I. Introduction: An Assessment of the Approaches to EU Roles in International Affairs

Whereas the European Union (EU) has established itself as an economic and development assistance powerhouse, it remains less established as a security actor. Essentially, the EU cannot independently deploy military capabilities without Member States’ consent. Further, common positions about military engagement depend on successful inter-governmental bargaining and negotiations among the 27 EU Member States, which is often a difficult process. Member States remain reluctant to cede power to the supranational level as it takes decision-making about national security, particularly defence against outside threats out of their hands. So, the main limitation of the EU is the inability of its Member States to harness their national capabilities to form a single and independent EU force.

Because the EU lacks independent military capabilities, some of the literature on EU external relations in the area of peace and security contend that the EU is more or less impotent as a security actor or weak at best (Bull, 1982; Hill, 1993; Zielonka, 1998). In responding to the claim that the EU’s strength was its ability to act as a civilian power, i.e. wield its economic might, Bull (1982) for instance suggests that to be recognised as a viable power in international affairs, economic power is not enough. The reality however is that the EU’s role in international affairs has moved well beyond the boundaries of the notion of civilian power Europe. Certainly, the participation of the EU in peace support operations in places such as Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Somalia among others implore us to consider the actual potential of the EU in international affairs based on what it actually does.

The EU itself desires to be more than an economic power. The EU has systematically developed its foreign relations capabilities with tools like the inter-governmental Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as well as increasing the breadth of its many economic agreements with third countries. This clearly indicates that the EU aspires to be more than just an economic power and understands that to be an international affairs actor, more is necessary. Admittedly, the use of these instruments which also include the use of Member States’ military capabilities do not invalidate the EU’s economic or civilian power (Stavidris, 2001; Whitman, 2002; however, retaining this label as the primary descriptor of the EU in international affairs is misleading in assessing what the EU does.

While civilian power Europe is insufficient for what the EU does, it has remained a tool of analysis for EU external relations actions. Rather than challenge the claim that the EU is not a security actor, proponents of the concepts have muddied the waters by ignoring the whole of EU actions and using an anachronistic concept for EU actions in the 21st century. Bull was therefore right in challenging the concept of civilian power Europe and the idea that economic power would suffice for participation in international affairs. While the consensus may suggest that these instruments of external relations are yet to reach their highest potential the actions undertaken using these instruments suggest that the EU is clearly more than a civilian power in the sense that Duchene (1973) meant. However, we have also come a long way from Bull’s claim that “Europe is not an actor in international affairs, and does not seem likely to become one.” The EU on the mandate of its Member States through programmes implemented by the Commission and the General Secretariat of the Council currently participates in reforming the security sectors of third countries, funding initiatives on conflict prevention, supporting

1 The EU refers to the coordinated efforts of its Member States and institutions especially the Commission and the General Secretariat of the Council.
peace operations in areas of armed conflict and directly intervening in matters of international insecurity such as piracy off the coast of Somalia (EU Council, 2010). In light of these, the EU is at present a recognisable actor in international affairs and a security actor too.

While others have moved away from this dichotomy of the EU as either a civilian power or a nonentity vis-à-vis international affairs, others take a more positive view of EU roles in external relations positing that the EU is a different sort of actor - an actor with normative power. Manners (2006) for instance suggests that determining EU roles, including security/peace roles requires looking beyond the traditional expectations. According to Manners, the role of the EU in international affairs stems from the ‘normative elements of its international identity’ (2006: 69). He goes on to identify 9 norms which the EU aims to possess and one of them is peace. Arguably, any means to promulgate the peace norm is acceptable and does not only involve military capabilities or only civilian power. The EU articulates this position in the security strategy.

