



INSTITUTE FOR  
EUROPEAN  
STUDIES



Working | paper

*The EL-CSID project is coordinated by the Institute for European Studies (IES)*



This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 693799.

# Council of the Baltic Sea States: The Role of a Sustainable and Prosperous Region in Bringing Science Diplomacy Forward

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Issue 2018/19 • July 2018

## Introduction

2017 has been a year full of promising major milestones for the future EU Science Diplomacy Strategy. At the beginning of 2017, the Directorate-General for Research and Innovation (DG RTD) of the European Commission released a thought-provoking report *Tools for an EU science diplomacy* (Van Langenhove, 2017). This publication was accompanied with a recognition among some parts of the academic circles and practitioners that the "Union is in process of reinforcing its diplomacy for science (the classical international S&T cooperation), while developing a genuine science for diplomacy" (López de San Román & Schunz, 2018, p. 262). Later on others have called the subsequent developments a worldwide "jump on the "science diplomacy" bandwagon" (Penca, 2018, p. 1).

In the Baltic Sea Region setting, on 20 June 2017, the Reykjavík Ministerial of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) took place and resulted in a *Declaration on the Occasion of the 25th Anniversary of the CBSS* (CBSS, 2017), as well as the endorsement of *Realizing the Vision: Baltic 2030 Action Plan* (CBSS Secretariat, 2017), which serves as "a solid basis for concrete CBSS action to meet the Sustainable Development Goals at regional level" (CBSS, 2017, p. 2).

The report *Tools for an EU science diplomacy* outlines promising recommendations for further assembly of cases, which might serve as reference points or potential sources of inspiration once crafting the main structures and guidance enshrined in the upcoming 'EU Science Diplomacy Strategy'. As it will be outlined in subsequent paragraphs, the CBSS-endorsed multilateral cooperation initiatives have spurred various macro-regional dynamics of implicit science diplomacy,<sup>1</sup> which might serve as a source of inspiration in the crafting of certain elements for the forthcoming strategy.

Likewise, the analysis presented is not limited to the presentation of the Baltic Sea Region's dynamics. The subsequent paragraphs and, most notably, the conclusions and recommendations are tailored to bring closer the strategic thinking on science diplomacy captured in the Van Langenhove report with the already presented reflections on the future organisational structure of the financial framework for research and innovation elaborated in the Mazzucato report titled *Mission-Oriented Research & Innovation in the European Union - A problem-solving approach to fuel innovation-led growth* (Mazzucato, 2018). Thus, the Working Paper aims at offering further ideas on the following two aspects. Firstly, the subsequent paragraphs outline what new modalities could be considered in order to unfold the strategic vision. Secondly, the Working Paper offers some thus far unexplored strands of EU policies in view of moulding the most optimal arrangement of implementation structures of the EU 'science diplomacy'.

In addition, in response to the interest in mapping science diplomacy activities and their level of success, as well as the academic quest to explore in more concrete terms the novelty of the concept of science diplomacy, discursive practices and the reason for this overall new rhetoric (Penca, 2018, p. 1), this Working Paper offers additional empirical insights to both communities for further examination. Consequently, it should come as a no surprise that the subsequent paragraphs will entail several references to the EL-CSID Working Paper 2018/16 *The rhetoric of "science diplomacy": Innovation for the EU's scientific cooperation?*, especially the so-to-say healthy grain of salt, which this review offers regarding the overall state of 'science diplomacy'. Remarks on Penca's Working Paper are presented bearing in mind the importance of the on-going theoretical honing of 'science diplomacy' intricacies in the EU setting as well as vis-à-vis EU's relations to other parts of the world.

Last but not least, the major added value of this Working Paper is its further elaboration on the existing EU domain-specific governance frameworks, which hold a considerable potential for the future richness of the contents of the EU Science Diplomacy Strategy, as well as its potential in bringing

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<sup>1</sup> The term 'implicit science diplomacy' refers to policies and practices which are not labelled as 'science diplomacy' (Van Langenhove, 2017, p. 5), nevertheless, they resemble to the basic definitions or categories of 'science diplomacy'.

substantial benefits to the European and wider communities of researchers and academics, as well as society at large.

The Van Langenhove report, the Mazzucato report and Penca's Working Paper for EL-CSID, together with the CBSS Baltic 2030 Action Plan, will remain the key reference points for the elaboration on implicit science diplomacy spurred by the multilateral initiatives endorsed by the CBSS.

