The Emerging Peace and Security Regime in Africa: The Role of the EU

This article focuses on the role the EU is playing in peacekeeping and conflict prevention in Africa. In this article it is argued that the EU’s peacekeeping approach is not only shaped by the interests of European Member States or EU institutions to deploy and maintain peacekeepers but is responsive to an emerging African peace and security regime. The majority of peacekeeping operations on the continent build upon some kind of inter-organizational arrangements between the UN, the EU, and the AU or in some cases other regional African organizations. The article will show how the existing forms of inter-organizational interaction between international organizations (IOs) in Africa impact on the EU’s engagement in peace operations in the continent. The article demonstrates the EU’s role in the multi-actor game of peacekeeping in Africa and how the EU’s involvement in these emerging international cooperation structures influences its peacekeeping strategy for Africa.

Key words: peacekeeping regime, organizational interplay, Africa

Introduction

The EU started its first fully independent military mission, Operation Artemis (Congo), in Africa in 2003. Since then eight civilian and military missions throughout the continent followed. The EU has been deeply involved in peacekeeping and policing operations in Congo (DRC) where it has deployed five of its nine African missions. Besides the DRC the EU currently runs operations in Guinea Bissau and has launched Operation Atalanta in the Indian Ocean to contain piracy from Somali waters. In 2007 the EU concluded its support operation to the African Union (AU) mission to Darfur (AMIS) and in 2009 the EUFOR mission in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR) was completed. In the majority of these operations the EU did not act on its own but was cooperating with either the AU or the UN. Indeed the vast majority of peacekeeping operations globally, including in Africa, are now organized in some kind of cooperation between IOs. Inter-organizational cooperation rapidly became a dominant trend in peacekeeping.¹ For this reason, this article explores the impact of organizational interplay between the EU, the AU and the UN on the EU’s engagement in peace operations. It will analyze to what extent the support of AU and UN missions by the EU can be explained through emerging patterns of cooperation between the EU, the AU and the UN. Does cooperation lead to delegation, division of labour or specialization of tasks between the EU and its partners? How is the EU’s Africa strategy affected by institutional cooperation? In order to analyze the impact of institutional cooperation, the article examines four peacekeeping missions in Africa with EU engagement, namely Operation Artemis (2003), EUFOR DR Congo (2006), the EU’s support mission to AMIS (2005-2006) and EUFOR Chad/CAR (2008-2009). These cases have been selected because they represent the EU’s most prominent peace operations in Africa in which it was operating alongside the AU and UN. In examining the consequences of cooperative peacekeeping efforts in concert with other IOs, the article challenges the view that the

interests of Member States and the military capabilities of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) alone are sufficient to explain the development of EU peace operations in Africa. Instead it is argued that the EU engagement in Africa is equally shaped by an emerging regional security regime involving the AU and the UN which shows patterns of functional convergence. At the conceptual level the article argues for a refinement of the analytical tools often applied to the analysis of EU foreign policy. In addition to the focus on intergovernmental approaches emphasizing the interests of European Member States individually and collectively, the article seeks to show how evolving regional governance structures in African peacekeeping are shaping the EU’s engagement on the continent.

EU Peacekeeping in Africa: From Intergovernmentalism to Organizational Interplay
The EU’s engagement in Africa has often been explained in terms of the interests of single EU Member States. In particular Britain and France have been identified as lead-states using the EU instrumentally to multilateralize their African foreign policy.\(^2\) Indeed both countries are key actors not only in African peace operations but also in developing the EU’s profile as an international actor. The well-known St Malo Declaration of Jacques Chirac and Tony Blair in 1998 paved the way for the adoption of the ESDP one year later, which provided the EU with a military component to its foreign policy, independent of NATO. The very dynamic development of EU foreign policies in recent years is unforeseen in the history of the EU. The European Security Strategy was developed in 2003, in 2007 EU Battle Groups became operational, and the recently adopted Lisbon treaty further streamlines EU foreign policy institutions and sharpens the EU’s foreign policy profile. Although these institutional reforms cannot be attributed to France and Britain exclusively, these two countries have played a dominant role in all EU peace operations in Africa. France especially is the main initiator of EU engagement in Africa. The fact that EU decision-making in foreign policy is still mainly shaped by the interests of individual Member States has tempted scholars in their analyses of the intergovernmental roots of the EU’s engagement in Africa.\(^3\)