The concept of normative power in relation to Europe gives a holistic view of EU international actorness in many areas including sustainable peace (and security). The concept however, does not account for those areas where the EU engages in external relations to use its limited military capabilities (for logistical support, police action and especially training). Additionally, it does not capture the processes, which the EU goes through to participate in the international system. If indeed the EU exports the peace norm to Africa, undoubtedly it would have to do this with partners on various levels including the United Nations, the regional organisations, and civil society. While normative power addresses the motivations of EU action and establishes the presence of the EU in the international arena, it leaves out the contextual processes of EU external relations, especially the perceptions of the external partners as recipients of EU actions in international affairs. The concept of normative power remains deficient because it unwittingly excuses the non-consideration of the EU as a security actor because of all it leaves out.

While we as EU scholars must strive to develop overarching concepts that account for the uniqueness of the EU in international security relations, the current discourse that asserts a different role for the EU in international relations is still lacking (see Bretherton and Vogler, 2007). They fail to explain those instances where the EU actively participates in international security without a common command structure and or accurately account for the ongoing timidity of the EU to participate in direct interventions. Ginsberg (2001) rightly suggests that rather than engaging solely with the normative debates or theoretical assertions about what the EU ought to be doing, or what it is incapable of doing, ‘real time’ participation is a better gauge of the extent of EU roles in international security affairs. Further, the extent of these roles depends on the perception of the action recipient. Hence, the extent of EU participation in international security relies on the partners of the EU including third countries and other regional institutions. Conceptual contributions to the study of EU roles in international affairs will benefit tremendously from such in-depth accounts. These accounts elucidate the contexts and processes of international security relations beyond the challenges of EU decision-making and inevitable limitations.

Having established that it is possible to successfully assess the EU’s participation in international security without an independent military, a good place to start such analysis is by examining recent EU-Africa relations pertaining to the establishment of international peace and security. This paper contends that the ability of the EU to perform in international security does not necessarily depend on such full integration of Member States’ military capabilities. Rather, the paper proposes that the successful performance of the EU in international security affairs relies on a division of labour between the Member States and EU institutions in Brussels. While the paper will focus on the development

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and implementation processes of a specific process, EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA, EURORECAMP is a process, which constitutes partnership and coordination among EU Member States and with the African Union (AU). It is a process steeped in past colonial relations and the institutionalised inter-regionalism, which commenced in 1957 between the EU and African states. This process of inter-regionalism was formalised first through the EU agreements with African Caribbean and Pacific countries and more recently through the JAES, a partnership between the EU and primarily the African Union.

Through the various agreements the European Union has built an enduring relationship with African states and institutions. This relationship has opened channels of political cooperation on peace and security among other things. The selection of the EU as the choice partner for developing African security capabilities is therefore not coincidental and the impact of the previous relationship is evident in the development and implementation of the EURORECAMP process.

II. EURORECAMP: EU Contributions to the Development of the African Standby Force

The idea that regional security constitutes part of international security is not a new one. If then this is the case, the responses to regional security threats ought to be considered international security responses. As a result, the regional security challenges within Africa are viewed as part of the broader challenges of the international community. The perceived international consequences of regional security has been a key motivator for the international donor community of European and North American countries who are committed to supporting African peace and security initiatives. EURORECAMP is a direct product of this consideration to support regional security in Africa.

EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA supports the African Standby Force (ASF) by providing a source of predictable funding (for training), knowledge or logistical know-how of peace support operations and a well-functioning institutional infrastructure. The ASF is one of the five components of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) of the African Union. It is to be composed of five regional brigades from North, South, East, West and Central African regions. In the initial two years of the EURORECAMP process (2008-2010) several training exercise will be undertaken by these brigades based on scenarios designed and funded by the EURORECAMP partners. It is expected that at the end of the two year period, a contingent of each brigade will be functional enough to participate in conflict prevention, management and resolution missions, as well as post-conflict reconstruction within Africa.

The lack of these three provisions, according to the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, “have an erosive effect on Africa’s ability to effectively resolve conflicts and prevent fresh ones” (Lamambara, 2009). Despite the AU’s comparative advantage in the African peace and security arena due to its personnel contributions, political legitimacy, and its geo-strategic location, its lack of these provisions requires the institution to partner with the international donor community within frameworks such as EURORECAMP. Indeed, Article 17 of the Protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council makes provisions for international cooperation to further the aims of the APSA.