### **Council of the Baltic Sea States in Brief**

Before getting down to details, it is worth pointing out some basic facts about the CBSS and why its work is of specific importance to the crafting of the future EU Science Diplomacy Strategy. The CBSS, established in 1992, is an intergovernmental organisation assembling eleven "Member States (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia and Sweden), as well as a representative of the European Union" (CBSS, 2018). Some scholars highlight the important role played by the CBSS as "a critical intergovernmental platform for cooperation in the Baltic Sea region" (Tassinari, 2017, p. 534). Others point out the value of CBSS due to it being one of the overall preferred multilateral forums for Moscow's engagement in the Baltic issues (Makarychev & Sergunin, 2017, p. 466). The Council "supports a global perspective on regional problems" (CBSS, 2018), where the translation of the UN Sustainable Development Goals in a Baltic Sea Region-specific outline, the **Baltic 2030 Action Plan**, should be mentioned as an example (CBSS, 2018-a).

The overall work of the CBSS is structured according to three long-term priorities – **Regional Identity, Sustainable & Prosperous Region, Safe & Secure Region** (CBSS, 2018). By and large, cooperation in science, research and innovation has had a more pronounced role in alignment with the **Sustainable & Prosperous Region** long-term priority.

Nevertheless, it must be pointed out right away that former and ongoing initiatives dedicated to multilateral collaboration in the higher education sector have had an important role, also in advancing the long-term priority **Regional Identity**. **EuroFaculty**, implemented from 1993 until 2005 (with premises in Riga, Tartu and Vilnius), "offered training programmes in law, public administration and economics for civil servants, administrators and academics" (Musiał, 2015, p. 272). Consequently, in the subsequent years, the EuroFaculty model was applied in Western Russia, namely, in Kaliningrad (2000-2007) at the Immanuel Kant State University of Russia to develop the quality of higher education in the faculties of law and economics and in Pskov (2009-2015) to improve the offered higher education in business economics and business administration (CBSS, 2018-b).

As mentioned earlier, 2017 was a special year for the CBSS due to the celebration of 25th anniversary of the organisation. The anniversary was marked not only by a look-back at earlier accomplishments but also enriched with forward-looking guidelines captured in more nuanced terms in the CBSS Baltic 2030 Action Plan. Science and research cooperation are some of the thematic components of this Action Plan. In addition, the drafting process of the document benefited from inputs from such CBSS-endorsed research-business collaboration initiatives as Baltic Transnational Research Access in the Macroregion (TRAM) (Baltic TRAM, 2018).

The CBSS guidance in the research domain is not solely related to such comprehensive frameworks as the 25th Anniversary's Declaration and the CBSS Baltic 2030 Action Plan. More than a decade-long tradition of the CBSS dialogue revolving around higher education, research and innovation was launched by the 2007 Latvian Chair's Conclusions **Higher Education and Science for Sustainable Development and Competitiveness of the Baltic Sea Region**, subsequently enriched by comprehensive perspectives on the future of the Baltic Sea Region issued by the Lithuanian (2009-2010) and Polish (2015-2016) Presidencies (CBSS, 2018-c; Šime, 2016). The 2016 Polish CBSS Chairman's Conclusions titled **Baltic Science: Renewing the Commitment to Science / Research Joint Actions in the Baltic Sea**

**Region** must be highlighted since this document endorsed two Interreg Vb Baltic Sea Region Programme's funded projects – **Baltic Science Network** and **Baltic TRAM**. These two projects then serve as the providers of key insights in the most recent implicit science diplomacy dynamics of the Baltic Sea Region.

## Implicit Science Diplomacy Dynamics in the Baltic Sea Region

In order to make the Baltic Sea Region's developments of multi-level and multi-location<sup>2</sup> 'implicit science diplomacy' more easily understandable to an outsider, the three pivotal taxonomies of science diplomacy, which are also adopted by Van Langenhove in the report *Tools for EU science diplomacy*, namely, '**diplomacy for science**', '**science in diplomacy**' and '**science for diplomacy**', will guide the subsequent insights in Baltic Science Network<sup>3</sup> and Baltic TRAM<sup>4</sup>.

It is worth pointing out that the CBSS is no stranger to the outlined dimensions of 'science diplomacy'. Namely, one of the earlier publications of Baltic TRAM titled *Multi-Level Governance of Innovation and Smart Specialisation* briefly refers to the pivotal report *New Frontiers in Science Diplomacy: Navigating the Changing Balance of Power* dedicated to science diplomacy, which introduced for the first time the three typologies of science diplomacy (Šime, 2017, p. 27). However, the key reference point in the subsequent chapters remains the Van Langenhove report, due to the fact that it offers a contextual background for the three typologies explained in the European context.