At the conceptual level, intergovernmentalism builds upon individual actor preferences which find application through the mechanism of rational choice.\(^4\) Furthermore intergovernmentalism is an elitist and rational institutionalist approach. It assumes that state leaders follow a cost-benefit calculation indicated by their own preferences which shapes the institutional design of IOs and their policies.\(^5\) The intergovernmental perspective of EU peacekeeping in Africa sees the EU and other IOs as a channel for Member State interests rather than as a significant actor in its own right. Undoubtedly foreign policy remains one of the policy areas in which Member States still exert a high degree of leverage and maintain the ability to shape institutional policies. However, an exclusive focus on the intergovernmental aspects of EU peacekeeping predetermines the analysis towards Member States’ preferences and neglects the extent to which peacekeeping in Africa has become conditional on organizational interplay between IOs.

As will be shown below, the process of setting up and maintaining peacekeeping operations depends not only on the initiation by lead-countries but is also shaped by partner

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\(^3\) Ibid.


institutions. As most peacekeeping operations are now conducted in cooperation between IOs, the deployment of EU military troops and civilian personnel is not taking place in a vacuum. Quite to the contrary, the EU must arrange its mission deployment in reciprocity with other IOs, most notably the AU and UN. Necessarily, cooperating organizations must take into account the peacekeeping doctrines and institutional capabilities as well as the operational needs of partner organizations and set them into relation with their own preferences and capabilities. If actors orient their planning and deployment of missions not exclusively according to their own preferences, but instead they systematically develop cooperation modes based on reciprocal interaction, we can observe the emergence of a regional security regime by IOs corresponding with Stephen Krasner’s definition of a regime as consisting of ‘explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations’.6

The regional governance aspects of the emerging African Security and Peace Architecture (APSA) includes a number of AU projects, like an early warning system or the setting up of an African Standby Force (ASF), but also involves external actors like the EU and UN which have become core partners in the APSA. The institutional space in which the EU operates and deploys its missions is becoming tighter, while lead-states such as France play a crucial role in initiating EU action. A mission’s operation, its functions, tasks and time of deployment are also influenced by the evolving governance and regime structures.

The EU and Peacekeeping in Africa
EU-Africa relations in security cooperation have gained momentum in recent years, which reflects the EU’s growing willingness and increasing institutional and military capabilities to become involved in African conflict zones. The European Security Strategy reflects upon this trend when stating that the EU needs ‘to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary robust intervention’. Since the launch of the ESDP in 1999, the EU has repeatedly based its African strategy on the concept of African ownership by introducing a standard phrase in most of its documents referring to African security issues stating that: ‘The primary responsibility for prevention, management and resolution of conflicts on the African continent lies with Africans themselves’. The willingness to increase African capabilities actively to deal with conflict situations and to strengthen cooperation with the UN is also referred to on a standard basis in EU Council Common Positions in 2001, 2004, and in the 2005 document ‘The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership’. However, it was only the EU-Africa Summit held in Lisbon (2007) that gave the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership political momentum and initiated a new framework allowing the EU to engage effectively in peace and security policies in Africa on a systematic and long-term basis. Now the First Action Plan (2008–2010) for the Implementation of the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership formulates a much more specific set of goals. It provides for a clear framework of EU-sponsored capacity building projects for the AU. Among other things it foresees the establishment of a regular dialogue, and consultations between the two organizations, enhancing capacity building with regard to peacekeeping operations (military, logistical, financially), joint assessment missions, exchange of experience, search for best practice solutions, and reduction of funding gaps for AU-led peace operations. The premier aim behind strengthening the APSA is to provide support for ‘African organisations for African-

led operations" while EU direct intervention through deploying peacekeeping forces is dependent on a case-by-case analysis. The concept of African ownership, the EU insists that capacity building measures must be a ‘demand-driven process’. The 2004 Action Plan for ESDP Support to Peace and Security in Africa further specifies this, stating that ‘ESDP actions should be in response to specific and well documented requests from the UN, the AU, African sub-regional organisations or African states’. Thus EU engagement with APSA, in whatever form, is in large part responsive to external demands for support and intervention.