The design of the EURORECAMP process is based on the French RECAP programme which has been transformed into a European inter-regional/multilateral project. Its core stakeholders are the African Union and the European Union (including the EU Commission, the General Secretariat of the

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3 EURORECAMP for short


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Council and Member States). It grew out of the desire of France to be on the forefront of security integration within the European Union while maintaining its privileged relationship with African countries despite the presence of new actors such as China and India on the continent. France began the process of Europeanising RECAMP in 2002. The French government sought to adapt RECAMP to the African states’ requirements and introduced a continental dimension through dialogue with the African Union. It was aware of RECAMP’s weaknesses including its lack of integration with African sub-regional organisations, which at the time had the primary task of enforcing peace on the continent. During the initial changes France included the participation of international organisations, including the UN and EU and non-governmental organisations as observers and advisors. By 2005 former French president Jacques Chirac formally announced the desire to include RECAMP in the ESDP framework as the “operator of reference” for other EU Member States’ programmes. The reorganisation of RECAMP in 2005 reflects the willingness of the French government to make the process more adaptable to a continental approach whereby the beneficiary was Africa as a whole.

EURORECAMP is a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) initiative implemented in accordance with the provisions of the European Security Strategy, and the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) which was adopted in December 2007 at the Lisbon Summit (EU Council Secretariat, 2009). ERAA is a direct result of the second Action Plan (AP) within the peace and security cluster of the JAES. The Action Plan commits the EU to supporting the APSA by building its capacities to prevent, manage and resolve conflict as well as engage in post-conflict reconstruction. The peace and security cluster of the JAES aims

“To strengthen and promote peace, security, democratic governance and human rights, fundamental freedom, gender equality, sustainable economic development, including industrialisation, and regional and continental integration in Africa.” (JAES, 2007)

The process through which EURORECAMP was created was also helped along by development in other EU Member States especially in the UK and in Germany. In the U.K., former Prime Minister, Tony Blair, declared 2005 as the ‘year of Africa’. Following the publication of the report, Our Common Interest, by the Commission for Africa (COA), Africa became a focal point for debate within the U.K. among development and security practitioners. The report emphasised the need for development agencies to work with the African Union in particular. It also made the crucial link between development and security emphasising that countries that showed successful development were less likely to succumb to violent conflicts (COA, 2005: 153).

Former Prime Minister of the U.K., Tony Blair, played a crucial role in promoting the panel’s report to other EU Member States through inter-governmental networks, EU institutions and the G8 grouping. Following in the footsteps of the U.K., Germany announced its own programme, Partnership with Africa (German Federal President, 2010). Established in 2005, the programme was announced by Horst Kohler, the German president at that time. The partnership was conceived as part of Germany’s broader development strategy although it included support for the African Union and its peace and security objectives. Germany is unique in that while it uses its European heritage to promote its partnership with Africa, until the eventual formation of EURORECAMP, it relied more on the G8

\(^4\) In addition to the EU Member States, the United States, Japan, NATO and the UN form the consortium of external partners or donors helping to develop African capabilities through EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA.  
\(^7\) The Commission is often referred to as the Blair Commission.  
\(^8\) Partnership with Africa: The Initiative. Available at: http://wwwpartnerschaft-uit-afrika.de/content/index.php?id=2&PHPSESSID=460fd3f7047863d94f0717f25c7b794
mechanism rather than the European Commission. Nevertheless, the prioritisation of Africa's peace and security by the Big 3 (France, UK and Germany) fed into the supranational psyche, which culminated in the adoption of the EU Strategy for Africa by the EU Council in 2005. This document was not about the centralisation of EU Member States relations with Africa, but rather better and broader coordination within Europe for political and security cooperation with African institutions especially the continental and regional economic communities (RECs).

