The impact of EU enlargement on the creation (or prevention) of a single voice for the EU.

(in the framework of CFSP)

Paper for presentation at the EU in International Affairs Conference 2010

Brussels, 22-24/04/2010

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The debate about the ability of the EU to function efficiently with more member states came to a head at the time of the 2004 EU enlargement. Did this EU enlargement have an impact in creating a ‘single voice’ for the EU in the framework of CFSP? Because an increase in the number of member states brings along more heterogeneity, the hypothesis of my paper is that the 2004 EU enlargement had a negative impact on the creation of a ‘single voice’ for the EU.

The assumption is that the EU adopted less Common Positions, Joint Actions and Decisions (Council of the EU) since May 2004. In order to examine this, I will count the actual amount of adopted Common Strategies, Common Positions and Joint Actions per year for the period of 1999-2009.

Because numbers do not tell everything, I will also look at the content of the Common Positions, Joint Actions, and Council Decisions in CFSP matters in order to examine whether or not the EU operates more as a framework organisation or as the action organisation it wants to be (Hill, 2004: 159).

This research will be indicative of the role EU member states can play in creating (or preventing) a ‘single voice’ for the EU.
Introduction

In the 1990s, the European Community promised EU membership to several Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, as soon as they met the EU accession provisions. This caused a broadening of the debate about the ability of the EU to function efficiently with (many) more member states. This debate about efficiency and the need for institutional reform continued until after the EU enlargement in May 2004, in as well as outside the EU (see e.g. Von Weizsäcker; Dehaene & Simon, 1999; von Carlowitz, 2001; Baldwin & Widgrén, 2007; European Commission, 2006 and Emerson a.o., 2006).

The academic world tackled the debate by examining whether or not changes were noticeable in the working of the EU institutions or in the EU institutional mechanism (see e.g. Best; Christiansen & Settembri, 2008; Dehouse; Deloche-Gaudez & Duhamel, 2006; Depoorter, 2008; Golub, 2008 and König, 2007; Wallace, 2004). In this literature, the Council of the EU, its working groups and COREPER get some specific attention (see e.g. Häge, 2007; Hagemann & De Clerck-Sachsse, 2007 and Juncos & Pomorska, 2008).

The overall conclusion of this research can be summarized quite easily. It appears that, until now, there are no major changes noticeable in the working of the EU’s institutional apparatus. The changes indicated by this research, are small and mostly situated at the informal working level. In other words, the working of the EU institutions after the 2004 enlargement is ‘business as usual [...]’ (Christiansen; Best & Settembri, 2008: 243).

Still, this enlargement might have influenced the outcome of policy areas compared to shifts in the EU’s internal functioning. Shifts in policy outcome or policy priorities could even have a more direct impact on the daily life of EU citizens or on the position of the EU in the world. This will be the focus of the paper. The accession of new member states can influence the position of the EU on the international scene. In this regard, the research question of the paper is whether or not the 2004 EU enlargement had an impact on the creation of a single voice for the EU in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

Despite the overall conclusion of the mentioned previous research, I assume that the EU enlargement had a negative impact on the creation of a single voice for the EU in CFSP matters. The reason for this hypothesis is that the CFSP is an intergovernmental policy and in this respect stands or falls with the unanimous commitment of all the member states. The increased number of member states since May 2004 brings along more heterogeneity, which will have a negative impact on the ability of the EU to speak with one voice in CFSP matters.

Some previous research already gave some attention to the CFSP, but mainly focused on the Council working groups (Juncos & Pomorska, 2007 and 2008) or on the impact of enlargement on the foreign policy of new member states (Denca, 2009). In this paper, I will mainly focus on the CFSP.
A single voice in the framework of CFSP

The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was introduced by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. However, the idea to integrate the member states’ foreign policies arose much earlier, together with the plan to integrate other, more economic, policy areas. The Luxemburg Report of 1970, which introduced the European Political Cooperation (EPC) only gained treaty status with the Single European Act in 1986. This shows that the idea to integrate the member states’ foreign policies was a politically sensitive topic for a long time (and it still is). Moreover, the EPC was an intergovernmental arrangement, i.e. the member states could only take a decision in these matters, when consensus was reached. In other words, member states were not willing to transfer their foreign policy control to the European level.