The European Security Strategy mainly supports this trend when promoting the idea of ‘an international order based on effective multilateralism’ which primarily refers to strengthening global governance structures such as regional and global IOs. It clearly states that the EU wants ‘international organisations, regimes and treaties to be effective in confronting threats to international peace and security...’. Thus the EU peace and security strategy builds upon well-developed inter-organizational relations between the EU and other IOs active in the security area.

In essence the EU’s recent increased engagement with the AU in peace and security matters does not only result from pro-active attitudes of the EU or European lead-countries, but is also the consequence of behaviour in response to external actors reflecting the EU’s own principles in this policy field. The concept of African ownership, the demand-driven approach to capacity building and the commitment to effective multilateralism provide entry points for external conditions to influence the course of EU security and peace building efforts. Indeed the EU’s current approach to Africa would hardly be imaginable without the substantially changed institutional security environment that now prevails in Africa. This is the consequence of the transition from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to the AU, which is currently stepping up its peacekeeping capacities in an attempt to overcome the long-standing culture of impunity and the often criticized unwillingness of the OAU to intervene robustly in cases of humanitarian crisis. This in turn has provided the EU with opportunities to increase its involvement in Africa by applying the concepts of regional ownership, demand-driven capacity building and effective multilateralism. The EU itself admits that its Africa strategy ‘builds on important progress made by the Africans themselves’.

The following four case studies analyze how the interplay between the AU, the UN and the EU has shaped the EU’s engagement in African peacekeeping missions. We will examine how IOs interact when setting up peacekeeping operations in cooperation with each other. The main focus is on the EU, exploring its role in the emerging APSA and how this developing international security regime is influencing the EU’s Africa policy. The analysis follows an inductive research approach which aims to explore how external conditions are shaping EU foreign policy. An inductive analysis has been chosen because it can best highlight how reciprocal dependencies between IOs are shaping the EU’s peacekeeping approach in Africa. The analysis proceeds chronologically starting with the first EU mission

in Africa in the DRC (2003 and 2006), followed by the support mission to AMIS and the co-
deployment of an EU force in Chad.

Congo
Over the course of the last few years the EU’s involvement in African conflict zones has been
most visible in the DRC which has seen the first independent EU military mission, Operation
Artemis, followed by a number of military and civilian missions. No other country in Africa
has received as much EU attention as the DRC, which formed the epicentre of one of the
most relentless wars in modern African history in the conflict-prone Great Lake region. This
section will focus on the two military missions the EU launched in 2003 (Artemis) and in
2006 (EUFOR RD Congo), analysing the EU’s engagement in African peacekeeping.

After years of war the conflict in Congo was ultimately settled by a number of peace
accords. The 1999 Lusaka Peace Agreement, was followed by the Luanda Agreement in 2002
and the Pretoria All Inclusive Political Agreement of the same year. Finally the Pretoria
agreement set off a peace process and transition period to democracy for the DRC. The
transition period was supposed to take two and a half years from mid 2003. However at the
beginning the security situation on the ground, especially in the Congolese Eastern provinces,
was anything but stable and posed the very realistic threat of renewed hostilities between
different militia groups.

The Luanda Agreement foresaw the withdrawal of Ugandan troops from the territory
of the DRC which actually started in April 2002. As a consequence the politically unstable
Ituri province witnessed a resumption of military clashes between ethnic-based militias in
that region, which were soon battling to take over the provincial capital, Bunia. While the UN
deployed a peacekeeping mission (MONUC) to support the implementation of the Lusaka Peace Agreement and was on the ground in Bunia, it was soon be clear that the situation was out of control and would lead to a humanitarian disaster for the civilian population of the
town. On 10 May 2003 Kofi Annan called upon the international community to ‘make every
effort to quickly address this dire situation’. While the formulation of this statement is
general in nature, addressing the international community, it was felt that European countries
and the EU were more than indirectly addressed, as they did not deploy significant numbers
of troops for MONUC and the AU had just launched its first peace operation in Burundi
which witnessed equally challenging political and military tasks. Prior to Annan’s call to
support MONUC in Ituri, the EU had just confirmed its support for the peace process in the
DRC in Council Common Position 319 on 8 May. The UN also addressed the EU High
Representative for its CFSP directly. On 15 May 2003 Annan reiterated his call for rapid
reaction of the international community, expressing the need to deploy a ‘highly trained and
well equipped multinational force’ which obviously the EU alone was capable of deploying.
The UN Security Council did approve an increase in MONUC troops to 10,800 following a
proposal by Annan to sent an extra brigade to Ituri. However, it was clear that these
reinforcements would reach Ituri with a delay of some weeks, leaving a critical power
vacuum.

