Abstract

Research on the impact of EU membership on national foreign policies is relatively rare and has so far produced few theoretical insights. This paper aims to fill this gap by proposing a synthetic theoretical framework, which can account for the various aspects of EU impact. It argues that at the substantive level Europeanisation is manifested either through the articulation of a 'need for adaptation' to specific EU policies (pathway 1) and/or through the invocation of EU policy philosophies and norms as 'models' to emulate as well as the overall 'transformative effect' of EU membership on national identities (pathway 2). At the procedural level EU membership may entail the adjustment of policy-making structures in order to accommodate the requirements of EU membership (pathway 3) and/or the entrenchment of national officials in the 'co-operative' diplomatic culture that guides interaction among member-states within the EU (pathway 4). The paper also discusses the significance of mediating factors, including the nature of EU policy competence, the extent of EU consensus, the salience of the issue area, the strength of the executive leadership and the role of change agents. The utility of the model is illustrated through a study of Greek foreign policy over an extended period of time from the application for EU membership in 1975 to the end of 2005. The paper calls for a more nuanced approach, which is able to take into the creative usage that actors make of Europe.
Introduction

Europeanization has been a fashionable term in the field European foreign policy over the last years. Ever since Ben Tonra’s pioneering study on Ireland, Denmark and Austria, a burgeoning literature has engaged with the effects of the development of EU foreign policy cooperation on the foreign policies of existing and prospective member states (see Tonra 2001, Major 2005). However, this work has produced few theoretical insights. To start with, whereas there is a significant amount of cumulative research on the Europeanization of policy-making structures and processes, studies that address the substantive dimension of foreign policy are relatively scarce (Wong 2006, Miskimmon 2007, Gross 2009). Another problem relates to the conceptual confusion that surrounds some of the research carried out. More precisely, although Europeanization is generally defined as a process of interaction between national and EU policies, in practice the empirical indicators used to assess it often centre on policy content. In this context Europeanization is sometimes erroneously taken to be synonymous to ‘convergence’ (Tsardanidis and Stavridis 2005) or ‘support for further integration’ (Torreblanca 2001).

In addition, although most studies carried out borrow concepts from the broader Europeanization literature (downloading, uploading, socialization), they use these as heuristic devices without specifying concrete mechanisms and scope conditions (for a notable exception see Vaquer i Fanes 2001). As a result, they end up with thick and very insightful descriptions, which however have limited value for theory building.

This paper aims to fill these gaps by proposing a synthetic theoretical framework which draws on the aforementioned literature as well as other studies that do not explicitly use the term Europeanization. More precisely, I argue that at the substantive level Europeanization is manifested either through the articulation of a ‘need for adaptation’ to specific EU policies (pathway 1) or through the invocation of EU policy philosophies and norms as ‘models’ to emulate as well as the overall ‘transformative effect’ of EU membership on national identities (pathway 2). At the procedural level it may entail the adjustment of policy-making structures in order to accommodate the requirements of EU membership (pathway 3) and the entrenchment of national in the cooperative diplomatic culture that guides interaction among member-states within the EU.
The utility of the model is illustrated through a study of Greek foreign policy since the application for EU membership in 1975.

The paper is structured as follows. In the first section I elaborate the conceptual framework. After establishing a definition of Europeanization, which takes into account cutting-edge contributions from the field of Comparative Politics I elaborate the four pathways through which the EU exercises its influence. For each pathway, I present the bodies of work drew upon and advance hypotheses about the factors that influence the likelihood and magnitude of EU influence. The second section applies the framework in the case of Greece. The concluding section summarizes the argument, discusses its theoretical contributions and limitations and traces the implications for further research.

I. Theoretical framework

The concept of Europeanization

The concept of Europeanization has been employed by historians, anthropologists, sociologists and political scientists to describe a variety of phenomena ranging from the emergence of European culture to the diffusion of societal habits (Featherstone 2003). Its introduction in the field of EU Studies, since the mid-1990s is associated with a research programme which focused on the transformation of member states’ policies, politics and polities in the context of European integration. Thus Europeanization is strictly speaking EU-zation. The initial idea was that the emergence distinct structures of governance at the EU level generated adaptational pressures whose magnitude and transformative potential were conditioned by the ‘goodness of fit’ between national and EU policies and institutional arrangements as well as a number of ‘mediating factors’ including the presence of reform-impeding veto points and reform-supporting formal and informal institutions (see Cowles et al. 2001).

This understanding of Europeanization can be criticized on two grounds. Firstly, it is difficult, if not impossible, to objectively establish the degree of misfit between the EU and national levels, because policies and institutional arrangements may be subject to different interpretations (Dyson and Goetz 2003: 16). In addition, the focus on top-down transfer of policy and institutional templates downplays the broader interplay between EU and domestic drivers of change. It has been argued for instance that the European
integration challenges existing domestic equilibriua by providing new opportunities and constraints for domestic actors to pursue their goals and that this may unleash substantial transformational forces even in the absence of concrete adaptational pressures (Haverland 2000, Heritier et al. 2001). Moreover, there is ample evidence of domestic leaders appropriating EU policy frames (Knill and Lehmkuhl 1999) or articulating mock adaptational pressures (Kallestrup 2002) in order to provide additional legitimacy to their reform programmes. In response to these criticisms, recent Europeanization scholarship has adopted a bottom-up approach, which ‘instead of starting by describing an EU policy or institutional arrangement, it starts by examining a domestic system of interaction comprising actors and structures, material interests and ideas and seeks to find whether the EU provides a change in any of the main components of the system and measure the consequences of all this in terms of domestic change’ (Radaelli and Pasquier 2008: 41).