In the Maastricht Treaty, the introduction of an intergovernmental, second, pillar for the CFSP, the successor of the EPC, indicated that this willingness was still not existent. The member states did not foresee policy instruments or means for the CFSP on a supranational level and the decision-making on it relied completely on unanimity. The Amsterdam Treaty and the Nice Treaty added some value to the CFSP framework with e.g. the creation of the function ‘High Representative for the EU foreign policy’, which gave the EU a ‘name and face’ in the outside world. The treaties also introduced a broadened scope for majority voting. Furthermore, the St Malo declaration of 1998 gave the necessary oxygen to a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), while the European Security Strategy of 2003 placed the ESDP in a broader perspective, adding extra value to the CFSP framework. However, the decision-making in this second pillar remained intergovernmental.

The European Council, which gathers the Heads of State and Government, defines the strategic direction of the EU for the CFSP/ESDP. The European Council decides on the principles of and the general guidelines for the CFSP, and on the Common Strategies by unanimity (Art. 13 and 23, TEU, Title V). The main foreign policy decision-making body however is the Council of the European Union meeting in the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), where the member states’ ministers of foreign affairs are present. According to article 23 of TEU (Title V), the Council takes decisions by unanimity. Although abstentions to the vote do not prevent the adoption of a decision, it is clear that the main feature of EU decision-making in CFSP matters is the complete control of the member states. However, Joint Actions, Common Positions and decisions based on a Common Strategy; the decisions to implement a Joint Action or Common Position; and the appointment of a special representative can be adopted with a qualified majority, unless these decisions have military or defence implications. In any case, a member state may ‘for important and stated reasons of national policy’ oppose the adoption of a decision. Then, the Council will not vote and may refer the matter (by qualified majority voting [QMV]) to the European Council for a decision by unanimity. So, although the Treaty foresees provisions for qualified majority voting, every member state is able to block any decision. Moreover, Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008: 109) state that ‘the treaty provisions on [...] the [...] use of QMV are [...] irrelevant’. Decision-making by consensus, without actually going to a formal vote, remained the normal way of decision-making in CFSP.

Of course, this highlights the importance of a ‘single voice’ for the EU in CFSP matters. All member states have to agree before the EU can take any action or decision in the CFSP to achieve the EU’s
objectives in this area (Art. 11, TEU, Title V) or to act on the international scene. Therefore, logical reasoning leads to the (already mentioned) hypothesis that the accession of ten or twelve new countries will make the creation of a ‘single voice’ for the EU even more problematic. The Iraq crisis might be an example of this. Not only the three big member states (France, United Kingdom and Germany) were divided on this topic, there was also a clear pro-Americanism in the accession countries as opposed to the other member states (Hill, 2004: 152-154).

A decreased ability of the EU to create a ‘single voice’ in the CFSP can have at least two visible consequences making it possible to test the hypothesis of this paper. Firstly, enlargement might cause a decrease in the amount of CFSP decisions adopted by the Council since May 2004, simply because it is harder to agree on the same text with ten or twelve member states more. In order to examine this, I will count the actual amount of Common Positions, Joint Actions and Council Decisions (in CFSP matters) per year between 1999 and 2009. I neglect the Common Strategy as a CFSP instrument (introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty) because the European Council only adopted three Common Strategies (on Russia and Ukraine in 1999 and on the Mediterranean Region in 2000). Since then, the Common Strategy has been dropped as a CFSP instrument (Keukeleire & McNaughtan, 2008: 107).

Secondly, I will also look at the content of the Common Positions, Joint Actions and Council Decisions in CFSP matters. I do so in order to examine whether or not the EU operates more as a framework organisation or as the action organisation it wants to be (Hill, 2004: 159). The fifth EU enlargement might have had a negative impact on the weight or content of a CFSP decision. The need to incorporate more national perspectives into e.g. a Common Position risks rendering it ineffective. In order to make it possible for the Council member states to reach consensus on the same text, decisions might have become rather ‘empty’ since the 2004 EU enlargement.