## Diplomacy for Science

As elaborated by Van Langenhove, 'diplomacy for science' is tailored to use "diplomacy in order to establish cooperation agreements at government or institutional level. The goal of 'diplomacy for science' is to benefit from foreign science and technology capacity in order to improve the national capacity" (Van Langenhove, 2017, p. 8). In the Baltic Sea Region context, the Baltic TRAM network of Industrial Research Centres serves as a good example of such dynamics. As explained in previous publications (Šime & Legzdīņš, 2018, pp. 58-62, 65), the network of Industrial Research Centres serves as a macro-regional facilitating structure for introducing EU-based small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to the research potential of analytical facilities located across the Baltic Sea Region. The networked structure allows to broaden the availability of analytical services to SMEs, thus not restricting them solely to the offer of research-intensive services within a specific region of a country or within a certain national territory.<sup>5</sup>

One of the reasons why readers well-versed in science diplomacy dedicated to the Baltic Sea Region might find this perspective on Baltic TRAM rather new, might be explained by its indirect ties to 'science diplomacy'. So far, the advocacy of Baltic TRAM's contribution towards advancing the macro-region's innovation performance and sustainability has been much more pronounced. In relation to innovation, Baltic TRAM is often referred to along the lines of its adherence to the flagship **Baltic Science Link** of the *Policy Area Innovation* of the *EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region* (EUSBSR). In relation to sustainability, Baltic TRAM is aligned both with the science-specific guidance enshrined in

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<sup>2</sup> Reference to terms often employed in elaborations on the 'structural foreign policy' and 'structural diplomacy' (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014, p. 18; Keukeleire, Thiers, & Justaert, 2009, p. 152).

<sup>3</sup> Project website: <http://www.baltic-science.org/> Project entry on the Interreg Vb Baltic Sea Region Programme project library: <https://projects.interreg-baltic.eu/projects/bsn-27.html>

<sup>4</sup> Project website: <https://www.baltic-tram.eu/> Project entry on the Interreg Vb Baltic Sea Region Programme project library: <https://projects.interreg-baltic.eu/projects/baltic-tram-12.html>

<sup>5</sup> Baltic TRAM earlier analysis of innovation vouchers testifies to certain service limitations offered in a few countries and regions (Šime, 2018b).

the 2016 CBSS Polish Chair's Conclusions *Baltic Science*, and serves as a notable example of practical dynamics supporting primarily the Sustainable Development Goal 9 "Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure", including such awareness-building occasions as the *European Sustainable Development Weeks* 2017 & 2018 (Baltic TRAM, 2018-a; University of Latvia, 2017), and in broader terms – the priority focus area "Transition to a Sustainable Economy" of the Baltic 2030 Action Plan (Šime, 2017, pp. 23, 26). However, these should not be the sole considerations and cooperation patterns which are worth pointing out, once discussing 'diplomacy for science' in the Baltic Sea Region context.

In view of earlier EL-CSID published analysis on interaction or relations between the three taxonomies of 'science diplomacy', Penca notes that researcher mobility schemes require diplomatic and bureaucratic pre-arrangements, which correspond to the 'diplomacy for science' strand. Consequently, the productive collaboration among scientists and their obtained intercultural understanding is interpreted by Penca as 'science for diplomacy' (Penca, 2018, p. 3). In terms of this assessment, there are no major remarks to make at this nascent stage of theoretical modelling of further nuances of 'science diplomacy'. However, it might be just as well questioned whether any slightest diplomatic or bureaucratic encounter should hold the weight of being termed as 'diplomacy for science'.

Penca's suggested lack of boundaries between the existing taxonomies of 'science diplomacy' might benefit from further elaboration on the proposed demarcation models. Especially, clear references what volume of activity might truly hold the spirit of 'diplomacy for science', when it comes to the provision of diplomatic and bureaucratic services to multilateral research cooperation schemes launched in various circumstances, might be of value. Among three main categories for potential further examination of this subject matter might be:

- a) Implementation of multilateral research cooperation in a project format, which follows well-established and routinized procedures defined by the EU funding bodies (for some examples of such existing schemes, explore the mapping offered in the Baltic Science Network publications<sup>6</sup>);
- b) Implementation of multilateral research cooperation programmes established on the basis of an intergovernmental agreement in order to deliver scientific input for the policy- and decision-making (one of existing schemes worth exploring in greater detail might be the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme established under the auspices of the Arctic Council (AMAP, 2018));
- c) Commencement of a new type of or considerably closer multilateral cooperation in higher education or a specific science domain, established due to a major high-level momentum, its generated diplomatic responsiveness and allocated bureaucratic resources for targeted capacity building (with full respect towards differences of empirical case studies emanating from a highly integrated supranational governance framework or stemming from an intergovernmental agreement, such as implementation of EuroFaculty in several CBSS Member States).

The suggested three empirical categories for further examination of potential examples of 'diplomacy for science' follow Penca's invitation to reflect on the performance by the EU in a meaningful way and plan the forthcoming activities with greater attention to details and in a more targeted manner (Penca, 2018, p. 10). Last but not least, comparison of the diplomatic and bureaucratic engagement in each of the outlined categories might help to render more clarity about the scope of empirical cases which would qualify as embodying 'diplomacy for science'.