Drawing on the definition provided by Dyson and Goetz (2003: 20) I will define foreign policy Europeanization as ‘a complex bottom-up and top-down process in which national [foreign] policies are influenced by the formal and informal principles, norms, rules and procedures of the EU system of [foreign policy] governance and in which domestic actors use this system in order to shape [foreign] policy outcomes’.

By incorporating both the transfer of EU policies and institutional arrangements as well as the creative usage of the EU this definition provides a middle ground between the two approaches. At the same time it deliberately excludes the uploading dimension of Europeanization (i.e. the exporting of national policies at the European level) because this would overstretch the meaning of Europeanization and render it synonymous to integration (Radaelli 2003). The uploading of national policies is of course a possibility and cannot be ignored in empirical research but as Dyson and Goetz persuasively explain (2003: 20) it should be treated not as a ‘defining’ but as an ‘accompanying’ property of Europeanization.

The outcomes of Europeanization are usually measured according to scales that comprise transformation, adaptation, absorption, inertia and retrenchment (Heritier et al. 2001, Borzel & Risse 2003). This classification has the advantage of not prejudicing on the content of policy and of leaving open the possibility for ‘negative’ impact. At the same time the categories used might be subject to arbitrary interpretations (Vink and Graziano 2007). According to Radaelli (2003: 38) a way out of this problem is to couch this scale
into broader conceptual toolkits. In this context Peter Hall’s (1993) notion of policy paradigm provides a useful guide. More precisely inertia could be seen as corresponding to daily routine adjustments in the policy instruments used (first order change); adaptation could be seen as corresponding to alteration in the instruments used, which does not alter the hierarchy of goals (second order change); and finally transformation could be seen as corresponding to a radical alteration in the overarching terms of the policies used (third order change). Finally retrenchment could be associated with any of the three levels of change, but with the qualification that national policy becomes ‘less European’.

The process of foreign policy Europeanization: four pathways of EU impact

Combining existing work on the interaction of EU and national policies with the Europeanization literature reviewed above, I propose to distinguish four pathways of foreign policy Europeanization which can be categorized along two dimensions: The first dimension relates to the nature of EU influence, in particular whether it involves instrumental calculations and differential empowerment of domestic actors (regulative impact) or a transformation in their identities and interests (constitutive impact). The second, dimension concerns the level of EU influence, in particular whether EU membership affects the substance of foreign policy or the policy-making process (see figure 1).

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<th>Level of Interaction</th>
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<td>Policy adjustment</td>
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Figure 1: Pathways of Europeanization
The first pathway (*policy adjustment*), emerges when the EU prescribes or intends to prescribe a specific policy which challenges the policy pursued at the national level. The dynamics of change entail coercion emanating either from legal obligations grounded in the EU treaties and the *acquis communautaire* (legal pressure) or the enunciation of requests and threats from other member states (political pressure).

In terms of the scope conditions, it makes intuitive sense that legally-backed articulations of a ‘need for adaptation’ will carry more weight and therefore Europeanization is more likely in areas where the EU has extensive competence. Similarly, I expect the adaptational pressure to be lower if there is not widespread consensus among member-states and EU institutions, not only because it will be easier to block decisions but also because the need to combine different views is likely to compromise the specificity of the final policy, thus providing more leeway for interpretation, translation and editing (Morth 2003). The salience of an issue should also be influential, with adaptation being more difficult when an EU policy challenges core national interests. Finally, I expect Europeanization to be more likely if there is significant executive autonomy and few veto points (Radaelli 2003).

The fact that this pathway works through coercion implies that states will make instrumental and tactical changes without necessarily altering their identities and interests. Therefore the most likely outcome will be a limited adjustment of the policies pursued in order to accommodate the EU requirements with minimum ‘cost’ on national interests.

The second pathway (*policy legitimization*) emanates when the EU becomes a reference point in national foreign policy debates and provides member states with a different understanding of their interests. Representations of the EU may take different forms which vary according to the specificity of the policy prescriptions they entail.

The most specific form involves a process whereby policy concepts, which have been developed informally at the EU level, are presented as ‘new solutions to existing problems’. Such processes of policy transfer are evident in the field of defense where cooperation has been informal, consensual and non-hierarchical (see Irondelle 2003). However, there is no reason to assume that other more integrated policy areas may not be subject to such influence. Rather, the decisive enabling condition is the existence of reform-minded actors, at the domestic and international levels, who are ready to seize upon these ideas in order to promote new policies.
References to the EU might also be in the form of norms that delimit the realm of legitimate foreign policy action and which existing and prospective member states are expected to follow in order to be considered as ‘respected Europeans’. These norms can be said to derive from a set of widely shared principles such as peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and human rights, which constitute the basis of the EU’s international identity (Manners 2002: 242). However, ‘agreement on norm types does not preclude agreement about normative meaning’ (Puetter and Wiener 2007: 1070). It follows that the influence of the EU norms is not automatic but depends on the following factors: the existence of specific formal procedures that can establish whether a particular norm is violated; the active involvement of norm entrepreneurs in shaming a member state for contravening EU norms; and the ability of the state in question to defend itself by articulating a meaning of the norm which is consistent with its current policy.