11 H. Hoebek, S. Carette and K. Vlassenroot, EU Support to the Democratic Republic of Congo (Centre
12 UN, Statement by the Secretary General of the United Nations on the Democratic Republic of Congo, New
York, 10 May 2003.
13 S. Ulkriksen, C. Goutlay and C. Mace, ‘Operation Artemis: the shape of things to come?’, 11 International
The UN’s call for support finally found positive resonance in Paris, but France did not want to send its troops unilaterally and instead lobbied EU Member States to set up a mission. On 5 June the Council agreed to deploy an autonomous EU mission to Ituri with France as a Framework nation carrying the lion’s share of the mission. Operation Artemis was finally launched on 12 June, to last until 1 September 2003. The mission was authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 1484 on 30 May 2003, providing the EU with a mandate to send troops to the DRC stressing its ‘strictly temporary basis’ and geographical focus on just the regional capital town of Bunia. During its time of deployment, Artemis quickly succeeded in driving the militias out of Bunia and preventing a humanitarian catastrophe taking place. However, its limited geographical reach and short-term deployment prevented Artemis from having a wider regional and temporal impact on the province.

The setting up of the EU’s first fully independent mission can best be understood as a consequence of reciprocal interaction and dependencies between the UN and the EU. First, the UN requested the EU to deploy an interim force to Ituri. Thus the initiative was with the UN. Its need for additional, rapidly deployable forces matched the EU’s military capabilities. While there was no political willingness to undertake a long-term and large-scale military mission in the DRC, the UN’s request for a short-term and regionally limited support operation matched the EU’s capabilities and political willingness to take action. However, the success of Operation Artemis also depended on the UN’s ability to increase the number of military personnel after EU troops left the DRC. In general bridging operations are characterized by a mutual dependency. The interim force is assumed to take over tasks and responsibilities determined by the short-term needs of an existing comprehensive peace operation most often run by the UN. Furthermore, it must complete its task within a short period of time or prepare for a hand over to the main mission-bearing organization. Lastly there is a mutual dependency which determines both organizations’ reactions to the situation on the ground.

The consequences for the EU’s involvement in future African peace operations and the development of military capacities and the relatively young ESDP during that time were considerable. Operation Artemis became the starting point for institutionalized cooperation between the EU and the UN. Shortly after the completion of Artemis, both organizations issued a Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management setting up a joint consultative mechanism. One year later an implementation plan for the declaration was drafted outlining future possible involvement of the EU in UN peacekeeping operations. The implementation plan directly draws on experiences gained during Operation Artemis. It proposes a number of types of cooperation between the UN and the EU. EU missions under a UN mandate can take the form of autonomous stand-alone operations under the direction of the EU’s Political and Security Committee, or taking charge of a specific component within existing UN missions. They may also fulfil a bridging function which foresees a limited temporal but rapid deployment of EU troops until the UN takes over the main responsibilities within a larger mission. Lastly a standby model is mentioned in the document where the EU

17 UN, Operation Artemis (note 14 above).
provides an ‘over the horizon reserve’ force which is ready to intervene on the request of the UN. EU peacekeeping strategies in Africa have developed around these models of compensating UN shortcomings at some occasions in the rapid deployment of troops on a short-term basis. In essence the EU favours short-term, geographically limited support operations under its direct political and military control in selected cases, in contrast to running large long-term missions accomplishing multiple functions under UN authority. However, this only makes sense in the context of an existing more comprehensive peace operation set up by the UN or the AU.

