cooperation after the Accession of the Czech Republic in the EU, tackled the institutional impacts of the EU accession and started to put the EU before OECD when quoted together. The accompanying background report mentions that the EU “expects an active and coordinated approach from the new member states” and it quotes the 2002 Barcelona commitment to increasing the part of ODA on the gross national income (GNI) to 0.33% for each member state by 2006. To the Czech Republic it recommends, however, to reach only 0.1%, which corresponded approximately to the worst performance of an “old” member states. Besides that, the Principles acknowledge the “3 Cs” agenda but from the start they reject the budgetization of the EDF “on the financial, economic-industrial and territorial grounds” (Vláda České republiky 2004). According to the background report, the Czech Republic should follow the EU trend, but the stress is put on the institutional setting for bilateral cooperation that the Czech Republic should take over from the “advanced donor countries” in the “EU and OECD”, a reaction to the fragmentation of the implementation of development cooperation among nine ministries. As the EU soft law does not require any specific institutional setting of providing bilateral cooperation, this element refers rather to horizontal lesson-drawing than top-down Europeanization.

It is only three years after the EU accession in May 2004 that the government agrees with the transformation of the development cooperation that leads to the centralization of policymaking and budgeting at the MFA and the creation of the Czech Development Agency (Vláda České republiky 2007a). The character of the paper is hence very technical and very few mentions concern the EU dimension. The government proposal of the Act on Foreign Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid Provided Abroad (Vláda České republiky 2008) from the following year did not include any mention of the EU in its development section at all. The accompanying report of the law proposal by the MFA deals extensively, but technically with the compatibility with the acquis. The only substantial comment refers to the European Consensus, quoted among other multilateral commitments and documents.

Finally, it is only with the current draft of the new Strategy Paper that the general references to EU commitments become more detailed and translated to the national level. The result of an extensive consultation with other ministries and the NGDO and private sector platforms, specifically acknowledges the EU trend to shift from aid effectiveness to development effectiveness. Furthermore, it supports the implementation of the Code of Conduct and Policy Coherence for Development as an EU and not an OECD concept anymore. As far as the

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15 After years of struggles between ministries, the centralization of development cooperation was made possible by its inclusion in the programme declaration of the 2006 centre-right government from the electoral programme of the strongly pro-European Green Party.

16 The Foreign Committee of the Chamber of deputies has proposed an amendment that would give the Czech Development Agency the obligation to help Czech entities in EU tenders and redefined the goal of development cooperation according to the European Consensus on Development, but the amendment as well as the law are still to be voted by the parliament.
bottom-up Europeanization is concerned, the Czech Republic would “strive for establishing realistic goals in defining the EU policy in development” without further details. At the same time, the draft is very ambiguous since its statements on poverty reduction are still often contradicted by the foreign policy priorities, an ongoing conflict of the Czech development cooperation.

In sum, the interviews and a brief analysis of the documents show that with the EU accession and beyond, there is a growing number of references to the EU. However, most of them are technical in nature, they deal with financial impacts of the enlargement, highlight the opportunities for the Czech companies in EU tenders, and they come to elaborate on concrete commitments only recently. At the documentary level of EU adoption, there is little evidence of a transfer of EU values and norms to the Czech level. On the contrary, the MFA officials downgrade the role of the EU by emphasizing its external nature to the Czech interests, and if the EU has taken over the primary references to OECD, the latter still plays an important role as a multilateral source of norms and commitments.

4.2 The shallow domestic institutionalization and implementation of EU rules

This subsection develops further on the adoption of the acquis at the deeper level of implementation. It reviews the adoption of “hard law”, quantity and quality of bilateral aid; aid coordination, complementarity and policy coherence for development (the so called “3 Cs agenda), and the development aspect of EU-ACP relations. Starting with hard law, there is relatively little to say. The adaptation of the diplomacy to cover all EU agendas was quite technical, shaped on the representation of other member states, and without interference from the political level. The ratification of the Cotonou Agreement represented the sole exception. It is worth mentioning that the purpose of the EU-ACP relations was questioned neither by the parliament nor the president, but the parliament has reproved the government for not announcing clearly the costs related to the contribution to the EDF in time. EU development cooperation was hence considered as a cumbersome cost of the accession.