At the supranational level, the EU began to strengthen its ability to participate in the fields of foreign security and conflict prevention as a single entity." Although the Member States had different views about what developed European capabilities would look like, it was nevertheless an aspiration of the EU to be an international security actor. These developments were motivated by changes at the international which called for the international donor community to take action on African security concerns; and at the EU national levels where debates among EU Member States and within the EU bureaucracy was about what form security action and policies in Africa would take." The negotiation of the EU-ACP Agreement of 2000 (the Cotonou Agreement) was the first clear indication that EU intended to pursue policies within the area of security, for example conflict prevention and non-proliferation of small arms and light weapons (Cotonou Agreement, 2000). In 2004, the EU Peace and Security Committee (EU PSC) adopted the ESDP Action Plan for Africa (EU Council, 2004)." The Action Plan outlined practical recommendations that would later contribute to the establishment of an EU delegation to the AU, which included sending liaison officers to Addis Ababa and providing expert training in political affairs and peace and security.

The original French concept, RECAMP (Reinforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix)," was officially launched in 1998. RECAMP had been France’s attempt to ‘Africanise’ the face of the peace support operations on the continent which were usually dominated by non-African peacekeepers. Through ‘Africanisation’ France introduced a new system of security and defence cooperation whereby African troops could respond to African security threats rather than rely on French intervention. France's engagement in Africa is longstanding and it was France who laid the building blocks of institutionalised inter-regionalism by insisting on the inclusion of its former colonies as aid recipients in the Treaty of Rome. RECAMP however was deeply politically motivated, in that it sought to legitimise French security presence in Africa. Unlike the present EURORECAMP, its ‘Africanisation’ concept lacked the concept of ownership as it was planned in Paris and executed according to whatever was expedient for the French.

RECAMP was unique in that unlike other French interventions in African security affairs prior to 1998, the concept made no distinction between former French colonies and non-colonies. RECAMP therefore broadened French relations with other (non-francophone) African nations. The programme was pitched as a “mechanism to establish an open partnership to strengthen African peacekeeping capacity, in terms of training, equipment and exercises” (DFID, see also RECAMP). RECAMP also

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emphasised cooperation with other donor countries such as Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom.

As previously noted, EURORECAMP relies on the context of the existing relationships between the EU and Africa including the longstanding relationship between France and the UK, and their relationships with their former colonies. In the 1990s when France launched its RECAMP programme, the UK too launched the *UK African Peacekeeping Training Support Programme*. The U.K. had lacked the security presence that France had in Africa during the Cold War period. Indeed, the UK was mostly invisible from the security landscape of the African continent until 2000 when it intervened in the civil war in Sierra Leone. However, UK sought to maintain its influence by enhancing the peace support capabilities of African troops. The UK provided training to sub-regional organisations’ peace support missions as well as individual African countries. In many cases, the provision of training for African peacekeepers was intended to prepare them for being part of the multinational UN peacekeeping force.

Despite the different contexts of engagement in Africa, there were enough similarities between the French and British initiatives that made cooperation appealing to both countries. In 1998, the UK, France and the United States established the P3 initiative which was made up of the RECAMP, the UK African Peacekeeping Training Support Programme and the US African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). The purpose of the joint initiative was to engage in “a more focused and systematic approach to the implementation” of training for peace support operations for Africans. This division of labour model has inspired the current EURORECAMP process. Without a hierarchical order, each of the three initiatives formed a component of the whole, without infringing on the perceived territories of the others while maximising resources and expediting training for many African countries.

EURORECAMP, unlike previous programmes, also emphasises a broader outlook on security and so includes the training of military, police and civilian forces. The resulting African Standby Force is expected to have capabilities to deal with conflict prevention, management and post-conflict reconstruction EURORECAMP therefore embraces the spirit of the European Security Strategy (ESS) which advocates a holistic approach to security. Further, this framework of the EURORECAMP allows the EU to sidestep its lack of independent military capabilities. Given various contributions from France and Britain (and other partners) EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA goes beyond the simple Europeanisation of the French RECAMP. It is a new tool, which retains the education and training component of the French RECAMP Figure 1 below illustrates the transformation.