Operation Artemis had very direct consequences for the development of the EU’s military capabilities. Its operational characteristics, the rapid deployment of a small multinational and autonomous combat group for a short period of time, were a blueprint for the setting up of EU Battle Groups (BGs).\(^{19}\) Indeed the BG concept foresees the concurrent deployment of just two BGs consisting of 1500 troops each for a period of up to 120 days.\(^{20}\) Such a small force would of course only be able to perform bridging and standby functions but would hardly be able to run stand-alone operations of a greater scale or without substantial cooperation with the AU or UN.

The deployment of EUFOR RD Congo from July to November 2006 is a further example of how the EU’s peacekeeping approach to Africa is not only shaped by EU institutional interests but is reactive to external demands and results from the interplay with the UN. Over the years the peace and democratization process in the DRC has made significant progress. A constitutional referendum was held in December 2005 paving the way for the first democratic elections in decades. However, the UN feared the outbreak of violent clashes during the presidential election campaign, which could lead to serious interruption in the peace process if the elections failed. Therefore the UN Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, on 27 December 2005 requested the deployment of an EU ‘deterrent force’ in the DRC. According to Guéhenno, this force should function as a reserve force enhancing the rapid reaction capabilities of MONUC during the election period.\(^{21}\) The EU agreed to deploy a four-month mission to Kinshasa, of which large parts were stationed in Gabon as an ‘over the horizon’ reserve.\(^ {22}\) EUFOR RD Congo was designed to enforce MONUC temporarily but not to take over standard responsibilities from the UN. In principle the EU’s engagement in the DRC is reactive to UN demands and the shortfall of UN personnel to guarantee the peaceful organization of presidential elections. While the character of EU peacekeeping is responsive in nature it has also been argued that cooperation is determined by what the EU wants to offer instead of what the UN needs to deploy.\(^ {23}\) This is true especially when considering the EU’s refusal to ‘re-hat’ some of its troops after completion of Operation Artemis and EUFOR RD Congo. In this regard the UN must act responsively to the EU’s strict exit strategy. However the EU’s calculation of deploying short-term and geographically limited support operations to the UN only pays off if the UN is capable of retaking the initiative. Thus there is a mutual dependency of the two organizations

\(^{20}\) Ibid.
\(^{21}\) UN, Security Council, Letter from the Secretary General address to the President of the Security Council, dated 12 April 2006, Annex I.
is becoming clearly apparent, which is based on reciprocal responsiveness converging around operational needs, institutional capabilities and political willingness to deploy peacekeeping missions.

**The EU and the Crisis in Darfur**

Since the beginning of the Darfur crisis the EU has been involved in peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts on various occasions. Nonetheless EU engagement was not sufficiently determined to stop the genocide in Darfur. Despite the increasingly severe humanitarian situation, the EU avoided being dragged into the conflict directly while supporting efforts by the UN and the AU to settle the conflict at the negotiating table and through capacity building of the AU. Only in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR) did the EU intervene with its own troops to contain the spread of the conflict to neighbouring countries.

The Darfur conflict so far has seen the killing of at least 300,000 people and the displacement of up to two million.24 The Janjaweed, an Arab militia used by the Sudanese government as a proxy force, have been involved in the mass killing and displacement of Darfurians in this geographically vast area. The international community reacted by negotiating a ceasefire in 2004, resulting in the signing of the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCFA) in N’djamena, Chad. While the UN could not agree on the setting up of a peacekeeping mission, and the EU did not want to get dragged into a conflict without a clear exit option, the AU took the initiative and authorized the deployment of a peacekeeping force (AMIS).25 Although the UN was at an impasse for years, it endorsed and supports AMIS by UN Security Council Resolution 1556. With only a few thousand troops at its disposal, AMIS was soon criticized for not accomplishing its mission as the HCFA was broken frequently. Its mandate also only foresaw the monitoring of the HCFA but was not adequate for a situation of de facto continued hostilities against Darfurians in a geographically large province. A substantial lack of adequate equipment allowing for a rapid movement of peacekeepers became apparent. Funding and logistical shortcomings of AMIS threatened to cause the mission to fail altogether.