The share of a member state on the EDF, the financial tool of EU-ACP relations, relates to the problem of aid quantity. While the part of the Czech Republic on the total EU population is approximately 2%, the contribution to the 10th edition of the fund will be only 0.51%, starting with the year 2011 (Vláda České republiky 2007b). Even though the contributions to the EDF are voluntary and fall under “soft law”, this result seems to be a compromise between the demands of the EU to the “new” members states to participate on the fund immediately after the accession, and the newcomers to pay as less as possible to the recipient countries located in the territories that do not make part of their foreign policy priorities (cf. Lightfoot 2010: 335). Real financial flows are essential here. As far as the Czech Republic does not contribute to the fund, the EU-ACP cooperation is not seen as a major problem; however, there is a growing concern at the MFA and other ministries that the Czech companies, and in a lesser extent NGDOs, will not be capable to participate in the EDF tenders. The Permanent Representation of the Czech Republic to the EU in Brussels has already to report their share on the EDF contracts to the MFA on a regular base. Again, there is a very low identification with the EU as a whole and a perceived absence of ownership of the EU policy. In this

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17 The 10th EDF started already in 2008 and the ‘new’ member states have the right to participate in its tenders since the beginning. But as the absorption capacity of the 9th EDF by the ACP countries has been limited, the “new” member states will start to pay three years later.

18 E-mail communication with an Officer at the Czech Development Agency, 12 January 2010.
particular case, the Czech Republic has eventually adopted soft law, but not its underlying values.

Apart the EDF, the main non-enforceable document that regulates the volume of aid are the Brussels Council Conclusions (European Council 2005), subsequent to a Communication by the Commission (European Commission 2005b). The “new” member states must “strive to increase” their ODA/GNI ratio to 0.17% in 2010 and 0.33% in 2015, while the ‘old’ member states must reach 0.51% in 2010 and 0.7% in 2015. The Czech Republic is currently stagnating at about 0.14%. A half of this consists of the Czech participation on the EU budget that the country cannot evade. The relatively high figure was facilitated by the economic recession rather than aid increases. The draft of the new Strategy Paper plans only minimal increases that make the 2015 goal unrealistic. The existence of the 2015 target was celebrated as a success (Lightfoot 2010: 33), but the individual 2010 commitments were initially opposed by the Czech Republic who advocated for a collective goal only (Carbone 2007: 76). Moreover, in contrast with the Commission’s communication, the wording of the commitments was softened by the verb “strive for”. It is generally interpreted as non-binding by the Czech actors and in extremis as a mere “recommendation” by the Ministry of Finance. Finally, according to a senior representative of the Commission, the 2002 Barcelona commitments asking each member state to „strive to reach (…) at least 0.33% ODA/GNI by 2006“ (European Council 2002: 5) were renegotiated in 2005 since the “new” member states refused to honour the 2002 commitments “because they were not there” at the time.

There is probably no other instance in the acquis communautaire where such a gap in the commitments of the “old” and “new” EU member states was institutionalized. In addition to that, the targets diverge instead of converging in a medium term. This model of a “double speed Europe” is very far from attesting Europeanization in the sense of adoption – or at least adaptation – of EU rules. I argue that the agenda of aid volume attests the resistance of the “new” member states to accept the norms, or their accommodation to serve the particular interests of the domestic actors. Of course the economic and social disparities between the Czech Republic and the most advanced EU donors are still large, the public awareness and political support of development issues in new member states is low, and therefore it might also be counterproductive to require more of them is the sustainability and democratic legitimacy of their development cooperation programme is seen as desirable (Horký 2010). Right or wrong, the resistance to Europeanization and the refusal of the previously agreed soft acquis is a matter of fact.

The Czech Republic faces a similar situation in the generally overseen area of aid quality. Even though many standards are just taken over from the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), the problem of aid effectiveness is integrally tackled in the European Consensus on Development (based on European Commission 2005a; European Parliament et al. 2005). The Consensus was approved by the “new” EU member too soon after the accession to give them enough space to influence the process, but there are so many shortcomings in the Czech development cooperation that they cannot be treated all here in detail. Czech aid is not deconcentrated, but it is predominantly tied, non-transparent, gender blind, and led by the offer side. There is a consensus on the undesirability of the general budgets support, including the NGDOs. The Czech development cooperation has not been evaluated since 2007. Motivated predominantly by the commercial interests and foreign

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19 Given the compulsory contribution to the EU budget, the share of multilateral aid is higher for the less performing donors and the increases in aid volume of the newly accessed member states must be hence put in perspective.
policy priorities, its main recipients are situated in the middle income countries, especially in the East and South East Europe. Its bilateral cooperation projects account only for about 25 million euros, excluding the extensive number of scholarships that has led to a substantial brain drain from the South (see Horký forthcoming-a). There is a number of effective and/or sustainable projects though, implemented mostly by the NGDOs who advocate for a poverty-oriented development policy, but the current absence of evaluations and the non-publication of the previous set of evaluations prevents from concluding on the development impact of the Czech development cooperation.