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<sup>6</sup> The full list offered online: <http://www.baltic-science.org/index.php/publications>

## Science in Diplomacy

'Science in diplomacy' refers to the use of "scientific knowledge in foreign policy decisions. The goal of such activities is to improve foreign policy actions through the use of scientific knowledge" (Van Langenhove, 2017, p. 8). This strand of multilateral science diplomacy is manifested in the CBSS joint activities in a rather limited, but at the same time multi-faceted and complex way.

The CBSS Secretariat already completed a research exercise in terms of comparing the similarities and identifying differences among the research and innovation agendas of the Four Councils of the North. In comparison to the advanced stage of the Arctic Council's multilateral work aligned with the United Nations conventions (Šime, 2017, p. 26), the CBSS-endorsed initiatives are much less reliant on the transnationally overseen acquisition of scientific evidence in the macro-regional policy-shaping. Instead, the CBSS modus operandi, as showcased by the practices adopted across the wide spectrum of the expert groups and partnerships, relies more heavily on finding a common denominator among the national policy perspectives, as well as knowledge transfer and sharing of best practices (Heininen, 2017, p. 445). Thus, the overall argument here is made focusing not on a national science-informed policy, but on a transnational science-informed policy. While the importance of science informing the national positions of the CBSS Member States should not be disputed, the overall argument here stands for the role what science plays on a transnational level. Such scientific inputs play a combined role (in other words, each of them having a graded weight) in the CBSS jointly agreed and endorsed activities.

Instead of the discussed set-up being downplayed as a mere ignorance towards scientific evidence, the CBSS science-policy dynamics should be viewed within the wider scholarly thinking revolving around '*evidence-based policy*'. The CBSS developments mirror the usual policymaking process which involves "trade-offs between multiple competing social values, with only a very small proportion of policy decisions simply concerned with technical evidence of the effects of interventions" (Parkhurst, 2017, p. 5). On the basis of earlier scholarly thinking, Parkhurst rightly points out that it would be wrong to assume that "policymaking is merely an exercise in 'decision science', when the policy process is, instead, a 'struggle over ideas and values'" (Parkhurst, 2017, p. 5). Science policy and its diplomatic dimensions are no exception to these observations.

Perhaps an illustrative item might render it easier to understand this considerable level of complexity which unfolds along the lines of Weiss' defined two models of 'research utilisation' – interactive use<sup>7</sup> and enlightenment<sup>8</sup>. For example, **BONUS, the joint Baltic Sea research and development programme**, is a member of Baltic Science Network and a much-appreciated contributor to the overall debate about research cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region. However, BONUS' generated research findings are not the only source of research insights consulted by Baltic Science Network. In other words, BONUS' generated scientific outputs are not the sole research evidence on which Baltic Science Network bases its assumptions and suggested further transnationally coordinated actions.<sup>9</sup> Instead, Baltic Science Networks taps into multiple sources of research findings, as well as supports further implementation of BONUS programme.<sup>10</sup> Similarly, certain CBSS Member States, Finland being one of them, sees the continuous operation of BONUS as not the sole, but one of the items having a role in its Baltic Sea Region Strategy (Tikka, 2018). Thus, Baltic Sea Region is a fascinating example of a certain extent flexible science-policy interface, benefiting from various complementarities.

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<sup>7</sup> Interactive utilisation being understood as "a back-and-forth process of learning between policy makers and multiple sources of information, including research" (Parkhurst, 2017, p. 24).

<sup>8</sup> Enlightenment being understood as "an indirect way through which social science research influences thinking more broadly or generally, including working to identify problems or convert them into 'non-problems'" (Parkhurst, 2017, p. 24).

<sup>9</sup> The list of Baltic Science Network publications are telling examples in this respect: <http://www.baltic-science.org/index.php/publications>

<sup>10</sup> As outlined in Baltic Science Network Policy Paper regarding the FP9 (Baltic Science Network, 2018, p. 4).

In the spirit of camaraderie, it is worth noting that the Arctic Council's work dedicated to the United Nations conventions goes a long way further than just assembling scholarly recommendations produced throughout a research mobility scheme. Thus, the Working Paper serves to highlight the northernmost Council's work as potentially offering a more promising ground for exploring the full potential of 'science in diplomacy' dynamics, in comparison to the earlier Penca's suggested researcher mobility (Penca, 2018, p. 3).

This serves also as a remark in light of Penca's assessment that the 'science diplomacy' model doesn't correspond to clear-cut empirical cases and does not offer a specific demarcation between the three defined typologies. Namely, a certain level of fluidity of activities being part of one event but corresponding to different strands of three taxonomies was highlighted by Penca. This Working Paper points out the limitations of such an approach, seeing certain research activities as manifesting the whole three-fold spectrum of 'science diplomacy'.