Although the articulation of new solutions or normative limits does not explicitly problematize the basic foreign policy goals they usually entail a substantial adaptation in existing policies (second order change).

At the more general level EU membership may lead to a substantial reconstruction of national identities and interests. By this I do not mean that nation-state identities are becoming obsolete or replaced by a European identity (Ricker 2007), but that a European dimension is incorporated in national identity discourses and changes the way member states see themselves and the world around them (see Risse 2001, Waever 2001, Jokela 2005). Given that identity effects fall in the realm of discourse, it is difficult to come up with specific hypotheses about the likely direction and content of policy change. However, a general argument can be made that identity representations that prescribe a positive relationship with Europe will be strengthened. On the contrary, discourses that construct the Self and Europe in antithetical terms will be constantly confronted with the ‘realities’ EU membership and therefore weakened. Arguably this is the most far reaching aspect of Europeanization and the only one that can foster a transformation of the dominant policy frameworks.

The third pathway (institutional adjustment) relates to the institutional restructuring incurred within member states in order to coordinate national positions at the EU level and carry forward EU policies. This entails an alteration in the opportunity structures of
domestic foreign policy actors, which in turn may have implications in the content of the policies pursued.

On the basis of the existing literature (White 2001, Kassim et al. 2000, Soetendorp and Hanf 1998, Spence 2005, Pomosrka 2007, Allen and Oliver 2008) I identify three levels where differential empowerment may occur. First, EU membership may affect the relative power of different strands of government, with executives acquiring more control over foreign policy-making at the expense of other strands of government. This may enhance the ability to introduce policy changes and therefore the responsiveness to substantive adaptational pressures. Second, EU membership may affect the inter-ministerial balance, with the foreign ministries acquiring more central political control over policy co-orientation and domestic ministries developing their own external relations and challenging the role of foreign ministries as gatekeepers. This more active involvement of domestic ministries may entail a strengthening of policy articulations that include technocratic aspects as opposed to traditional diplomacy. Third, EU membership generates the need for a radical reorganization of foreign ministries, which includes an expansion in size but also a re-orientation towards Europe, manifested through the establishment of autonomous branches dealing with EU affairs. In substantive terms this could mean that policies that incorporate European concerns will gain more clout.

The fourth pathway (procedural socialization) stems from the entrenchment of national officials in the culture of co-ordination that characterizes policy-making within the EU. The existence of a ‘coordination reflex’ had been reported since the mid-1980s in the writings of practitioners, who argued that despite the intergovernmental nature of the European Political Cooperation member states frequently managed to transcend lower common denominator policies (de Schoutheete 1986, Nuttall 1992). The argument has been taken up in recent years by academics who have employed the trinity concepts institutionalization, socialization and identity in order to show how the frequency of interactions and the existence of EU procedural norms (i.e. consultation, consensus-seeking, secrecy, informality, respect of national sensitivities, neutrality of the presidency) have fundamentally transformed the way member states pursue their interests within the EU (see Jorgensen 1997, Ohrgaard 1997, Glarbo 1999, Smith 2000, Aggestam 2004).

At the substantive level I expect this culture to have a double effect. On the one hand the coordination imperative may be mobilized alongside extant legal and political
pressures in articulating a ‘need for adaptation’. For instance the consensual style of decision-making might prevent member states from making full use of the opportunities provided by the formal EU institutional framework (vetoes etc.). Similarly the de facto binding quality of the *acquis politique* may induce member states to alter their policies even in the absence of direct requests or threats. On the other hand the familiarization with the EU policy-making process provides opportunities on member states to increase their influence in the EU policy-making process (Juncos and Pomorska 2006). For example past EU decisions may be invoked by a member state in order to block new policies with which it disagrees. The influence of member states might also by enhanced through the frequency of informal consultations, the building of multifaceted coalitions, the elaboration of complex package deals and the reformulation of national interests as European interests.

II. The operation of pathways in Greek foreign policy

In this section I illustrate how my four-pathway model has functioned in the case of Greece. I will show that EU membership has exercised a substantial influence on Greek foreign policy. During the pre-accession period and the early years of membership this influence was manifested in the form of reactive adaptation. However, over time we observe an increase in the significance of constitutive effects and a concomitant increase in the magnitude of observed changes.

*Pathway 1: Policy adjustment*

As far as policy adjustment is concerned, my empirical research confirms the findings of other studies that the Europeanization process starts in the pre-accession period. Policy changes were particularly evident in the economic domain, with Greece undertaking a wholesale reconfiguration of its tariff-regime and abandoning the use of ‘clearing’ as a method of international payments in order to comply with the requirements of the EU’s Common Commercial Policy (Karouzos 1982, Stangos 1987). At the political level, the influence of the EU was more subtle. For instance, although Greece softened its traditional pro-Arab posture towards the Arab-Israeli conflict in order to take into account the European Political Cooperation it did not change its voting record in the UN
General Assembly and remained firm in its refusal to recognize *de jure* the State of Israel, despite the fact that the normalization of Greek-Israeli relations was considered as a ‘test case of community solidarity’ for the Greek government (Tsakaloyannis 1984: 111).