This research will enable a conclusion on the role of EU member states in creating (or preventing) a ‘single voice’ for the EU. It will also start to assess the impact of this ‘single voice’ on the EU’s international position.

**CFSP decisions**

The decisions I take into consideration are the Common Positions, the Joint Actions and the Council Decisions adopted by the Council of the EU under Title V (provisions on common foreign and security policy) of the Treaty of the EU (TEU) in the period 1999-2009. According to art. 13 of TEU, the European Council also adopts by unanimity another instrument in areas where the member states have important interests in common, i.e. a Common Strategy. The Common Strategy states its objectives, duration and means. By adopting Common Positions and Joint Actions by qualified majority, the Council will implement the Common Strategy. In 1999, two Common Strategies were adopted by the European Council, a Common Strategy on Russia and a Common Strategy on the Ukraine. Both Common Strategies were extended in 2003 by another Common Strategy in 2004. A last Common Strategy on the Mediterranean region was adopted in 2000. In 2004, it was extended until 2006 by a Council Decision. Although the three Common Strategies were extended, it is clear
that the Common Strategy as a policy instrument was quickly dropped. Common Strategies did not seem to have a real added value as a policy instrument. Therefore I will neglect this instrument.

The first policy instrument in CFSP matters, I will take into consideration, is the Common Position. A Common Position has to be adopted by the Council with unanimity.\(^1\) According to art. 15 of TEU, it will ‘[...] define the approach of the Union to a particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature’. It is the responsibility of the member states to ensure that their national (foreign) policy is in accordance with the Common Position. In other words, the member states are obliged to comply with the Common Position. This has to make cooperation between the member states in the CFSP area more systematic. It also means to improve the coordination of the national foreign policies.

The next instrument, adopted by the Council with unanimity is the Joint Action.\(^2\) According to art. 14 of TEU a Joint Action will ‘[...] address specific situations where operational action by the Union is deemed to be required. They shall lay down their objectives, scope, the means to be made available to the Union, if necessary their duration, and the conditions for their implementation’. In other words, a Joint Action is the coordination of the member states’ actions; in which all kinds of resources are mobilized in order to attain its objectives.

Lastly, the Council can also adopt Council Decisions in the area of CFSP. These decisions are necessary for defining and implementing Common Strategies, implementing Joint Actions and Common Positions or for appointing a Special Representative. These decisions are taken by the Council by qualified majority, except for decisions with military or defence implications.

**Amount of CFSP decisions**

The first consequence of the assumed decreased ability of the EU to create a ‘single voice’ in the CFSP is a drop in the amount of adopted CFSP decisions in the period under investigation (1999-2009). More in particular, according to the hypothesis, I assume a drop in the amount of CFSP decisions since 2004.

To discover this assumed drop in CFSP decisions, I count all the Common Positions, Joint actions and Council Decisions in CFSP matters adopted by the Council for each year of the mentioned period. Using Eur-Lex, the EU database which gives access to EU law, I was able to find all the decisions needed in this paper.\(^3\)

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\(^1\) Except the adoption of a Common Position on the basis of a Common Strategy without military or defence implications.

\(^2\) Except the adoption of a Joint Action on the basis of a Common Strategy without military or defence implications.

\(^3\) Another way to find these decisions is by going through all the monthly summaries of the Council (under Annex III) or by scrolling the Official Journal of the EU and looking for Common Positions, Joint Actions and Council Decisions in the CFSP area.
Table 1 lists the number of adopted Common Positions, Joint Actions and Council Decisions in CFSP matters for each year, from 1999 to 2009.

**Table 1: adopted CFSP decisions/year**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Common positions</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint actions</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council decisions</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Eur-Lex database, author’s calculations*

These figures do not indicate a drop in the amount of adopted CFSP decisions. On the contrary, we see a gradual rise of the amount of decisions. This is certainly the case for the Joint Actions. As a Joint Action can be seen as the more profound instrument in this policy area, this means that the 2004 EU enlargement did not have a negative impact on the ability of the Council to create a ‘single voice’ in order to adopt decisions in the framework of CFSP. Quite the opposite is true. Table 2 makes the sum of the adopted number of CFSP decisions before and after May 1\textsuperscript{st} 2004. And this confirms that the amount of adopted CFSP decisions (Common Positions, Joint Actions and Council Decisions in CFSP matters) increased since the 2004 EU enlargement.