When it comes to naming certain examples, Penca highlights that 'science in diplomacy' could manifest itself if researchers from mobility schemes produce policy recommendations that are recognised and adopted in the policy-making process (Penca, 2018, p. 3). With all due respect to the brightest of the academic minds hosted by Europe, in general terms, such a suggestion of potential assessment of the value of research mobility results would benefit from further elaborations, perhaps exploring some of the findings of the earlier reference 'evidence-based policy' literature. Otherwise, judging all research mobility schemes alike runs the risk of being too simplistic, in other words, without paying attention to the particularities (such as the aims, expected and/or achieved results and duration) of each research mobility scheme. In addition, too much of a generalised approach to the results delivered by various research mobility schemes or an exclusive focus on research mobility being the ultimate example of 'science in diplomacy' might downgrade the true value that 'science in diplomacy' not only holds in terms of its yet unexplored potential, but also what 'science in diplomacy' (in its finest forms of complex and validated research expertise supporting the policy-making process) already delivers in such notable forums as the earlier noted Arctic Council.

Moreover, such assessment of Penca's suggestion to view research mobility schemes as potential sources of the next policy guidelines is based not only on the concise observations of the detailed work dedicated to the United Nations conventions taken up by one of the Four Councils of the North. It is also based on the insights gained from the **CBSS Summer University** programme (Šime & Legzdīņš, 2018, pp. 48 - 52), another strand of the CBSS long-term priority **Regional Identity**. The CBSS Summer Universities have not taken up such an ambitious task of drafting sound and thorough recommendations for policy-makers during approximately week-long, in other words, short-term encounters. The task is too demanding for such a brief collaborative gathering, especially if it is not combined with any thorough preparatory and pre-drafting process ahead of the meeting. Instead, the CBSS Summer Universities have proven to be well placed for building wider awareness about the multi-faceted developments of the Baltic Sea Region, thus, at best providing to the participating researchers and policy experts some initial impetus for exploring new research avenues, expand their networks and assess feasibility of collaborative initiatives. This elaboration on one empirical example, which arguably should not be automatically labelled as representing 'science in diplomacy', should be viewed as following Penca's call to depart from "an uncritical use of "science diplomacy" in both policy and academic discourse" (Penca, 2018, p. 10). Let this be one of the first occasions acknowledging that a certain example of researcher mobility, namely, the CBSS Summer University, does not represent 'science in diplomacy'.

Coming back to a more general level, along the lines of 'science in diplomacy' thinking, the CBSS Science, Research and Innovation Agenda<sup>11</sup> aspires to lay some minimal grounds and spur initial expert discussions on further options for macro-regional assessment tools, which could be translated

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<sup>11</sup> For more thorough background information on this framework, please consult earlier elaboration captured in the article "Research and Higher Education Cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region" (Šime & Legzdīņš, 2018, pp. 47 - 48).

in such actions as a wider expert community recommending thorough progress monitoring options. What would be important in such case is not just an agreement among the subject matter experts about the feasibility and value of the envisaged assessment method, which would guide further recommendations. The utmost value of such a suggested monitoring tool would be of worth only if it would be met by a united support among all eleven CBSS Member States and the representative of the EU. Undoubtedly, it is a bar set high enough. But, taking a look back at the CBSS 25 year-long legacy and Baltic Sea Region-wide dynamics initiated throughout these years, it would be better to aim rather high, once thinking about the future potential actions aligned with the science in diplomacy spirit, instead of seeking out short-lived solutions, characterised by a simplistic approach, quick brainstorming with little consideration allocated to the long-term repercussions that the recommended actions would generate in the context of the prosperity and sustainability of any geographical area.

Thus far, the CBSS Secretariat has had the pleasure to witness and engage in a thorough peer-to-peer review of the outputs of Baltic Science Network and Baltic TRAM. On the basis of these promising results, the CBSS Science, Research and Innovation Agenda is judged to contribute to further capacity building required to perform activities, which hold a potential to qualify in future as 'science in diplomacy'. Last but not least, since such capacities have not been demanded by the political leadership of the CBSS, during the upcoming years the evolution of this strand of the implicit CBSS science diplomacy is not foreseen to gain a substantial momentum.

Thus, hopefully, the examples of 'science in diplomacy' related developments taking place or being discussed in the Baltic Sea Region will help such sceptics as Penca to rethink whether science diplomacy is an empty buzzword (Penca, 2018, p. 10). Perhaps the cause of such a scepticism is tied to the fact that the global attention to the term has generated a more colossal myriad of inputs and responses than the theoretical founders and like-minded academic peers have been capable to grasp and incorporate in their thinking towards honing down the conceptual and methodological intricacies of science diplomacy. Certainly, the EU's support, in terms of funding three projects<sup>12</sup> dedicated to getting a better understanding of science diplomacy in the European setting, testifies to the overall support provided to the academic community in its aspirations to offer new theoretical frameworks for a structured understanding of the phenomenon, which is continuously attracting a landslide of attention and inputs.