After Greece’s accession in 1981 there was a short period of retrenchment, with the Greek government requesting a reassessment of the country’s economic obligations and attempting to block EPC action on a variety of issues, including Libya’s intervention in Chad, the deployment of a US-led peacekeeping force in the Sinai Peninsula (November 1981), the imposition of martial law in Poland (January 1982), the shot down of a Korean civilian airliner (September 1983), the deployment of medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe, the Falklands War (Christodoulides 1988). The Europeanization process resumed since the mid-1980s. This does not mean that disagreements were not voiced or that the threat of veto was never invoked. However systematic deviations were limited to the most salient issues: Turkey (where Greece insisted that the development of EU-Turkish relations should be conditional upon progress in the resolution of Greek-Turkish conflicts), Cyprus (where Greece requested a more pro-active involvement of the EU and an acceleration of the country’s accession to the EU irrespective of the prior resolution of the conflict), the war in former Yugoslavia (where Greece initially opposed the recognition of the constituent republics by the EU and later deplored the EU for having an ‘anti-Serbian bias’) and the so-called Macedonian issue (where Greece prevented the recognition of the newly established ‘Republic of Macedonia’ until the latter agreed to modify its name). In all these areas what we observe is a process of uneasy accommodation of EU policies coupled with attempts to influence their content in order to reflect Greek interests (see table 1). A more substantial shift in Greek foreign policy can be observed since the mid-1990s, with Greece actively supporting most EU policies, sometimes even taking positions that were previously considered inconceivable (e.g. the consistent support for Turkey’s European membership since the 1999 Helsinki European Council).

With respect to the drivers of change, the early and relatively straightforward adjustment of Greece’s trade policy confirms the hypothesis that the pressure is higher and adaptation more likely in cases where EU policies embed formal legal instruments. However this general conclusion is subject to several caveats. In the first place, the range of EU competences is not as clear-cut as it first appears and there is a lot of room for
manipulation of existing rules. For example the EU’s decision to impose an economic embargo against Serbia was based on article 113 of the Treaty of Rome (Regulation EEC 1432/92 and EEC 990/93 reprinted in Perrakis 1997: 38). In this way the EU bypassed the lack of explicit competence to impose sanctions. What is more, Greece was unable to block this decision because it only required qualified majority.

In addition legal and political pressures are not mutually exclusive, but instead may be exercised simultaneously. This is amply demonstrated by the gradual relaxation of Greece’s conditionality towards Turkey’s European perspective. The legal case against conditionality was built on the argument (articulated by legal scholars and governmental representatives) that the framework underpinning the EU-Turkish relationship had been established much before Greece became a member and constituted therefore part of the acquis that Greece had committed itself to accept in the accession treaty (Perakis 1988: 17-21, Greek Parliament: Minutes of Proceedings 11/3/1988: 4672). The political pressure rested on the deliberate exclusion of Greece from the decision-making process. For instance the EC-Turkey Association Council was reconvened in September 1986 despite Greece’s outright objection and the European Commission conducted negotiations over the required adaptation protocol without consulting with the Greek government, which was eventually faced with a fait accompli (Kazakos 1987: 586). Similarly, when the Greek government blocked the completion of the EC-Turkey Customs Union in December 1994 it became clear that other member states were looking at ways to bypass the Greek veto by evoking a different legal basis (most notably 113 of the TEC) (Eleftherotypia 10/2/1995). Moreover, in what seemed as a brute violation of EC procedures Britain invited Turkey together with France, Germany and Italy to discuss the future of EU-Turkish relations (Athens News Agency Bulletin, 4/2/1995). The pressure felt by Greek policy-makers – which led to the lifting of the veto a few weeks later – is amply manifested in the words of Yannos Kranidiotis (senior adviser to the PM Andreas Papandreou and later Deputy Foreign Minister):

The dogmatic and complete denial of Greece to accept the EU-Turkey Customs Union would not only breach Greece’s contractual obligations but it could also lead our country to face a ‘legal coup’ from our partners and the approval of the Customs Union with qualified majority from the Council despite Greece’s objections.

(Kranidiotis 2000: 213)
My empirical research provides partial support to the hypothesized link between the solidity of EU consensus on a particular issue and the likelihood of adaptation. For instance, part of the reason why Greece was successful in blocking the provision of financial assistance to Turkey until 1992 was the support provided by the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice: The former repeatedly requested to remove funds available for Turkey from the Community budget because of its poor human rights record whereas the latter blocked the Commission’s attempt to grant a special 10 million ECU under a different budget line that did not require Greek approval (Kazakos 1987). More generally, it can be argued that Greece’s conditionality would have been completely ineffective if it did not meet the silent approval of member states which are reluctant to accept Turkey as a full member. On the contrary, whenever Greece faced a clear and unified EU position (e.g. late stages of the Bosnian War, Kosovo crisis) it had little choice but to align its policy.

It is important however to note that the adaptation process is not necessarily linear and intense political pressure may sometimes lead to the opposite result, at least in the short term. For instance in the case of the Republic of Macedonia, Greece was faced with a mounting political pressure to reach a compromise settlement on the basis of a synthetic name that would be acceptable to both parties. Despite repeated warnings (in the form of overt threats or friendly advice) that the grounds for Community solidarity were being exhausted Greece refused to soften its stance and eventually announced its withdrawal from the negotiations which were conducted under the auspices of the UN. This prompted several EU countries to recognize the Republic of Macedonia. Despite its absolute diplomatic isolation Greece hardened its stance even further and imposed a comprehensive embargo against Macedonia. This decision sparked a new wave of intense criticism from the entire EU edifice: member states, the European Parliament and the European Commission, which initiated proceedings in the ECJ (Stavridis 1997: 143). But Greece remained unresponsive for several months, until the US intervened and sponsored an Interim Agreement by which Greece agreed to recognize the new state under a provisional name (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia).