**Table 2: amount of CFSP decisions before and after 1/05/2004**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1999 - 1/05/2004</th>
<th>1/05/2004 - 2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Common positions</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint actions</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council decisions</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Eur-Lex database, author’s calculations*

In other words, with this research my first hypothesis (i.e. a drop in the amount of CFSP decisions due to a decreased ability of the EU to create a ‘single voice’ in the CFSP area since the 2004 EU enlargement) is rejected. Instead of a drop in the amount of CFSP decisions a rise of CFSP decisions can be noticed. This especially holds true for what is concerned the Joint Actions.

Concerning this, is worth noticing how table 1 does indicate a significant drop in the number of adopted Common Positions, Joint Actions and Council Decisions in 2009, in comparison with the other years since the EU enlargement. The 2009 European Parliament elections, the tough appointment of the Barroso II Commission and the ‘hesitation’ of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty might have caused this drop. The General Report on the Activities of the European Union of 2009 does not mention this. But the report of 2004 explains a similar drop in the amount of adopted co-decision decisions by the European Parliament elections of that year, besides the accession of the new member states (European Commission, 2005 and Depoorter, 2008: 85). Therefore, further research still has to be done to explain the drop of adopted CFSP decisions in 2009.
Content of CFSP decisions

Because numbers do not tell everything, it is necessary to look at the content of the adopted Common Positions, Joint Actions and Council Decisions in CFSP matters. According to the hypothesis of this paper, the accession of ten new member states in May 2004 had a negative impact on the creation of a single voice for the EU in the framework of CFSP. As a consequence, this has to be reflected in the content of the adopted CFSP decisions. In other words, CFSP decisions risk being ineffective or ‘empty’ because the view of all member states has to be taken into account in a compromise.

To examine this, I will look if the EU operates more as a framework organisation or as an action organisation (Hill, 2004: 159). According to Hill (2004), the EU has become more of a framework organisation. To affirm this statement, he suggests to look at the tendency of the (most powerful) member states to form inner groups. However, this statement should also be reflected in the content of the adopted CFSP decisions. Following Hill (2004) and the hypothesis of this paper, I assume that, since May 2004 the content of the adopted Common Positions, Joint Actions and Council Decisions in CFSP matters will prefer the EU as a framework organisation and not as an action organisation.

Before I can ascribe each CFSP decision (Common Position, Joint Action or Council Decision in CFSP matters) to framework or action organisation (see below), I have to make a distinction between CFSP decisions based on previous CFSP decisions and ‘new’ CFSP decisions. The decisions based on previous ones are those that revised (i.e. amending, repealing, extending,...) earlier adopted decisions. This distinction is necessary because it seems quite reasonable that decisions that are only revising other decisions are less difficult to be adopted than decisions that deal with a (complete) new matter or issue related to CFSP. It is less hard to find an agreement among all member states (in consensus or by unanimity) for an adjustment to an existing CFSP decision than it is to find an agreement to adopt a ‘new’ CFSP decision.


Table 3: revising and ‘new’ CFSP decisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1999-1/05/04</th>
<th>1/05/04-2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Common Positions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>revising</td>
<td>57 (52%)</td>
<td>93 (76%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘new’</td>
<td>52 (48%)</td>
<td>30 (24%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Actions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>revising</td>
<td>45 (60%)</td>
<td>142 (68%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘new’</td>
<td>30 (40%)</td>
<td>66 (32%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council Decisions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>revising</td>
<td>36 (34%)</td>
<td>32 (20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>implementing</td>
<td>31 (29%)</td>
<td>48 (30%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘new’</td>
<td>39 (37%)</td>
<td>79 (50%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eur-Lex database, author’s calculations
Table 3 indicates that there is an increase in the amount of Common Positions and Joint Actions revising earlier adopted Common Positions and Joint Actions and that there is a drop in the amount of ‘new’ Common Positions and Joint Actions after the 2004 EU enlargement. This suggests that member states prefer to work with or amend existing Common Positions and Joint Actions. Still, because this tendency is more profound for Common Positions than for Joint Actions (the more profound CFSP instrument), member states still seem to be able to create an ‘active’ single voice in the framework of CFSP.