## **Science for Diplomacy**

'Science for diplomacy' refers to the occasions when science facilitates an improvement of relations between states. Bearing in mind that, once their geography and population are taken into consideration, most of the CBSS Member States in EU terms are relatively small, this strand of 'science diplomacy' bears relevance in terms of offering a grouping of states an opportunity to jointly tackle challenges, which they are not able to properly address alone (Van Langenhove, 2017, p. 8). One of the commonly referred terms of this narrative are societal challenges, often named in the context of the European Research Area.

Baltic Science Network is affiliated to this strand of science diplomacy in terms of its full appreciation that the competitiveness of the scientific excellence emanating from the Baltic Sea Region should be based on closer cooperation and, in the spirit of brain circulation (as opposed to brain drain), further support researchers' mobility (Baltic Science Network, 2017). Moreover, Baltic Science Network advances this line of thinking by bearing in mind the guidance enshrined in the *EU Global Strategy*,

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<sup>12</sup> Namely, European Leadership in Cultural, Science and Innovation Diplomacy (EL-CSID), Using science for/in diplomacy for addressing global challenges (S4D4C) and Inventing a Shared Science Diplomacy for Europe (InsSciDE) (Bunn & Ledgerwood, 2018, pp. 4-5).



which notes that a selective engagement over such matters of European interest as education and research could take place between EU and Russia (European External Action Service, 2016, p. 33). It is a so-called "soft cooperation area" of the Baltic Sea Region, where the stakeholders of this specific domain have developed a considerable expertise, and where knowledge transfer and sharing of best practices has turned out to be possible (Heininen, 2017, p. 445). In the Baltic Science Network setting, this cooperative spirit is mirrored by the Saint Petersburg State University of Economics (UNECON) being nominated by the Ministry of Education and Science of Russia to take part in the Network. Moreover, the first annual gathering revolving around the CBSS Science, Research and Innovation Agenda – the CBSS **Baltic Sea Science Day** 2017 (CBSS, 2016; Šime, 2017) – took place in Saint Petersburg, hosted by the Board of the Rectors of Saint Petersburg's Universities.

Likewise, along the lines of encouragement to develop "deeper societal ties through facilitated travel for students" (European External Action Service, 2016, p. 33) enshrined in the EU Global Strategy, the Baltic Science Network, being a flagship of the Policy Area Education, Research and Employability of the EUSBSR, has benefited from closer ties with the EUSBSR **Horizontal Action Neighbours** during the second CBSS Baltic Sea Science Day (Šime, 2018a). To name in more exact terms the most recent example of facilitated encounters between universities and researchers, the parallel session "International Cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region – a Major Factor for Success – Research, Innovation and Mobility" of the CBSS Baltic Sea Science Day 2018 was attended by several guests from Russia and Belarus, which were invited by the EUSBSR Horizontal Action Neighbours (CBSS, 2018). It is worth pointing out that the CBSS Secretariat's collaborative engagement in leading the Horizontal Action Neighbours is one of the telling examples how CBSS engages in the implementation of the EUSBSR<sup>13</sup>, and thereby promotes not solely the immediate goals of the EUSBSR, but also broader guidance, such as indicated in the EU Global Strategy.

All in all, this section of the Working Paper echoes the acknowledgements that the EU Global Strategy holds a mandate for action, which once implemented will have a recognised impact. CBSS is one of the forums which prove that Europe's diversity is an asset not only when it comes to having influence in the world (Cross, 2016, pp. 410-411), but also nurturing cooperative ties in its immediate neighbourhood.

## Conclusions and Recommendations for Further Action

The concise elaboration on the various strands of the CBSS and its Science, Research and Innovation Agenda testifies to the fact that the Council's overseen dynamics follow the trend, earlier identified among the EU Member States (Van Langenhove, 2017, p. 26), of deploying 'science diplomacy' tools even if the CBSS has not issued a clear strategy or a vision dedicated exclusively or referring in explicit terms to science diplomacy. Instead, the CBSS Science, Research and Innovation Agenda has been enriched by science diplomacy practices deeply rooted in the multilateral guidance issued on various occasions, thus testifying to its support and the CBSS' full awareness of multi-level and multi-location characteristics and interdependencies of the research and innovation policies. For example, the report **Multi-Level Governance of Innovation and Smart Specialisation** through the phrasing of "transcendent institutional embedding" (Šime, 2017, p. 28) sums up the alignment of Baltic TRAM efforts with a plethora of Baltic Sea Region-wide, European, international and global guidance and frameworks.