Furthermore, it is not only the quality of aid that prevents an assessment of the effectiveness of the Czech development cooperation, but the multiplicity and fuzziness of its objectives that allow almost any project to qualify for the policy. While the European Consensus defines the “primary and overreaching” objective of the EU development cooperation as the “eradication of poverty in the context of sustainable development, including pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)” (European Parliament et al. 2005), the non-amended draft of the law proposed by the government still offers a larger definition, including the economic development, that still allows for legitimizing the commercially-driven projects, for example. In sum, the Czech development cooperation puts less stress on poverty reduction than the acquis and therefore, it has Europeanized only partially in terms of objectives, and in a very limited way in the implementation. If the cross-cutting issue of gender equality, for example, was recently put on the agenda, the Czech Republic has never committed to untie aid or deconcentrate it.

A short review of the coordination and complementarity agenda, as expressed in the EU Code of Conduct on Division of Labour (European Commission 2007), reveals only rare and references to the document. As far as its implementation is concerned, the Czech Republic became a “supporting facilitator” in Moldova and Mongolia upon an initiative of the Commission in October 2009, and the Czech Development Agency has signed a bilateral memorandum of cooperation and complemented projects with the Austrian Development Agency in Moldova. On the other hand, the delegation of implementation to another donor seems to be out of question. Being the only member from the “new” member states, the Czech Development Agency has even presided the Practitioners’ Network for European Development Cooperation in 2009. More importantly, the draft of the new Strategy Paper has reduced the number of programme countries from eight to four, with four additional “project countries”, but the total number of sectors was hardly reduced. Despite these rather positive ad hoc steps, other forms of continuous coordination and complementarity with other donors are still lacking.

As I deal with the issues of policy coherence for development elsewhere (Horký forthcoming-b), suffice to say that policy coherence has been institutionalized as one of the two agendas of the inter-ministerial Council for Foreign Development Cooperation. Two awareness raising presentations on PCD by the academia and the NGDO platform took place in 2008 and 2009 in the Council, but no further steps towards implementation have been undertook so far. Finally, the EU-ACP relations have been tackled in the beginning of this section in relation to the financing of the EU development cooperation. The general attitude towards Sub-Saharan

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20 They include “poverty reduction, economic and industrial development, gradual integration of partner countries into the world economy, development of agriculture, development and reinforcement of democracy, human rights and good governance, rule of law, migration management, sustainable development with emphasis on its environmental component and post-conflict resolution.” (Vláda České republiky 2004).

21 Interview with the Director of the Czech Development Agency, 29 November 2009.
Africa may be illustrated on the example of reasons given by the MFA for the inclusion of Ethiopia among the four programme countries: its absence would be perceived as a diversion from the MDGs agenda and a bad signal to the Czech citizens that consider Africa as a development priority according to public surveys.

Overall, the Czech Republic has actively resisted EU soft law especially in terms of quantity and quality of bilateral aid, but it has partly adapted the EU-ACP agenda by taking a very instrumental stance to the EDF. The subordination of development cooperation to foreign policy has been identified as the main reason for putting forward other particular interests instead of poverty reduction. In contrast to the resistance to the recognized principles of aid efficiency such as aid untangling and deconcentration, the declared adoption of the “3 Cs” agenda seems to be less problematic as the very first individual cases of implementation do not contradict nobody’s interest and they are generally initiated by external actors. This section did not allow for comparing the influence of the EU with other actors such as OECD, but even so, the review of the key policy areas leads to the confirmation of the “shallow Europeanization” indicated by Goetz (2005) generally and Lightfoot (2010) particularly. This diagnostic can be summarized in the following way: the resistance to Europeanization took place when financial contribution was required, the EU norms in terms of aid quality and the EU-ACP agenda were partly refused and partly adapted to the needs of the domestic actors, and the “3 Cs” agenda was recently adopted in the discourse, but not implemented.

4.3 The ambiguous socialization of the Czech EU presidency in development policy

If the top-down Europeanization of the Czech Republic seems problematic because of the absorbing awareness of EU values among politicians and the missing need for the EU collective action in the realm of development policy, the bottom-up Europeanization, documented here on the example of the Czech presidency in the Council of the EU in the first half of 2008, shows that social learning and the recognition of interests in terms of policy-making in the Council were much more articulated than the relation of the policy to the South. The presidency in CODEV, the working group on development, required neither substantial political nor public support: the presidency evolved almost exclusively at expert level.