At the same time table 3 indicates the opposite trend for the Council Decisions in CFSP matters. There is a decrease in the amount of the Council Decisions revising earlier adopted Council Decisions and an increase in the amount of ‘new’ Council Decisions in CFSP matters. The amount of Council Decisions implementing Joint Actions or Common Positions remains more or less the same before and after the 2004 enlargement.

The ‘new’ CFSP decisions are more important to examine whether or not the EU operates more as a framework organisation or as an action organisation.

Framework or action organisation

The EU does not see itself as a framework organisation, i.e. an organisation that e.g. only passes on funds. Although ‘soft power’ is its main instrument for resolving international conflicts, the EU sees itself as ‘a key player in international issues’ (European Union [EU], 2010). The police and military missions, sent to several places in the world (e.g. to the Balkans), indicate that the EU is willing and capable to act (in the most literal sense of the word) in the framework of CFSP. Still, according to the hypothesis of this paper, I want to examine whether or not the EU is less willing and capable to take concrete action in the international spheres, since May 2004. Has or has not the EU shifted into an organisation that is more comparable with a framework organisation, since the 2004 EU enlargement?

To answer this question, I will ascribe each Common Position, Joint Action and Council Decision in CFSP matters to framework or action organisation. I will do this based on the content of the title of each CFSP decision. Obviously not every decision can be equally ascribed to either action or framework organisation. I recognize that there are ‘degrees of action’. Some decisions will be entirely comparable to decisions taken by a framework organisation, others to decisions of an action organisation. But many decisions will vary in between framework and action: some of them will tend more to framework than to action organisation, others will tend more to action than to framework organisation.

I will deal with the Common Positions, Joint Actions and Council Decisions in CFSP matters separately. The results of these three separate researches will be brought together in the conclusion (see below).

I divided the ‘new’ Common Positions into four ‘degrees of action’. From framework to action, these four degrees are restrictive measures (1), support (2), positions concerning a specific country (3) and strong or active support (4). These four categories represent less or more action from the EU.
Common Positions concerning restrictive measures towards a country represent the least action, because the EU stops doing things, or in most cases, stops doing one specific thing. A Common Position concerning a country represents more action because it suggests much more support on many levels for one specific country. Table 4 indicates the amount of Common Positions for each of the four categories, before and after the 2004 EU enlargement. These figures indicate that the EU adopts Common Positions, in the framework of CFSP, that can be ascribed to action organisation as well as Common Positions that can be ascribed to framework organisation. In other words, based on the Common Positions, I cannot conclude that the EU is only a framework organisation or only an action organisation (in CFSP matters).

Table 4: Common Positions – framework or action

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Framework (1999-1/05/04)</th>
<th>Framework (1/05/04-2009)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18 (35%)</td>
<td>16 (53%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrictive measures</td>
<td>9 (17%)</td>
<td>5 (17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>11 (21%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>14 (27%)</td>
<td>9 (30%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eur-Lex database, author’s calculations

However, table 4 indicates that, since May 2004, the biggest part of adopted Common Positions has to be ascribed to framework decisions. That means that the impact of the 2004 EU enlargement on the content of the Common Positions takes the form a shift to an EU that operates more as a framework organisation than as an action organisation.

The ‘new’ Joint Actions are also divided into four ‘degrees of action’. From framework to action, these categories are assisting CFSP (1), support (2), EU representation (3) and EU mission (4). The Joint Actions that are listed as assisting CFSP represent the least action because they establish centres or agencies (e.g. the European Defence Agency) that have to develop, promote and assist the CFSP. The EU representation Joint Actions tend more to action organisation because they appoint (special) representatives in a specific country or region. These representatives ‘play an active role in efforts to consolidate peace, stability and the rule of law’ (Council of the European Union, 2010). Table 5 indicates the amount of adopted Joint Actions for each of the four categories, before and after the 2004 EU enlargement.