The EU’s engagement was firstly only a diplomatic one, supporting UN and AU efforts to settle a peace agreement before anyone could start deploying a mission. After an agreement was reached, the AU was the only IO willing to deploy a monitoring mission. While the UN could not agree on the setting up of a peacekeeping mission in Darfur for years, EU Member States equally rejected direct intervention. However, AMIS’s lack of airlifting capacity, an initially very low number of troops, lack of funding, lack of basic military equipment, and the de facto continuing genocide which AMIS was not mandated to stop, soon made it clear that the mission was very likely to fail without additional external support. The EU’s reaction to the Darfur conflict was largely a reaction to the capability shortcomings of AMIS. A liaison support group consisting of the UN, the EU, the US and Canada was established for AMIS, coordinating donor activities and meeting twice a week.26 The operational needs of AMIS guided the EU’s approach to capacity building, in the case of Darfur encompassing ‘on-the-job’ support for the AU (International Crisis Group, Africa Report 99, 2005). Between July 2005 and when the transition of AMIS into an AU/UN

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A hybrid mission was formally completed, the EU more directly supported AMIS by providing political, financial and military support. In Council Joint Action 557, the EU established the ‘AMIS EU Supporting Action’. Accordingly EU support was divided into civilian and military components. An EU police team was deployed to provide advice and training of AMIS police personnel. Military support was provided in the area of planning and technical assistance but also through providing much needed airlift capacities, vehicles and other military equipment. On average the EU sent 30 police officers, 15 military experts and two military observers to the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa and AMIS in Sudan. In addition to this support, the EU African Peace Facility provided for much of AMIS budget, in total the Peace Facility contributed €305 million. If one adds up all the funds provided by the EU and its Member States for humanitarian aid and capacity building for AMIS, Europe has spent €1 billion on Darfur.

Formally the EU’s response is a reaction to the AU’s request for support by the then President of the AU Commission, Alpha Oumar Konaré, in April 2005 in line with the EU’s principle of African ownership of peacekeeping operations. However, the request was only general in nature and did not require specific tasks and materials to be provided from the EU. Thus the EU’s engagement in Darfur very much reflects upon what the EU was capable and willing to offer. Considering AMIS’s dire need of external assistance the AU had little influence on EU support policies.

In summary, for the case of Darfur, EU engagement was shaped by at least two conditions. Firstly the EU’s preferences for peacekeeping in Africa limited its involvement in Darfur. In contrast to the DRC, a geographically limited, short-term deployment within a clearly defined task area was not viable in Darfur. On the contrary, the situation was determined by continued hostilities and an overburdened and ill-equipped AU mission, as well as a generally hostile Sudanese government rejecting non-African interference within its territory. Additionally, the deployment of a larger UN mission to Darfur, in which the EU troops could play a bridging or tactical reserve role, was not existent. Under these circumstances, the EU did not want to launch its own operation but opted for substantial support of the existing AU mission to Darfur. Secondly, EU support was aligned towards practical operational needs, responding to AMIS’s shortcomings in military equipment and funding and the general capacity shortfalls of AU peacekeeping. EU support ended with the transition of AMIS into a joint AU/UN peace operation, corresponding with EU preferences for short-term engagement with clear exit options. Thus EU peacekeeping preferences and external conditions, such as AU capacity shortfalls and the involvement of the UN in peace operations from 2008 onwards, had a decisive influence on the nature of EU involvement in the conflict in Darfur and international peacekeeping efforts.

**EUFOR Chad/CAR**

From 28 January 2008 to 15 March 2009 the EU deployed up to 3700 troops in Chad and the CAR in order to contain the spread of hostilities from neighbouring Darfur into these two countries, and to protect and control the growing stream of refugees. The setting up of EUFOR Chad/CAR is the result of several conditions. It reflects on the limited military capabilities of the EU, expresses the interests of individual Member States in the region, and finally results from coordination with the UN and the host countries.