The case of Macedonia is also illustrative of how policy adaptation may be hampered by a weak executive. It is now well documented that the then Prime Minister
Constantinos Mitsotakis was personally in favour of a compromise on the basis of a synthetic name (Skylakakis 1995, Papaconstantinou 1995). However at repeated intervals he was forced to back down and follow the hardline position supported by his foreign minister Samaras as well as the majority of the Greek people. Mitsotakis’ failure to assert his political authority can be attributed to the slim parliamentary majority of only two seats as well as the lukewarm relationship with the rank and file of his party, who despised his neo-liberal political ideology.

Pathway 2: Policy legitimization

One of the most obvious examples of the EU serving as a reference point for the introduction of new policy instruments is the promotion of functional and regional integration schemes as a means to foster peaceful relations and conflict resolution. Traditionally, the idea of cooperation among rivals was met with suspicion. During the 1990s, this aversion towards low level cooperation started to be problematized in various academic gatherings and conferences. Eventually these ideas made their way into the mainstream political discourse and by the end of the decade there has been a surge of bilateral and regional cooperation initiatives in low politics areas.

George Papandreou, who as Foreign Minister sponsored the conclusion of nine low level agreements between Greece and Turkey in 1999, affirms his intellectual debt in no ambiguous terms:

The frequent contacts among common people as well as between academics, business and journalists, can contribute decisively to the reduction of mutual suspicion [...] It has been possible for implacable enemies to overcome their mutual hatred and cooperate harmoniously in the context of the European Union, it is also possible for Greece and Turkey’

(www.papandreou.gr).

More eloquently, the then Deputy Foreign Minister Yannis Kranidiotis argued that the low-level Greek-Turkish dialogue was ‘part of a broader strategy exemplifying the neo-functionalist approach, which had been successfully employed by the EU since the 1950s’ (Kranidiotis 2000: 202). Greek Commissioner Anna Diamantopoulou went even further and expressed the hope that Greece and Turkey could ‘become the locomotives for the
The development of the [Balkan] region, like France and Germany, which had been enemies in the past had done in the context of the EU (Diamantopoulou 2005: 131). The mission statement of the Nesta-River Euroregion, a cross-border cooperation scheme established in 1998 by the municipalities of Drama (Greece) and Gotze Delchev (Bulgaria) is also indicative:

> For centuries, national boundaries divided the region [...] Today we are in a position to offer a model for co-operation within the framework of a unified Europe [...] The association is paying attention, copying, learning from, following up and implementing all the developments and policies of cross-border co-operation practices that apply all over Europe, within internal and external border regions [...] [these] give rise to *new forms of regional identity* (www.euroregions.gr/mission.htm).

The EU has provided not only general ideas but also specific templates. The institutional machinery of the so-called South-East European Co-operation Process, a regional cooperation scheme among the Balkan countries, which was established in 1996, has mirrored to a large extent the institutions of the EU. For instance, the participating states have established a Troika at the level of ministers, political advisors and higher officials in order to ‘ensure continuity’ (http://old.mfa.gr/seecp/seecp.html). Similarly, in what seems as a replication of the so-called Gymnich formula the foreign ministers of the participating states have initiated informal meetings (http://www2.mfa.gr).

References to EU norms have also been relevant in the policies pursued towards the Turkish-speaking minority of Western Thrace. This minority, which is composed of ethnic-Turks, Pomaks and Gypsies was subjected to a variety of discriminatory measures, which ranged from the prohibition to acquire land to the arbitrary application of the article 19 of the Greek citizenship code that gave state authorities the discretion to rescind Greek citizenship from ‘non-ethnic Greeks who left the country ‘with no intention of returning’ (Kostopoulos 2003: 53-75).

Despite the absence of explicit legal obligations for existing member states to change their minority policies, minority rights are a very important element within the international human rights regime to which the EU ascribes. Thus the frequent criticisms against Greece by various international bodies could hardly go unnoticed and brought Greece in a very ‘awkward position’ as a former expert in the Greek Ministry of Foreign
Affairs recalls (Anagnostou 2005: 342). The normative pressure on Greece intensified as individual members of the minority brought successfully legal challenges against the Greek state in front of the European Court of Human Rights. A much quoted critical assessment of Greek foreign policy published by four prominent diplomats in 1995 concluded that ‘the recent development of international human rights has transposed the issue of the Muslim minority from bilateral to multilateral level [and therefore] it would be difficult if not impossible for Greece to obtain the comprehension of its EU partners’ (Theodoropoulos et al. 1995: 75). These concerns were echoed in the debates surrounding the fate of article 19, with supporters of the abolition depicting it as a means to ‘bridge the gap between Greece and the European average’ (Kranidiotis 2000: 383) and ‘strengthen Greece’s democratic credentials in international fora’ (Greek Parliament: Minutes of Proceedings 9/6/1998: 276).