Similarly, Baltic Science Network has sought to explore a notable scope of research and science facilitatory measures<sup>14</sup> ahead of defining its selected three areas for transnational strategies of scientific excellence and corresponding national action plans.

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<sup>13</sup> It is a role noted also among the scholars interested in the macro-regional developments (Gänzle, 2017, p. 410).

<sup>14</sup> Publications accessible on the Baltic Science Network website: <http://www.baltic-science.org/index.php/publications>

Therefore, the CBSS-witnessed evolution of multilateral research cooperation, closely following the logic of 'science diplomacy' (according to its 'science for diplomacy' and 'diplomacy for science' taxonomies), might serve as an encouragement to craft the upcoming EU Science Diplomacy Strategy avoiding any potential silos. In other words, in the midst of the ongoing implementation of existing dense layer of various EU strategies, taking a close look at the domain-specific strategies already in place and their science strands might help craft a neat or more coherent puzzle of complementarities with a clearer understanding of the potential added value of the newly promoted strategic component. Similarly, a scholarly attention to and a closer examination of the strategies indicated in the subsequent paragraphs might facilitate the process of honing the demarcation lines and definitions in terms of what precisely in the EU setting could be understood with the three typologies of 'science diplomacy'.

For example, while the initial mapping of 'science diplomacy' tools suggests aligning the Horizon 2020 programme with the UN's sustainable development agenda (Van Langenhove, 2017, p. 8), at this point in time, it is worth bearing in mind that, already in 2016, the EU defined its **Action for Sustainability**, a European framework for the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals. The accompanying European Commission staff working document of the European Action for Sustainability also highlights the role of Horizon 2020 in implementing a number of Sustainable Development Goals (European Commission, 2016), as well as points out the role that **smart specialisation** plays in advancing Sustainable Development Goal 9 (Šime, 2017, pp. 14, 23, 26). Therefore, in view of the already ongoing discussions about the future **EU Multiannual Financial Framework**, it seems to be an appropriate moment to reflect on how the future mission-oriented structure of the **Framework Programme 9 (Horizon Europe)** would contribute to a continuous advancement of the European Action for Sustainability, as well as how to further the legacy generated by the Horizon 2020-funded initiatives during the first years of the implementation of the European Action for Sustainability.

Likewise, besides the earlier expressed Van Langenhove's valuable remarks on the need to consult with such Directorates-General of the European Commission as Directorate-General for Trade (DG TRADE), Directorate-General for Education, Youth, Sport and Culture (DG EAC) and Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO) (Van Langenhove, 2017, p. 27), perhaps also the expertise of three other Directorates-General should be considered:

- The Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries' (DG MARE) work aligned with the **EU Maritime Security Strategy**, its focus area 4 "maritime research and innovation of dual- (multi-) use capabilities and training" (European Commission, 2017b);
- The Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy (DG REGIO) oversees research and innovation strands of all four **macro-regional strategies**<sup>15</sup>. Consultations with DG REGIO would help acquire a better oversight of the wide scope of modalities revealing how 'implicit science diplomacy' is taking shape or already being implemented in various forums where EU and representatives of its institutions have a key role. For example, several Policy Areas of the EUSBSR are already benefiting from Horizon 2020 funded initiatives (Rafaelsen et al., 2017, p. 11);
- Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs' (DG GROW) overseen progress of the renewed **EU Industrial Policy Strategy** (European Commission, 2017a).<sup>16</sup> This recommendation goes along the lines of Mazzucato's suggestion to tie the future EU

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<sup>15</sup> Besides the EUSBSR launched in 2009, EU Strategy for the Alpine Region (EUSALP) was launched in 2015, EU Strategy for the Danube Region (EUSDR) was launched in 2011 and EU Strategy for Adriatic-Ionian Region (EUSAIR) was launched in 2014 (Etzold, 2018, p. 1). The research and innovation strands of these strategies are discussed in the report **Multi-Level Governance of Innovation and Smart Specialisation** (Šime, 2017, pp. 15-16).

<sup>16</sup> The EU Industrial Policy Strategy was identified during the Baltic TRAM mapping exercise of innovation vouchers (Šime, 2018, p. 5).

missions to the national industrial strategies (Mazzucato, 2018, p. 16). The industrial strategies have experienced a come-back not solely on the national level of the EU Member States, but, in 2017, the European Commission formulated a European initial framework dedicated to the industrial development matters with strong ties to innovation (European Commission, 2017a, p. 6), which received support from the Council in March 2018 stressing "the urgent need for a comprehensive and long-term EU industrial strategy which should be in place at the latest by the beginning of the next EU institutional cycle" and be accompanied by an action plan (Council of the European Union, 2018, p. 2). Thus, first and foremost, DG GROW should serve as the first point of contact to offer its perspectives on the industrial matters to DG RTD.