**Figure 1:** Transformation of bi-lateral to inter-regional/multilateral

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14 The U.K. for instance provided training to the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) operation in Liberia (see Walpole, 1998 for more details).
The role of the African Union as co-owner of the EURORECAMP process further contributes to the ‘newness’ of European programmes for capacity building in Africa. The EURORECAMP process as it currently exists cannot exist without the partnership with African states and institutions. As part of the conditions of the cooperation with the EU, the AU made three central demands. First, African states insisted on partnership with the AU rather than African states or sub-regional organisations. With the AU as the main coordination counterpart to the EU in Africa, process can be truly inter-regional. This allowed the AU to assert its authority in the area of peace and security. Second, the AU requested for the process and product to be owned by Africans. So rather than directly training African armed forces, the European partners’ responsibility is to train the trainers, who then use the knowledge gained in their local context to help their troops prepare for multidimensional peace support operations. Third, it was important for the EU rather than France to lead the European side of the partnership. This was necessary because according to sources in the EU and Africa the history of colonialism lingers when it comes to issues of peace and security. The intent of co-ownership represents a fundamental difference from previous EU-Africa relations and other European capacity building programmes but also continuity in that it reinforces inter-regionalism between the EU and Africa. Whereas, EU-Africa inter-regional relations have been institutionalised over the past 50+ years, they had more or less emphasised a relationship of acute asymmetry - a donor-recipient relationship. However, the structure and practice enshrined in the JAES has contributed to a transformation in that relationship and the implementation of the EURORECAMP is a tangible example of this. This is not to assert that the relationship between the EU and AU is completely equal.

The implementation of EURORECAMP involves a division of labour among EU Member States. Member States offer military and civilian peacekeeping at national training centres in Italy, France, and Hungary among others. In addition, the EU Member States are responsible for funding training at African training centres like the Kofi Annan Training International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), the Ghanaian Staff and Command College and the Kenyan Staff College and Peace Support Training Centre (DFID, 2004). In theory, the day-to-day process of EURORECAMP is led

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15 Available at: http://www.amaniafricacycle.org/spip.php?article2&lang=en
18 Recent budget cuts due to the 2008 financial crises has led to a reduction in the level of support for the Kofi Annan Training Centre.

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by AU and EU personnel. The EU’s work is represented by the peace and security division of the EU Delegation to the AU in Addis Ababa, while the AU’s counterparts are based within the Peace Support Operations Division of the African Union. However, the EU takes on a substantial amount of the operational responsibilities because it has better institutional capabilities than the African Union. Consequently, the EU Commission and General Secretariat of the Council (GSC) work together to assist the EU Member States with the implementation of the EURORECAMP process. Additionally, the EU Commission External Relations organs (DG RELEX and DG Development) contribute to the budget of EURORECAMP in a variety of ways. The Commission sponsors the African Peace Facility and €300 million has recently been negotiated as part of the 10th European Development Fund (2008-2010) and €20 million earmarked for capability building. The funds which have been allocated to the EURORECAMP endeavour for capability building to train the Standby Force are kept in a trust fund managed by the framework nation, France.

In addition to the role of the EU institutions and the EU Member States, the mission to achieve a functional Standby Force through EURORECAMP has involved a strong tripartite alliance of EU-UN-AU. The UN has contributed a seconded team of six personnel from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The UN’s involvement is obvious to the extent that the AU’s peace operations are seen as part of the broader response to international security threats. Regional organisations could potentially play the role of agents of international peace and security within their spheres of influence. These roles, it has been argued would make up for the deficiencies in the UN’s peacekeeping system and it is supported by Chapter 8 of the UN Charter.