Despite a gradual liberalization of Greek minority policy, which culminated to the abolition of the infamous article 19 in 1998, the dominant discourse on the minority depicts it as an alien and potentially threatening entity and subordinates its rights to the right of the Greek state to protect its security and territorial integrity. This ‘restrictive’ interpretation of minority rights has prevented more bolt reforms, such as the acknowledgment of the ‘ethnic’ character of the minority. The lack of change is even more pronounced in the case of the Slavophone populations in the north of Greece, to whom the Greek state refuses to grant minority status, even in a limited linguistic sense. As Tsitselikis notes, the EU has exercised ‘a mediating role in accommodating otherness in an almost hostile ideological environment’ (Tsitselikis 2004: 3).

The aforementioned analysis begs a number of questions: Why has it been so difficult for the Greeks to come to terms with the existence of minorities in their country? What are the underlying identity discourses that support such attitudes? Has EU membership fostered alternative identities? What could be the broader foreign policy implications of such an identity shift?

To answer these questions in full would require a separate article (see Agnantopoulos 2008). In a nutshell it can be argued that Greece’s difficulties in incorporating European minority norms are an instantiation of an ethno-cultural identity discourse, which has dominated Greek foreign policy debates. This discourse constructs the Greek nation as an immutable, timeless and organic community united by particularistic attributes such as
language, religion, descent and conscience. This exclusivist construction of the Greek nation generates a suspicion for the other, legitimizes a nationalistic foreign policy and establishes an ambivalent relationship with the West and Europe. The historical alternative to ethno-culturalism is a liberal-westernist discourse, which constructs the Greek nation as a constellation of individuals united by common structures of citizenship and positions Greek history within an evolutionist narrative, whereby humanity progresses from tradition and parochialism to modernity. This construction of the Greek nation is inclusive and open to otherness. Crucially it also establishes a more positive relationship with Europe, which is seen as a more advanced form of the self. As a result it has been reinforced by EU membership and has started to challenge the dominance of ethno-culturalism.

This ongoing replacement of the static and exclusionary idea of the Greek nation with the evolutionary and open identity representations entailed in liberal-westernism may have important foreign policy implications. Greece’s Balkan policy in the 1990s provides some illustrations of what this might involve. In the early 1990s Greek foreign policy debates were dominated by a Balkanization discourse, which depicted the Balkans as an inherently unstable region overwhelmed by intractable ethnic antagonisms and assessed Greece’s position in terms of ‘vulnerabilities’ and ‘relative strengths’. The apprehensive response towards the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the debacle over Macedonia’s name reflected this discursive constellation. Since the mid-1990s however, Greece’s Balkan policy has been informed by a more positive image of the Balkans as amenable to change. In this context Greece is assigned the position of a ‘role model’ for the ‘less advanced’ countries of the region and a locomotive for their full integration into the European economic and security architecture (Houliaras and Tsardanidis 2005).

A similar influence can be identified in the case of Turkey. More precisely the perception that Turkey represents an imminent existential threat for Greek security has been nurtured by a stereotypical image of Turkey as inherently aggressive (Heraclides 2001). This image rendered logical the argument that the only way to discipline Turkey was through coercion. This representation, which legitimized the policy of conditionality, has been challenged from the liberal-westernist reading of Greek identity. Although Turkey’s irredentist aspirations are not denied, it is assumed that the Turkish society is not a monolithic entity but instead comprises many peace prone constituencies, which recent
the authoritarian nature of their state (Keridis 2001). It follows that a realistic prospect of
EU membership would reinforce those domestic forces that endeavour for change and lead to the transformation of Turkey to a democratic, liberal and peaceful country. From this perspective the resolution of the Greek-Turkish disputes does not constitute a prerequisite for the accession process to begin; rather it should be seen as part of the accession process itself. Such arguments have enjoyed some popularity within governmental circles since the late 1990s and had some influence on the decision to accept Turkey’s candidacy status in 1999 (see Greek Parliament: Minutes of Proceedings 15/12/1999) and support the start of accession negotiations three years later (Greek Parliament: Minutes of Proceedings 17/12/2002).

Pathway 3: Institutional adaptation

Within the constitutional practice of the Third Greek Republic (in place since the return of democratic rule in 1974) the foreign policy-making process evolves around the Prime Minister and the Cabinet who have ‘substantive responsibility’ for the conduct of foreign and defence policies (Gikas 2005). EU membership has not challenged this constellation and in certain respects it has reinforced it. For instance the President of the Republic, who has formal responsibility to represent the state, has been excluded even from the purely ceremonial aspects of EU policy-making. Moreover, the widespread use of the so-called ‘delegation authority’ (i.e. legislation by degrees) in the ratification of EU international agreements and the transposition of EU regulations and directives has deprived the Parliament from its most powerful instrument to scrutinise governmental policies (Tsinizinelis 1996: 231). Following the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty a Standing Committee for European Affairs, which brings together MPs and MEPs was established, alongside the Committee for Defence and External Affairs, which had traditionally dealt with foreign policy issues. However, the role of the Committee has been marginal because of the lack of adequate resources (example non remuneration of its members for their participation) and the refusal of ministers and government officials to provide appropriate briefings (Frangakis and Papayannides 2003: 172).