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28 EU Factsheet: European Union Response to the Darfur Crisis, July 2006.
EUFOR Chad/CAR is fully in line with EU peacekeeping preferences in Africa. It is a short-term operation with a clear exit option in multilateral cooperation with the UN and consent by the host countries. It primarily functions as a bridging operation preparing the ground for a comprehensive and long-term UN mission to take over after the EU has pulled out. Despite efforts to increase the EU’s autonomous military capabilities, through the introduction of BGs, the EU as an institution is currently not able to deploy and maintain larger numbers of troops. It remains the case that only individual States enjoy these military capabilities, as one can observe in Iraq and Afghanistan. EUFOR Chad/CAR was facing substantial shortfalls in strategic airlift capacities and had to rely on Russian aircraft, which delayed the timely deployment of EU military resources.

EU involvement in Chad and the CAR also needs to be set in context with UN efforts to establish a mission on the ground. The success of EUFOR Chad/CAR crucially depends on the UN to get its mission going before the departs. Concerted efforts on both sides are required. However, in the case of Chad and the CAR, EU/UN coordination was crucially influenced by the interests of individual EU Member States and the host countries’ preferences. France has taken the lead in initiating the setting up of both EU and UN peacekeeping operations. Idriss Deby, the president of Chad, unconstitutionally remained in power in 2005. As a consequence, rebel groups tried to topple his government by force. France wanted Deby to remain in power, but shied away from unilateral intervention, although around 1000 French soldiers had been stationed in Chad since the early 1990s. With the humanitarian situation in Darfur worsening, France could lobby for an international peace operation in Chad and the CAR, thereby keeping Deby in power and containing the spread of the conflict in Darfur to Chad and the CAR. However, the final arrangement of a co-deployment of EU and UN personnel was not only a result of French initiative in both organizations but also depended on the mission hosting countries. Security Council Resolution 1778, authorizing the deployment of a one-year long EU mission and the deployment of a relatively small UN force of just 300 police and 50 military liaison officers, is a reaction to the government of Chad’s opposition to a large UN operation.\(^{30}\) Through these circumstances, the EU de facto dominated peacekeeping operations on the ground during its time of deployment. With the departure of the EU, the UN operation (MINURCAT) was extended by Security Council Resolution 1806, augmenting the troop levels of the UN to 5200. However, around 2000 troops from EUFOR Chad/CAR were ‘re-hatted’ and now serve under the UN mandate.

The case of EUFOR Chad/CAR is a good example of how individual EU Member States’ interests permeated through EU structures but external conditions shaped the character of the mission. EUFOR Chad/CAR would generally be unthinkable without France pushing for the setting up of an international peace operation in both the UN and the EU. The French military presence on the ground before the deployment of EU and UN troops clearly accelerated the process of garnering support for EUFOR Chad/CAR in Europe. While the initiative for deploying a European mission into the region was taken by France, the character of the mission was determined by EU preferences on peacekeeping in Africa, reflecting principles of multilateral cooperation with the UN, short-term deployment and a clear exit option. The de facto dominance of EU peacekeepers during its time of deployment primarily results from Chadian opposition to a stronger UN presence at that time. However, the EU only fulfilled a bridging task until a larger UN mission was established.

The African Peace and Security Architecture and the EU

Peacekeeping missions of IOs in Africa are increasingly characterized by inter-institutional cooperation forming an international security regime. The fact that IOs tend not to act in isolation when setting up peacekeeping operations has far reaching consequences for the EU’s foreign policy in African security matters which have been underexplored by current research. Many studies on EU foreign policy are Eurocentric in the sense that they either see EU foreign policy from an intergovernmental perspective, emphasizing the influence of Member States on the EU, or they extrapolate the EU’s foreign policy from its institutional interests and preferences. In both cases, we are running the danger of delimiting our analytical tools too much by overlooking the impact of external conditions on the operation of the EU’s involvement in African peacekeeping missions. The emergence of an African security regime in which the EU takes part produces a number of implications indicative for the EU’s role within this regime and the relationship between intergovernmental and global governance approaches. Ultimately, we argue that cooperation and organizational interplay between IOs is a key enabling factor for the EU to take part in peacekeeping in Africa.