The prominent role of the UN does not discount other non-European actors in the EURORECAMP; rather it has encouraged their participation. Indeed one of the main accomplishments of the EU institutions including the Commission, and the General Secretariat of the Council has been to woo other non-EU countries and organisations such as NATO to contribute to the EURORECAMP process. Countries such as Canada, Norway and Japan are some of such countries while NATO provides non-monetary resources that contribute to capability building for the ASF.

At the Canadian Summit of 2002 for instance, the Group of 8 leading industrial nations, G8 (with the EU represented), adopted the G8 African Action Plan which pledged support for African efforts to ensure lasting peace and security. The action plan guaranteed the AU “financial and technical assistance so that, by 2010, African countries and regional and sub-regional organisations (sic) are able to engage more effectively to prevent and resolve violent conflict on the continent, and undertake peace support operations in accordance with the United Nations Charter” (G8 Action Plan, 2002: 4).

Following the establishment of the African Union and the commitment to build the African Standby Force, the African states held discussions with international donors to ask for their assistance. Part of this process involved engaging with those donors who had a previous relationship with the African states such as the U.K., France and the US. The result of this was a formal request to the G8 at the 2003 Evian Summit to ask for assistance to defray the costs of building the ASF. This first overture was unique in that it was done by an African Union representative rather than by individual states. It embodied the African states’ commitment to regionalism through security cooperation. With the active lobbying of the France and the United Kingdom (and the United States) and the EU representation, particularly the EU Commission the G8 countries pledged their support for the AU initiative and committed to the “continuation of funding, training and enhanced co-ordination of activities” (Kent and Malan, 2003). The G8 welcomed the prospect of engaging in African security in this manner, bearing in mind that by 2003 the US and some of the EU Member States19 with historically privileged

19 I refer to France, Britain, Portugal, Belgium and Germany.
positions in Africa’s international relations had a growing concern about the influence of China in Africa (see Diebert, 2008 for expressions of more recent concerns).

The result of these initial dialogues with the G8 was the Joint Africa/G8 Action Plan to Enhance African Capabilities to undertake Peace Support Operations (2003). In response, the G8 called for a more gradual approach to the implementation of the ASF by identifying key “building blocks” which targeted the specific aims of building African capabilities to launch peace support operations (Joint Africa/G8 Action Plan, 2003; see also Kent and Malan, 2003: 74). The Action Plan sets out the precise aims of the partnership and emphasised African ownership of the process. Further, it acknowledged other ongoing training programmes undertaken by the G8 in the assumption that these would be components of the G8-Africa partnership.

The role of the G8 is important because it presents the first concise and robust platform for the initiatives of EU Member States and institutions (Scorgie, 2007: 13). Further, the G8 presents another avenue where the EU works together in the context of its own arrangements (the ESS and the JAES) to multilateralise its external relations and cooperation with Africa. Additionally, the G8’s decision to cooperate as one entity also reflects another early attempt to consolidate and coordinate donors’ contributions to African capacity building efforts within a framework that allowed African institutions retain some ownership of the processes. Not surprisingly, the G8 relied on the knowledge and experience of its 3 experienced members (France, UK and EU representation) to formulate new ideas and responses, which reflected the new realities in the African security architecture as well as changes in the discourses of how security is defined. These responses relied on the institutionalised relationship between Europe and Africa. The G8 agreement thus served as a core building block in the process that would later become EURORECAMP--AMANI AFRICA.

Despite the participation of other donor partners, the EU, including the Member States and the EU Commission have contributed the most to the process. EURORECAMP has been integral to the development of Africa’s ability to deal with security threats on the continent and this cannot be understated. “The EU has the means, willingness and experience the AU needs to develop its structures” and through EURORECAMP it uses these. The broader contribution of the EURORECAMP is to the creation of a viable African Peace and Security Architecture which is to maintain regional peace and security. Because regional security contributes to international security, EURORECAMP is therefore a contributory tool to international security.