All in all, a more comprehensive inter-service engagement in the drafting of the EU Science Diplomacy Strategy would also follow Mazzucato's suggested logic of building the missions which will guide the Framework Programme 9 on the basis of the "rich stock and flow of high quality science and innovation that is already being funded under different European programmes" (Mazzucato, 2018, p. 7), thus encouraging further capitalisation on the existing strengths in various science domains.

Such a comprehensive approach in defining the future EU Science Diplomacy Strategy would also ensure more coherence among various EU policy strands, frameworks, as well as their funding sources and subsequent performance review.<sup>17</sup> These remarks echo the spirit present in the Mazzucato report that "Europe also needs European Union-wide efforts to connect policies and grand challenges" (Mazzucato, 2018, p. 5). Likewise, a more nuanced examination of potential strategic-level synergies and complementarities would fit the overall proposed line of missions being supported by actions grounded in "cross-discipline academic work, with a strong focus on an intersection between natural sciences, formal sciences, social sciences and humanities; collaborations across different industries; and new forms of partnership between the public sector, the private sector and civil society organisations" (Mazzucato, 2018, p. 12). In addition, a comprehensive approach would also contribute to the overall targeted character of the strategy's intervention logic and estimated added value to be delivered during the upcoming years of its implementation.

Moreover, the comprehensive approach in designing the EU Science Diplomacy Strategy would help lessen the risk of the strategy being the recipient of a general criticism earlier addressed at the European diplomatic practices emanating from various logics and working practices applied by EU's diplomats and European national diplomats, which result in an "inadequate coordination between EU policy sectors, inadequate coordination between member states' foreign policies and ambitions of the EU institutions, inability to define the concrete aims of strategic partnerships or of key policies, such as – "effective multilateralism": in sum, precisely the opposite of what the Lisbon Treaty intended" (Spence, 2015, p. 61). Such considerations might be of importance due to the already identified potential various interests revolving around the future advocacy of EU science diplomacy by stakeholders in the following manner: "traditionalists and purists caring about STI per se may find themselves in the reinvigorated classical S&T narrative of diplomacy for science, those interested in strategically exploiting the economic potential of EU STI at a global scale will buy into the framing of science for economic diplomacy, and those – like the EEAS – who see the potential of using science for other, primarily developmental or peace-building purposes will prefer the (...) framing of science for diplomacy" (López de San Román & Schunz, 2018, p. 263). Therefore, a thorough look at the existing implicit science diplomacy practices, as well as existing cross-cutting ties with other domain-specific strategies might help render the EU Science Diplomacy Strategy not solely a valuable visionary

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<sup>17</sup> Performance review has been stressed on earlier occasions of EU launched or forthcoming strategies, where the Council of the European Union's guidance emphasising "the need to monitor the implementation of the industrial policy objectives and, even more importantly, the trends in the development of the EU industry with appropriate indicators, keeping in mind that the indicators need to be measurable, time sensitive and should, where feasible, allow for comparison at a global level" (Council of the European Union, 2018, p. 2) in the context of the forthcoming EU industrial strategy serves as a good example.

document but also a concise and explicit reference point for well-concerted, complementary top-down actions and inspiring source of reference for targeted bottom-up support initiatives.<sup>18</sup>

This line of thinking complements earlier remarks offered by policy experts and academics that "EU (science) diplomats will need to be clearer in their interactions with various groups of interlocutors and, while norms might – as seen in the science domain – increasingly be alluded to, EU interests might well be what they will defend in practice" (López de San Román & Schunz, 2018, p. 263). Thus, if the earlier elaborated challenge of offering clear intervention logic based on a thorough assessment of complementarities between different existing instruments and a clear understanding on the performance measurement of the specific document would be successfully addressed in the process of setting up a comprehensive design of the strategy, then it might spur some long-term pay-offs. One of such examples would be that within a few years' time it would be awarded with such high appraisals as EU showcasing itself as a united bloc of Member States which remains a multilateral entity par excellence (Ujvari, 2016, p. 2). On a more down to earth note, it would not turn out to be a hard task to articulate the clear added value what the EU Science Diplomacy Strategy has ensured in terms of an enhanced EU's actorness, strengthened EU's research performance and benefits delivered to both EU's research communities, their counterparts in the EU neighbourhood and other parts of the world.

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<sup>18</sup> The bottom-up dynamics should be viewed in line with Mazzucato's suggested embracement of multiple bottom-up solutions as a means for the implementation of the missions to be agreed for the Framework Programme 9 (Mazzucato, 2018, p. 15).

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The EL-CSID project  
is coordinated  
by the  
Institute for European Studies (IES)  
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This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 693799.