Thanks to the timely preparation and the quality of the personnel with an EU or multilateral development background, the Czech diplomacy has well understood what was expected from a presidency. The interviews have highlighted that the presidency of CODEV is generally supposed to work with the Commission and the member states. Is should never become isolated and take “unilateral steps” or “step from” to the national agenda. The presidency has to “deal with issues on the table whatever are its priorities” so that once a topic is put on the agenda, the presidency “cannot kill it”; at maximum it can “play with delays”. Therefore there is “no space for invention” except the national priority as a retribution “in return for loyalty”.

The Czech main priority was the *Access to sustainable sources of energy at the local level in developing countries*, a topic related to the area that the Czech Republic considers as its “comparative advantage” and where the development constituency as a whole, including the non-governmental organizations and private companies, could participate with their know-how through the participation of an inter-ministerial working group. The second initiative *Support of democratic governance* responded to the declared transition experience of the

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22 The background report on the topic was, however, prepared by a British consultancy company.
Czech Republic, but it could involve only a limited number of actors especially from the non-governmental sector. Finally, the Presidency has selected *Eastern dimension* as a cross-cutting priority that reflected the territorial priorities of the Czech foreign policy.

The peer assessment of the Czech preselected priorities was positive and the presidency was seen as “just right” in terms of aspiration. Of course, the expectations from a presidency vary according to the profile of the country: the subsequent Swedish and Spanish presidencies were supposed to be “more ambitious” and present “big things” respectively. Only the purpose of the Eastern priority was understood rather as an awareness raising action on the poverty in Eastern and South East Europe since a concrete proposal was expected after the January ministerial conference. However, this step would require a reconstruction of the EU aid architecture, currently split between the DGs Development, and External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy. There is a consensus in the Council that the EU should cover all poor regions by its policy, so a radically opposite territorial priority to the preceding French presidency was accepted as legitimate as the Mediterranean one.

In terms of implementation, the Czech presidency could not by any means choose the dominant topic on the agenda: the EU response to the impacts of the financial and economic crisis in the South. Even though the Southern dimension of the crisis was never raised by the Czech politicians during the presidency, its day-to-day management in the Council, in cooperation with the Commission, was appreciated and the Czech “learning curve” was comparable to other countries. In terms of general implementation, the presidency was assessed above expectations despite the very limited (and somehow non-confessed) personal capacities. Noteworthy controversies concerned only the cross-cutting Eastern dimension that was successful with the DG External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy and the conclusion of the Eastern partnership, but it met resistance at the DG Development and did not overcome the compartmentalization of the Commission mainstream the East it in the EU development cooperation.

With the positive external evaluation, the self-assessment of the presidency on the operational level was positive as well, but the emphasis was put on different issues. The crisis has paradoxically softened the stress of the member states on the financial commitments and the presidency did not have to cross the only “red line” it had received form the Ministry of Foreign affairs: refuse pledges for additional resources. As a member of the permanent representation has put it, “the Czech Republic will never fight for commitments”. Moreover, the presidency had an “educational function” and the Czech Republic, a pioneering state among the newcomers has emancipated and learnt to express its opinion and promote the priorities that are substantially different from the EU mainstream: minimal financial commitments, low interest in the European Development Fund, focus on technical assistance (and hence tied aid). The fundamental issues of aid effectiveness, and especially the implementation of the *Code of Conduct*, and the Policy Coherence for Development were literally absent from the presidency’s agenda.

While on most issues the Czech Republic has ignored the EU priorities in development policy, on the procedural level, it “socialized and did not tear the bunch apart” It also searched for alliances with the “old” member states that could not openly express their non-mainstream opinion, but the dividing line “old” vs. “new” member states remained the most relevant one to all interviewed actors.\(^{23}\) If according to the Czech diplomats their strategies did not differ

\(^{23}\) During the presidency, the Czech Republic could not naturally promote its own interests directly but via other member states since it was supposed to remain neutral and moderate the debates in CODEV.
from other countries, the contents of their politics created a slight irruption. The other member states were allegedly surprised when the Czech Republic decided to put the Eastern dimension on the agenda of the January informal ministerial conference as “nobody actually believed that we would do it”, and the low expectations allowed them to adopt a “backwoodsman’s attitude” and promote more overtly their interests.

The presidency of the Czech Republic in development policy extends the meaning of Europeanization. Paradoxically, the Czech Republic has quickly adopted and profited of the procedural rules in the working group to promote its interests that differ from the European mainstream and that may go in the opposite direction than Europeanization in terms of contents of the policy. Rather than “going European”, the Czech Republic has firmly decided to redefine, or at least enlarge the scope of the EU development policy to accommodate its own foreign policy priorities while leaving the recent EU efforts apart which makes its position to Europeanization ambiguous.