This paper has so far developed the argument that the partnership between the EU and Africa through EURORECAMP is a positive alliance for international peace and security. Further, EURORECAMP is an innovative way for EU participation in international security affairs because it is able to evade the requirement of security actorness based on independent military capability. This requirement, which is undoubtedly useful to EU’s credibility as a security actor, remains elusive because Member States are unwilling to devolve certain powers to Brussels, yet as seen with EURORECAMP, this does not prevent active participation in international security.

III. Conclusion: Lessons Learnt from EURORECAMP

The EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA reflects a unique case of cooperation on security among EU Member States which relies on new understandings of international security. The process of EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA has been a long time coming. The creation and function of the process has transformed internal EU dynamics as well as cooperation dynamics between the EU and

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*With the exception of Canada, Japan, the United States and Russia, the remainder of the G8 is made of EU Member States.

* Other efforts include the P3 initiative. This was an amalgamation of the training programmes of France, the U.K. and the US.

* Interview, EU Delegation to the AU, Addis Ababa, 30th April 2009,

* Interview, African Union Conflict Management Division, Addis Ababa, 15th April 2009

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Africa. The process represents a distinct embrace of inter-regionalism (and arguably multilateralism) in lieu of bi-lateral relations. Through the sheer number and types of participants involved in the design and implementation of EURORECAMP, it would be remise not to consider its consequences for the European Security Strategy to promote effective multilateralism. This paper shows that the EU is capable of promoting multilateral engagement in international security and EURORECAMP is a discernible example of its success. The knowledge of the EURORECAMP process presented in this paper is indicative of the types of roles the EU plays in the international security arena.

Multilateralism as it pertains to the EU deserves a two-fold examination. First is a brief examination of its conceptual meaning. The second part evaluates the extent to which EURORECAMP contributes to the EU’s quest for effective multilateralism. As a concept, multilateralism is much less developed in international relations than other concepts (Bouchard and Peterson, 2009: 2). Yet, the few works dedicated to multilateralism have defined the concept in a variety of ways (see Ruggie, 1992; Brenner 1994; Krause and Knight, 1995; Cox, 1997; Gill, 1997; Keohane, 1990; 1998; Kissack, 2003). In assessing these scholarly contributions, one can conclude that the concept of multilateralism is both a principle and a process of cooperation among actors in international relations. Hence, multilateralism is both a goal of EU external security relations and a means of pursuing such relations.

As previously described, EURORECAMP involves other actors outside of the EU institutions and Member States including other institutions such as NATO and the G8, and individual countries such as the United States and Canada. The arrangement pursued by EURORECAMP is exemplary of this sort of multilateralism. Importantly, the arrangement also involves the participation of the ultimate multilateral institution, the United Nations through the active engagement of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in the design and implementation of the current EURORECAMP exercises.

Within the broader framework of EU-Africa relations, EURORECAMP-AMANI AFRICA constitutes a change in how EU Member States relate to African Member States on matters of security. The EU and AU have forged an exclusive instance of cooperation that champions partnership in security without necessarily compromising the jealous hold of the nation state in this arena. Indeed, the arrangement of the EURORECAMP perhaps confirms the continued primacy of EU Member States’ roles in international security. In addition to examining a unique alliance on peace and security, the study of EURORECAMP reveals the evolved methods of implementation within the intergovernmental structure of external relations of the EU. Contrary to reports about the EU’s ineffectiveness in the area of security due to its lack of a single foreign policy, EURORECAMP reflects a unique role of the EU as a different type of institutional contributor within the international security architecture.