Table 5: Joint Actions – framework or action

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Framework (1999-1/05/04)</th>
<th>Framework (1/05/04-2009)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 (7%)</td>
<td>3 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>assisting CFSP</td>
<td>14 (46%)</td>
<td>25 (37%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>support</td>
<td>8 (27%)</td>
<td>12 (18%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU representation</td>
<td>6 (20%)</td>
<td>26 (39%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eur-Lex database, author’s calculations
This table indicates that, based on the Joint Actions (i.e. the more profound CFSP instrument) the EU can be seen as an action organisation. Since May 2004, this is even more the case than before. Although there is a decrease in the Joint Actions concerning EU representation, there is a clear increase in the Joint Actions concerning a mission (civilian, police or military mission). In other words, the 2004 enlargement did not have a negative impact on the content of the adopted Joint Actions (in the framework of CFSP).

The ‘new’ Council decisions in CFSP matters are also divided into four ‘degrees of action’. From framework to action, these categories are assisting CFSP (1), agreement with country/organisation (2), EU representation (3) and EU mission (4). Table 6 indicates the amount of adopted Council Decisions in CFSP matters for each of the four categories, before and after the 2004 enlargement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Framework</th>
<th>1999-1/05/04</th>
<th>1/05/04-2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assisting CFSP</td>
<td>14 (36%)</td>
<td>10 (12%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreement</td>
<td>18 (46%)</td>
<td>60 (76%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU representation</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
<td>3 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU mission</td>
<td>6 (15%)</td>
<td>6 (8%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eur-Lex database, author’s calculations

These figures indicate that, based on the Council Decisions in the CFSP framework, the EU is not the action organisation it wants to be. The amount of Council Decisions ascribed to framework decisions is much higher than the amount of Council Decisions ascribed to as action decisions. The 2004 EU enlargement did not change that. Rather, it confirms the EU as a framework organisation.

Conclusion

To examine whether or not the 2004 EU enlargement had a negative impact on the creation of a single voice for the EU in the CFSP framework, I looked at the amount of adopted Common Positions, Joint Actions and Council Decisions in CFSP matters, and at the content of these CFSP decisions, for the period 1999-2009. I also looked at the amount of CFSP decisions revising earlier adopted CFSP decisions and the amount of ‘new’ CFSP decisions, as well as to what extent these ‘new’ CFSP decisions can be ascribed to a framework or to an actionorganisation.

The EU member states in the Council of the EU did not adopt less but more Common Positions, Joint Actions and Council Decisions in CFSP matters. This indicates that the 2004 EU enlargement did not prevent a single voice for the EU in the CFSP framework. However, the fact that most of the adopted CFSP decisions are revising earlier adopted CFSP decisions sounds bad. This subverts the previous conclusion based on the total amount of CFSP decisions. It suggests that it actually has become harder to create the single voice for the EU.
Furthermore, the content of the ‘new’ Common Positions and Council Decisions in CFSP matters indicates that, since the 2004 EU enlargement, the EU is more operating as a framework organisation than as an action organisation. Again, this implies that the 2004 enlargement had a negative impact on the creation of a (active) single voice for the EU in the framework of CFSP. Still, the content of the ‘new’ Joint Actions indicates the opposite trend. Based on the Joint Actions, the EU enlargement did not have a negative impact on the activeness of the EU in the CFSP area.

As sum, the overall conclusion of this paper is that, since the 2004 EU enlargement, it has become harder for the EU member states to create a single voice for the EU in the CFSP framework. But the EU enlargement did not have an exclusively negative impact on the activeness of the EU in the CFSP area. The Common Positions and Council Decisions in CFSP matters indicate the EU is a framework organisation, but the Joint Action is the more profound CFSP instrument, and its analysis shows that, since May 2004, the degree of action is higher than before.

So, based on this research, it is fair to say that the 2004 enlargement made it harder for the EU member states to create a single voice, although this voice has not become less powerful. Nevertheless, further research, i.e. more specifically in-depth interviews with the member states’ representatives in the CFSP area, should be done to confirm this conclusion.

Bibliography