With respect to the inter-ministerial balance, the main beneficiary from EU membership has been the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), which has been entrusted
with the overall responsibility to communicate information to and from Brussels and coordinate national positions, thus reinforcing its grip on policy-making. The preponderance of the MFA was institutionalized and consolidated in 1993 with the establishment of a Committee for the Coordination of Governmental Policy in Greek-EU Relations, which is chaired by the Deputy Minister for European Affairs (Spanou 2005: 104). The strengthening of the MFA came at the expense of the Ministry of National Economy (Treasury), which had traditionally been seen as the ‘coordinator’ of governmental policy and had also conducted the accession negotiations (Ioakimidis 1993: 211-218). At the same time, the technical nature of issues pertaining upon the EC external relations has endowed the economic ministries with considerable autonomy. Similarly other sectoral ministries have maintained direct contacts with their respective officials in Brussels, thus eroding the gate-keeping role of the MFA.

EU membership also entailed a substantial reorganization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The most tangible effect has been the establishment and gradual expansion of a General Directorate on EU Affairs (DG C), which has been entrusted with the task of formulating and co-ordinating the Greek positions on EU affairs (Griva 2002). The influence of the EU division has been enhanced by the fact that unlike the other directorates, it does not report to the General Secretary of the Ministry, but instead it is headed by a distinct General Secretary on European Affairs (GSEA) who provides a direct link between the bureaucratic mechanism and the political leadership (Passas 2005: 369). However, the European orientation of the MFA has been constrained by the tendency to separate between high and low politics. More precisely, whereas DG C has competence over the first and third pillars, CFSP issues are handled by a separate section, which is part of the Political Affairs Directorate (DG A). This division between high and low politics has also generated several co-ordination problems. For instance when EU-Turkish economic relations are discussed, two units under two different General Directorates might claim competence: C1-EC External Relations and A4-Bilateral relations with Turkey. According to Kavakas (2001: 94), the usual practice is that the ‘national unit’ will take charge, however this creates a further complication since officials in these units are less familiar with EU processes and this often leads to a lack of comprehension of the Greek argument by other member states.
In sum, my findings on the effects of EU membership on the policy-making process and structures confirm the findings of other studies regarding the coexistence of centripetal and centrifugal forces. What this entails in terms of substantive outcome however is unclear. The actual prime ministerial control over foreign policy-making has in most cases been stronger than what the formal institutional arrangements implied. Likewise, the decision of the conservative New Democracy government to leave vacant the position of GSEA after it came to power in 2004, reveals that the special attention given to European issues reflected a personal choice of the socialist party rather than an enduring trend within the Greek foreign policy machinery. According to Ioakimidis (1999) this dominance of personalities in the policy-making process is the result of a general mistrust towards institutions but also reflects a ‘culture of proceduralism’, which prevents Greek bureaucrats from questioning the decisions of their political supervisors.

**Pathway 4: Procedural socialization**

During the early years of membership Greece’s negotiating strategy followed a particular sequence, which started from an attempt to impose a Greek position to other EU member states and block policies that were considered to entail political and economic costs. This stance reflected a representation of the EU as an arena where antagonistic interests compete for supremacy. For instance, in his programmatic speech in October 1981, Andreas Papandreou stated that his government would ‘defend Greek interests by using all leeway available’ (Greek Parliament 23/10/1981: 749 emphasis added). A few days later he attended his first European Council he stated that his government ‘would not accept any decision that might have negative repercussions for our nation’ (quoted in Valinakis 1993: 255). Consistent with this representation Council meetings were reported by the press in the terminology of ‘battle’ ‘combat’ and ‘struggle’ (Verney 1993: 145).

This unwillingness to compromise was even more evident within the EPC because of an underlying juridico-legalistic interpretation of membership obligations, which deprived the *acquis politique* from any binding qualities:

The acceptance of the *acquis politique* implies for us a higher cost; a cost that we cannot afford paying […] It would be a mistake to give the impression that after our entry we
are obliged to adopt views that are diametrically opposed to those we upheld until now.

(Ioannis Charalambopoulos in Perrakis and Grigoriou 1994: 62)

In the 1990s there has been a growing concern over the effectiveness of Greece’s participation in the EU. These concerns were articulated partly with reference to the normative obligation of member states to refrain from blocking EU consensus and align with the *acquis politique*. In addition it was argued that Greece’s uncompromising stance led the other member states to search for loopholes in order to circumvent the Greek veto and that the insertion of footnotes and reservations in EU decisions simply resulted in the mentioning of Greece’s disagreement without any substantive implications (Valinakis 1993: 275). Out of these concerns emerged a distinction between offensive and defensive participation: The first was ‘inward looking’ and ‘reactive’ in the sense that it merely attempted to avert unpleasant developments whereas the second was ‘outward looking’ and ‘proactive’ in the sense that it focused on the production of ‘synergies’ and ‘positive sum-games’ (see Ioakimidis 2000, Keridis 2003).

The practical manifestations of this discourse have been twofold. The first has already been referred to in the previous sections: a more selective use of the power to veto, coupled with an effort to portray Greece as actively seeking solution. The second relates with the more active effort to build coalition building engage in package deals and express Greek interests in terms of European interests. The way Greece sponsored Cyprus’ accession exemplifies the new approach. Greece’s diplomatic efforts were based on three pillars:

The first and most evident was the linkage of Cyprus’ accession with Turkey’s European perspective, which conferred a significant bargaining chip to Greek diplomacy. More precisely in order to endorse the EU-Turkey customs union the Greek government requested and succeeded a commitment that Cyprus would start accession negotiations soon after the 1996 intergovernmental conference. Moreover, the accordance of candidacy status to Turkey was exchanged with a provision, in the Helsinki European Council conclusions, that the resolution of the Cyprus conflict would not be a prerequisite for the accession of the island to the EU. Thereafter, Greece successfully defended the disassociation of Cyprus’ membership from the resolution of the conflict as a principled common policy (so-called ‘Helsinki *acquis*’), whose reversal was unacceptable.
The second was the assertion that the prospect of accession would have a catalytic effect for the resolution of the conflict, not only because it would alter the cost-benefit calculations of the parties involved (Kranidiotis 2000: 210), but also because the EU would offer a common framework for cohabitation (Greek Parliament: Minutes of Proceedings 17/12/2002). Whether the catalytic effect thesis was well grounded and whether the Greek government really endorsed it is subject to debate. What is important, however, is that the articulation of the catalytic effect instituted a fundamental responsibility for the EU to be actively involved. Eschewing this duty would seriously damage the EU’s collective identity.