Evidently, the EU Member States can cooperate as one entity without ceding their decision-making powers to Brussels. Cooperation amongst EU member states seems to favour a division of labour, model rather than a pooled system of decision-making. Division of labour is a well known economic model whereby a work process is shared among different actors who specialise in their task areas. In the case of the EU, this allows for non-competitive engagement in areas of international security while minimising duplication among EU Member States and their partners. One of the reasons that cooperation among EU member states has worked is because each country involved in the process formed a component of the initiative; so rather than a complete centralisation of the training process, the involved countries sought ways in which to coordinate in accordance with their perceived national interest and with full decision-making powers. This allowed each country to maintain their privileged position within Africa. While duplication was eliminated, no one programme supersedes another. This formula would become important for EURORECAMP, as EU Member States still jealously guard their sovereignty on matters of security. The ability of each partner to own a component of the EURORECAMP was one of the reasons why the EU Member States agreed to cooperate with each other. EURORECAMP therefore allows better coordination among EU Member States. This is
especially important within EU-Africa relations because African institutions lack the capabilities to sift through donor contributions. In a case such as EURORECAMP where the EU has organised the donors, the daily travails of cooperation between the EU and Africa work better.

In addition to broadening interregional cooperation, EURORECAMP has deepened interregional cooperation as implementation methods call for an in-depth knowledge of countries and regions in Africa as well as the bureaucratic arrangements of EU Member States. EURORECAMP has also increased the EU’s commitment to Africa has increased. To this end, the EU has a delegation dedicated to the AU. Additionally, EURORECAMP has allowed for the broader participation of EU countries such as Finland and Denmark whose engagement with African countries had been limited to its external development policies in a handful of countries.

Despite its success, as an alliance for international security and peace, the process of EURORECAMP has had its challenges (EC, 2009). It would be remise not to question whether EURORECAMP as a capability building project responds adequately to the immediate threats of violence in Africa. This is a valid concern especially since the full operationalisation of the ASF will take time and the peace and security challenges are happening now.

The process of creating a multidimensional force is also quite difficult as the institutional cultures of the military and civilian have been difficult to reconcile. There have been concerns that the military components of the ASF are being developed more rapidly than the civilian components within EURORECAMP. These civilian components which are intended to tackle humanitarian and post conflict reconstruction are crucial for lasting peace on the continent and therefore the stagnation of their development is a problem. Despite this concern, many of the brigades that constitute the ASF have performed quite well in their training exercises. The frequent meeting of the stakeholders in EURORECAMP identified the problems earlier in the process and the concerted effort to mitigate its impact on the process has so far been successful. However, the importance of civilian aspects of the ASF ought to be constantly on the forefront of future partnerships because the tendency is to prioritise the military components of peacekeeping forces.

Further to the above two challenges, a prevailing challenge during the EURORECAMP process has been ‘ownership’. Built into the design of EURORECAMP whereby the EU and the AU are equal partners is the idea that the process would be locally owned by Africans. However, participants have raised concerns about the extent to which this has been the case. This is a valid concern. The African side of the partnership is having trouble integrating the concerns of national and sub-regional actors and institutions into the African Union apparatus and this is an ongoing concern across all aspects of African Peace and Security Architecture. To mitigate this, the EU is funding integration programmes through the monetary and logistical support for the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and Regional Integration for Development in ACP Countries (EU Commission, 2008). These challenges are ongoing, and will take time to tackle. However, awareness means they are constantly on the forefront of both the EU and AU’s agenda.

As this paper has tried to show, the opportunity for EU engagement in international security is not limited to autonomous military capabilities. While this will contribute to its credibility as a security and

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*In Finland for instance, bi-lateral development relations in Africa are confined to Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland)*


*Communication From The Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, The European Economic And Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Regional Integration for Development in ACP Countries (EU Commission, 2008)*

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As this paper has tried to show, the opportunity for EU engagement in international security is not limited to autonomous military capabilities. While this will contribute to its credibility as a security and
defence power and, it would be misleading to ignore current security cooperation. EUROCAMP as an example of such security cooperation relies very much on bargaining and coordination among Member States. It confirms the importance of member states in the construction and successful implementation of EU security policies and engagements. Additionally, it also highlights the perspectives of the external partners in determining the extent and success of EU security actorness. This and future EU security engagements will have their challenges, however, in acknowledging that EU is capable of being a security through the assessment of current processes, we can begin to develop better tools for measuring the EU as a security actor.

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