The EU’s role in peacekeeping operations in Africa is determined by a number of factors. First of all it does follow a classical reading of EU foreign policy highlighting the interests of Member States and the preferences of EU institutions. In the cases of the Congo, Chad and the CAR, lead-states, such as France, have played a crucial role in initiating the deployment of EU troops. Without the French initiative the EU’s engagement in African peacekeeping would be substantially diminished. EU institutional preferences as they are formulated, for example, in cooperation agreements with the UN provide framework conditions under which the EU sets up its peacekeeping missions. Accordingly the EU prefers to deploy troops on a short-term basis, often in support of an existing larger mission, and under its direct political control. Operation Artemis, EUFOR Congo RD and EUFOR Chad/CAR all fit this pattern. In all three operations the EU opted for a short-term deployment in preparation for a larger UN mission. The tasks the EU performed were limited to specialized or bridging capacities gaps of the UN. In the situation of Darfur, the EU did not intervene militarily but provided substantial capacity building support for the underequipped AU mission until the UN and the AU launched their hybrid mission. In all these cases the EU is not a provider of comprehensive peace building solutions in Africa. EU peacekeeping missions would leave no sustainable positive effect on peace building in Africa if they were disconnected from UN and AU operations. Indeed EU troop deployment only becomes meaningful if set in context with UN and AU peace missions. There is no genuine individual EU approach to peacekeeping in Africa. As the EU has repeatedly expressed, it views peacekeeping in Africa as a process that primarily lies in the hands of Africans and that should be demand-driven in the context of multilateral interaction. Thus the EU delegates the main burden of peacekeeping to the AU and UN and reserves for itself a supporting role. By following a strategy of delegated and shared responsibilities, the EU actively furthers the emergence and development of an international African security regime between the UN, the AU and itself. The EU’s role within this regime is not to take initiative when setting up comprehensive peacekeeping missions or to provide all-inclusive conflict solution packages by its own but to support the setting up of, or already existing, UN and AU peacekeeping operations. This, however, creates reciprocal dependencies between IOs.

The EU’s involvement in peacekeeping operations takes place within a broader institutional context of the UN and the AU. Short-term EU military missions have to match not only with the EU’s own preferences and the support or at least passive consent of Member States. EU bridging and support operations are reactive to AU and UN capacity shortcomings in certain geographical and issue areas. They are guided by operational needs.
emerging from ongoing peace operations. Bridging and support missions are only effective if the cooperating organization is capable of taking over tasks provided by the EU on an interim basis. In this sense the supposed greater military capacities of the EU only leave a positive imprint if they can be properly integrated into a larger mission concept, most probably designed by the UN. Thus, EU missions correspond with AU and UN capacity limits. To this end, the overall success of peace operations is increasingly dependent on effective cooperation between IOs creating a mutual reliance on external institutional capacities between IOs. De facto cooperation between IOs in the above case studies led to the development of temporal functional convergence between IOs in order to set up peacekeeping missions and run them successfully. Despite the existence of several cooperation agreements between all three organizations, collaboration is not formalized or determined by these agreements. On many occasions they are temporary, functional and responsive to changing situations on the ground in the mission-hosting countries.

At the theoretical level the formation of patterns of functional convergence between the EU, the UN and the AU in peacekeeping challenges intergovernmental approaches to the EU’s foreign policy. Increasingly EU foreign policy is not only dependent on what its Member States agree or on EU institutional preferences but on the peacekeeping capacities of partner organizations. The interplay of IOs within the emerging African security regime impacts directly on their involvement in peacekeeping operations. While operational needs for peacekeeping missions are always external conditions for each organization reacting to the specific circumstances in which missions operate, especially EU missions, because of their short-term and supportive character, are aligned to UN and AU peacekeeping capacities and varying needs for EU assistance. A division of labour is becoming visible between the three organizations. While the EU only provides support for existing missions, the AU has a considerably faster reaction time. In the case of Darfur, but also in Burundi or Somalia, the AU was the first IO to send peacekeepers into the region. However, the severe military and financial incapacities of AMIS made it necessary to plan for a comprehensive peace mission by the UN. Indeed most peace operations in Africa which follow a comprehensive peacekeeping and peace building approach are UN missions. This is largely because the EU does not want to set up larger-scale long-term missions which would overstretch its own capabilities, and the AU cannot run more demanding operations on its own. Thus for all the IOs involved there is a reciprocal dependency between them which has triggered the emergence of a loose security regime in which the EU plays an integral supportive role.

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