The third pillar was the successful integration of Cyprus’ accession to the overall enlargement process. In order to achieve this, the Greek government joined forces with Finland and Sweden, who were interested in the rapid accession of the Baltic states, and sponsored the notion of ‘group approach’ to enlargement, whereby applicant states would be judged according to their own merits, but their evaluation would be embedded in an overall framework (Simitis 2006: 168).

Since the mid-1990s Greece has also been more willing to address national concerns with general ‘European clauses’. Thus in the Helsinki European Council the Greek government requested and succeeded to include a clause that candidate countries should solve their territorial disputes within a certain timeframe, either through dialogue or by submitting them to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (European Council 1999). Although not specifically mentioned the target of this clause was to force Turkey to recognise the jurisdiction of the ICJ. This general reference enabled Greece to inscribe a long standing Greek demand as EU policy, without having to define what the existing differences with Turkey were (a very sensitive point since Greece recognises only one difference with Turkey over the delimitation of the continental shelf, whereas the others are seen as unilateral Turkish demands) and without being accused of high-jacking the EU decision making process.

The Greek strategy in Helsinki contrasts highly with the actions of the Greek government with respect to the free movement of Turks in the Community as part of the reactivation of the association agreements in the 1980s. Greece argued that an influx of Turkish immigrants could alter the demographic composition of sensitive borderline regions and requested to opt out. The Commission attempted to accommodate the
‘reasonable’ Greek concerns by including in the relevant regulation a clause allowing ‘member states to take special restrictive measures for reasons other than those related with the labour market’ (Kazakos 1987 emphasis added). The Greek government however rejected this general clause and instead insisted that Greece’s national security concerns should be explicitly mentioned. Finally Greece got its way, but the insistence on an issue, which appeared of minor importance to other member states, exacerbated the perception of intransigence.

Conclusion

This paper started with the assertion that despite a recent surge in the study of foreign policy Europeanization, the field remain largely undertheorized. I have tried to fill this gap by providing a theoretically informed account on the impact of EU membership on Greek foreign policy. The four pathways proposed can account most aspects of Europeanization encountered in the academic literature while the use of the distinction between regulative and constitutive effects enables dialogue with wider bodies of work. The empirical analysis also allows advancing a number of analytic generalizations regarding the exact processes and conditions of Europeanization, which of course need to be subjected to further research in a larger number of cases.

My empirical findings support the hypothesis that policy adaptation is more likely in areas where the EU has extensive competence, there is widespread agreement on the policy to be pursued and no core national interests are at stake. Still, the article has demonstrated that the Europeanization is not necessarily a linear process. Institutional provisions might be manipulated in various ways and attempts to isolate a member state may backfire (as in the case of Macedonia). Moreover whereas policy change on salient issues may take longer to materialize, it is by no means impossible; much to the contrary it may sometimes be impressive (as the case of Greek position towards Turkey’s European perspective demonstrate). All this suggest that there is a lot to be gained from getting a closer look on how domestic and international actors use the EU as a resource and symbol in the pursuit of their goals.

I have also shown how policy adaptation in the case of the name dispute with the Republic of Macedonia was hampered by the existence of a weak executive leadership.
However, the nature of policy-making in Greece (strong one party government, prevalence of personalities) does not permit an authoritative argument about the link between the executive leadership autonomy and Europeanization. This would require a comparative analysis of countries that have different constitutional designs (semi-presidential/parliamentary), government systems (one-party/coalition), electoral systems and bureaucratic cultures (centralized/decentralized). It is one of the areas were more research is needed.

The paper has provided ample evidence of the EU becoming a reference point in domestic foreign policy debates, either through the invocation of specific policy philosophies and norms or through the broader impact of membership on Greek national identity. As expected this pathway took relatively long to materialize, but the effects it has produced seem to be more pervasive (although by no means irreversible). I have also hinted at the role of change agents in the process of policy formulation and legitimization. An assessment of the concrete impact of these actors would of course require a detailed process tracing, which would go beyond the scope of the paper.

With respect to the procedural dimension I have shown that EU membership has unleashed both centripetal and centrifugal forces as far as competence allocation is concerned and that new arrangements have been incorporated in existing structures without provoking a wholesale transformation. This is congruent with other similar studies. I have also found evidence that the coordination imperative has made its way in Greek foreign policy-making within the EU. At the same time I have demonstrated that this should not necessarily be seen as leading to realignment of national policies towards the EU. On the contrary, it may offer new opportunities to influence EU policies. This seems to confirm the broader scepticism in much of the socialization literature regarding the prospect of internalization and the concomitant focus on strategic socialization (Checkel 2005).
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