5 Conclusion

This paper has confirmed that the Czech policy of “Foreign Development Cooperation” is an example of shallow Europeanization (Goetz 2005: 162), related to low political support to poverty reduction in the South and the extensive use of the development agenda as a tool of foreign policy by the government. The “new” member states generally claim their Europeaness, they affirm that they strive for becoming advanced donors and they occasionally complaints on the low political support and missing capacities in their emerging development cooperation programmes. In contrary to that, I have shown on the Czech case that the accommodation of EU rules for domestic interests and their refusal are more frequent modes of dealing with EU norms that their mere adoption. This may not be a rule for the other countries of the region since not all of them entered the EU with a relatively developed constituency but (re)started their policies on a green field.

A previous application of the Europeanization framework to the field of development policy has revealed that social learning and, in a lesser extent, global incentives and lesson-drawing are the leading models of adopting EU rules in the domestic context of the member states, disregarding their experience in development policy. In the Czech case, the values of poverty reduction in the South are not seen as relevant by the political elites, the sentiment of belonging to the European community is fragile, and the submission of development cooperation to foreign policy priorities impedes the need to coordinate with other donors. With the absenting or weak motors for the three relevant mechanisms of adopting EU rules, the bleak picture of Europeanization in the Czech Republic, and probably many other “new” and “old” member states, is not surprising.

If a large political support for development cooperation is necessary for the top-down Europeanization, the successful assessment of the Czech EU presidency in the area of development policy shows that the bottom-up dimension can be ensured by the élites, in concordance with the priorities of the foreign policy.24 These findings may serve as a support

24 The paper has not scrutinized the drivers that have lead to an outstanding performance of the Czech presidency at the operational level, but they seem to differ substantially from those leading to the adoption of EU norms in development policy. The interviews suggest that peer pressure from the socialized actors in Brussels and the need for defending the national prestige in Prague have probably played a decisive role.
for political recommendations. Considering that a better implementation of the principles enshrined in the European Consensus would lead to a more successful poverty reduction in the South, a greater role of the EU on the global scene and higher effectiveness of its development cooperation, the European Union should use the identified channels as leverages. The high misfit in social learning, especially, is due to the absence or weakness of norm entrepreneurs and cooperative institutions (Börzel 2005) that should be in the focus of the European Union.

Firstly, the EU should support political advocacy activities of the civil society, public awareness and development education campaigns. Development cooperation among the weak performers must step out from the expert to political level. Secondly, and this is a more difficult point, the European Union must not be perceived as an external body to the member states. As a recommendation dealing directly with the problem of identity is unrealistic, the EU should start by overcoming the postcolonial divide in dealing with ACP countries and the rest of the world in the Commission which separates the newcomers from an occasion to give their specific inputs and allow for a collective action of the Union. Finally, the concrete initiatives by the Commission and the “old” member states show that a relevant cooperation between the relatively autonomous development agencies is possible despite the different national priorities.

Obviously, if these recommendations are implemented, the effects will be tangible in a long term. Hence, it is crucial to start as soon as possible. This paper has identified the European Commission as the leading normative actor that sets the direction to the EU development policy through the cumulative character of the development agenda in the Council. However, the Commission had supported the civil society in the “new” member states only recently. Before and during the accession, the European Commission has literally failed in promoting the development agenda in the “new” EU member states in a tangible manner, to the difference of UNDP, CIDA and other bilateral agencies. The Commission did not ask for political support from the “old” member states to inhibit the break through the agreed language of the 2002 Barcelona commitments and a creation of a “double speed Europe” in the development field by the 2005 Council Conclusions.

Eventually, this study contributes to the assessment of the EU accession conditionality. While it has been generally seen as a success, the five year period since the first round of the “Eastern” enlargement has rather confirmed the existence of “inconsistencies in its application by the Commission over time, and the weakness of a clear-cut causal relationship between conditionality and policy or institutional outcomes in the CEECs.” (Hughes et al. 2004: 9). This lesson may be beneficial to the future enlargements and in some extent to the European Neighbourhood Policy, which has been fashioned on the enlargement model. In relation to the current reforms related to the entry of the Lisbon Treaty in vigour, the shallow Europeanization of the member states, both “new” and “old”, points out to the need to overcome the historical legacy of colonialism in the EU aid architecture and erase the dividing line left by the Iron Curtain. If the European Union is unable to close the gap between the “new” and “old” member states, it will hardly be able to narrow the gap between the North and South.

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25 It must be acknowledged that this accumulation of commitments leads at the same time to the high discrepancy with reality. It allows only slow reactions to the changing global environment and depoliticizes development.
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